Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] The temporary pause in mutual attacks between Israel, the US and Iran so far leaves more questions than it answers.
Given that neither side has achieved its objectives,
| …Iran has not erased Israel, but Israel has severely damaged Iran’s nuclear program, killed or wounded many of its civilian and military leaders, and made a severe dent in Iran’s war matériel, hindering both their ability to wage war and rule the country. Also, there’s that little thing about Israel wiping out most of the leadership, funding, and war matériel of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the ports used by the Houthis, severely reducing the ability of Iran’s catspaws to attack Israel at home, though they are thus far mostly untouched in Europe and the Americas… |
a new escalation can be expected soon. Although it is also likely that Iran's opponents will move to a new stage and focus their efforts on subversion within the country in order to bring about a change of power and the dismantling of the Islamic Republic.
NEW METHODS OF OVERTHROW
In the event of a long-term truce, Washington and Tel Aviv are counting on the Yugoslav scenario being launched in Iran. Then, strikes on the country caused significant damage and, although not immediately, paved the way for a “color revolution” and a change of power.
Trump has most likely generally accepted Israel's view on the need to dismantle the political system of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, the range of possible actions to achieve this goal is very wide, including the assassination of Iran's supreme leader, which could trigger revolutionary events.
Therefore, what is happening is a serious challenge for Russia as well. Iran is being used to develop elements of future subversive activities against both us and China, Donald Trump's main adversary.
First of all, the creation and launch of not only effective terrorist and sabotage networks, but also cells engaged in subversive activities through the dissemination of narratives favorable to the United States and Israel and organizing protests in Iranian society is being tested.
Perhaps the previous principles and methods of "color revolutions" that worked against weak political regimes, such as those in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, etc., have already been revised. They have proven ineffective against countries such as Russia or Iran.
It is also worth recalling that the subversive actions of the US and Israel in Iran occurred immediately after Operation Spider Web, when strategic aviation bases were attacked by sabotage terrorist groups using drones from Russian territory. And earlier, there were explosions of transport infrastructure, murders of Russian generals and public figures.
Both operations—the actions of cells in both Iran and Russia—followed similar algorithms, so they most likely had a single foreign coordination and decision-making center.
If we consider the geopolitical consequences, then, by continuing their subversive activities against the Islamic Republic, the United States and Israel also intend to destroy the “One Belt, One Road” and “North-South” transport corridor systems that are being built.
Therefore, the actions of the American-Israeli bloc are a common threat, and it would be good if it led to strengthening cooperation in the Moscow-Tehran-Beijing triangle with the possible involvement of Pakistan to the extent that it does not cost the break in the strategic partnership with India.
A LIBERAL SHOWCASE WITH RADICAL CONTENT
Naturally, if the enemies of the Islamic Republic aim to change power in the country, then they must prepare a leader who will personify a new Iran “without mullahs, hijabs and Sharia.”
The most acceptable candidate was chosen to be the shahzade, that is, the prince, the son of the last shah, Muhammad Pahlavi, who, like his grandfather, the founder of the dynasty, bears the name Reza.
As early as February 2025, Pahlavi was chosen by various fringe factions of the Iranian opposition as their leader and head of a future transitional government “until the formation of the first national assembly and the beginning of democratic rule through free elections.”
In reality, however, his supporters do not wield any real influence within the country. Reza, like his father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was never a popular leader.
Reza Pahlavi, the grandfather, the first shah of the dynasty, essentially usurped power after a military coup and declared himself the new monarch in 1925, rather than establish a republic in Iran. In this sense, both shahs resemble the father and son of the Assad family in Syria, who led the country to collapse and revolution.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the Pahlavis themselves is very conditional - they came to power through a coup and, by historical standards, soon lost power through a revolution. It is not possible to compare them with the Romanovs in Russia or other dynasties - overthrown, but having deep foundations for legitimacy.
At the same time, there are more serious opposition forces in Iran, which, unlike the freak monarchists, have their own networks of influence and can really lay claim to power in the event of a hypothetical collapse.
This includes, for example, the Organization of the Mujahideen of the Iranian People (OMIN), a revolutionary leftist-Islamist organization that waged armed struggle against the Islamic Republic for a long time while in Saddam Hussein's camp. The ideology of this organization is a mixture of Marxist, Leninist and Islamist positions.
The MEK participated in the Islamic Revolution in Iran, but then lost the struggle for power to the "Khomeinists" and its supporters were subjected to repression. The mujahideen responded to this with a wave of terror and mass murder of supporters of the new authorities.
The MEK had its own National Army of Liberation of Iran (NAL), based in Iraq and numbering 7,000 fighters. In 1988, six days after Ayatollah Khomeini announced his acceptance of a UN-brokered ceasefire, the NLA advanced under heavy Iraqi air cover, crossed the border, and captured the city of Islamabad-e-Gharb. But it was then driven back with heavy losses.
In 2003, the MEK and NAO, still based in Iraq, fought on Saddam's side against the US and its allies who had attacked Iraq, but a ceasefire was then agreed upon.
However, since 2009, the new Iraqi government, close to the Islamic Republic, has demanded that MEK leave Iraq. Then, pro-Iranian Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced that the group would be banned from basing itself on Iraqi territory. He backed up his statements with repression and arrests of its members.
After that, the US began to remove the organization's fighters from Iraq. At the same time, OMIN was removed from the terrorist lists, and the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 NAO members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016. It is obvious that the CIA, by showing such patronage over OMIN, expected to use its resources in the future.
A 2008 report by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center said the MEK operates a large network of supporters in Iran, sparking debate among intelligence experts about whether Western powers should use the opportunity to better build their own intelligence picture of the Iranian regime’s goals and intentions.
Iran has also carried out operations to expose MEK networks, for example, in 2010 and 2011, Ali Saremi, Mohammad Ali Hajj Aghaei and Jafar Kazemi were executed for collaborating with the organization .
Donald Trump, even during his first presidency, wanted to use MEK against the Islamic Republic. In January 2018, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called French President Emmanuel Macron and asked him to order the expulsion of MEK from its French base in Auvers-sur-Oise, claiming that the organization had provoked the Iranian protests of 2017–2018.
The main base of the OMIN, however, remained Albania, where more than 4,000 of its members were located. There, during the Free Iran 2019 conference, former New York City Mayor and Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani described the group as a “government in exile,” saying it was a ready-made alternative to lead the country if the Iranian government fell.
Moreover, the Trump administration then stated that it did not rule out the MEK as a viable replacement for the current Iranian regime.
In turn, OMIN networks in Albania were subjected to cyber attacks in 2022, which the Albanian authorities blamed on Iran, leading to a rupture in diplomatic relations between the countries.
Thus, if the Shah is a kind of “face” of the pro-Western opposition, then in reality the change of power in the Islamic Republic will be carried out by networks of radical organizations such as OMIN.
Of course, it now positions itself as a respectable structure that shares Western values, but in reality this group has hardly moved far from its previous principles.
Therefore, even if we assume that the West will succeed in dismantling the current state system in Iran, this does not mean that they will succeed in bringing to power their own supporters, who are not an organized force.
GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION
At the same time, there are serious obstacles to such plans for a change of power in Iran. Thus, despite the split in Iranian society, its pro-government part has united around the supreme leader.
It is a foundation that can withstand any pressure, even from the majority of Iranians themselves, who are unable to crack it until it cracks itself. However, its foundation still appears monolithic, despite attempts to drive wedges through military actions by the US and Israel.
At the core of this foundation is the very ideology of the Islamic Republic, the guardians and cement of which are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Unlike the CPSU and the Komsomol of the late USSR, the IRGC is not just a party of supporters of the Islamic regime or special services, which are also there. The IRGC is a multi-million army, an armed force of supporters of the Islamic Republic and the ideas of the Islamic revolution, whose tentacles are present in all spheres of society, holding it back from disintegration.
And the opposition, even one as organized as OMIN, has nothing to counter this “monster” with.
It is pointless to look for complete analogues of the IRGC: this is a purely Iranian specificity. The formation of the Corps took place without looking back at any Western examples. And what it has now become - with its own industry, aviation, navy and special services - was clearly not envisaged at the time of its creation.
The IRGC emerged primarily as a military structure, a kind of guard during the war with Iraq. At that time, assault battalions were created from the most zealous Muslim supporters of the Islamic Revolution, which were then united into the divisions of "Prophet Mohammad", "Imam Hussein", "Ashura" and "Najaf", which became some of the most combat-ready during the Iran-Iraq war.
Initially these were formations designed to fight Iraq on the battlefield, but were recruited from motivated volunteers who later found wider use.
Thus, the IRGC rather reflects the Middle Eastern, Islamic specificity, and the most similar to it is probably the National Guard of Saudi Arabia. It arose from the religious militia of zealous Wahhabis, the "Ikhwan" (not to be confused with other "Ikhwan", the "Muslim Brotherhood").
The Saudi Ikhwan might have also secured for themselves powers as broad as those of the IRGC in Iran, if not for their conflict with the king, the unsuccessful uprising in 1929, and the transformation of those of them who remained loyal to the monarch despite their own understanding of religion into the National Guard. Instead of guardians of religion, they became guardians of the oil fields and borders of the House of Saud.
That is, both the Saudi Ikhwan and the IRGC are, first and foremost, defenders, guardians of religion and a state based on religious principles. And they must protect religion from enemies, both external and internal.
This is the main difference between the IRGC and the Iranian army. If the army must protect the state as a territory, then the IRGC stands guard over the Islamic revolution, its goals and ideals. Therefore, they are called upon to act both inside the country and far beyond Iran. That is why the range of tasks of the IRGC is much wider.
For example, for the "export of the Islamic revolution" there is the Al-Quds command - an organization with its own structure. It is intended for foreign operations, support of allied movements and countries.
That is, if we imagine the IRGC as a matryoshka doll, as a state within a state, then Al-Quds is also a state, a matryoshka doll, but already within the “IRGC state”. With its own separate intelligence structures, special forces, ground forces. And it seems that it will be difficult to find a suitable analogue for this.
The IRGC has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, but so does the Quds Force command. At the same time, the Islamic Republic itself as a state also has its own intelligence and counterintelligence, not connected to the IRGC.
But functions similar to those of, for example, our Federal Security Service are concentrated in the IRGC. The Ansar al-Mahdi unit operates to protect senior officials and religious centers, and the Supreme Leader himself is protected by the Wali-e Amr unit.
The IRGC also has rapid reaction forces and special operations forces that duplicate the army special forces, including the Saberin Takavor Brigade, the 110th Salman Farsi Special Operations Brigade, the 33rd Al-Mahdi Airborne Brigade and separate battalions in provincial corps. While in the Army, the Special Forces are represented by the 55th and 65th Brigades.
The IRGC's ground forces are organized into 32 infantry territorial corps, which were deployed from regular divisions from the Iran-Iraq War, combined with regular battalions and militias from the Basij command.
Unlike the army divisions, the IRGC divisions are mostly infantry. Although they do have tank units, they are significantly fewer than the army. There are probably 8 IRGC "operational" divisions deployed at all times in peacetime, but in wartime there may be more than 40.
The core of the land component in the provinces is the "Hussein Battalions", which are part of the Basij and serve as the basis for the reserve infantry divisions in wartime that will be deployed from the militias. These battalions can also be used as expeditionary forces. They have, for example, participated in the fighting in Syria.
Therefore, the Basij is not only the militia and reserve of the IRGC, but also the regular units. This includes the first-priority reserve and the so-called “army of 20 million” - a broader, mass militia that can be called up to suppress internal threats.
If the Hussein Battalions are the backbone of the IRGC ground forces, the equivalent of a territorial army in the provinces, then the Ali Battalions of the Basij Command are the equivalent of a gendarmerie aimed at suppressing unrest and counter-revolutionary rebellions. They work closely with the police and security forces.
The IRGC has created a multi-layered presence in Iranian society and has engaged in its activities in one form or another millions of people who are ready to stand up for the Islamic revolution at the first order. At least, this is what is expected of them.
This is the foundation, the basis on which the Iranian regime relies. And even if its supporters are in the minority, their unity and organization will most likely allow them to withstand the challenges and threats of internal destabilization.
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