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Iraq
The Beatings Will Continue: Iraqi Edtion
2016-10-21


ISIS attempt to calm troops following coup plot
Now called al-Baghdadi Bob
(IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Iraqi media outlets reported on Thursday that ISIS media launched a vast campaign to reassure its fighters and supporters about the presence of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in the city of Mosul after a failed coup attempt against him.

Al Sumaria News stated, “ISIS media began a campaign to assure its fighters and supporters that Baghdadi would not leave Mosul, and denied any news regarding his escape to the Syrian city of Raqqa,” adding that, “ISIS propaganda did not provide any evidence that Baghdadi is still in Mosul, and this raised serious doubts among its fighters and supporters, who suffer from low morale.”

For the first time, ISIS media acknowledged the recent coup attempt against its leader and how the group was able to foil it.

“ISIS foiled the coup of its “Islamic Police” against its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and executed the coup leader, along with other ISIS members in some areas of central Mosul,” Al Sumaria added.

Earlier this week some members of ISIS announced through loudspeakers in Mosul that al-Baghdadi fled to the Syrian city of Raqqa and that his wife was arrested.

Mosul rebels threaten Bad Guys using leaflets

(IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Rebel detachments pasted threatening leaflets on the houses of ISIS militants in the city of Mosul, Al Sumaria reported on Thursday.

Al Sumaria News stated, “Detachments of rebels pasted leaflets on the houses of ISIS militants, at a late hour yesterday, in a number of neighborhoods in Mosul,” and that “These rebels vowed through the leaflets to avenge martyrs.”

“These leaflets consider as another evidence on the rising popular resistance against ISIS in Mosul,” Al Sumaria added.

Two days ago, Mosul started to show signs of a popular armed uprising against the Islamic State, where a group of armed rebellious residents attacked a headquarters of ISIS and destroyed six patrols in less than five hours in the city.

ISIS forces Mosul residents to donate money to support Kalifate
Or what we call taxes
(IraqiNews.com) Nineveh – Iraqi media outlets announced on Thursday, that ISIS launched a large fundraising campaign to support its “Caliphate State” in the battles of Mosul and forced Mosul residents to donate their money to support this cause.

Al Sumaria News stated, “Today, ISIS launched the largest fundraising campaign, and forced the people of Mosul to donate their money to support the ‘Caliphate State’ in the battles against the government forces and other security forces.”

“The donations were coerced through threat of violence or severe pressure,” Al Sumaria added. “A significant rejection and resentment rose among the residents,” Al Sumaria explained.

ISIS has suffered from a severe financial crisis for months due to the loss of most of its major funding sources, including oil fields.
Link


Iraq
Hollywoody ISIS leader killed
2014-10-09
[ABNA.IR] On Monday the operations command of al-Anbar announced, that the senior ISIS leader Shaker Waheeb was killed along with a number of his aids near Kabisa area in west of the province.

The operations commander Rashid Fleeh informed IraqiNews, "The Army Forces with aerial support from the international coalition have managed to kill the senior ISIS leader Shaker Waheeb and 10 other big shots of the ISIS group in Kabisa, 70 km west of al-Ramadi."

Noteworthy, Shaker Waheeb is the assistant of the ISIS leader al-Baghdadi, and survived with him on Aug. 19 during US drone strikes that targeted them in Nineveh.

Organization of the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear the pols talk they're not really Moslems....
in Iraq and the Levant "ISIS" published pictures of one of its leaders who called 'Shaker Abo Wahib' who alias is Caliphate State's handsome which takes administrative tasks within the organization, and the recent task is the media, while according to information leaked from inside the organization to be the goal of this step is show another form of influence in young people and to attract the ladies.

In photos which appears Abo Wahib permanently in the garb of well-groomed and stylish colors unconventional does not look like his peers in the organization shown in this figure, the latest of which was a video accompanied by Gulf jihadists performing a song inside the house of the governor of djinn-infested Mosul
... the home of a particularly ferocious and hairy djinn...
ethyl Najafi, where he sat in a high place and wear a black Umrah similar to the Argentine rebel's hat 'Che Guevara' with film looks and shy smiles.

According to information that conflicting with the first confirmed that Abu Wahib was the commander of a special unit that is very close to al-Baghdadi called "Osod al-Sahraa" which provide for protection him, as well as assigning tasks to the organization's leadership in al-Anbar.

Abu Waheeb is a well known video when he stopping 3 truckers somewhere between Syrian - Iraq border he asking them a bunch of religious questions and at the he execute them because they couldn't answer them to his liking..

This happens at at the end of August 2013 he doing a 'Test' with the 3 truckers and ask them thing about Sunni Qur'an. Abu Wahib first tested the three men on their knowledge of Sunni Islam and then, concluding they were probably Syrians Alawites or Iraqi Shias who working for the Syrian Government and decided brutality shot them, latter Abu Waheeb play with his bodies... This happens when Al Qaeda / ISIS / FSA / Others Insurgents groups was a common faction against the Syrian Army.

The Iraqi security officials swiftly put a $50,000 bounty on his head, but little progress appears to have been made to capture him.
Link


Europe
German Police Search Mosque, Homes
2005-11-24
Police and prosecutors searched a mosque and 22 homes Wednesday in southern Germany as part of an investigation into an outlawed Islamic group accused of spawning terrorists. Bavarian police were investigating 21 people in connection with the pre-dawn raids near the towns of Ingolstadt and Schwabach, police spokesman Heinz Rindlbacher said. Police said they could not immediately report arrests or the results of the searches due to the ongoing investigation.

Authorities said the suspects may have been continuing the activities of Hilafet Devleti, or Caliphate State, which was outlawed in December 2001 under anti-terrorism powers put in place after the Sept. 11 attacks. The Cologne-based Caliphate State, led by Turkish-born Muhammed Metin Kaplan, had openly called for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state.

Former Interior Minister Otto Schily described the group, which had more than 1,000 members in Germany, as "a breeding ground for Islamic terrorists" that spread anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Kaplan served a four-year prison sentence in Germany for incitement in the 1997 killing of a rival cleric in Berlin. He was extradited last year to Turkey, where he was sentenced to life in prison for masterminding a failed 1998 plot to crash an airplane into the mausoleum of modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The ban on Caliphate State covered a number of affiliates, including one that was shut down in Ingolstadt. Former members rented the premises again early in 2003, saying it would be used for prayer, Rindlbacher said. "In the course of the investigation, suspicion has hardened against 21 persons from the region that they are members of a forbidden organization or that they support its continuation," he said.
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Europe
Some interesting tidbits on Kaplan
2005-04-06
Many commentators on the late Pope John Paul II's ministry have noted his outreach efforts towards the Muslim world. Apparently it was a two-way street. On April, 4 Metin Kaplan, nicknamed the "Caliph of Cologne" and leader of the self-proclaimed "Anatolian Federal Islamic State" told a tribunal in Istanbul, "When I was in Germany, before the pope's death, I wrote him a letter, asking him to convert to Islam," adding that it was his "responsibility" as a Muslim to try "to bring the pope into the Islamic fold."

Kaplan is on trial for attempting to overthrow Turkey's secular political system and an alleged 1988 effort to crash an aircraft into Kemal Ataturk's mausoleum in Ankara. Prosecutor Suleyman Pehlivan is seeking a life sentence. Kaplan led the Cologne-based extremist Hilafet Devleti, a movement that translates to "Caliphate State." Germany extradited Kaplan to Turkey in October 2004 after he served four years in prison for ordering the murder of a rival religious leader, after receiving assurances that he would not face capital punishment. During his trial in Germany, the court heard evidence that Hilafet Devleti sent funds to Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. Kaplan's lawyers Ismet Koc and Husnu Tuna denied the mausoleum bombing charge and called on the court to act in accordance with European Union judicial practice and grant their client bail. Denying the request, the court and adjourned the trial to May 30 to allow Kaplan's lawyers time to develop their defense.
Link


Terror Networks & Islam
Interview with Schanzer on al-Qaeda's army
2005-03-04
FP: Mr. Schanzer, welcome to Frontpage Interview.

Schanzer: Thank you. It's great to be here.

FP: What motivated you to write this book?

Schanzer: I first started thinking about Al-Qaeda's Armies when I came to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in September 2002. One year after the 9/11 attacks, analysts inside the beltway were spending countless hours researching al-Qaeda, but there was something missing. The primary target known as "al-Qaeda" had been oversimplified. As a result, many Americans believed that if the U.S. military simply captured Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist threat would dissipate. The Bali bombing and the attack on the French Tanker Limburg in Yemen that fall demonstrated to me that al-Qaeda's power and reach stemmed from a network of small and local groups that work as "subcontractors" for terrorist attacks all over the world, even as bin Laden and his top lieutenants hid in distant caves. In other words, the al-Qaeda network was able to be resilient because it relied not only upon its top leaders and clandestine cells, but also "affiliate groups," which are larger, homegrown, organic Islamist terror groups that became volunteer fighters for the al-Qaeda matrix.

With fighters that returned to their home countries after passing through the Afghanistan training camps and the Bosnian jihad, affiliate groups became the local outposts of al-Qaeda throughout the Muslim world. To put it very simply, if Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was the headquarters of the al-Qaeda corporation, affiliates are the international franchises.

I worked with the hypothesis that the next challenge in the War on Terror is to defeat this growing network of affiliates and cells — what amounts to "al-Qaeda's Armies." As such, the book examines the affiliate groups operating specifically in the Arab world. I looked at Usbat al-Ansar in Lebanon, the Islamic Army of Aden in Yemen, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, Ansar al-Islam in Iraq, as well as the two original affiliate groups in Egypt — al-Jihad and al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya.

FP: Tell us how the affiliate groups give al-Qaeda its resiliency.

Schanzer: Clearly, the U.S. has gone on a counterterror offensive since 9/11. Al-Qaeda has adjusted to the challenge by relying more on the infrastructure of associate groups and individuals. This allows for the sharing of expertise, resources, strategic ideas and even individuals prepared to carry out an attack. This kind of sharing on the periphery allows the network to continue to function, even under intense international pressure. Playing a large role in this peripheral infrastructure are affiliate groups. Al-Qaeda can rely on them because they are considered the second tier of looming al-Qaeda threats, and therefore play a small or nonexistent role in the grand strategy of the global war on terror.

Another thing that allows these groups to operate is their size and their remote areas of operation. They are often relatively small and operate in areas outside the reach of state authority. In the Arab world, where leaders exert too much authority, al-Qaeda has found pockets of weak government control, where terror can proliferate. The U.S. government calls these areas "ungoverned spaces" or "ungoverned territory." Today, these ungoverned spaces of have become the well-entrenched homes of today's terrorist groups in the Arab world. Lebanon's Usbat al-Ansar operates in the lawless Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp, which is simply teeming with Palestinian terrorists. Yemen's Islamic Army of Aden has traditionally operated in three or more lawless, tribal provinces, including Marib, which I visited in 2003. Ansar al-Islam first operated in the northeastern Kurdish enclave, but soon spread throughout war-torn Iraq with the help of terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat operates throughout Algeria, where civil war ravaged the country for more than a decade, and where the government continues to struggle for control.

FP: Could you discuss the sources you used for your research?

Schanzer: I used varied sources for this. I had to read just about every book and article about al-Qaeda first, to draw upon the good work of others. It was also important to look at the Arabic language newspapers that saw each individual affiliate as a local threat. Interestingly, while much of the Arabic media is not free and often regurgitates government propaganda, papers form Lebanon, Algeria and Egypt actually allowed some good information to trickle out into the public. Even though I don't speak French or Turkish, I looked at valuable journal and magazine articles in French and Turkish with the help of some colleagues. It was also interesting to hold interviews with government officials (State Department and Pentagon), foreign diplomats (Barham Salih, now deputy prime minister of Iraq), and even a few academics (Professor Mark Katz of George Mason University and Quintan Wictorowicz of Rhodes College).

The real fun came in the form of face-to-face interviews in Baghdad, Sulaymaniyya, Sanaa, Aden, Cairo, Paris and Tel Aviv. Government officials, academics, security experts and people on the street all helped provide for a better understanding of the affiliate groups I studied, as well as the environment that allows them to thrive. I hope that the governments of Lebanon and Algeria will consider allowing me to travel there the next time I make a request.

FP: You interviewed one of Saddam Hussein's former intelligence officers. Can you tell us about that experience?

Schanzer: During a trip to Iraq last year, I interviewed a young man named Abdul Rahman al-Shamari, who served in Saddam's Mukhabarat from 1997 to 2002. I interviewed al-Shamari in a PUK prison in Sulaymaniyya on January 29, 2003. He had been in prison since March 2002. He spoke in Arabic, and I understood most of what he told me. I also had a translator with me.

My first question to al-Shamari was whether he, as an agent of Saddam's secret police, had been involved in the operations of Ansar al Islam, the small al-Qaeda affiliate group that had been active on the Iranian border leading up to the Iraq war of 2003. Al-Shamari stated that his division of the Mukhabarat provided weapons to Ansar, "mostly mortar rounds." Al-Shamari added that the Mukhabarat also helped finance Ansar al Islam "every month or two months," providing hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Al-Shamari also told me about ties between Saddam's regime and the broader al-Qaeda network. He estimated that some 150 foreign fighters were imported from al-Qaeda affiliate groups in Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon to fight with Ansar al-Islam's Kurdish fighters. For instance, he mentioned a man named Abu Aisha. He was likely referring to Bassam Kanj, alias Abu Aisha, who fought with the Dinniyeh group, a faction of the Lebanese al-Qaeda affiliate Usbat al-Ansar. Al-Shamari said that there was also contact with the Egyptian "Gamaat al-Jihad," and the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Al-Shamari talked of Abu Wael's links with Turkey's "Jamaa al-Khilafa"--likely the group also known as the "Organization of Caliphate State."

Al-Shamari also explained that Abu Wael had fostered some cooperation with Abu Musab al Zarqawi. He claimed that Zarqawi, now seen as the top terrorist in Iraq, was al-Qaeda's link to Iraq in the same way that Abu Wael was the Iraqi link to al-Qaeda. In short, al-Shamari claimed that al-Qaeda and Saddam were cooperating well before the insurgency that erupted after the March 2003 invasion. If al-Shamari was telling the truth, Saddam Hussein may not have had a close relationship with al-Qaeda's top leaders, but he likely had a close relationship with some of al-Qaeda's lesser known lieutenants and affiliates.

FP: What it will take to successfully fight and defeat these affiliate groups?

Schanzer: While we continue to hunt for Usama bin Laden and company, we must now also consider a sustained campaign against al-Qaeda's periphery, which constitutes the bulk of the threat. If affiliates around the world are allowed to operate unchecked, they could expand into larger centers of al-Qaeda activity.

Fortunately, while affiliates threaten American interests, the U.S. and its allies can also threaten them. Clandestine al-Qaeda cells are hard to identify and even more difficult to dismantle. By contrast, al-Qaeda affiliates can be seen as al-Qaeda's soft targets. It is known exactly where these groups are based (for targeting) and who commands them (for financial operations or even arrests). As such, they represent the "low hanging fruit" in the war against al-Qaeda — in the Middle East and throughout the world. At a time when the U.S. military is spread thin in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, small operations against these groups can be a less complicated, less time-consuming and less expensive mode of fighting terrorism.

In addition to targeting groups with military might, the U.S. now also faces the challenge of building relationships with cooperative Middle East states that will bring areas of weak central authority under their control so that more affiliates cannot spawn. Across the board, al-Qaeda Middle East affiliates first grew from areas of weak central authority. From Lebanon and Yemen to Northern Iraq and Algeria, al-Qaeda exploited weak central authority by furnishing financial, military, and/or logistical assistance to local Islamists groups, allowing them to develop into more dangerous as affiliates.

In the cases when Middle Eastern states are willing to cooperate fully with the U.S., it will be important to ensure that the U.S. role is not a heavy-handed one. A light footprint is necessary for successful cooperation in states such as Algeria, Yemen and elsewhere. Overzealous U.S. activity in the Middle East, a part of the world that resents U.S. power, if not harboring an outright hatred for America, can lead to disaster, both in the fight against al-Qaeda affiliates, and more broadly, in U.S.-Middle East relations. For example, open cooperation between the highly unpopular government in Algiers and Washington, which continues to decline in popularity throughout the Middle East, will not go unnoticed by an Algerian public prone to mistrust and conspiracy theories. If progress is to be made in countering the threat of the GSPC, it should be done quietly and behind the scenes. Over time, if stability and transparency result from U.S.-Algerian cooperation, a heavier footprint could be advised.

If a country, such as Syria (in the case of Asbat al-Ansar in Lebanon) refuses to take steps against affiliate groups and the lawless environments in which they operate, intense diplomacy is the first step. If diplomacy fails, tough penalties and sanctions can be imposed. Threat of force may even be necessary. After all, harboring terrorists amounts to aiding and abetting them. Countries that allow affiliates to operate openly within their borders may first dig in their heels and ignore U.S. demands. Indeed, some may initially become more sympathetic to the affiliates in reaction to U.S. pressure. But a steadfast commitment to a policy that does not allow states to harbor al-Qaeda affiliates will eventually yield positive results.

In the final analysis, fighting al-Qaeda's affiliates will require a Herculean effort, given the amorphous nature of affiliate groups. The U.S. will have to be flexible because the strategies, tactics, positions, and leaders of affiliate groups change fast and often, requiring real-time intelligence and quick decision making. If employed successfully, such a strategy of aggressively pursuing affiliate groups can yield a series of unequivocal victories in a short amount of time. These victories will be perceived as both military and political. These small operations can also take immense pressure off of an increasingly overburdened American military. Indeed, small victories might invigorate a public that has already grown weary of incessant bad news in Iraq and the war on terror, writ large.
Link


Europe
Germany extradites Islamic militant to Turkey for 1998 airplane attack plot
2004-10-12
An Islamic militant suspected of devising a 1998 plot to crash an explosives-laden plane into a major Turkish landmark was extradited from Germany on Tuesday. Muhammed Metin Kaplan will face treason charges in Turkey for allegedly trying to destroy the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state. Turkish authorities allege Kaplan plotted in October 1998 to smash an explosives-laden executive jet into Ataturk's mausoleum, which covers an entire hilltop in Ankara. The attack, officials say, was to happen when thousands of officers, students and foreign dignitaries were visiting the site for a ceremony marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the secular republic. German officials say Kaplan chartered a jet for the attack, but the alleged plot was foiled when Turkish police arrested 23 suspected members of Kaplan's group the day before the ceremony. German authorities detained Kaplan, dubbed the ``Caliph of Cologne'' by his supporters, earlier Tuesday at an Internet cafe after a court approved his extradition. Germany has outlawed Kaplan's Caliphate State group, which calls for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Kaplan has denied the allegation. He has, however, declared a jihad or ``holy war'' against the secular Turkish republic. Officials say Kaplan has about 800 followers in Germany.

Kaplan has been free since May 2003 after serving a four-year German prison sentence for incitement in the killing of a rival cleric in Berlin in 1997. He has been required to report to Cologne police weekly. Kaplan foiled German police attempts to arrest him in May by disappearing for several days after another court ruled he could be extradited. The arrest warrant was called off when a federal court granted Kaplan an appeal, which is pending. The Cologne, Germany, court ruled Tuesday that Kaplan remains ``an identification figure for Islamic extremism'' and that his interest in staying in the country is ``outweighed by the public interest in an immediate deportation.'' Kaplan had asked the local court to reinstate his status as a political asylum seeker, but in Tuesday's decision it refused. The court also claimed that his appeal in federal court in Leipzig does not justify keeping Kaplan in the country. It rejected Kaplan's argument that he was too sick to travel. His extradition had been delayed by concerns that his followers have been subjected to torture in Turkey and that he could face political persecution.

Kaplan's extradition to Turkey was made possible after Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002. Turkey has introduced measures to crack down on torture to meet European Union conditions for membership, but rights groups say torture still occurs. Turkey last year assured the German government that Kaplan would get a fair trial. No connection has been established between Kaplan's group and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. But German investigators have said that some members traveled to Afghanistan to meet with supporters of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in 1996 or 1997.
Link


Europe
Police hunt 'Caliph of Cologne'
2004-05-27
German police have launched a manhunt for the suspected extremist known as the Caliph of Cologne, a day after his extradition to Turkey was ordered. Metin Kaplan had vanished from his home in Cologne when police went to detain him after Wednesday's court decision to send him to Turkey. At least 100 German officers are taking part in the search for Mr Kaplan, who is wanted in Turkey on treason charges.
Tisk, tisk, Germans used to be much more "efficent" at this sort of thing.
His Caliphate State group wants an end to Turkey's secular government. The group was banned by the German government in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the US. The allegations against Mr Kaplan include claims that he planned to fly a plane into the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, founder of modern, secular Turkey.
Well, not him personally, he's much too holy for that.
The court decision for him to be extradited was taken on Wednesday in Muenster, near Cologne. The decision reversed earlier rulings that Mr Kaplan could stay in Germany as he would not receive a fair trial in Turkey. An arrest warrant was issued and police went to detain him, but he had already vanished. "Kaplan has disappeared. He is being searched for," a police spokesman in Cologne said. Mr Kaplan has served a four-year prison sentence in Germany for inciting members of his group to murder a rival Islamic leader. He was freed in March last year. Reports in Germany suggest he may have fled to the Netherlands, where he is believed to have a number of supporters.
And now, if caught in the Netherlands, I expect another long round of court hearings on extraditing back to Germany.
At which point he'll scoot to Belgium...
Can't wait for a Belgian court to indict him for crimes against humanity ...


Never mind...
German police call off hunt for suspected Turkish extremist
German police called off a Europe-wide manhunt for a suspected Turkish extremist leader after a court granted him a two-month reprieve as a final ruling is sought on his deportation order.
Why? It doesn't matter where he is?
Metin Kaplan, known as the Caliph of Cologne, was reported missing late Wednesday after police went to his home in the western German city to act on an arrest warrant issued after a court gave its approval for him to be deported. But Cologne's administrative court on Thursday handed Kaplan a two-month reprieve to await a final verdict. The Turk cannot be deported within that period. "Consequently, our search operations have stopped," said a spokesman for Cologne police, which had widened their hunt to Europe.
"We'll start hunting for him when the two months are up...
The 51-year-old Islamic fundamentalist ended a four-year prison term in Germany in March 2003 for inciting members of the Hilafet Devleti group or "Caliphate" to murder a rival Islamic leader. Cologne authorities had placed restrictions on Kaplan's movements about a year ago ordering him to report regularly to police, and opposition politicians demanded that an investigation be launched into how he escaped surveillance. "The authorities were watching, observing," lamented Bavarian state interior minister Guenther Beckstein "but that was just not the case."
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Saddam’s ambassador to al-Qaeda
2004-02-21
A RECENTLY INTERCEPTED MESSAGE from Iraq-based terrorist Abu Musab al Zarqawi asking the al Qaeda leadership for reinforcements reignited the debate over al Qaeda ties with Saddam Hussein’s fallen Baath regime. William Safire of the New York Times called the message a "smoking gun," while the University of Michigan’s Juan Cole says that Safire "offers not even one document to prove" the Saddam-al Qaeda nexus. What you are about to read bears directly on that debate. It is based on a recent interview with Abdul Rahman al-Shamari, who served in Saddam’s secret police, the Mukhabarat, from 1997 to 2002, and is currently sitting in a Kurdish prison. Al-Shamari says that he worked for a man who was Saddam’s envoy to al Qaeda.

Before recounting details from my January 29 interview, some caution is necessary. Al-Shamari’s account was compelling and filled with specific information that would either make him a skilled and detailed liar or a man with information that the U.S. public needs to hear. My Iraqi escort informed me that al-Shamari has been in prison since March 2002, that U.S. officials have visited him several times, and that his story has remained consistent. There was little language barrier; my Arabic skills allowed me to understand much of what al-Shamari said, even before translation. Finally, subsequent conversations with U.S. government officials in Washington and Baghdad, as well as several articles written well before this one, indicate that al-Shamari’s claims have been echoed by other sources throughout Iraq.

When I walked into the tiny interrogation room, it was midmorning. I had just finished interviews with two other prisoners--both members of Ansar al-Islam, the al Qaeda affiliate responsible for attacks against Kurdish and Western targets in northern Iraq. The group had been active in a small enclave near Halabja in the Kurdistan region from about September 2001 until the U.S. assault on Iraq last spring, when its Arab and Kurdish fighters fled over the Iranian border, only to return after the war. U.S. officials now suspect Ansar in some of the bloodier attacks against U.S. interests throughout Iraq.

My first question to al-Shamari was whether he was involved in the operations of Ansar al Islam. My translator asked him the question in Arabic, and al-Shamari nodded: "Yes." Al-Shamari, who appears to be in his late twenties, said that his division of the Mukhabarat provided weapons to Ansar, "mostly mortar rounds." This statement echoed an independent Kurdish report from July 2002 alleging that ordnance seized from Ansar al Islam was produced by Saddam’s military and a Guardian article several weeks later alleging that truckloads of arms were shipped to Ansar from areas controlled by Saddam.
[Hack! Caff!] That gun's really smoking...
In addition to weapons, al-Shamari said, the Mukhabarat also helped finance Ansar al Islam. "On one occasion we gave them ten million Swiss dinars [$700,000]," al-Shamari said, referring to the pre-1990 Iraqi currency. On other occasions, the Mukhabarat provided more than that. The assistance, he added, was furnished "every month or two months."
No surprises, only confirmation...
I then picked up a picture of a man known as Abu Wael that I had acquired from Kurdish intelligence. In the course of my research, several sources had claimed that Abu Wael was on Saddam’s payroll and was also an al Qaeda operative, but few had any facts to back up their claim. For example, one Arabic daily, al-Sharq al-Awsat, stated flatly before the Iraq war, "all information indicates [that Abu Wael] was the link between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime" but neglected to provide any such information. Agence France-Presse after the war cited a Kurdish security chief’s description of Abu Wael as a "key link to Saddam’s former Baath regime" and an "intelligence agent for the ousted president originally from Baghdad." Again, nothing was provided to substantiate this claim. In my own analysis of this group, I could do little but weakly assert that Wael was "reportedly an al Qaeda operative on Saddam’s payroll." The best reporting on Wael came from a March 2002 New Yorker article by Jeffrey Goldberg, who had visited a Kurdish prison in northern Iraq and interviewed Ansar prisoners. He spoke with one Iraqi intelligence officer named Qassem Hussein Muhammed, whom Kurdish intelligence captured while he was on his way to the Ansar enclave. Muhammed told Goldberg that Abu Wael was "the actual decision-maker" for Ansar al Islam and "an employee of the Mukhabarat."
Given Abu Wael's travels, that fits well.
"Do you know this man?" I asked al-Shamari. His eyes widened and he smiled. He told me that he knew the man in the picture, but that his graying beard was now completely white. He said that the man was Abu Wael, whose full name is Colonel Saadan Mahmoud Abdul Latif al-Aani. The prisoner told me that he had worked for Abu Wael, who was the leader of a special intelligence directorate in the Mukhabarat. That directorate provided assistance to Ansar al Islam at the behest of Saddam Hussein, whom Abu Wael had met "four or five times." Al-Shamari added that "Abu Wael’s wife is Izzat al-Douri’s cousin," making him a part of Saddam’s inner circle. Al-Douri, of course, was the deputy chairman of Saddam’s Revolutionary Command Council, a high-ranking official in Iraq’s armed forces, and Saddam’s righthand man. Originally number six on the most wanted list, he is still believed to be at large in Iraq, and is suspected of coordinating aspects of insurgency against American troops, primarily in the Sunni triangle. Why, I asked, would Saddam task one of his intelligence agents to work with the Kurds, an ethnic group that was an avowed enemy of the Baath regime, and had clashed with Iraqi forces on several occasions? Al-Shamari said that Saddam wanted to create chaos in the pro-American Kurdish region. In other words, he used Ansar al Islam as a tool against the Kurds.
Which is the reason we've come up with for the establishment of Ansar in the Kurdish areas. It wasn't really all that hard to work out, but it's always nice to have your conclusions confirmed...
As an intelligence official for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (one of the two major parties in northern Iraq) explained to me, "Most of the Kurdish fighters in Ansar al Islam didn’t know the link to Saddam." They believed they were fighting a local jihad. Only the high-level lieutenants were aware that Abu Wael was involved.
Which also fits with our opinion that the Kurdish part of Ansar was yokels and hicks, useful for beating up on the local peshmerga, and providing a cover for the presence of the al-Tawhid Arabs...
Al-Shamari also told me that the links between Saddam’s regime and the al Qaeda network went beyond Ansar al Islam. He explained in considerable detail that Saddam actually ordered Abu Wael to organize foreign fighters from outside Iraq to join Ansar. Al-Shamari estimated that some 150 foreign fighters were imported from al Qaeda clusters in Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and Lebanon to fight with Ansar al Islam’s Kurdish fighters. I asked him who came from Lebanon. "I don’t know the name of the group," he replied. "But the man we worked with was named Abu Aisha." Al-Shamari was likely referring to Bassam Kanj, alias Abu Aisha, who was a little-known militant of the Dinniyeh group, a faction of the Lebanese al Qaeda affiliate Usbat al Ansar. Kanj was killed in a January 2000 battle with Lebanese forces.
The Dinnieh group of Takfiri was clobbered by the Lebanese army when they got out of hand in 2000. But that also implies an earlier presence for what was to become Ansar in Kurdistan.
Al-Shamari said that there was also contact with the Egyptian "Gamaat al-Jihad," which is now seen as the core of al Qaeda’s leadership, as well as with the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which bin Laden helped create in 1998 as an alternative to Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Al-Shamari talked of Abu Wael’s links with Turkey’s "Jamaa al-Khilafa"--likely the group also known as the "Union of Islamic Communities" (UIC) or the "Organization of Caliphate State." This terror group, established in 1983 by Cemalettin Kaplan, reportedly met with bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1997, and later sent cadres there to train. Three years before 9/11, UIC plotted to crash a plane into Ankara’s Ataturk Mausoleum on a day when hundreds of Turkish officials were present.
Kaplan was the "Caliph of Cologne." I thought his Qaeda ties were only peripheral. Goes to show what I know...
Al-Shamari stated that Abu Wael sometimes traveled to meet with these groups. All of them, he added, visited Wael in Iraq and were provided Iraqi visas. This corroborates an interview I had with a senior PUK official in April 2003, who stated that many of the Arab fighters captured or killed during the war held passports with Iraqi visas. Al-Shamari said that importing foreign fighters to train in Iraq was part of his job in the Mukhabarat. The fighters trained in Salman Pak, a facility located some 20 miles southeast of Baghdad. He said that he had personal knowledge of 500 fighters that came through Salman Pak dating back to the late 1990s; they trained in "urban combat, explosives, and car bombs." This account agrees with a White House Background Paper on Iraq dated September 12, 2002, which cited the "highly secret terrorist training facility in Iraq known as Salman Pak, where both Iraqis and non-Iraqi Arabs receive training on hijacking planes and trains, planting explosives in cities, sabotage, and assassinations."
We knew about that, too...
Abu Wael also sent money to the aforementioned al Qaeda affiliates, and to other groups that "worked against the United States." Abu Wael dispensed most of the funds himself, al-Shamari said, but there was also some cooperation with Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Zarqawi, as the prisoner explained, was al Qaeda’s link to Iraq in the same way that Abu Wael was the Iraqi link to al Qaeda. Indeed, Zarqawi (who received medical attention in Baghdad in 2002 for wounds that he suffered from U.S. forces in Afghanistan) and Abu Wael helped Ansar al Islam prepare for the U.S. assault on its small enclave last year. According to al-Shamari, Ansar was given the plan from the top Iraqi leadership: "If the U.S. was to hit [the Ansar base], the fighters were directed to go to Ramadi, Tikrit, Mosul . . . Falluja and other places." This statement agreed with a prior prisoner interview I had with the attempted murderer of Barham Salih, prime minister of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This second prisoner told me that "Ansar had plans to go south if the U.S. would attack." Al-Shamari said the new group was to be named Jund al-Shams, and would deal mainly in explosives. He believed that Zarqawi and Abu Wael were responsible for some of the attacks against U.S. soldiers in central Iraq. "Their directives were to hit America and American interests," he said.
Al-Shams showed up last June, when Zarqawi was first reporting working from Iran. An article by Matthew Levitt in National Review suggests it's one of the many aliases of al-Tawhid. We should probably be thinking of Tawhid, Shams, al-Sunnah, and whatever else pops up as battalions within a regiment named Ansar al-Islam, commanded by Zarqawi, in itself part of an al-Qaeda division commanded by Saif al-Adel, though that's probably describing it too neatly.
Al-Shamari claimed to have had prior information about al Qaeda attacks in the past. "I knew about the attack on the American in Jordan," he said, referring to the November 2002 assassination of USAID official Lawrence Foley. "Zarqawi," he said, "ordered that man to be killed."
And an al-Qaeda audio tape took credit for the killing. Still any doubt about the connection? Didn't think so.
These are some of the highlights from my interview, which lasted about 45 minutes. I heard one other salient Abu Wael anecdote in an earlier interview during my eight-day trip to Iraq. That interview was with the former tenth-in-command for Ansar al Islam, a man known simply as Qods. In June 2003, just before he was arrested and put in the jail where I met him, Qods said that he saw Abu Wael. After the war, Abu Wael dispatched him from an Ansar safe house in Ravansar, Iran, to deliver a message to his son in Baghdad. The message: Ansar al Islam leaders needed help getting back into Iraq. It was only then, he said, when he met Abu Wael’s son, that he learned of the link between the Baathists and al Qaeda. Qods told me that he was angry with the leaders of Ansar for hiding its ties to Saddam. "Ansar had lots of secret ties between the Baath and Arab leaders," he said. The challenge now is to document the claims of these witnesses about the secret ties between Saddam, al Qaeda, and Abu Wael. A number of U.S. officials have indicated to me that there are other Iraqis who have similar stories to tell. Perhaps they can corroborate Abdul Rahman al-Shamari’s account. Meanwhile, the U.S. deck of cards representing Iraq’s 55 most wanted appears to be one card short. Colonel Saadan Mahmoud Abdul Latif al-Aani, aka Abu Wael, should be number 56.
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Europe
Germany still trying to extradite "Caliph of Cologne"
2003-09-16
EFL--Read the rest at the link. Interior Minister Schily is taking terrorism and militant Islam more seriously than Schröder or Fischer...
German Interior Minister Otto Schily was in Ankara on Tuesday to seek ways to extradite a militant Islamist from Germany to Turkey but said there were still obstacles to handing him over to Turkish officials. "Some questions still need to be solved," Schily told reporters after a meeting with his Turkish counterpart Abdulkadir Aksu. A court in Cologne last month ruled against a German government request to extradite Kaplan saying that it feared he would not receive a fair trial. Turkey wants to try Metin Kaplan, the leader of the banned Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) on charges of high treason over a 1998 plot to fly a light plane full of explosives into the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish state. Kaplan has served a four-year prison term in Germany for the murder of a rival Islamist leader. He was released in May but must report regularly to police.
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Europe
German court blocks extradition of Islamist Turk
2003-08-30
A German court rejected Turkey's bid to extradite a militant Islamist on treason charges, saying it feared he would not face a fair trial if he returned home. Turkey accuses Metin Kaplan of planning a failed plot to crash an aircraft loaded with explosives into the mausoleum of Kemal Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish state, in 1998. The administrative court in the western city of Cologne said on Wednesday it had turned down Turkey's bid to extradite Kaplan, citing concern that a Turkish court might use information extracted from witnesses who had been tortured. The ruling upholds a decision from a lower court in May that blocked Kaplan's extradition because of doubts about whether a trial in Turkey would comply with international law. A spokesman for Interior Minister Otto Schily said the German government did not consider Kaplan welcome in Germany and would do everything it could to ensure his expulsion. He said the ministry was examining the court ruling. Kaplan, who wants to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, is the leader of a Cologne-based group known as the Kalifatstaat (Caliphate State) that was banned in 2001 to stop what the German government called its extremist activities.
The court rejected a similar attempt back in May...
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Europe
German Court Rejects Kaplan Extradition Request
2003-05-27
A German court rejected Turkey's request on Tuesday to extradite an Islamic militant leader accused of plotting bomb attacks, saying he could face "political persecution" in Turkey. Turkish authorities allege Muhammed Metin Kaplan masterminded a failed plot in October 1998 to crash a plane laden with explosives into the mausoleum of the modern republic's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. On the same day, they say, he planned a violent occupation of Istanbul's Fatih mosque. Kaplan is the leader of a Cologne-based group called Caliphate State, which has been banned in Germany.
Kaplan's a hell of a name for a caliph, isn't it? Though I guess Cohen would be worse...
The Turkish militant had been serving a four-year prison sentence in Duesseldorf for incitement in the killing of a rival cleric in Berlin in 1997. His sentence ended in March, but he remained in custody pending an extradition ruling.
I guess I'd let him off easy for bumping off a mullah, too...
On Tuesday, the superior state court in Duesseldorf ruled against extradition and ordered Kaplan's immediate release. The court said there were "serious grounds" to believe that, if extradited, Kaplan would be prosecuted using testimony "extorted by police" and that the trial would "have the character of political persecution." Official documents from Turkey raised concern that Kaplan's followers were tortured by Turkish police during investigations in 1998, it said. The German government backed the extradition effort, which appeared to clear a major hurdle when Turkey abolished the death penalty last year. But Germany also sought Turkish assurances that Kaplan wouldn't be tortured on his return.
"Now, don't hurt 'im, okay?"
"We won't. We promise."
"Then why's that guy in the fez curling his moustachios and snickering?"
Kaplan's group calls for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Interior Minister Otto Schily has described the group as a "breeding ground" for terrorists, though he said it has no links to al-Qaida or other international terrorist groups.
It just funnels wannabe jihadis into them...
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Europe
Germany Imposes Ban on Islamic Group
2003-01-15
Germany's top security official on Wednesday outlawed an Islamic organization that he accused of extremism and spreading anti-Semitic propaganda in universities. Interior Minister Otto Schily said premises across the country had been searched overnight in connection with the ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir. He did not comment on the outcome, but his ministry said that 25 buildings were searched. "The organization is distinguished by the fact that it is active in universities with anti-Semitic slogans," Schily told Germany's ARD television, adding that the group - whose name translates as the Liberation Party - had long been under observation by German authorities.
Watching people and keeping records - old German tradition
The Interior Ministry said the group advocated the destruction of Israel and called for the killing of Jews. In a statement, it cited an event at Berlin's Technical University last October at which a speaker made anti-Semitic remarks and urged the introduction of a caliphate, or strict Islamic state, in Muslim countries. In November, federal authorities raided 27 apartments belonging to sympathizers of the Hizb ut-Tahrir across Germany on suspicion they were founding a radical Islamic organization. No arrests were made. "We have not yet been able to find recognizable organizational structures," Schily said Wednesday. "We have to assume that essentially they have their organizational base abroad."
Someplace with a lot of sand, I'll bet
Hizb ut-Tahrir sharply rejects accusations of extremism and says its aim is to restore the "Islamic way of life" in the Muslim world. It said the ban was "tantamount to thought policing."
"And that's our job as a Islamic group!"
"We are not against Jews or Christians - we are against the state of Israel," said Imran Waheed, the group's representative in Britain. The group "doesn't believe in the use of violence and armed struggle to achieve its aims," he added.
"Unless we don't get what we want"
Under anti-terror legislation introduced after the attacks in New York and Washington, Germany eased legal protections for religious groups and allowed for the first time outlawing of foreign-based groups, opening the way for the government to ban the Caliphate State organization in 2001 and the Aachen-based Al-Aqsa organization last November. The party was formed in Jordan in 1953 by Taqi Eddin al-Nabahani, a Palestinian who died in unclear circumstances in the Palestinian territories in 1978. Egyptian authorities outlawed the group in 1974 after blaming it for an attempted coup. The current leader is the Palestinian Abdul-Kaddim Zalloum, whose whereabouts are unknown.
In hiding? Taking a dirt nap?
Three of the Sept. 11 suicide hijackers and several other suspected plotters lived and studied in Hamburg, Germany, and authorities moved quickly after the attacks to tighten anti-terror legislation. Germany loosened legal protections for religious groups, allowing the government to ban the Caliphate State organization run by Turkish militant Muhammed Metin Kaplan in late 2001. That group openly calls for the overthrow of Turkey's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Last August, German authorities shut down the Al-Aqsa organization in the northwestern city of Aachen, saying the group posed as a charity to collect money for the radical Islamic movement Hamas.
Germany is trying to get its house in order
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