I came across this, from January 2025, while looking for an explanation of Tehreek-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind.
[MilitancyChowk] An analysis of the activities and recent developments of the major Pakistani Taliban factions
January 2025 has seen a dramatic uptick in the activities of the Pak Taliban ...Arabic for students... conglomerate. Not only have several groups increased the number of attacks, following an ongoing trend that started between 2023 and 2024 but also the relations between factions, sub-factions, and commanders have mutated.
Since August 15, 2021, when the Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan, the murderous Moslem scenario in Pakistain has been rapidly changing. Today, it is marked by a number of key factors that have been developing since 2021 and of which January 2025 is remarkably representative.
A first factor is the hyperactivity of jihadist murderous Moslem organizations. While several attacks have been repeatedly denied by security forces on the ground, often debunking murderous Moslems’ allegations that they carried out an attack and inflicted casualties, still, Pak Taliban groups have been consistent in claiming a high number of attacks, highlighting the pressure they intend to exercise on security forces and the larger public, physically and psychologically. For instance, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) has claimed an increasing number of attacks since 2021, when it claimed 282: in 2022, the group claimed 367; in 2023, 881: and in 2024, 1,758. While many of these attacks could not be verified, they underscore the operational growth of the TTP.
Furthermore, while this is not an entirely new phenomenon, for some Pak Taliban factions more than others, the high number of claims is part of a larger design aimed at redefining their image through the articulation of a new structure. Pak Taliban have been focusing on improving their power-projection capabilities through the establishment of ever more complex structures that can convey the sense that the murderous Moslem groups are expanding and increasing their strength. In 2024, for instance, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur ...a member of the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Waziris. Educated in a Deobandi madrassa located in Multan, he is affiliated with the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) political party. Upon the formation of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007, he was announced as the group's overall naib amir under Baitullah Mehsud, who was based in South Wazoo, but has largely distanced himself from the TTP due to rivalries with the Mehsuds and disagreements about the TTP's attacks against the Pak state.. group (HGB, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), framed a new structure that for the first time signaled that HGB was shifting from a jihadist tribal militia into a local powerhouse following the example of the TTP.
Thus, as the Pak Taliban attempt to expand their influence and power of attraction, they inevitably end up competing with each other for recruits and resources. This competition becomes manifest with the mergers of murderous Moslem groups with the faction that outbids the others. The consequence is a political game between commanders and sub-factions who switch sides for opportunistic reasons or to consolidate their power-base on the local population.
Three major factions have monopolised the murderous Moslem jihadist landscape in Pakistain: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP), Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB, or Tehrik-e-Taliban Ghazwatul Hind, TTG), and Tehrik-e-Lashkar-e-Islam ...a group of Islamic bandidos infesting Khyber Agency. It was headed by a former bus driver and eventually folded into the TTP... Pakistain (TLIP or simply LeI). While focusing solely on these three factions would underestimate the complexity of murderous Moslem dynamics on the ground, they still represent an indicator of jihadist groups' changing approach to their ultimate politico-military goal. They also address some of the main factors that are affecting the murderous Moslem scenario of Pakistain.
In the first three weeks of January 2025, the TTP, HGB, and LeI combined claimed more than 120 attacks across Pakistain. The areas of operations of their attacks remain within the trend of the previous year. The TTP claimed the majority of attacks in every province of Pakistain except Islamabad Capital Territory. While the TTP quantity of attacks is following the number of attacks claimed in December 2024 (182), the group has already exceeded the 75 attacks claimed in January 2024.
Similarly, HGB and LeI have both claimed several attacks concentrated in their usual operational areas: Khyber’s Tirah Maidan area for LeI and Bannu, North Wazoo, and even Dera Ismail Khan ... the Pearl of Pashtunistan ... for HGB.
Furthermore, since the start of 2025, the jihadist murderous Moslem environment in Pakistain has been marked by a series of changes that involve alliances between different Pak Taliban factions. In the span of just 19 days, the TTP was able to merge four new groups into its fold, while HGB suffered from the defection of a prominent commander and officially incorporated some commanders already affiliated and reinforced its alliance with an important murderous Moslem faction.
Between January 14 and 16, the TTP announced that three murderous Moslem groups from Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... Province had joined the group. Located in the Khuzdar and Mastung areas, which fall under the shadow province of Qalat and Makran for the TTP, Shahid Umar Baloch, Mawlawi Shoaib Baloch, and Mawlawi Yasir joined the TTP alongside their companions. Among these, Yasir is said to have several hundred murderous Moslems, being one of the major groups that joined the TTP from Balochistan.
These mergers followed the defection to the TTP of another murderous Moslem commander, Ali Dawar aka Alamgir, the supreme commander of the Jaish-e-Omeri (JeO) faction of HGB, on January 12. This marked the first major loss for HGB since 2020 after losing its own deputy, Commander Aleem Khan, who had also joined the TTP. Ali Dawar joined the TTP together with some of his own sub-commanders and murderous Moslems of JeO; however, since JeO is a special faction of HGB made by murderous Moslems coming from different groups of HGB, the special unit remains active under the leadership of HGB, who nominated Maulvi Farooq aka Maulvi Shafaq as the new head of JeO. Meanwhile,
...back at the dirigible, Jack stuck the cigar in his mouth, stepped onto the gantry, and asked Got a light, Mac?
Von Schtinken stopped short, lowering the dagger and trying to control his features.
If you light that thing, Herr Armschtröng, he pointed out, his voice tense, we all die!... TTP murderous Moslems affiliated with Ali Dawar published pictures and videos of the commander head of the suicide bomb squad of Ali Dawar together with jacket wallahs carrying the TTP flag.
While murderous Moslems from both Pak Taliban factions repeatedly stated that no enmity is sparked by these mergers, highlighting that TTP and HGB have the same goal, follow the same jihadist path, and differ only in tactics, a competition focused on power projection started between the TTP and HGB.
Between January 13 and 14, a day after Ali Dawar defected to the TTP, HGB announced the official incorporation of another commander into their jihadist platform. Mawlawi Abu Zar Bangash and his group from the Kohat area of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa pledged allegiance to HGB via another prominent commander already affiliated with HGB: Mukhlis Mehsud. Both of them belong to the Hakeemullah Mehsud Karwan group, which pledged allegiance to HGB already in November 2024 via its commanders Mukhlis Mehsud and Zarar, led by Umar Mehsud. Later, on January 22, a commander from Dera Ismail Khan, Iftikhar aka Umar, pledged allegiance to HGB, with the group claiming also attacks in the district in the name of HGB.
While the mergers were important because they further expanded HGB's foothold outside the traditional North Waziristan-Bannu region, they were minor mergers. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... between January 16 and 18, rumors started to circulate among Pak Taliban members that HGB was set to announce a major development regarding Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) on January 18. Shortly after, LeI and HGB announced that the two groups had decided to reinforce their alliance by pledging unity of struggle.
Based in the Khyber tribal district's Tirah Valley, LeI is a powerful group that resurged in recent years, mostly after August 2021 and particularly since 2022. After the killing of its founding leader, Mangal Bagh ...a former bus driver, now head of the Deobandi bandido group Lashkar-e-Islam and the Terror of Khyber Agency... , in January 2020 in a mysterious blast in Nangarhar The unfortunate Afghan province located adjacent to Mohmand, Kurram, and Khyber Agencies. The capital is Jalalabad. The province was the fief of Younus Khalis after the Soviets departed and one of his sons is the current provincial Taliban commander. Nangarhar is Haqqani country.. Province of Afghanistan, LeI had been led briefly by Zala Khan Akakhel; however, as a prominent commander of the group revealed, due to an illness that struck the latter, Tayyab Afridi aka Ajnabi, one of the sons of Mangal Bagh and previously deputy to Zala Khan, became the new leader of LeI.
LeI has maintained independent leadership while nurturing close relations with both the TTP and HGB, mostly through connections with Jamaatul Ahrar ...A Pak Taliban splinter group that split off from the Mullah Fazlullah faction because it wasn't violent enough... (JuA) commanders and Majlis-e-Askari Karwan's leader, Akhtar Muhammad Khalil. Videos featuring tashkeel (fighting units) of Akhtar Muhammad Khalil and LeI walking in different areas of Tirah Valley in the Khyber tribal district were not uncommon, while occasionally, LeI and JuA murderous Moslems conducted joint attacks in the same area.
Rumors about LeI and potential merger and/or unity are not new. In late February 2024, following a major crisis within the TTP involving JuA and some sections of the TTP leadership, there was news circulating among Pak Taliban circles that HGB, TTP, and LeI were considering forming a consolidated platform. At that time, talks were held between TTP, HGB, LeI, and JuA for 5/6 days allegedly facilitated by Afghan Taliban officials, according to a front man for HGB. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... no agreement was reached, mostly due to some reservations that HGB and LeI had concerning the TTP in relation to the murder of JuA founding leader, Omar Khalid Khorasani, for which at that time JuA had accused members of the TTP leadership of being involved. Eventually, the TTP and JuA managed to solve their contrasts, hence practically ending the experiment for creating a unified platform. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... different commanders of HGB, LeI, and JuA repeatedly said to The Khorasan Diary at that time that talks between HGB and LeI were still ongoing, and that the possibility of merging the two was not completely off the table.
Less than a year later, rumors started to circulate again. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... this time, the commanders of HGB and LeI confirmed that the pledge of unity of struggle had been taken. It became official when the spokespersons of the two factions openly acknowledged it.
Meanwhile,
...back at the dirigible, Jack stuck the cigar in his mouth, stepped onto the gantry, and asked Got a light, Mac?
Von Schtinken stopped short, lowering the dagger and trying to control his features.
If you light that thing, Herr Armschtröng, he pointed out, his voice tense, we all die!... on January 18, the TTP inaugurated its new structure for the year 2025. An annual practice started in 2022, the structure of the TTP has been increasingly expanding in its multiple articulations. In mid-2022, the TTP displayed a limited number of shadow provinces, first seven and then eight by the end of the year. At the same time, for the first time, it openly revealed the presence of an internal administration divided into different ministries. The structure outlined for 2024 included 11 shadow provinces whose number increased during the year, reaching a total of 14. However,
death is not the end. There remains the litigation over the estate... in 2025, the TTP massively expanded its structure by reaching the number of 37 shadow provinces, adding new ones for Balochistan while fragmentation larger provinces into small ones, often matching the actual district-level administration of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Additionally, the 2025 chart outlined in detail the administration of every province and every ministry. Furthermore, the TTP inaugurated new committees for overseeing the overall administration of the provinces in addition to the already established commissions for military operations.
For the first time ever, the TTP also disclosed the members of the Rahbari Shura or Leadership Council. Comprising 17 members, it includes big shots of the TTP and founders but also prominent commanders and veterans. It also reveals that the TTP opted for a balance of power among factions and institutions in the Leadership Council while reinforcing the grip of the leader of the group, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud.
All of these changes highlight the fluid characteristics of the composition of the murderous Moslem landscape in Pakistain. They also underscore how Pak Taliban factions have been able - to different degrees - to accommodate both a long-term, ambitious vision and local, warlord-like short-term objectives. This is possibly the deadliest combination for Pakistain’s security environment because it encapsulates local conflicts and grievances into a higher goal. And for now, the Pak Taliban seem to have found an effective strategy to streamline both.
Posted by: trailing wife ||
08/23/2026 00:00 ||
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Long. You’ll want a cup of coffee and a bit of something to eat to accompany this one, dear Reader.
[Jpost] Israel and India's strongest response to a new security bloc may not be another bloc. It is the ability to stand independently and to have capable partners standing with you.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on August 6. The very following day, Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start... , Pakistain, and The Sick Man of Europe Turkey ...a NATO ...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A cautionary tale of cost-benefit analysis.... member, but not the most reliable... signed a mutual defense pact in Mecca. Does the sequence of events suggest a connection, or is it simply a coincidence?
There is no evidence the two events were connected. But the sequence is striking enough to deserve attention.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement states that an armed attack against one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three, inviting comparisons with NATO's Article 5.
But is this really an Islamic NATO-type alliance?
Or is it, instead, an instrument of deterrence, political signaling, and strategic positioning?
For both Israel and India, that distinction matters. But first let us revisit some key events from last year.
FROM SAUDI-PAKISTAN TO A THREE-WAY PACT
The story began publicly in September 2025, when Saudi Arabia and Pakistain signed their Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement.
Saudi Arabia gained a deeper military relationship with Pakistain, the only openly nuclear-armed Moslem-majority country. Pakistain gained an even stronger strategic relationship with a wealthy and influential Gulf power.
Then Turkey entered the picture.
Pakistain's principal military adversary is India, while its relationship with Israel has long been openly hostile. For instance, Pak Defense Minister Khawaja Asif recently called for "Moslem countries to unite against Israel."
Turkey brings another dimension.
President His Enormity, Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdogan the First ...Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi but they voted him back in so they deserve him. It's a sin, a shame, and a felony to insult the president of Turkey. In Anatolia did Recep Bey a stately Presidential Palace decree, that has 1100 rooms. That's 968 more than in the White House, 400 more than in Versailles, and 325 more than Buckingham Palace, so you know who's really more important... has positioned Turkey as one of Israel's strongest political opponents over Gazoo and the Paleostinian issue. At the same time, Turkey is a NATO member and has developed an increasingly independent security role in the Moslem world.
Its growing defense relationship with Pakistain and repeated support for Pakistain's position on Kashmir ...a disputed territory lying between India and Pakistain. After partition, the Paks grabbed half of it and call it Azad (Free) Kashmir. The remainder they refer to as "Indian Occupied Kashmir". They have fought four wars with India over it, the score currently 4-0 in New Delhi's favor. After 72 years of this nonsense, India cut the Gordian knot in 2019, removing the area's special status, breaking off Ladakh as a separate state, and allowing people from other areas to settle (or in the case of the Pandits, to resettle) there.... add another layer.
India and Israel, meanwhile, are both strengthening defense relationships with Greece and Cyprus, countries with longstanding disputes with Turkey.
WHAT DOES ’AN ATTACK ON ONE IS AN ATTACK ON ALL’ ACTUALLY MEAN?
This terminology sounds like NATO.
But NATO's Article 5 does not automatically mean that every member goes to war when another is attacked. Members ultimately determine the nature of the response.
The Mecca agreement appears similarly flexible. Ottoman Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has described its collective defense provision as technically comparable to Article 5, while stressing that the nature of assistance would depend on circumstances.
That leaves the crucial question:
What happens when the pact is actually tested?
Saudi Arabia has been attacked multiple times by Iran and Iranian proxies such as the Iran's Houthi sock puppets ...a Zaidi Shia insurgent group operating in Yemen. They have also been referred to as the Believing Youth. Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi is said to be the spiritual leader of the group and most of the military leaders are his relatives. The legitimate Yemeni government has accused the them of having ties to the Iranian government. Honest they did. The group has managed to gain control over all of Saada Governorate and parts of Amran, Al Jawf and Hajjah Governorates. Its slogan is God is Great, Death to America™, Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews They like shooting off... ummm... missiles that they would have us believe they make at home in their basements. On the plus side, they did murder Ali Abdullah Saleh, which was the only way the country was ever going to be rid of him... s in Yemen ...an area of the Arabian Peninsula sometimes mistaken for a country. It is populated by more antagonistic tribes and factions than you can keep track of... . If these attacks continue or escalate significantly, to what extent would Turkey and Pakistain be willing to support Saudi Arabia with weapons, intelligence, air defense systems, or troops? More importantly, under what circumstances, if any, would either country be willing to deploy forces and actually fight on Saudi territory?
That ambiguity may be deliberate. The pact may be intended primarily to deter an attack, but that deterrence depends on Iran believing Turkey and Pakistain would actually respond if Saudi Arabia were attacked.
The pact also offers these countries a chance to expand their influence in the Gulf and establish themselves as powers with a greater say in regional security. An attack on Saudi Arabia could therefore become far more complicated for Iran, potentially drawing Turkey and Pakistain into a confrontation alongside the US and Israel.
But economics may ultimately impose limits: Pakistain cannot afford a regional war, while Saudi Arabia itself depends heavily on stable trade, energy exports, and maritime routes. And if Turkey became embroiled in a conflict with Greece or Israel, this would raise an even more fundamental question: Would Pakistain really risk its own economic interests to follow Turkey into a wider war? These aspects will determine whether the agreement is a genuine security commitment or largely political theatre.
Saudi Arabia may be the most interesting member of the pact. Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman
...Crown Prince and modernizer of Saudi Arabia as of 2016. The Turks hate him, so he must be all right, despite the occasional brutal murder of Qatar-owned journalists... , has spent years trying to transform the kingdom through Saudi Vision 2030, economic diversification, technology, and investment. Normalization with Israel once appeared compatible with that strategy.
However,
if you can't say something nice about a person some juicy gossip will go well... Riyadh has tied any normalization with Israel to Paleostinian statehood, making the Paleostinian issue both a diplomatic condition and a source of political leverage. For Turkey and Pakistain, championing the Paleostinian cause also offers a way to strengthen their standing across the Moslem world while positioning themselves as independent regional powers.
The Moslem world, however, is far too fragmented for this to become a simple "Moslem countries unite against Israel" scenario.
The UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, for example, are part of the Abraham Accords and have pursued normalized relations with Israel. At the same time, the UAE has also emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner of India.
A DIFFERENT MAP: FOLLOW THE MARITIME ROUTES
In matters concerning the Middle East, geography plays a significant role.
On a conventional map, the Mecca pact creates a striking triangle: Turkey to the north-west, Saudi Arabia to the south and Pakistain to the east. Strategically, those three countries occupy important positions across the region.
But geography looks different if we follow the maritime routes.
The critical question is not simply who controls territory, but who can help keep the sea lanes open.
The EU-India security and defense partnership specifically includes maritime security, while India and La Belle France have committed to deeper operational cooperation and freedom of navigation across the Indian Ocean and wider Indo-Pacific.
At the other end of this strategic arc, Israel's recognition of Somaliland ...Republic of Somaliland is an unrecognised sovereign state in the Horn of Africa, recognised internationally as a de jure part of Somalia. It is located in the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden with approximately 5.7 million residents as of 2021. The capital and largest city is Hargeisa. The government regards itself as the successor state to British Somaliland, which united from 1960 to 1991 with the Trust Territory of Somaliland (the former Italian Somaliland) to form the Somali Republic. Under the Siad Barre regime, Somaliadestroyed ninety percent of Hargeisa Per international law, once you're in, you gotta stay in, no matter how bad it smells.... in December 2025 has given Jerusalem a new relationship in the Horn of Africa, directly adjacent to the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
This does not create a formal counter-alliance. But it produces a different strategic picture.
The Mecca pact may look powerful when drawn across the landmass. Still, the picture changes when the map is drawn along the maritime arteries connecting the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean.
That is where India's relationships with Europe, Israel, the wider Gulf, and the Horn of Africa become increasingly significant.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND ISRAEL
India and Israel are not members of a mutual-defense treaty. Yet their strategic partnership is far more substantial than that distinction suggests.
The relationship includes decades of defense cooperation, from the Barak-8/MRSAM air defense system to unmanned systems, radar, surveillance, precision weapons, electronic warfare, cyber, and intelligence cooperation.
More importantly, the relationship is moving from procurement toward industrial integration, with joint development, production, and technology cooperation becoming increasingly important.
That is the real strength of the partnership: reliability built over time rather than promises written on paper. This is what a strategic partnership looks like when it is built over time.
From Kargil ... three months of unprovoked Pak aggression, over 4000 dead Paks, another victory for India ... to Uri and the security challenges following Pahalgam, India's experience has reinforced Israel's practical value as a dependable defense partner.
The relationship may not be a formal mutual-defense alliance, but it has demonstrated something that can matter more than treaty language: reliability when security is at stake.
The Mecca agreement should neither be dismissed nor exaggerated.
It may remain primarily a deterrence mechanism. It may be intended to strengthen the strategic positions of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistain. Or it may eventually become a genuine military commitment.
The greatest danger is not immediate war, but miscalculation.
Any future India-Pakistain crisis could become more dangerous if Ottoman Turkish commitments to Pakistain intersected with Israel's strategic relationship with India.
That makes Netanyahu's call with Modi on August 6, one day before the pact was announced, noteworthy. There is no evidence the events were connected. The coincidence is simply interesting.
But India and Israel do not need to respond with another bloc. They need greater strategic independence: deeper cooperation in missile defense, drones, cyber, AI, space, and other critical technologies, alongside stronger partnerships with pragmatic states such as the UAE, Europe, and countries across the wider Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa.
The Moslem world is not a unified bloc, and India and Israel should not treat it as one. Strengthen the economy at home, cooperate where interests align, protect vital maritime routes, and maintain enough strategic depth to avoid dependence on any single power.
The strongest response to a new security bloc is not necessarily another bloc. It is the ability to stand independently and to have capable partners standing with you.
#1
None of these "partners" seem to commit much past the announcement back-patting moment. Trust they'll all renege at any important point where actual "material, kinetic or financial" is needed
Posted by: Frank G ||
08/23/2026 17:03 Comments ||
Top||
[NationalContext] The attack on Masrour Barzani’s office on August 17th and a resting house belonging to one of the KDP’s key intelligence officials was likely connected to the ongoing Iraqi-Iranian negotiations over the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. The reason becomes relatively straightforward when the attack is placed within the timeline of negotiations before it and the statements that followed.
Since the middle of the Iran war, and more intensively since the ceasefire, Tehran has been pressing Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region for a new arrangement governing the Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran increasingly appears to regard the 2023 Iraq-Iran security agreement as no longer sufficient. That agreement was intended to disarm the groups, move them away from Iran’s border and prevent them from using Iraqi territory for attacks. The war demonstrated, however, that several remained organised and capable of remobilising.
Tehran has therefore been pushing for a more far-reaching solution, including their removal from Iraq altogether to a non-neighbouring third country. On May 26, Al-Araby al-Jadeed reported, citing an official in Iraq’s National Security Advisory and a senior KDP politician, that Tehran considered the 2023 agreement no longer sufficient and was seeking the complete removal of the groups from Iraqi territory, similar to the earlier removal of the Mujahedin-e Khalq. The KDP source also said Iran had demanded the handover of named senior figures, which he said the Kurdish side would not accept.
The sequence that followed is worth setting out. On July 6, KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani was on an official visit to Albania, the country where the MEK was eventually resettled after leaving Iraq. On exactly the same day, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi and a senior KRG delegation headed by Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed were meeting in Baghdad to discuss the Iran security agreement. That meeting dealt specifically with implementation, including the stages of the agreement and the next steps.
No evidence establishes that Qubad Talabani’s visit concerned the Iranian Kurdish groups, and his side subsequently denied such reports. The coincidence is notable, however, because third-country removal had already emerged as an Iranian demand more than a month earlier. Albania also provides an obvious precedent for precisely such an arrangement, having taken in an Iranian opposition organisation that was removed from Iraq and resettled at a distance from Iran.
An endless effort as the Ummah keeps pouring money in. Still, that’s one way for Israel to finance the war against them. From Wednesday.
[IsraelTimes] Gaza's terror group is rearming, in part with money from the daily influx of aid
I’d really like to think that the US Middle East peace team has gotten over Steve Witkoff’s delusion that Hamas ..always the voice of sweet reason... is not ideologically intractable and that it can be persuaded to lay down its weapons and quietly slink away into history.
I’d like to believe that when Jared Kushner meets, as he did again in Egypt over the weekend, with Khalil al-Hayya, he is thoroughly aware that the current Hamas chief was one of the architects of the October 7, 2023, invasion and massacre in southern Israel, and remains laser-locked on the goal of destroying Israel.
In purportedly agreeing to the US-established Board of Peace’s plan for its own disarmament and Israel’s withdrawal from Gazoo, Hamas is manifestly playing the United States and playing for time: It is recruiting; it is training; it is awaiting a less intrusive, more anti-Israel American administration; it is awaiting a resumption of funding from the despicably resilient Iranian regime.
That does not mean that the US-led effort, via the Board, to marginalize Hamas and gradually change the face of Gaza is a lost cause. But success requires genuine Hamas disarmament; ongoing, relentless elimination of Hamas operatives preparing and attempting to carry out attacks... and a heightened focus on Hamas’s finances.
According to Yitzhak Gal, of the center-left Mitvim advocacy think tank, Hamas retains broad leverage over aid entering the near-50% of Gaza where it retains control, and is able to tax (at entry and in the markets), obstruct and loot supplies to the tune of some $2 million a day. (A Board of Peace official acknowledged to The Times of Israel that diversion of aid continues, but did not confirm Gal’s figure, and said the scale of Hamas intervention has been going down.) It is essential, therefore, urged Gal, that the Board’s yet-to-be-deployed International Stabilization Force fully control the entire aid distribution process.
In an Army Radio interview on Monday, Gal further argued that Hamas, in purportedly agreeing to relinquish civilian governance to the Board’s National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, the intended interim technocratic government, is, again, playing the US, the Board et al for fools, since it has ensured that the hierarchies through which this committee would seek to operate are staffed by Hamas and its loyalists.
Finally, Gal urged the establishment of a kind of economic police force — to oversee taxation, money-changing, cryptocurrency dealings and every other aspect of finance in Gaza, an effort that he acknowledged would likely trigger open conflict with Hamas.
Common to these proposals is the imperative to ensure not only the disarming of Hamas but also the draining of Hamas’s coffers.
The Board of Peace may not be perfect, Gal argued, but it is the least bad international tool around to heighten pressure on Hamas. And that pressure must include shattering Hamas’s financial leverage.
Otherwise, Hamas will continue quietly strengthening, and another round of devastating conflict is only a matter of time.
How potent and proximate is the threat?
Former and would-be prime minister Naftali Bennett, visiting the Gaza border town of Netiv Ha’asara two weeks ago, sounded a furious alarm: "Hamas has restored its command system, they appointed company commanders, battalion commanders, brigade commanders, rearmed themselves with long-range missiles, UAVs, drones, and weaponry and are now digging the tunnels anew," Bennett said, adding that the terror group was "already training for the next massacre."
Bennett is campaigning to defeat Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and unsurprisingly pointed a renewed finger of blame at Netanyahu, declaring that "a direct line connects the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem to what is happening here on the other side of the fence: Netanyahu gave up on eliminating Hamas, brought Qatar ...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi... into the Prime Minister’s Office, and later gave the Qataris the keys to Gaza."
But a month earlier, officers in the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate and Southern Command similarly warned that Hamas’s military wing was preparing for renewed war with Israel, specifying that the terror group was producing hundreds of bombs and anti-tank missiles every month, recruiting fighters aged 18-22, and recently restarted training for members of its elite Nukhba force.
Hamas, the officers said, according to a Kan TV report, is also trying to smuggle in drones and communication devices from Sinai. And it is working to rebuild its underground infrastructure, much of which was never destroyed.
At least twice in recent weeks, indeed, the IDF has stated that it attacked Hamas operatives working to restore Gaza tunnels.
Almost unbelievably, what’s more, three years after October 7, IDF surveillance soldiers say they are again witnessing Hamas terror activities, and that their superiors are ignoring their warnings.
Naivete and complacency are unthinkable when it comes to Hamas. But so, too, are paralysis and inaction.
[News With Views] There’s no question that America has turned away from God. Yes, there are some true Christ followers left who sincerely love and seek the Lord with all their hearts, but their numbers are few, and Jesus said it would be this way.
Matthew 7: "Enter in at the strait gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leads to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat: Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."
What happened to our people, once grateful and devout followers of our Creator and Sustainer? Not only have they abandoned their reverence, awe and faith in Almighty God, but for most Americans, God has become totally irrelevant in their daily lives. Some even openly mock, despise and hate God and those who faithfully follow Him. They see Christianity as a "repressive religion," though they really know nothing about the Bible, God the Father, or Jesus Christ, our Savior. Because no one has ever taught them.
In 1904, Aleister Crowley, an English writer who was deeply involved in the occult, satanism and ritual "magic" ceremonies, wrote, "Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law." This became a key point of doctrine when Anton LaVey founded the Church of Satan in 1966, in San Francisco. This satanic movement found a ready and willing following during this time of rebellion, hedonism and debauchery here in the US. Our Supreme Court had just recently ruled that Bible reading and prayer would be prohibited in public schools. The "Johnson Amendment" had been in effect for a dozen years by this time, and pastors were already retreating from public discourse regarding politics and cultural issues. Meanwhile, the "hippie" and "free love" movements were starting, and young people (always the devil’s targets) were ripe for this new, permissive lifestyle. With "pastors" now afraid to preach the whole counsel of God for fear of losing their 501c3 status, there was little Godly leadership for young people with more questions than answers — and the lure of promiscuity and moral liberties became very enticing.
Today, we regard that time as the "good old days," because most Americans still had a healthy fear of the Lord. Most families still attended church every week, and the line between right and wrong was still pretty clear to most. But the downward spiral had begun.
[Jpost] The core issue therefore centers not on the raw strength of the Baloch movement alone but on whether it holds attributes that make it a strategic asset major powers can viably invest in.
Has the Baloch insurgency in Iran become a genuine pressure lever for Washington, now that its options with the Kurds have narrowed?
A rise in armed operations in southeastern Iran might suggest this outcome, yet this reading outpaces available facts: the Baloch lever remains far from serving as a viable replacement for the Kurdish alternative.
The worth of any armed movement rests not in attack volume but in the capacity to alter internal power dynamics, secure political legitimacy, and sustain external backing. The core issue therefore centers not on the raw strength of the Baloch movement alone but on whether it holds attributes that make it a strategic asset major powers can viably invest in.
On-the-ground records confirm that the Sistan and Baluchestan province has been Iran’s weakest territorial segment since its military annexation under Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1928.
Three to four million residents live there; Sunni Baloch make up roughly three-quarters of the population. Official figures rank this province as Iran’s poorest, with the lowest scores for development, education, and life expectancy nationwide.
Systemic marginalization carried steep political and security costs. The Baloch people account for no more than five percent of Iran’s population, yet their share of individuals executed in political and security cases in recent years far exceeds their demographic weight.
The events of the Bloody Friday massacre in Zahedan in September 2022, when dozens of protesters and worshippers died, deepened rifts between the state and large groups of local residents and turned the province into one of Iran’s most persistent, chronic unrest hubs.
Such environments naturally breed protest movements and armed factions. The emergence of insurgency does not set strategic worth, however. True value comes from an evolution into a political project that enforces new realities.
From the rise of the Sunni Jundallah ..."Soldiers of God," a name used by two multiple separate terror outfits, one active in Iran and the other in Pakistain. Both are Sunni organizations that target Shiites. The Pak version has close relations with al-Qaeda and the Pak Talibs and is probably a false nose and mustache for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi... fighter group under leader Abdolmalek Rigi in Iran, through the Jaish al-Adl group’s activities, to the late 2025 unification of multiple factions under the People’s Fighters Front, the Baloch movement moved beyond scattered independent groups. It pursued a tighter unified political and military framework.
Most notably, this shift avoided open separatist rhetoric and instead framed goals as replacing the Velayat-e Faqih system (a political Shi’ite approach) alongside other Iranian societal groups. This nationalist stance gives the movement a wider margin for maneuvering than separatist messaging, which faces tougher acceptance domestically and internationally.
THE BALOCH CARD: WISHFUL THINKING?
These advances do not erase structural constraints limiting the movement. Its workforce and military capabilities stay small relative to Kurdish groups. The desert theater sits distant from Iran’s key political and economic hubs, and leading associated armed factions retain terrorist designations from the US.
These factors make transition from indirect contacts to overt support a costly choice politically and legally and explain the absence of indicators pointing to a true partnership.
Limits inherent to the Baloch lever emerge clearly here — reliance on external actors ties to the nature and limits of achievable support.
Near-term external engagement will likely stay confined to unacknowledged intelligence and financial aid in addition to limited media and political backing.
Overt military support is low-probability and costly; major powers favor deniable assistance channels and avoid direct involvement with gangs tangled in complex legal and regional sensitivities.
Drawing parallels with Kurdish movements brings the core trade-offs into focus. The Kurdish track record bears out a basic rule: major powers select armed partners for their capacity to produce strategic gains at acceptable political and military cost, not for their operational intensity.
The Kurdish lever thus appeared more operationally useful to Washington during the 2026 conflict before colliding with Ottoman Turkish national priorities.
Ankara viewed empowerment of any armed Kurdish force near its borders as a direct threat to national security and applied political pressure that halted this path before realization.
The collapse of the Kurdish option proved a critical point: no lever inside Iran carries value solely through military force; regional allies must also stand ready to absorb its consequences.
Accordingly, the decision to dial back Kurdish support did not trigger an automatic realignment behind the Baloch movement.
Pakistain carries equal weight in this calculus. Islamabad combats domestic Baloch insurgency and recognizes that escalation on Iranian territory risks a rapid spillover across borders. Ergo, national interests drive containment rather than encouragement of unrest, even as Pak influence over Washington lags behind Ottoman Turkish clout.
Consequently, moreover, any external bet on the Baloch factor remains governed more by regional balances than by developments inside Iran. The success of any such project requires a regional consensus that appears absent for now.
In this light, the Baloch card seems closer to an instrument of attrition than to a regime-change project. Although it does force Tehran to spread security resources across an added front and raises control costs for peripheral regions, it lacks the capacity to threaten the state’s center or impose a new political equation.
Confusing security nuisance with strategic impact often leads to misleading assessments.
History records many armed factions drained state resources successfully yet failed to alter underlying power balances.
Therefore, to correctly judge this option, analysts must use measurable indicators instead of impressions. Key measures include moving from scattered raids to holding inland territories permanently, coordinated external backing that grows past limited talks to regular political, logistical, or financial support, and wider splits in Iranian state bodies that weaken the IRGC’s grip on remote provinces.
If these three factors all come together, claims of a true strategic change would hold up. Without them, talk of a strong Baloch card is little more than wishful thinking.
Posted by: trailing wife ||
08/23/2026 00:00 ||
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Link ||
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Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
#1
having the Balochs knock off a few dozen IRGC troops would help
Posted by: Lord Garth ||
08/23/2026 12:28 Comments ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
...Arabic for 
...a former bus driver, now head of the Deobandi bandido group Lashkar-e-Islam and the Terror of Khyber Agency...
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start...
..always the voice of sweet reason...
