Hello !
| Terror Networks & Islam |
| Keeping Score Against al Qaeda |
| 2005-02-08 |
| February 8, 2005: How can you tell if al Qaeda is winning, or losing, the war on terror? How do you even tell who the major players are in al-Qaeda? Like baseball, one's best bet is to use a scorecard. The scorecard for al-Qaeda ("The Base") is pretty complex. Al-Qaeda was originally built like a large corporation. It has a board of directors of 24, with Osama bin Laden as the CEO (official title is Emir-General). Bin Laden also has 15 people in what could be described as his "inner circle" of aides. Al-Qaeda also had training camps in six countries in September, 2001 (Afghanistan, Indonesia, Chechnya, Albania, Sudan, and the Philippines), with eight commanders. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells in numerous Arabian and European countries. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States and allies have been hunting down the leadership of al-Qaeda. Among the big fish (the "Board of Directors"), seven are dead and ten are in custody. Four members of the "inner circle" are also in custody. This is 53 percent of the senior leadership for al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden is still at large, along with Ayman al-Zawahiri (the deputy commander of al-Qaeda) and Abu Mohammed al-Masri (the planner of the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). However, five out of the eight training camp commanders are dead or in custody. Other statistics of note: Eighteen al-Qaeda financiers are dead or in custody. Among those still at large, though, are two of bin Laden's sisters, two of his brothers-in-law, and a Swiss banker by the name of Ahmed Huber. Huber also has extensive connections with neo-Nazis in Europe. The real financial resource for al-Qaeda remains untouched the dozen or so Saudis who are called the "Golden Chain." All are at large, and all can still provide enough resources for bin Laden to regroup and strike again. Al-Qaeda's military committee has also been decimated. One is dead (killed by a CIA Predator firing Hellfire missiles), fourteen, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Yousef, have been captured. These include the commanders in Singapore, Java, Southern Europe, and Japan. Several are at large, including the operations chiefs in Kosovo, Tunisia, and Somalia. Subordinate networks in several countries have been rounded up or decimated. In Jordan, five out of the six major al-Qaeda figures are in custody; in Syria, only five major terrorist figures are still at large dozens of al-Qaeda members are currently incarcerated, but three major Hezbollah figures are still on the loose. Syria, however, remains a sponsor of Hezbollah. Egypt has rounded up all of the major al-Qaeda figures, as have Italy, Belgium, Germany. The United Kingdom, Spain, and France have rounded up many al-Qaeda figures as well. Many of the major al-Qaeda figures in Saudi Arabia are dead or apprehended, but a number of figures involved in the Khobar Towers bombing are still at large some with connections to Hizbollah. In Turkey, 75 percent of the big fish connected with al-Qaeda are dead or in custody. Most of the support structure for the 9/11attack, including Mukhabarat agent Ahmad Khalil Ibraham al-Ani (who the Czechs insist met hijacker Mohammed Atta in Prague), are in custody. But in some places, the network is pretty intact. Many major Taliban figures are still on the loose. So are all three members of al-Qaeda's WMD Committee, and all of those involved in a Bolivian hijacking plot. Short version, al-Qaeda is on the run throughout most of the globe. Even Abu Musab Zarqawi, in charge of all al-Qaeda elements in Iraq, is on the run as elements of his infrastructure are taken apart. Eight of Zarqawi's top aides are dead. Twenty others have been captured. Zarqawi was unable to disrupt the elections on January 30, a serious loss for the terrorists. Al-Qaeda is still potent, as the attacks in Madrid proved, but they are clearly reacting to the multi-pronged offensive in the United States. |
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| Al-Qaeda funding down but not out |
| 2004-08-24 |
| Financial support for Al Qaeda and the size of its operating budget have plummeted in the three years since the Sept. 11 attacks, but the network "continues to fund terrorist operations with relative ease," according to new findings released Saturday by the commission that investigated the strikes. The report from the panel also says that the Saudi government provided lackluster cooperation to stanch the flow of money to Al Qaeda for two years after the attacks, but began to respond more aggressively after several Al Qaeda strikes in the kingdom last year. I'll retain my skepticism on this one. The members of the Golden Chain still haven't been jugged, after all ... Al Qaeda's annual budget appears to have shrunk from about $30 million a year before the Sept. 11 attacks to as little as a few million dollars a year now, the commission reported. Funding for the terrorist network has shriveled during that period, partly because of the more aggressive stance by Saudi Arabia in combating Al Qaeda financial support, the report said. But the financial falloff has not caused a commensurate decline in Al Qaeda's capabilities because the attacks it sponsors are relatively inexpensive. It has shed high-cost obligations, including its support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the network can still find ready funding from its most solid supporters, the report said. The findings were released in an exhaustive study of Al Qaeda's financing that was completed by the Sept. 11 commission's investigative staff. The material served as a basis for several sections in the commission's final report, released last month, that dealt with terrorist financing. But the study released Saturday was more lengthy and detailed than those sections of the final report. |
| Link |
| Arabia | |
| 9/11 report good but incomplete | |
| 2004-07-28 | |
In establishing how the government failed to prevent the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the 9/11 Commission Report is excellent. Its grasp of some details, however, is less than reassuring - particularly details about Saudi Arabia, which it calls, in a gross understatement, "a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism." Perhaps even more startling is the report's conclusion that the panel has "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually" helped to finance Al Qaeda.
| |
| Link |
| Great White North |
| Canadian ranch owner linked to bin Laden |
| 2004-02-07 |
| A Saudi sheik who owns one of the largest ranches in British Columbia has been named in a lawsuit by people who lost relatives in the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. The class-action lawsuit, filed in the United States, lists a number of people suspected of being part of the "Golden Chain," a group of wealthy patrons who donated millions of dollars to Osama bin Laden starting in 1988. Ibrahim Mohammed Afandiâs name is on that list. He has owned the Gang Ranch near Clinton, B.C., for the past 16 years. Conservative foreign affairs critic Stockwell Day says he wants the government to find out if the ranch owner is linked to international terrorism. "There have been some suggested links and we would like to find out so that the gentlemanâs name either can be cleared or it can be found out if there is the possibility of some association with al-Qaeda," Day said. If he is found to have funded terrorism, Day said the Gang Ranch could be seized under new anti-terrorism legislation. Afandi has not been charged with any crime in Canada or the United States. The manager of the huge ranch, Larry Ramstad, said heâs known Afandi for years, but hasnât seen him for about a year and a half. Heâs probably fled back to the Magic Kingdom, where itâs never against the law to fund terrorists as long as Prince Nayef runs the Interior Ministry. |
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| Al-Qaeda got the cash |
| 2003-12-14 |
| Informative and mildly edited ... Governments around the world are not enforcing global sanctions designed to stem the flow of money to al Qaeda and impede the business activity of the organizationâs financiers, allowing the terrorist network to retain formidable financial resources, according to U.S., European and U.N. investigators. Several businessmen designated by the United Nations as terrorist financiers, whose assets were supposed to have been frozen more than two years ago, continue to run vast business empires and to travel freely because most nations are unaware of the sanctions and others do not enforce them, the investigators said. Several charities based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that were reportedly shut down by the governments there because of the groupsâ alleged financial ties to Osama bin Laden also continue to operate freely, they said. Thoseâd be members of the Golden Chain, the top 20 financiers who keep the cash flowing to the krazed killers. Consider it the financial arm of the Learned Elders of Islam. As a result, al Qaeda continues to receive ample funding not only to carry out its own plots but also to finance affiliated terrorist groups and to seek new weapons, the investigators and terrorism experts said. A report released this month by a U.N. panel of experts documented the continued flow of money -- including drug money -- to terrorist organizations and warned that al Qaeda "has already taken the decision to use chemical and biological weapons in their forthcoming attacks. The only constraint they are facing is the technical complexity to operate them properly and effectively" -- rather than a lack of means to acquire them. For all we know, they may have most of Sammyâs still-missing arsenal tucked away somewhere - waiting for the right time to use it ... "We desperately need to revitalize our effort to choke off terrorist financing, because until we cut that off, we have not crippled al Qaedaâs ability to attack us," said one senior U.S. official who monitors terrorist finances. "We started out well, picked all the low-hanging fruit, and then, as we have squeezed, they have simply moved on to different methods." A separate report released last week by the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, noted that U.S. law enforcement still has no clear idea of how terrorists move their money and that the FBI, which is the lead agency in tracking terrorist assets, still does not "systematically collect or analyze" such information. It concluded that the Justice and Treasury departments have fallen more than a year behind in developing plans to attack terrorist financial mechanisms, such as the use of diamonds and gold to hide assets. Liberia and Burkina Faso both helped out al-Qaeda in regards to obtaining both of the latter quantities. Under the sanctions policy adopted by the United Nations immediately after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, individuals designated by the world body as terrorists or terrorist supporters were to have their assets frozen and be banned from international travel. So far, the world body has publicly named 272 people as sponsors of terrorism. But U.N. and U.S. officials said they do not know where more than a handful of those people are, and only 83 of 191countries have submitted the required U.N. reports on attacking terrorist financing and implementing the travel ban. Only a third of those have given the list to their border guards. More UN incompetence ... The investigators said some developing nations lack the resources to comply with the sanctions, while some wealthier countries do not know of the sanctions or are hampered by bureaucratic inertia. Yeah ... right. U.S. officials said that about $138 million in terrorist assets have been frozen since the attacks, and that some steps have been taken to clamp down on charities and other known terrorist funding mechanisms. Officials noted the closure of three large Islamic charities in the United States and an ongoing investigation of a group of charities and organizations in Northern Virginia. Thatâd be the Safa Group weâve all heard so much about lately ... But the officials acknowledged that al Qaeda, now more decentralized, needs less money to operate than it did when bin Laden was supporting training camps and propping up the Taliban government in Afghanistan. There are still camps running though (Russians reportedly shut down one at Serzhen-Yurt a little while ago), just less of them and in cases like the Philippines the affiliate groups seem to be picking up the tab. The U.N. report said $75 million of the $138 million in frozen assets claimed by the United States belonged to al Qaeda or the Taliban. The Taliban money, which was a "substantial" portion, has been turned over to the new Afghan government. Illustrating the ineffectiveness of the sanctions regime, U.S. and U.N. officials said, are the joint business empires of Yousef Nada and Idris Nasreddin, which sprawl across Europe and Africa and are worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Nada, an Egyptian national who lives in Switzerland, was designated a terrorist financier by the United Nations on Nov. 9, 2001, and was publicly accused by U.S. and U.N. officials of providing direct aid to al Qaeda. Nasreddin, an Eritrean who lives in Italy, was designated a terrorist supporter on April 24, 2002. At that time, the assets of more than a dozen of their joint enterprises were supposed to have been frozen, and a travel ban was imposed on the pair. Both men have strongly denied any involvement in terrorist activities. Lies, all lies! But U.S. officials and the U.N. report said that many of the pairâs businesses, including a luxury hotel in Milan, continue to operate and that both men violate the travel ban with impunity. The U.N. panel found that on Jan. 28, Nada traveled from his home in Campione dâItalia, in Switzerland, to Vaduz, Liechtenstein, to change the names of two of the companies that were targets of the asset freeze. Looks like theyâre taking a page out of the Pakistani playbook ... Despite his designated status, he traveled under his own name and even applied for and received a new passport shortly before leaving. In Liechtenstein, Nada sought to liquidate both renamed companies and listed himself as the liquidator, a move that would have allowed him to pocket the proceeds. When U.N. officials discovered the move and protested, the liquidation was halted. U.S. and U.N. officials said the lack of enforcement is especially acute in Europe and Saudi Arabia, and they expressed dismay that, 27 months after the terrorist attacks, many countries have done little to install a legal framework that would make the sanctions effective. Most lacking in Europe are laws that would allow the seizure or shutdown of shell companies, businesses and properties -- not just bank accounts -- if there is evidence linking them to terrorism. Legal issues, including how to confiscate properties when one owner is a designated terrorist sponsor but others are not, present another obstacle, officials said. "The question is, how do you go after real properties and not just bank accounts," said Juan C. Zarate, the Treasury Departmentâs deputy assistant secretary for terrorist finance. "These are men of resources, men of high finance who know how to reformulate their businesses and how to move money." Several branches of the al Haramain Charitable Foundation, a Saudi Arabia-based organization that in the past raised as much as $30 million a year, remain active, they said. Several offices of the organization were directly implicated in the financing of al Qaeda, and in May the Saudi government announced that the charity had been required to suspend all activities outside Saudi Arabia. "Al Haramain is still active in a number of countries and has just opened a new Islamic school in Jakarta, Indonesia," the U.N. report said. The al Haramain office in Saudi Arabia did not respond to telephone calls, but in the past its leaders denied any links to terrorism. U.S. officials said that shutting down al Haramain and ensuring that other suspected terrorist financiers are put out of business by Saudi Arabia is at the top of the two nationsâ agenda. Similarly, the U.N. report noted that the al Rashid Trust, a designated Pakistani charity, "continues its operation in Pakistan under various names and partnerships . . . it has continued to be active in funding al Qaeda related activities as well as other social and humanitarian projects." The investigators also expressed concern about the alleged activities of Wael Julaidan, a businessman who helped found al Qaeda and who was designated by the U.N. on Sept. 6, 2002, as a terrorist financier. Until last year, Julaidan was the Saudi chairman of the Rabita Trust, a Pakistani charity also found by the United Nations to have funded al Qaeda activities. U.N. and U.S. officials said Julaidan continues to work in charities and to handle large sums of money. A source with direct knowledge of U.S. actions said the "highest priority of the U.S. government is to get the Saudis to do what they said [they] would do and close down what they were supposed to close down." The source noted that, after agreeing to put him on the U.N. list, senior Saudi officials publicly denounced Julaidanâs designation. "Then the Saudis said he was questioned but wouldnât tell us what he said," the source said. "They said his assets are frozen, but wonât say where. Itâs like Humphrey Bogart in âCasablanca.â They round him up when the pressure builds and are shocked to find anything going on." A senior Saudi official disputed the U.S. and U.N. accounts of the ongoing activities of al Haramain and Julaidan. "Julaidan is not operating," the official said. "His assets are frozen. Al Haramain cannot spend a penny outside Saudi Arabia. We are doing what we can." He added: "If they think al Haramain is doing something in Indonesia, then it is up to the government of Indonesia to take action, not Saudi Arabia." Here again we can see one of the big failures of the Saudi crackdown that I noted over at Winds of Change awhile back - the failure or unwillingness to eliminate the moneymen for al-Qaeda. As long as they do that, the gunnies are going to keep coming. |
| Link |
| Europe | |||
| Swiss raid Binnyâs broâs firms too | |||
| 2003-12-05 | |||
| Looks like somebody is finally acting on that info on the Golden Chain recovered in Bosnia over a year ago that said that, contra to media reports, that the Bin Laden Group was shilling out cash for everybodyâs favorite Dr. Fu Manchu. Swiss police have raided eight firms with links to Yeslam Binladin, the half-brother of Osama Bin Laden, as part of a money laundering probe. Binladinâs Geneva
| |||
| Link |
| Iraq | ||||||||||
| About that smoking gun ... | ||||||||||
| 2003-11-15 | ||||||||||
| This is a complete transcript of the Weekly Standard article that details US intelligence on the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection. OSAMA BIN LADEN and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks, al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by THE WEEKLY STANDARD. And there goes the "hyped intelligence" charge in regards to the Iraq/al-Qaeda connection. A lot of this stuff also comes from the early to late 1990s, long before Bush even thought of running for president. The memo, dated October 27, 2003, was sent from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. It was written in response to a request from the committee as part of its investigation into prewar intelligence claims made by the administration. Intelligence reporting included in the 16-page memo comes from a variety of domestic and foreign agencies, including the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Much of the evidence is detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources. Some of it is new information obtained in custodial interviews with high-level al Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials, and some of it is more than a decade old. The picture that emerges is one of a history of collaboration between two of Americaâs most determined and dangerous enemies. Which would seem to annihilate the belief that secular and religious terrorist groups are incapable of collaboration. Why, itâs as outrageous as a right-wing American Republican president being in league with a left-wing British Labour prime minister! Their ideologies are completely incompatible. According to the memoâwhich lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered pointsâIraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq War began. Most of the numbered passages contain straight, fact-based intelligence reporting, which in some cases includes an evaluation of the credibility of the source. This reporting is often followed by commentary and analysis. Mmm! Yummy! The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to reporting in the memo, bin Laden sent "emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to meet with Iraqi government officials." At some unspecified point in 1991, according to a CIA analysis, "Iraq sought Sudanâs assistance to establish links to al Qaeda." The outreach went in both directions. According to 1993 CIA reporting cited in the memo, "bin Laden wanted to expand his organizationâs capabilities through ties with Iraq." That would make General Bashir and Turabi the main drivers behind al-Qaeda hooking up with Iraq as well as Iran. Yet another reason to keep Sudan on the terrorist list.
Do "proscribed weapons" include nerve gas? We saw Abu Khabab and Co testing it out on dogs at Darunta camp. The UN bright boys say that itâs only a matter of time till al-Qaeda carries out a chem/bio attack and that may well be what El Shukrijumah and his boss Jdey were sent over to the States for. Interesting that we first started looking for them about the same time that Sammyâs 48 deadline expired, donât ya think? One such confirmation came in a postwar interview with one of Saddam Husseinâs henchmen. As the memo details: 4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meetingâthe first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were . Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes.Yet another benefit of having nearly collected the entire deck of cards. Hijazi is now in custody and the only Mukhabarat bad boy still at large is Habbush, IIRC. A decisive moment in the budding relationship came in 1993, when bin Laden faced internal resistance to his cooperation with Saddam. 5. A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the "Islamic Army" of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam. Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam that the Islamic Army would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an "understanding" with Saddam under which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against the Iraqi leader.The Islamic Army was an early name for al-Qaeda, though Binny didnât care much for it and so he stuck with the latter. The mention of differences over whether or not to align with Iraq among the al-Qaeda brass is interesting and could explain why both Zubaydah and Khalid said it never happened to begin with. May be yet another sign of the groupâs decentralization that not all the leaders were aware of the full extent of the groupâs allies. Or they could just be lying and in need of more giggle juice. Another facilitator of the relationship during the mid-1990s was Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi). Abu Hajer, now in a New York prison, was described in court proceedings related to the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as bin Ladenâs "best friend." According to CIA reporting dating back to the Clinton administration, bin Laden trusted him to serve as a liaison with Saddamâs regime and tasked him with procurement of weapons of mass destruction for al Qaeda. FBI reporting in the memo reveals that Abu Hajer "visited Iraq in early 1995" and "had a good relationship with Iraqi intelligence. Sometime before mid-1995 he went on an al Qaeda mission to discuss unspecified cooperation with the Iraqi government." Salim got jugged after the Embassy bombings and stabbed a guard in the eye with a knife he made out of a comb. He was reportedly head of al-Qaedaâs WMD division, though I imagine that Abu Khabab has taken on that role these days. Makes sense that he would try to get technical help from the people with the most experience in that field. Some of the reporting about the relationship throughout the mid-1990s comes from a source who had intimate knowledge of bin Laden and his dealings. This source, according to CIA analysis, offered "the most credible information" on cooperation between bin Laden and Iraq. This sourceâs reports read almost like a diary. Specific dates of when bin Laden flew to various cities are included, as well as names of individuals he met. The source did not offer information on the substantive talks during the meetings. . . . There are not a great many reports in general on the relationship between bin Laden and Iraq because of the secrecy surrounding it. But when this source with close access provided a "window" into bin Ladenâs activities, bin Laden is seen as heavily involved with Iraq (and Iran). Ties with the Black Hats isnât going to be surprising anybody, given that Binny himself may well be hanging out at an IRGC military base with Junior these days if heâs still alive. Be interesting to know where else he was racking up frequent flyer miles, though. Reporting from the early 1990s remains somewhat sketchy, though multiple sources place Hassan al-Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri, bin Ladenâs current No. 2, at the center of the relationship. The reporting gets much more specific in the mid-1990s: 8. Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was receiving training on bomb making from the IISâs [Iraqi Intelligence Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at bin Ladenâs farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July 1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti.That "farm" was also al-Qaeda HQ as long as the group was based in Sudan. 9 . . . Bin Laden visited Doha, Qatar (17-19 Jan. 1996), staying at the residence of a member of the Qatari ruling family. He discussed the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in Dammam, Dharan, and Khobar, using clandestine al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. Upon his return, bin Laden met with Hijazi and Turabi, among others.Iâm guessing that the Qatari royal in question is our good buddy Abdul Karim al-Thani, who also hosted Zarqawi and Khalid on occasion and poured millions into al-Qaedaâs coffers. My guess would be that heâs another link in the Golden Chain. And later more reporting, from the same "well placed" source: 10. The Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti, met privately with bin Laden at his farm in Sudan in July 1996. Tikriti used an Iraqi delegation traveling to Khartoum to discuss bilateral cooperation as his "cover" for his own entry into Sudan to meet with bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi. The Iraqi intelligence chief and two other IIS officers met at bin Ladenâs farm and discussed bin Ladenâs request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c) making false passport [sic]. Bin Laden specifically requested that [Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed], Iraqi intelligenceâs premier explosives makerâespecially skilled in making car bombsâremain with him in Sudan. The Iraqi intelligence chief instructed Salim to remain in Sudan with bin Laden as long as required.Ali Mohammed said court testimony at the Embassy bombing trials that Binny decided to outsource explosives expertise after the first WTC bombing and that Turabi hooked him up with the Black Hats, Mugniyeh, and Hezbollah. From the looks of things, he didnât stop there. The analysis of those events follows: The time of the visit from the IIS director was a few weeks after the Khobar Towers bombing. The bombing came on the third anniversary of a U.S. [Tomahawk missile] strike on IIS HQ (retaliation for the attempted assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait) for which Iraqi officials explicitly threatened retaliation.And they did a little outsourcing of their own to do it. That also means that the Saudi cover story was bunk, whoâd of thought it? IN ADDITION TO THE CONTACTS CLUSTERED in the mid-1990s, intelligence reports detail a flurry of activities in early 1998 and again in December 1998. A "former senior Iraqi intelligence officer" reported that "the Iraqi intelligence service station in Pakistan was Baghdadâs point of contact with al Qaeda. He also said bin Laden visited Baghdad in Jan. 1998 and met with Tariq Aziz." That fits with documents recovered by various newspapers from the old Mukhabarat HQ, including the UK Telegraph.
11. According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in Afghanistan in 1999. . . .Iâm guessing that this Jund al-Shams or whatever the prototype for Ansar al-Islam was called. Another possibility would be that itâs Komala Islamiyyah, which hosted one of Ansarâs chemical weapons factories at Khurmal before the war and got hit with US cruise missiles on the first night of the bombing. Abdul Aziz sounds like a Saudi name, though Iâm curious as to whether or not he was "Ghost," the name of the top terrorist trainer referenced by the two Iraqi defectors from Salman Pak in October 2001. That visit came as the Iraqis intensified their defiance of the U.N. inspection regime, known as UNSCOM, created by the cease-fire agreement following the Gulf War. UNSCOM demanded access to Saddamâs presidential palaces that he refused to provide. As the tensions mounted, President Bill Clinton went to the Pentagon on February 18, 1998, and prepared the nation for war. He warned of "an unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals" and said "there is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam Hussein." And loathe as I am to admit it, he had a good point. The day after this speech, according to documents unearthed in April 2003 in the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters by journalists Mitch Potter and Inigo Gilmore, Husseinâs intelligence service wrote a memo detailing coming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to Baghdad. Each reference to bin Laden had been covered by liquid paper that, when revealed, exposed a plan to increase cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda. According to that memo, the IIS agreed to pay for "all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message from us to bin Laden." The document set as the goal for the meeting a discussion of "the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and to achieve a direct meeting with him." The al Qaeda representative, the document went on to suggest, might provide "a way to maintain contacts with bin Laden." Yep, it looks like Sammy wanted to be able to outsource al-Qaeda to hit back at the US without him actually having to do so, which fit with Binnyâs goals just perfectly. Four days later, on February 23, 1998, bin Laden issued his now-famous fatwa on the plight of Iraq, published in the Arabic-language daily, al Quds al-Arabi: "For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples."Bin Laden urged his followers to act: "The ruling to kill all Americans and their alliesâcivilians and militaryâis an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it." This would be the formal creation of the International Islamic Front, IIRC correctly. CNN has the video up in the "Terror on Tape" section of their website. Although war was temporarily averted by a last-minute deal brokered by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, tensions soon rose again. The standoff with Iraq came to a head in December 1998, when President Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a 70-hour bombing campaign that began on December 16 and ended three days later, on December 19, 1998. According to press reports at the time, Faruq Hijazi, deputy director of Iraqi Intelligence, met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on December 21, 1998, to offer bin Laden safe haven in Iraq. CIA reporting in the memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee seems to confirm this meeting and relates two others. 15. A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation, including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in Afghanistan.Hijaziâs little trek to Afghanistan is pretty much a matter of public record when it happened ... and was roundly ignored by the press during the run up to war. An analysis that follows No. 18 provides additional context and an explanation of these reports:
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS about the nature of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda from mid-1999 through 2003 are conflicting. One senior Iraqi intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, "said that the last contact between the IIS and al Qaeda was in July 1999. Bin Laden wanted to meet with Saddam, he said. The guidance sent back from Saddamâs office reportedly ordered Iraqi intelligence to refrain from any further contact with bin Laden and al Qaeda. The source opined that Saddam wanted to distance himself from al Qaeda." Then there is still the issue of Zarqawi in Baghdad, indicating that perhaps Sammy didnât want to back off quite that much ... The bulk of reporting on the relationship contradicts this claim. One report states that "in late 1999" al Qaeda set up a training camp in northern Iraq that "was operational as of 1999." Other reports suggest that the Iraqi regime contemplated several offers of safe haven to bin Laden throughout 1999. The northern Iraq training camp was probably actually the proto-Ansar al-Islam (at Khurmal?), though this was indicate that they were up and running by 1999. 23. . . . Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden.Some of the most intriguing intelligence concerns an Iraqi named Ahmed Hikmat Shakir: 24. According to sensitive reporting, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national (Shakir) facilitated the arrival of one of the Sept 11 hijackers for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Jan 2000). Sensitive reporting indicates Shakirâs travel and contacts link him to a worldwide network of terrorists, including al Qaeda. Shakir worked at the Kuala Lumpur airportâa job he claimed to have obtained through an Iraqi embassy employee.Now that is interesting. Where exactly is Shakir these days, anyway? One of the men at that al Qaeda operational meeting in the Kuala Lumpur Hotel was Tawfiz al Atash, a top bin Laden lieutenant later identified as the mastermind of the October 12, 2000, attack on the USS Cole. Yet another one-legged al-Qaeda supremo ... 25. Investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 by al Qaeda revealed no specific Iraqi connections but according to the CIA, "fragmentary evidence points to possible Iraqi involvement."Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was on the top 20 list pre-9/11 (back when Khalid was assumed to be just Oplan Bojinka small fry), so if this is him talking under interrogation it be at least as credible as Zubaydah and Khalidâs. The analysis of this report follows. CIA maintains that Ibn al-Shaykhâs timeline is consistent with other sensitive reporting indicating that bin Laden asked Iraq in 1998 for advanced weapons, including CBW and "poisons." Thereâs a comforting thought. Did he get an answer? Additional reporting also calls into question the claim that relations between Iraq and al Qaeda cooled after mid-1999: 27. According to sensitive CIA reporting, . . . the Saudi National Guard went on a kingdom-wide state of alert in late Dec 2000 after learning Saddam agreed to assist al Qaeda in attacking U.S./U.K. interests in Saudi Arabia.And then there is the alleged contact between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. The reporting on those links suggests not one meeting, but as many as four. Whatâs more, the memo reveals potential financing of Attaâs activities by Iraqi intelligence. The Czech counterintelligence service reported that the Sept. 11 hijacker [Mohamed] Atta met with the former Iraqi intelligence chief in Prague, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al Ani, on several occasions.And the commentary: CIA can confirm two Atta visits to Pragueâin Dec. 1994 and in June 2000; data surrounding the other twoâon 26 Oct 1999 and 9 April 2001âis complicated and sometimes contradictory and CIA and FBI cannot confirm Atta met with the IIS. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross continues to stand by his information.Itâs not just Gross who stands by the information. Five high-ranking members of the Czech government have publicly confirmed meetings between Atta and al Ani. The meeting that has gotten the most press attentionâApril 9, 2001âis also the most widely disputed. Even some of the most hawkish Bush administration officials are privately skeptical that Atta met al Ani on that occasion. They believe that reports of the alleged meeting, said to have taken place in public, outside the headquarters of the U.S.-financed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, suggest a level of sloppiness that doesnât fit the pattern of previous high-level Iraq-al Qaeda contacts. Whether or not that specific meeting occurred, the report by Czech counterintelligence that al Ani ordered the Iraqi Intelligence Service officer to provide IIS funds to Atta might help explain the lead hijackerâs determination to reach Prague, despite significant obstacles, in the spring of 2000. (Note that the report stops short of confirming that the funds were transferred. It claims only that the IIS officer requested the transfer.) Recall that Atta flew to Prague from Germany on May 30, 2000, but was denied entry because he did not have a valid visa. Rather than simply return to Germany and fly directly to the United States, his ultimate destination, Atta took pains to get to Prague. After he was refused entry the first time, he traveled back to Germany, obtained the proper paperwork, and caught a bus back to Prague. He left for the United States the day after arriving in Prague for the second time.
31. An Oct. 2002 . . . report said al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel.How many of those 90 or so operatives turned out to be "North Africans" who showed up in Europe for Zarqawiâs chemical weapons plots in late 2002 and early 2003? Thereâs an imminent threat if you want one, IMHO ...
37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawiâs procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.We seem to be to dealing with the aftermath of that deal right now. That also jives with press reports of al-Qaeda fighting alongside the Fedayeen during the war. 38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence service officer said that as of mid-March the IIS was providing weapons to al Qaeda members located in northern Iraq, including rocket propelled grenade (RPG)-18 launchers. According to IIS information, northern Iraq-based al Qaeda members believed that the U.S. intended to strike al Qaeda targets during an anticipated assault against Ansar al-Islam positions.Yeah, that did them a lot of good ... The memo further reported pre-war intelligence which "claimed that an Iraqi intelligence official, praising Ansar al-Islam, provided it with $100,000 and agreed to continue to give assistance." Thatâs interesting, the highest sum Iâd seen that the PUK reported from Iraq to Ansar was $35,000 CRITICS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION have complained that Iraq-al Qaeda connections are a fantasy, trumped up by the warmongers at the White House to fit their preconceived notions about international terror; that links between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden have been routinely "exaggerated" for political purposes; that hawks "cherry-picked" bits of intelligence and tendentiously presented these to the American public. Carl Levin, a senior member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, made those points as recently as November 9, in an appearance on "Fox News Sunday." Republicans on the committee, he complained, refuse to look at the administrationâs "exaggeration of intelligence." Said Levin: "The question is whether or not they exaggerated intelligence in order to carry out their purpose, which was to make the case for going to war. Did we know, for instance, with certainty that there was any relationship between the Iraqis and the terrorists that were in Afghanistan, bin Laden? The administration said that thereâs a connection between those terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Was there a basis for that?"
That pretty much sums up the whole article in a nutshell. | ||||||||||
| Link |
| Terror Networks |
| Feds have 'the Golden Chain' from Sarajevo... |
| 2003-02-11 |
| Thanks to Paul for the tip-off... The Federal Bureau of Investigation has discovered a list of the top financial backers of al Qaida during a raid of a Muslim charity in Sarajevo, according to court documents obtained by United Press International. HOT DAMN! The reference to the list is the first public indication that U.S. authorities have specific information as to the identities of the financiers of Osama bin Laden's terror network, but it is unclear what, if any, action has been taken against the persons named in the document. The handwritten list â referred to within al Qaida as "The Golden Chain" â details 20 wealthy donors to al Qaida followed by the specific recipient of the funding. Osama bin Laden's name appears next to seven of the entries, including at least one donation made by the "bin Laden brothers," according to the court document. Comes as a surprise, huh? And all this time you thought... Oh. I didn't, either. The bin Laden family claims to have disowned Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s. The U.S. government has repeatedly stated that the bin Laden family has assisted in the efforts to contain and destroy the al Qaida network and the family itself denies supporting Osama's terror campaign. But the discovery of this document in Sarajevo calls into question whether al Qaida has received support from one of Osama's scores of wealthy brothers. I think I'd put it a little stronger than that. I might even use the phrase "goddamned lying sons of bitches"... The revelation that the United States has such a list came in a sealed proffer made by federal prosecutors in the case against Enaam M. Arnaout, the director of Benevolence International Foundation. Arnaout had been charged with multiple counts of racketeering, conspiracy, money laundering and aiding al Qaida before pleading guilty Monday to a single racketeering count. The proffer was ordered unsealed Tuesday after the plea agreement was reached, although several of the exhibits remain sealed unless they are introduced as evidence at Arnaout's sentencing. That means there's more, but the gummint doesn't want to spill what it has... In March 2002, authorities in Bosnia raided the offices of the BIF in Sarajevo and Zenica at the behest of the U.S. authorities. There have been longstanding concerns in the European and U.S. intelligence services that several charities that operated in Bosnia during and after that country's civil war were being used as a cover for al Qaida activities. The raids discovered information linking BIF to al Qaida, according to Arnaout's indictment, law enforcement officials and intelligence documents prepared by Bosnian intelligence agencies. Oh, inconvenient, that. And weren't the Bosnians being hammered by the Serbs during the civil war? The Bad Guys were occupied with more important things, I guess... "The BIF had in its Sarajevo office a computer file labeled 'Tareekh Osama,' or 'Osama's History,'" the filing says. "BIF possessed in a file a handwritten draft list of the people referred to within al Qaida as the 'Golden Chain,' wealthy donors to mujahedin efforts, Ex. 5. At the top of the list is a Koranic verse stating: 'And spend for god's cause.' The list contains 20 names, and after each name is a parenthetical, likely indicating the person who received the money from the specified donor. 'Usama' appears after seven of the listings, including the listing 'Bin Laden Brothers.'" Seems pretty solid to me, but I'm not a lawyer... "'Baterji', LBI and BIF's founder, appears after six of the listings. Only three other persons are listed in the parentheses." So Batterjee is the money clearinghouse. And this gets even more interesting... "Baterji" appears to refer to Adel Batterjee, a wealthy businessman from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, who founded BIF and its predecessor organization Lajnatt Al-Birr Al-Islamiah, or LBI. A class action lawsuit filed by families of victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on New York and Washington have named Batterjee as a defendant, but he has not been located. One lawyer associated with Arnaout's case said that despite Batterjee being a fairly famous businessman, he had repeatedly failed to locate him. "This guy is considered a famous figure in Jeddah," the lawyer said. "For such a captain of industry, I find it strange that in a year of trying I haven't been able to find him once." A figment of someone's imagination? A front? The proffer document filed by the government also expands on charges made in the indictment against Arnaout that he supplied equipment and money to Islamic military groups in Chechnya and the Sudan with donations to BIF intended for humanitarian purposes. These charges were dropped as part of the plea agreement. What the hell? Guns and ammunition can be very humanitarian... |
| Link |
| Home Front |
| U.S. ties Arnaout, bin Laden |
| 2003-01-30 |
| The head of a Muslim charity in Palos Hills was so close to Osama bin Laden that he was allowed to sign letters for the terrorist leader, federal prosecutors allege in new documents unsealed Wednesday. The files show how prosecutors plan to link Bin Laden with Enaam Arnaout, head of the Benevolence International Foundation, when Arnaout stands trial for racketeering, money laundering and providing support to terrorists next month. The documents--released in response to a lawsuit--include government filings chronicling the formation of bin Laden's terrorist group al-Qaida, photographs supposedly showing Arnaout with bin Laden and a list of high-profile contributors like Microsoft. The government charges that while Benevolence claimed to be a charitable organization, it "spent a significant amount of money in support of groups engaged in violence and concealed that fact from the public." BIF got some of its financial support through a "matching gift program," where corporations including Microsoft and Houston-based Compaq matched contributions from employees, the government states. The filings also describe a handwritten list of people referred to within al-Qaida as the "Golden Chain"--wealthy donors to militant Muslim causes. We'd really like to see that list, please? The list was found at Benevolence's Bosnia office, where investigators also discovered "a treasure trove of electronically scanned documents and photographs, including many with the defendant Arnaout," according to government documents. One file was labeled "Tareekh Osama," which means "Osama's History," according to prosecutors. Included in the file is a letter to a former Benevolence leader named Mohamed Loay Bayazid. The letter states that although it is from bin Laden, it is signed by Arnaout, using bin Laden's alias Abu Mahmoud. "He [bin Laden] is far away from me and he authorized me through a communication to sign on his behalf, my apology," Arnaout writes in the letter according to the proffer. Bet he was real proud of that letter. Kind of shoots down the "I didn't know him" argument. One file contains minutes of an Aug. 11, 1988, meeting between Bayazid and bin Laden "regarding the establishment of a new military group," the documents state. Al-Qaida "commenced" on Sept. 10, 1988, with "15 brothers," according to notes from a report in the file. There is no allegation linking Arnaout to either meeting. Arnaout, 40, has been in jail since his arrest last April. His attorneys were not available for comment Wednesday, but they have previously accused the government of prosecuting a case based heavily on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence has put away many a bad guy. |
| Link |