by Artemy Sharapov
[REGNUM] The flags flying over the Syrian embassies in Istanbul, Stockholm, Yerevan, and Moscow are being changed — a visible symbol of the fact that “power has changed.” The flag of the armed opposition that took control of the country was already the state flag — until 1958.
In a sense, time has turned back in Syria to the times before the rise to power of the secular Arab socialists, from whose ranks emerged the Assad “dynasty” that ruled the country from 1970 to 2024.
In order to understand the rapidly unfolding events now (after all, after 13 long years of civil war, the situation has changed dramatically in just 12 days), it is necessary to at least briefly glance at the recent history of Syria.
FOUR IN ONE
The word "Syria" ("Suriyya" in Arabic) is ancient, but the state with this name is only 78 years old. Until the end of World War I, this part of the Levant, that is, the Eastern Mediterranean, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Turks drew the borders of the provinces (vilayets) based on the convenience of governance, without regard for the diversity of ethnic groups and religions. Present-day Syria, Lebanon and the southern part of Turkey proper were divided between the vilayets of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Deir ez-Zor.
When the Entente defeated Germany and its allies (including the Ottoman Empire) in 1918, the victorious powers divided up the Turkish Sultan's possessions. France — formally, under a League of Nations mandate — got the territories of modern Syria, Lebanon, and the Turkish province of Hatay. All of this was called Greater Syria.
Syrian centenarians – there are almost a quarter of a million of them in the country – can remember the times when the French assembled the country and drew its borders as they saw fit. Initially, the Mandatory authorities divided their possessions into six “states” along ethnic lines.
Thus, in the north, the state of Aleppo was allocated to the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Turks and their relatives, the Turkomans. On the Mediterranean coast (in the present-day province of Latakia, where the Russian Khmeimim base and the Tartus base are now located) there was the Alawite state. It was intended for the compactly living Alawite religious community, whose religion is so different from orthodox Islam that many Sunnis and Shiites do not consider them to be true believers, as well as for Shiites and Christians.
Another unorthodox community, the Druze, living in southern Syria, was given the state of Jabal Druze. The Sunnis and Shiites of the southwest were given the state of Damascus. Finally, Greater Syria included what is now Lebanon.
But in 1926, the French separated Lebanon (which was distinguished by its high ethno-religious diversity, even by Middle Eastern standards) into a separate mandated territory. The Hatay region, after long interethnic clashes and complaints to the League of Nations, was given to the Turks (Syria, however, did not recognize Turkey's sovereignty over this territory until 2005).
And from the remaining lands, the French authorities, for the sake of convenience of governance, cobbled together a country that had never existed before. In one territory there were Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Alawites, Ismailis, Christian Arabs, Armenians, Druze, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians.
There is nothing special about this, however: the British authorities created the never-existent state of Iraq on the same principle. When leaving, the Europeans sought to ensure that their former colonies would always have ethnic and confessional tensions that would periodically “explode” into wars. And, it must be admitted, they succeeded.
ONE COUNTRY, TWO STARS, MANY REVOLUTIONS
Since gaining independence in 1947, Syria (like Iraq) has experienced a series of military coups, uprisings and has intervened in several wars with Israel.
The optimal way to keep ethnic groups, confessions, clans and influence groups in line (and to keep the interests of these warring groups in balance) was an army dictatorship. However, this type of government was traditionally unstable for the Middle East. Between 1946 and 1956, the country saw 20 governments and 4 constitutions.
In 1958–1961, the country lost its independence, becoming part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) for a time, the brainchild of the ambitious Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. At that time, instead of the previous green-white-black flag, Syria adopted the black-white-red pan-Arab flag of the UAR with two green stars (the two stars originally symbolized the two "union republics", Egypt and Syria). In 1961, another coup took place in Syria, this time against Nasser. The country left the UAR, but the flag remained.
In 1963, the military changed power again. Now the country is "ruled" by the regional branch of the Baath Party - the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (in the same year, Baath comes to power in Iraq). The word "Arab" was added to the name "Syrian Republic", which is unlikely to be to the taste of non-Arab ethnic groups, primarily the Kurds inhabiting the northeast of the country.
Three years later, in 1970, another coup takes place, this time within the Baathist leadership, and the leader of the country is the former commander of the Air Force, a native of the influential Alawite clan, Hafez al-Assad.
LIONS ON THE THRONE
The father and grandfather of the presidents of Syria, Ali Suleiman, the leader of a mountain clan in Latakia, changed his former nickname al-Wahsh (the savage) to a more harmonious one and one corresponding to his social status back in the 1920s: al-Assad (the lion).
Hafez al-Assad, who held the presidency from 1971 until his death in 2000, was called "the Sacred One" ("al-Muqaddas") and "the Immortal Leader." His son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, was titled a little more modestly upon ascending to the "throne" - "the Hope of the People."
It is hardly possible to reproach the Assads for a cult of personality: this was typical of Middle Eastern secular regimes - Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Egypt from Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, the Libyan Jamahiriya of Muammar Gaddafi, etc.
There is an opinion that the years of the Assad family in power were a dictatorship of the Alawite religious community, to which Hafez and his son Bashar belonged. According to a slightly more complex version, the Assads relied on a coalition of ethno-religious minorities: Alawites, Shiites, Druze, Christians, etc.
In fact, a regime was created in the country that was in many ways similar to Saddam's government: a group of authoritative military men in power, united by common interests with a division of spheres of influence.
ON THE BRINK OF SPRING
And it was this system that largely allowed the Syrian government to successfully repel the first onslaught of Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood* uprising of 1976–1982. The storming of the city of Hama, which was commanded by the president’s younger brother Rifaat al-Assad, was considered a model for restoring order (it was this battle that pacified the radical jihadists for a long time).
Syria's loss of the Yom Kippur War with Israel did not shake the regime's position. Especially since the Assads waged a successful proxy war with the same Israel in Lebanon.
Compared to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which essentially fell victim to its own foreign policy adventures, the Assad “dynasty” demonstrated stability. But Soviet specialists who worked in the country in the 1970s and 1980s recalled that the situation was consistently unsettled. Explosions and shootouts “somewhere on the outskirts” were commonplace, and even family members of civilian specialists were trained in case of a terrorist attack.
The stability gained at such a high price allowed the country's economy to develop until the crisis caused by the US invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2001 erupted. The constant influx of refugees and the growth of radical sentiments in the region could not help but affect Syria.
At the same time, discontent grew among a part of Syrian society and the army, who had been removed from key positions. The political opposition demanded democratic reforms (essentially, a redistribution of power and property), while the Islamists demanded the introduction of Sharia law.
Therefore, the wave of unrest throughout the Arab world (the so-called Arab Spring) and the fall of governments in Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011–2012 and the outbreak of war in Libya could not but lead to similar events in Syria.
BEGINNING OF HALF-LIFE
In 2011, protests began across the country, quickly escalating into fighting. Some of the armed forces broke away from government control, forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They were joined by local Islamist militias known as the Islamic Front and a number of other groups.
The country, first assembled by the French and then by the Damascus military regimes, began to fall apart at the seams. A number of regions in the north, near the border with Turkey (where the Turkmen tribes live), and in the south, in the regions adjacent to Jordan and Israel, where the Druze live, have left the government's control.
At the same time, in the northwest, in areas of ethnic Kurdish residence, a local administration and armed structures were created that were equally hostile to the government in Damascus and the opposition.
By the beginning of 2012, the revolution and “democratization” were forgotten – a full-scale civil war broke out in the country.
WAR OF THE ENCLAVES
Unlike traditional wars, where the sides are divided by a front line and strive to break through it, the map of the war in Syria quickly took shape into a bizarre mosaic of several colors.
After the authorities managed to suppress the opposition and Islamists in most major cities, they were pushed out to the outskirts, where they strengthened their positions. For example, in Aleppo, the armed opposition retained part of the central districts of the city and the northwestern outskirts, in Homs – the northern districts of the city and the suburb of al-Rastan, in the vicinity of Damascus – entire oases of dozens of settlements, closely adjacent to the city quarters. In one of these enclaves – Eastern Ghouta, there were up to ten thousand armed people.
On the other hand, the successful opposition offensive led to the capture of large territories in the provinces of Raqqa, Idlib and Hama. But even here there remained enclaves that remained loyal to the government. First of all, areas inhabited by religious minorities.
For example, the cities of Fua and Kafariya in Idlib province; Nubl and Zahraa in Aleppo province have been fighting in complete encirclement for several years. The reason is simple: Shiites live here, “heretics” from the point of view of the militants who consider themselves devout Sunnis.
The history of the city of Deir ez-Zor stands apart, its garrison, together with local militia units, was able to withstand several years of siege and wait for help to arrive. Several airbases also remained completely surrounded, the garrison of which did not surrender and continued to resist. The Tabqa, Abu Duhur and Menang airfields were eventually taken by storm, and their garrison was killed.
However, the garrison of the Kweires air base, consisting mainly of cadet pilots, was able to repel attacks for several years and eventually received outside help. Such tenacity and sometimes, without exaggeration, heroism seem even more incredible against the backdrop of the events of 2024, when the army simply refused to participate in military operations.
In other words, military operations were conducted on dozens of fronts at once, and the decisive role was often played not by regular armed formations, but by local forces.
DIVERSITY VS. GENOCIDE
The semi-collapse of the Syrian state after 2011 went hand in hand with the internationalization of the conflict. Since 2013, Al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIS, later the Islamic State*) have been actively involved in the war.
The Wahhabi IS*, which by definition does not recognize existing state borders, included part of the territory of Syria with the cities of Idlib and Raqqa into its “caliphate,” which continued further to the east, capturing part of Iraq.
It is noteworthy that even in a state of simultaneous war on ten fronts throughout the country, the Damascus government of Bashar al-Assad has not lost control of the situation.
Over the course of several years of military action, the troops managed to fully or partially hold all major settlements. This was partly possible due to the actions of the armed opposition itself, in whose leadership former politicians and military personnel were often replaced by radicals. Those groups that swore allegiance to the terrorist international directly stated that they were bringing death to representatives of other religious communities: Christians, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and Ismailis. For example, in March 2014, Islamist units stormed the Armenian city of Kessab, carrying out ethnic cleansing in it.
And in this case, the thesis about the “coalition of minorities” opposing the Islamists and situationally supporting Bashar al-Assad is correct.
Thus, a pro-government Druze militia was formed in the province of Suwayda, a Christian militia in the city of Maharda in the province of Hama (later one of the most combat-ready formations of the government forces), and an Ismaili militia from Salamiyah and Masyaf. These formations were created primarily for the survival of their communities. They waged war on the side of the Assad government as long as they considered this government capable of protecting the interests of communities and ethnic groups.
Also on the government's side were representatives of local businesses and/or criminals, who simply did not want to give up their positions to new people and created militia units with their own money. The most famous example of such formations is the "Desert Falcons", financed by the Jaber clan from the Latakia province.
One should also not forget about the loyalty of some army commanders who refused to go over to the opposition for one reason or another. Among them are the commander of the defense of the encircled Deir ez-Zor, General Issam Zahreddine, and the hero of the defense of Aleppo, Suheil Hassan. Therefore, Bashar al-Assad managed to avoid the fate of Gaddafi and retain power, albeit having lost control over part of the country's territories.
But this could not go on forever.
START FROM SCRATCH
With access to almost inexhaustible human, financial and military resources from abroad, the Islamists have organized a series of successful military operations.
Government forces, on the contrary, began to gradually “run out of steam” and give up their positions by the mid-2010s. In the circumstances, the Syrian government turned to foreign military assistance.
Russia's involvement in ending the Syrian conflict since 2015, including support for the government army and other anti-ISIS forces "on the ground" and in the air, has radically changed the course of the long-standing war. Russia's peacekeeping efforts require a separate description. For now, several important points should be noted
The Russian leadership has always supported the Assad government in its fight against terrorism, while emphasizing that intra-Syrian reconciliation, the restoration of the balance of interests of the various communities, faiths and ethnic groups living here is the business of the Syrian people themselves. As President Vladimir Putin noted back in 2015, “we are not going to be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves.”
Moscow has always advocated for the normalization of dialogue between Syria’s political and religious forces and organizations, speaking about the need to conduct the most fruitful negotiations under the auspices of the UN.
Now that the government has collapsed, the danger of the conflict becoming "Somalizatsi" is growing, with a complete collapse of statehood and intercommunal wars. Therefore, now more than ever, dialogue is needed between the constituent parts of Syria, from the Kurds to the Druze and from the Alawites to the Sunnis.
[LawEnforcementToday] Federal prosecutors with the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced charges against an Afghan national living in Oklahoma City for conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack on behalf of ISIS.
[Dawn] A Pak physician was sentenced on Friday to 18 years in prison for attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the
...the twenty first century equivalent of bubonic plague, only instead of killing off a third of the population of Europe it kills 3.4 percent of those who notice they have it. It seems to be fond of the elderly, especially Iranian politicians and holy men...
...Arabic for 
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling 
...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire...
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
[Daily Mail, where America gets its news]