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| Iraq |
| The Beatings Will Continue: Iraqi Edtion |
| 2016-10-21 |
![]() ISIS attempt to calm troops following coup plot Now called al-Baghdadi Bob (IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Iraqi media outlets reported on Thursday that ISIS media launched a vast campaign to reassure its fighters and supporters about the presence of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in the city of Mosul after a failed coup attempt against him. Al Sumaria News stated, “ISIS media began a campaign to assure its fighters and supporters that Baghdadi would not leave Mosul, and denied any news regarding his escape to the Syrian city of Raqqa,” adding that, “ISIS propaganda did not provide any evidence that Baghdadi is still in Mosul, and this raised serious doubts among its fighters and supporters, who suffer from low morale.” For the first time, ISIS media acknowledged the recent coup attempt against its leader and how the group was able to foil it. “ISIS foiled the coup of its “Islamic Police” against its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and executed the coup leader, along with other ISIS members in some areas of central Mosul,” Al Sumaria added. Earlier this week some members of ISIS announced through loudspeakers in Mosul that al-Baghdadi fled to the Syrian city of Raqqa and that his wife was arrested. Mosul rebels threaten Bad Guys using leaflets (IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Rebel detachments pasted threatening leaflets on the houses of ISIS militants in the city of Mosul, Al Sumaria reported on Thursday. Al Sumaria News stated, “Detachments of rebels pasted leaflets on the houses of ISIS militants, at a late hour yesterday, in a number of neighborhoods in Mosul,” and that “These rebels vowed through the leaflets to avenge martyrs.” “These leaflets consider as another evidence on the rising popular resistance against ISIS in Mosul,” Al Sumaria added. Two days ago, Mosul started to show signs of a popular armed uprising against the Islamic State, where a group of armed rebellious residents attacked a headquarters of ISIS and destroyed six patrols in less than five hours in the city. ISIS forces Mosul residents to donate money to support Kalifate Or what we call taxes (IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Iraqi media outlets announced on Thursday, that ISIS launched a large fundraising campaign to support its “Caliphate State” in the battles of Mosul and forced Mosul residents to donate their money to support this cause. Al Sumaria News stated, “Today, ISIS launched the largest fundraising campaign, and forced the people of Mosul to donate their money to support the ‘Caliphate State’ in the battles against the government forces and other security forces.” “The donations were coerced through threat of violence or severe pressure,” Al Sumaria added. “A significant rejection and resentment rose among the residents,” Al Sumaria explained. ISIS has suffered from a severe financial crisis for months due to the loss of most of its major funding sources, including oil fields. |
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| Iraq |
| Hollywoody ISIS leader killed |
| 2014-10-09 |
| [ABNA.IR] On Monday the operations command of al-Anbar announced, that the senior ISIS leader Shaker Waheeb was killed along with a number of his aids near Kabisa area in west of the province. The operations commander Rashid Fleeh informed IraqiNews, "The Army Forces with aerial support from the international coalition have managed to kill the senior ISIS leader Shaker Waheeb and 10 other big shots of the ISIS group in Kabisa, 70 km west of al-Ramadi." Noteworthy, Shaker Waheeb is the assistant of the ISIS leader al-Baghdadi, and survived with him on Aug. 19 during US drone strikes that targeted them in Nineveh. Organization of the Islamic State ...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear the pols talk they're not reallyMoslems.... in Iraq and the Levant "ISIS" published pictures of one of its leaders who called 'Shaker Abo Wahib' who alias is Caliphate State's handsome which takes administrative tasks within the organization, and the recent task is the media, while according to information leaked from inside the organization to be the goal of this step is show another form of influence in young people and to attract the ladies. In photos which appears Abo Wahib permanently in the garb of well-groomed and stylish colors unconventional does not look like his peers in the organization shown in this figure, the latest of which was a video accompanied by Gulf jihadists performing a song inside the house of the governor of djinn-infested Mosul ... the home of a particularly ferocious and hairy djinn... ethyl Najafi, where he sat in a high place and wear a black Umrah similar to the Argentine rebel's hat 'Che Guevara' with film looks and shy smiles. According to information that conflicting with the first confirmed that Abu Wahib was the commander of a special unit that is very close to al-Baghdadi called "Osod al-Sahraa" which provide for protection him, as well as assigning tasks to the organization's leadership in al-Anbar. Abu Waheeb is a well known video when he stopping 3 truckers somewhere between Syrian - Iraq border he asking them a bunch of religious questions and at the he execute them because they couldn't answer them to his liking.. This happens at at the end of August 2013 he doing a 'Test' with the 3 truckers and ask them thing about Sunni Qur'an. Abu Wahib first tested the three men on their knowledge of Sunni Islam and then, concluding they were probably Syrians Alawites or Iraqi Shias who working for the Syrian Government and decided brutality shot them, latter Abu Waheeb play with his bodies... This happens when Al Qaeda / ISIS / FSA / Others Insurgents groups was a common faction against the Syrian Army. The Iraqi security officials swiftly put a $50,000 bounty on his head, but little progress appears to have been made to capture him. |
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| Europe |
| German Police Search Mosque, Homes |
| 2005-11-24 |
| Police and prosecutors searched a mosque and 22 homes Wednesday in southern Germany as part of an investigation into an outlawed Islamic group accused of spawning terrorists. Bavarian police were investigating 21 people in connection with the pre-dawn raids near the towns of Ingolstadt and Schwabach, police spokesman Heinz Rindlbacher said. Police said they could not immediately report arrests or the results of the searches due to the ongoing investigation. Authorities said the suspects may have been continuing the activities of Hilafet Devleti, or Caliphate State, which was outlawed in December 2001 under anti-terrorism powers put in place after the Sept. 11 attacks. The Cologne-based Caliphate State, led by Turkish-born Muhammed Metin Kaplan, had openly called for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Former Interior Minister Otto Schily described the group, which had more than 1,000 members in Germany, as "a breeding ground for Islamic terrorists" that spread anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Kaplan served a four-year prison sentence in Germany for incitement in the 1997 killing of a rival cleric in Berlin. He was extradited last year to Turkey, where he was sentenced to life in prison for masterminding a failed 1998 plot to crash an airplane into the mausoleum of modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The ban on Caliphate State covered a number of affiliates, including one that was shut down in Ingolstadt. Former members rented the premises again early in 2003, saying it would be used for prayer, Rindlbacher said. "In the course of the investigation, suspicion has hardened against 21 persons from the region that they are members of a forbidden organization or that they support its continuation," he said. |
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| Europe |
| Some interesting tidbits on Kaplan |
| 2005-04-06 |
Many commentators on the late Pope John Paul II's ministry have noted his outreach efforts towards the Muslim world. Apparently it was a two-way street. On April, 4 Metin Kaplan, nicknamed the "Caliph of Cologne" and leader of the self-proclaimed "Anatolian Federal Islamic State" told a tribunal in Istanbul, "When I was in Germany, before the pope's death, I wrote him a letter, asking him to convert to Islam," adding that it was his "responsibility" as a Muslim to try "to bring the pope into the Islamic fold." Kaplan is on trial for attempting to overthrow Turkey's secular political system and an alleged 1988 effort to crash an aircraft into Kemal Ataturk's mausoleum in Ankara. Prosecutor Suleyman Pehlivan is seeking a life sentence. Kaplan led the Cologne-based extremist Hilafet Devleti, a movement that translates to "Caliphate State." Germany extradited Kaplan to Turkey in October 2004 after he served four years in prison for ordering the murder of a rival religious leader, after receiving assurances that he would not face capital punishment. During his trial in Germany, the court heard evidence that Hilafet Devleti sent funds to Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. Kaplan's lawyers Ismet Koc and Husnu Tuna denied the mausoleum bombing charge and called on the court to act in accordance with European Union judicial practice and grant their client bail. Denying the request, the court and adjourned the trial to May 30 to allow Kaplan's lawyers time to develop their defense. |
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| Terror Networks & Islam |
| Interview with Schanzer on al-Qaeda's army |
| 2005-03-04 |
| FP: Mr. Schanzer, welcome to Frontpage Interview. Schanzer: Thank you. It's great to be here. FP: What motivated you to write this book? Schanzer: I first started thinking about Al-Qaeda's Armies when I came to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in September 2002. One year after the 9/11 attacks, analysts inside the beltway were spending countless hours researching al-Qaeda, but there was something missing. The primary target known as "al-Qaeda" had been oversimplified. As a result, many Americans believed that if the U.S. military simply captured Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist threat would dissipate. The Bali bombing and the attack on the French Tanker Limburg in Yemen that fall demonstrated to me that al-Qaeda's power and reach stemmed from a network of small and local groups that work as "subcontractors" for terrorist attacks all over the world, even as bin Laden and his top lieutenants hid in distant caves. In other words, the al-Qaeda network was able to be resilient because it relied not only upon its top leaders and clandestine cells, but also "affiliate groups," which are larger, homegrown, organic Islamist terror groups that became volunteer fighters for the al-Qaeda matrix. With fighters that returned to their home countries after passing through the Afghanistan training camps and the Bosnian jihad, affiliate groups became the local outposts of al-Qaeda throughout the Muslim world. To put it very simply, if Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was the headquarters of the al-Qaeda corporation, affiliates are the international franchises. I worked with the hypothesis that the next challenge in the War on Terror is to defeat this growing network of affiliates and cells what amounts to "al-Qaeda's Armies." As such, the book examines the affiliate groups operating specifically in the Arab world. I looked at Usbat al-Ansar in Lebanon, the Islamic Army of Aden in Yemen, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, as well as the two original affiliate groups in Egypt al-Jihad and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya. FP: Tell us how the affiliate groups give al-Qaeda its resiliency. Schanzer: Clearly, the U.S. has gone on a counterterror offensive since 9/11. Al-Qaeda has adjusted to the challenge by relying more on the infrastructure of associate groups and individuals. This allows for the sharing of expertise, resources, strategic ideas and even individuals prepared to carry out an attack. This kind of sharing on the periphery allows the network to continue to function, even under intense international pressure. Playing a large role in this peripheral infrastructure are affiliate groups. Al-Qaeda can rely on them because they are considered the second tier of looming al-Qaeda threats, and therefore play a small or nonexistent role in the grand strategy of the global war on terror. Another thing that allows these groups to operate is their size and their remote areas of operation. They are often relatively small and operate in areas outside the reach of state authority. In the Arab world, where leaders exert too much authority, al-Qaeda has found pockets of weak government control, where terror can proliferate. The U.S. government calls these areas "ungoverned spaces" or "ungoverned territory." Today, these ungoverned spaces of have become the well-entrenched homes of today's terrorist groups in the Arab world. Lebanon's Usbat al-Ansar operates in the lawless Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, which is simply teeming with Palestinian terrorists. Yemen's Islamic Army of Aden has traditionally operated in three or more lawless, tribal provinces, including Marib, which I visited in 2003. Ansar al-Islam first operated in the northeastern Kurdish enclave, but soon spread throughout war-torn Iraq with the help of terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat operates throughout Algeria, where civil war ravaged the country for more than a decade, and where the government continues to struggle for control. FP: Could you discuss the sources you used for your research? Schanzer: I used varied sources for this. I had to read just about every book and article about al-Qaeda first, to draw upon the good work of others. It was also important to look at the Arabic language newspapers that saw each individual affiliate as a local threat. Interestingly, while much of the Arabic media is not free and often regurgitates government propaganda, papers form Lebanon, Algeria and Egypt actually allowed some good information to trickle out into the public. Even though I don't speak French or Turkish, I looked at valuable journal and magazine articles in French and Turkish with the help of some colleagues. It was also interesting to hold interviews with government officials (State Department and Pentagon), foreign diplomats (Barham Salih, now deputy prime minister of Iraq), and even a few academics (Professor Mark Katz of George Mason University and Quintan Wictorowicz of Rhodes College). The real fun came in the form of face-to-face interviews in Baghdad, Sulaymaniyya, Sanaa, Aden, Cairo, Paris and Tel Aviv. Government officials, academics, security experts and people on the street all helped provide for a better understanding of the affiliate groups I studied, as well as the environment that allows them to thrive. I hope that the governments of Lebanon and Algeria will consider allowing me to travel there the next time I make a request. FP: You interviewed one of Saddam Hussein's former intelligence officers. Can you tell us about that experience? Schanzer: During a trip to Iraq last year, I interviewed a young man named Abdul Rahman al-Shamari, who served in Saddam's Mukhabarat from 1997 to 2002. I interviewed al-Shamari in a PUK prison in Sulaymaniyya on January 29, 2003. He had been in prison since March 2002. He spoke in Arabic, and I understood most of what he told me. I also had a translator with me. My first question to al-Shamari was whether he, as an agent of Saddam's secret police, had been involved in the operations of Ansar al Islam, the small al-Qaeda affiliate group that had been active on the Iranian border leading up to the Iraq war of 2003. Al-Shamari stated that his division of the Mukhabarat provided weapons to Ansar, "mostly mortar rounds." Al-Shamari added that the Mukhabarat also helped finance Ansar al Islam "every month or two months," providing hundreds of thousands of dollars. Al-Shamari also told me about ties between Saddam's regime and the broader al-Qaeda network. He estimated that some 150 foreign fighters were imported from al-Qaeda affiliate groups in Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon to fight with Ansar al-Islam's Kurdish fighters. For instance, he mentioned a man named Abu Aisha. He was likely referring to Bassam Kanj, alias Abu Aisha, who fought with the Dinniyeh group, a faction of the Lebanese al-Qaeda affiliate Usbat al-Ansar. Al-Shamari said that there was also contact with the Egyptian "Gamaat al-Jihad," and the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Al-Shamari talked of Abu Wael's links with Turkey's "Jamaa al-Khilafa"--likely the group also known as the "Organization of Caliphate State." Al-Shamari also explained that Abu Wael had fostered some cooperation with Abu Musab al Zarqawi. He claimed that Zarqawi, now seen as the top terrorist in Iraq, was al-Qaeda's link to Iraq in the same way that Abu Wael was the Iraqi link to al-Qaeda. In short, al-Shamari claimed that al-Qaeda and Saddam were cooperating well before the insurgency that erupted after the March 2003 invasion. If al-Shamari was telling the truth, Saddam Hussein may not have had a close relationship with al-Qaeda's top leaders, but he likely had a close relationship with some of al-Qaeda's lesser known lieutenants and affiliates. FP: What it will take to successfully fight and defeat these affiliate groups? Schanzer: While we continue to hunt for Usama bin Laden and company, we must now also consider a sustained campaign against al-Qaeda's periphery, which constitutes the bulk of the threat. If affiliates around the world are allowed to operate unchecked, they could expand into larger centers of al-Qaeda activity. Fortunately, while affiliates threaten American interests, the U.S. and its allies can also threaten them. Clandestine al-Qaeda cells are hard to identify and even more difficult to dismantle. By contrast, al-Qaeda affiliates can be seen as al-Qaeda's soft targets. It is known exactly where these groups are based (for targeting) and who commands them (for financial operations or even arrests). As such, they represent the "low hanging fruit" in the war against al-Qaeda in the Middle East and throughout the world. At a time when the U.S. military is spread thin in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, small operations against these groups can be a less complicated, less time-consuming and less expensive mode of fighting terrorism. In addition to targeting groups with military might, the U.S. now also faces the challenge of building relationships with cooperative Middle East states that will bring areas of weak central authority under their control so that more affiliates cannot spawn. Across the board, al-Qaeda Middle East affiliates first grew from areas of weak central authority. From Lebanon and Yemen to Northern Iraq and Algeria, al-Qaeda exploited weak central authority by furnishing financial, military, and/or logistical assistance to local Islamists groups, allowing them to develop into more dangerous as affiliates. In the cases when Middle Eastern states are willing to cooperate fully with the U.S., it will be important to ensure that the U.S. role is not a heavy-handed one. A light footprint is necessary for successful cooperation in states such as Algeria, Yemen and elsewhere. Overzealous U.S. activity in the Middle East, a part of the world that resents U.S. power, if not harboring an outright hatred for America, can lead to disaster, both in the fight against al-Qaeda affiliates, and more broadly, in U.S.-Middle East relations. For example, open cooperation between the highly unpopular government in Algiers and Washington, which continues to decline in popularity throughout the Middle East, will not go unnoticed by an Algerian public prone to mistrust and conspiracy theories. If progress is to be made in countering the threat of the GSPC, it should be done quietly and behind the scenes. Over time, if stability and transparency result from U.S.-Algerian cooperation, a heavier footprint could be advised. If a country, such as Syria (in the case of Asbat al-Ansar in Lebanon) refuses to take steps against affiliate groups and the lawless environments in which they operate, intense diplomacy is the first step. If diplomacy fails, tough penalties and sanctions can be imposed. Threat of force may even be necessary. After all, harboring terrorists amounts to aiding and abetting them. Countries that allow affiliates to operate openly within their borders may first dig in their heels and ignore U.S. demands. Indeed, some may initially become more sympathetic to the affiliates in reaction to U.S. pressure. But a steadfast commitment to a policy that does not allow states to harbor al-Qaeda affiliates will eventually yield positive results. In the final analysis, fighting al-Qaeda's affiliates will require a Herculean effort, given the amorphous nature of affiliate groups. The U.S. will have to be flexible because the strategies, tactics, positions, and leaders of affiliate groups change fast and often, requiring real-time intelligence and quick decision making. If employed successfully, such a strategy of aggressively pursuing affiliate groups can yield a series of unequivocal victories in a short amount of time. These victories will be perceived as both military and political. These small operations can also take immense pressure off of an increasingly overburdened American military. Indeed, small victories might invigorate a public that has already grown weary of incessant bad news in Iraq and the war on terror, writ large. |
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| Europe |
| Germany extradites Islamic militant to Turkey for 1998 airplane attack plot |
| 2004-10-12 |
| An Islamic militant suspected of devising a 1998 plot to crash an explosives-laden plane into a major Turkish landmark was extradited from Germany on Tuesday. Muhammed Metin Kaplan will face treason charges in Turkey for allegedly trying to destroy the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state. Turkish authorities allege Kaplan plotted in October 1998 to smash an explosives-laden executive jet into Ataturk's mausoleum, which covers an entire hilltop in Ankara. The attack, officials say, was to happen when thousands of officers, students and foreign dignitaries were visiting the site for a ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the secular republic. German officials say Kaplan chartered a jet for the attack, but the alleged plot was foiled when Turkish police arrested 23 suspected members of Kaplan's group the day before the ceremony. German authorities detained Kaplan, dubbed the ``Caliph of Cologne'' by his supporters, earlier Tuesday at an Internet cafe after a court approved his extradition. Germany has outlawed Kaplan's Caliphate State group, which calls for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Kaplan has denied the allegation. He has, however, declared a jihad or ``holy war'' against the secular Turkish republic. Officials say Kaplan has about 800 followers in Germany. Kaplan has been free since May 2003 after serving a four-year German prison sentence for incitement in the killing of a rival cleric in Berlin in 1997. He has been required to report to Cologne police weekly. Kaplan foiled German police attempts to arrest him in May by disappearing for several days after another court ruled he could be extradited. The arrest warrant was called off when a federal court granted Kaplan an appeal, which is pending. The Cologne, Germany, court ruled Tuesday that Kaplan remains ``an identification figure for Islamic extremism'' and that his interest in staying in the country is ``outweighed by the public interest in an immediate deportation.'' Kaplan had asked the local court to reinstate his status as a political asylum seeker, but in Tuesday's decision it refused. The court also claimed that his appeal in federal court in Leipzig does not justify keeping Kaplan in the country. It rejected Kaplan's argument that he was too sick to travel. His extradition had been delayed by concerns that his followers have been subjected to torture in Turkey and that he could face political persecution. Kaplan's extradition to Turkey was made possible after Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002. Turkey has introduced measures to crack down on torture to meet European Union conditions for membership, but rights groups say torture still occurs. Turkey last year assured the German government that Kaplan would get a fair trial. No connection has been established between Kaplan's group and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. But German investigators have said that some members traveled to Afghanistan to meet with supporters of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in 1996 or 1997. |
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| Police hunt 'Caliph of Cologne' | |||||||
| 2004-05-27 | |||||||
German police have launched a manhunt for the suspected extremist known as the Caliph of Cologne, a day after his extradition to Turkey was ordered. Metin Kaplan had vanished from his home in Cologne when police went to detain him after Wednesday's court decision to send him to Turkey. At least 100 German officers are taking part in the search for Mr Kaplan, who is wanted in Turkey on treason charges.
Never mind... German police call off hunt for suspected Turkish extremist German police called off a Europe-wide manhunt for a suspected Turkish extremist leader after a court granted him a two-month reprieve as a final ruling is sought on his deportation order.
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| Saddamâs ambassador to al-Qaeda | ||||||||||
| 2004-02-21 | ||||||||||
| A RECENTLY INTERCEPTED MESSAGE from Iraq-based terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi asking the al Qaeda leadership for reinforcements reignited the debate over al Qaeda ties with Saddam Husseinâs fallen Baath regime. William Safire of the New York Times called the message a "smoking gun," while the University of Michiganâs Juan Cole says that Safire "offers not even one document to prove" the Saddam-al Qaeda nexus. What you are about to read bears directly on that debate. It is based on a recent interview with Abdul Rahman al-Shamari, who served in Saddamâs secret police, the Mukhabarat, from 1997 to 2002, and is currently sitting in a Kurdish prison. Al-Shamari says that he worked for a man who was Saddamâs envoy to al Qaeda. Before recounting details from my January 29 interview, some caution is necessary. Al-Shamariâs account was compelling and filled with specific information that would either make him a skilled and detailed liar or a man with information that the U.S. public needs to hear. My Iraqi escort informed me that al-Shamari has been in prison since March 2002, that U.S. officials have visited him several times, and that his story has remained consistent. There was little language barrier; my Arabic skills allowed me to understand much of what al-Shamari said, even before translation. Finally, subsequent conversations with U.S. government officials in Washington and Baghdad, as well as several articles written well before this one, indicate that al-Shamariâs claims have been echoed by other sources throughout Iraq. When I walked into the tiny interrogation room, it was midmorning. I had just finished interviews with two other prisoners--both members of Ansar al-Islam, the al Qaeda affiliate responsible for attacks against Kurdish and Western targets in northern Iraq. The group had been active in a small enclave near Halabja in the Kurdistan region from about September 2001 until the U.S. assault on Iraq last spring, when its Arab and Kurdish fighters fled over the Iranian border, only to return after the war. U.S. officials now suspect Ansar in some of the bloodier attacks against U.S. interests throughout Iraq. My first question to al-Shamari was whether he was involved in the operations of Ansar al Islam. My translator asked him the question in Arabic, and al-Shamari nodded: "Yes." Al-Shamari, who appears to be in his late twenties, said that his division of the Mukhabarat provided weapons to Ansar, "mostly mortar rounds." This statement echoed an independent Kurdish report from July 2002 alleging that ordnance seized from Ansar al Islam was produced by Saddamâs military and a Guardian article several weeks later alleging that truckloads of arms were shipped to Ansar from areas controlled by Saddam.
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| Europe |
| Germany still trying to extradite "Caliph of Cologne" |
| 2003-09-16 |
| EFL--Read the rest at the link. Interior Minister Schily is taking terrorism and militant Islam more seriously than Schröder or Fischer... German Interior Minister Otto Schily was in Ankara on Tuesday to seek ways to extradite a militant Islamist from Germany to Turkey but said there were still obstacles to handing him over to Turkish officials. "Some questions still need to be solved," Schily told reporters after a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Abdulkadir Aksu. A court in Cologne last month ruled against a German government request to extradite Kaplan saying that it feared he would not receive a fair trial. Turkey wants to try Metin Kaplan, the leader of the banned Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) on charges of high treason over a 1998 plot to fly a light plane full of explosives into the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state. Kaplan has served a four-year prison term in Germany for the murder of a rival Islamist leader. He was released in May but must report regularly to police. |
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| German court blocks extradition of Islamist Turk | |
| 2003-08-30 | |
A German court rejected Turkey's bid to extradite a militant Islamist on treason charges, saying it feared he would not face a fair trial if he returned home. Turkey accuses Metin Kaplan of planning a failed plot to crash an aircraft loaded with explosives into the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish state, in 1998. The administrative court in the western city of Cologne said on Wednesday it had turned down Turkey's bid to extradite Kaplan, citing concern that a Turkish court might use information extracted from witnesses who had been tortured. The ruling upholds a decision from a lower court in May that blocked Kaplan's extradition because of doubts about whether a trial in Turkey would comply with international law. A spokesman for Interior Minister Otto Schily said the German government did not consider Kaplan welcome in Germany and would do everything it could to ensure his expulsion. He said the ministry was examining the court ruling. Kaplan, who wants to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, is the leader of a Cologne-based group known as the Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) that was banned in 2001 to stop what the German government called its extremist activities.
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| German Court Rejects Kaplan Extradition Request | ||||
| 2003-05-27 | ||||
A German court rejected Turkey's request on Tuesday to extradite an Islamic militant leader accused of plotting bomb attacks, saying he could face "political persecution" in Turkey. Turkish authorities allege Muhammed Metin Kaplan masterminded a failed plot in October 1998 to crash a plane laden with explosives into the mausoleum of the modern republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. On the same day, they say, he planned a violent occupation of Istanbul's Fatih mosque. Kaplan is the leader of a Cologne-based group called Caliphate State, which has been banned in Germany.
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| Germany Imposes Ban on Islamic Group |
| 2003-01-15 |
| Germany's top security official on Wednesday outlawed an Islamic organization that he accused of extremism and spreading anti-Semitic propaganda in universities. Interior Minister Otto Schily said premises across the country had been searched overnight in connection with the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir. He did not comment on the outcome, but his ministry said that 25 buildings were searched. "The organization is distinguished by the fact that it is active in universities with anti-Semitic slogans," Schily told Germany's ARD television, adding that the group - whose name translates as the Liberation Party - had long been under observation by German authorities. Watching people and keeping records - old German tradition The Interior Ministry said the group advocated the destruction of Israel and called for the killing of Jews. In a statement, it cited an event at Berlin's Technical University last October at which a speaker made anti-Semitic remarks and urged the introduction of a caliphate, or strict Islamic state, in Muslim countries. In November, federal authorities raided 27 apartments belonging to sympathizers of the Hizb ut-Tahrir across Germany on suspicion they were founding a radical Islamic organization. No arrests were made. "We have not yet been able to find recognizable organizational structures," Schily said Wednesday. "We have to assume that essentially they have their organizational base abroad." Someplace with a lot of sand, I'll bet Hizb ut-Tahrir sharply rejects accusations of extremism and says its aim is to restore the "Islamic way of life" in the Muslim world. It said the ban was "tantamount to thought policing." "And that's our job as a Islamic group!" "We are not against Jews or Christians - we are against the state of Israel," said Imran Waheed, the group's representative in Britain. The group "doesn't believe in the use of violence and armed struggle to achieve its aims," he added. "Unless we don't get what we want" Under anti-terror legislation introduced after the attacks in New York and Washington, Germany eased legal protections for religious groups and allowed for the first time outlawing of foreign-based groups, opening the way for the government to ban the Caliphate State organization in 2001 and the Aachen-based Al-Aqsa organization last November. The party was formed in Jordan in 1953 by Taqi Eddin al-Nabahani, a Palestinian who died in unclear circumstances in the Palestinian territories in 1978. Egyptian authorities outlawed the group in 1974 after blaming it for an attempted coup. The current leader is the Palestinian Abdul-Kaddim Zalloum, whose whereabouts are unknown. In hiding? Taking a dirt nap? Three of the Sept. 11 suicide hijackers and several other suspected plotters lived and studied in Hamburg, Germany, and authorities moved quickly after the attacks to tighten anti-terror legislation. Germany loosened legal protections for religious groups, allowing the government to ban the Caliphate State organization run by Turkish militant Muhammed Metin Kaplan in late 2001. That group openly calls for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Last August, German authorities shut down the Al-Aqsa organization in the northwestern city of Aachen, saying the group posed as a charity to collect money for the radical Islamic movement Hamas. Germany is trying to get its house in order |
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