[IsraelTimes] ‘Od Nirkod,’ which takes title from slogan of Nova festival survivors, is latest show of solidarity from the musician, who is increasingly vocal in support of Jewish communities
The British pop icon Boy George has gone to bat for Israel and its supporters multiple times in recent months, rejecting boycott calls and expressing solidarity after antisemitic violence. Now, he has released a single in the same key.
"We Will Dance Again" defends Israel’s military response in Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response... , criticizes musicians and activists who have publicly supported the Paleostinian cause and declares, "If you’re ever confused: I stand with the Jews."
The song borrows its title from the slogan of survivors of the Nova music festival, where Hamas ..always the voice of sweet reason... bully boyz killed 378 young people and kidnapped dozens as part of the October 7, 2023, invasion of southern Israel. The slogan has become a symbol of resilience in the aftermath of October 7.
The singer released the reggae-inspired track, titled "Od Nirkod" in Hebrew, on his social media accounts on Monday with a single hashtag: #Shalom.
"You say genocide, I say war / When you’re attacked, that’s what the army’s for," the song opens. Later, Boy George sings, "You never mention Oct. 7," in a criticism of those he sings have "selective memory" about atrocities deserving their reprobation. The song ends by repeating the opening lyrics in Hebrew.
Although Boy George is not Jewish, he has become increasingly vocal when it comes to supporting Jewish communities in the wake of October 7.
He rejected calls to boycott this year’s Eurovision Song Contest over Israel’s participation, saying he would not "turn my back" on his Jewish friends. The singer participated this year representing San Marino, in a counterpoint to artists and countries that pulled out rather than compete alongside Israel.
Boy George had a long relationship with Jon Moss, the Jewish drummer who launched Culture Club with him, the New Wave band that dominated much of the 1980s with its melodic soul-infused music and its outlandish styles. Boy George then often wore a tunic with "Culture Club" in Hebrew translation.
Following an antisemitic stabbing in London’s heavily Orthodox Golders Green neighborhood earlier this year, where the singer happened to be at the time, he said Jewish people should know "we support them."
Boy George’s new song has drawn appreciation from pro-Israel voices. Stop the Hate UK, a British Jewish anti-antisemitism campaign, called Boy George a supporter of "Jewish joy" and thanked him publicly for standing with the Jewish community.
And the official Nova Music Festival account on Instagram responded to Boy George’s post announcing the song with a simple comment: "We will dance again."
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Viktor Lavrinenko
[REGNUM] In Britain, a decision has been made in the high-profile case of Aigars Balsevich, a Latvian national and former mayor of Wisbech. He has been sentenced to a prison term followed by deportation.
Balsevich's rise from migrant to mayor seemed like an incredible success story, but just a year after his triumph, he committed a crime that ruined his career and reputation: a Latvian man raped a woman. This was the end of the "British Dream" fairytale that Balsevich had inspired in many migrants.
A LONG WAY TO THE TOP
Balsevich arrived in the UK in 2004, among the first wave of Baltic immigrants who flocked there en masse immediately after Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia joined the European Union. Like other Eastern Europeans, he started out small, toiling away at various odd jobs.
Balsevich settled in Wisbech, a small town (population 33,000) in Cambridgeshire. Eastern European migration quickly changed the town's appearance. It boasted several large food factories, and the surrounding area boasted approximately 4,000 farms and food packaging plants, which required a large workforce.
Guest workers from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia flocked there in huge numbers. As a result, up to 10,000 residents of Wisbech are now from these countries.
Most migrants remain at the lowest level for life, never rising above the low-skilled labor force, but some do manage to escape. Among these lucky ones was Balsevich—unlike most other migrant workers, he didn't squander his hard-earned money, but carefully saved it, considering the best investment options.
He quickly went into business and prospered, opening three pubs and an entertainment center in Wisbech. All of his establishments became well-known in the town and began to generate profits. Most of his clients were once again Eastern European migrant workers. Later, Balsevich also became interested in a political career. Until 2024, all EU citizens residing in the UK had the right to vote and stand as candidates in local elections.
Balsevich was elected to Wisbech Borough Council in 2015 on the Conservative Party list. It's unlikely, of course, that he would have been elected had voters known about the skeleton in the closet he carefully concealed.
During one of his trips home, he committed an act of robbery, for which he received a five-year suspended sentence. Balsevich was placed under the supervision of the Latvian Probation Service and was forced to regularly report to Latvia to confirm compliance with the terms of his sentence. In England, he naturally kept quiet about the true purpose of these trips, claiming he was visiting relatives.
Meanwhile, his political career was progressing successfully. In 2019, Balsevich became deputy mayor of Wisbech. And in May 2020, city council members elected him as the full mayor. His full title was "ceremonial mayor of the city council." The election was hailed as "historic"—he was the first municipal mayor of Eastern European descent in the kingdom.
The post's functions are primarily formal: they chair meetings, represent the city at various public events, and engage in charitable activities on its behalf. When Balsevich took office as mayor, he was 41 years old—an excellent age for a politician.
The British press hailed their country as a "land of opportunity"—a man who once arrived as an unknown immigrant had risen to a high-ranking position. Latvian was praised as a "model of successful integration," and his election as "a step forward for multicultural Britain."
However, an incident soon occurred that would prove to be a harbinger of his imminent fall from grace. In March 2021, Balsevich's pub, The Angel, was accused of multiple COVID-19 violations. This led to the mayor's license being revoked. A couple of months later, even more damning news arrived.
HIDING BEHIND CHILDREN
In Wisbech, the ceremonial mayor's term is one year. Less than a week after Balsevich resigned, news broke that he had gone to the home of a woman he knew and raped her.
The court and police are keeping the identity of this woman a secret to avoid further traumatizing the victim. According to the case file, the victim cried and repeatedly told the former mayor "no," but he ignored her pleas.
When the victim attempted to escape the room where the violence occurred, the former mayor held her back and immediately assaulted her again. Later, the victim managed to contact two friends and call for help. They immediately went to her home. When they arrived at the door, the rapist immediately fled.
The woman immediately filed a complaint with the police, and Balsevich was arrested the very next day. An incredible scandal erupted. The Latvian vehemently denied both charges. But on July 31, 2023, after a trial at Peterborough Crown Court, a jury found him guilty on both counts.
The court soon sentenced him to 6.5 years in prison. The judge also ordered Balsevich to be placed on the sex offenders' registry for life. Shortly after the verdict, the rapist was expelled from the Conservative Party and informed that he would be deported. He filed an appeal, citing Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights—"The right to respect for private and family life."
In London's Immigration Court, Balsevich's lawyers cited his children, who were born and raised in England. He argued that deportation would cause them irreparable harm. However, during the trial, it emerged that the children had not lived with him for six years, following his divorce from their mother. Incidentally, this happened because Balsevich had taken to beating his wife. He had not seen the children at all for the past three years.
In July 2026, Judge Susan Kebede ruled: "Balcewicz's prior status in our society, his contribution to British democracy and his length of residence in the UK are outweighed by the nature and seriousness of his offence."
The former mayor tried to argue that he'd long since lost all ties to his homeland and that ending up there would be like being in a foreign country. But this argument also fell apart when the judge was presented with evidence from Latvia showing that Balsevich had been regularly reporting to the probation service for a long time.
The British Home Office supported the deportation decision. According to the court's ruling, the former mayor must remain in prison until at least the end of next year. His possible parole is expected in December 2027. He will then be deported to Latvia.
The case became an important precedent in British legal practice. For the first time, a court considered and ruled positively on the deportation of a person who had not only lived in the country for many years but also held the highest municipal office.
Now Latvians bitterly joke that a man convicted of theft and subsequently able to become mayor will easily integrate into the political elite of his native state.
"FEATS" OF THE BALTS
Balsevich's case is no exception. Many people from the Baltics have become defendants in high-profile crimes in the UK.
The most high-profile recent example: in February 2026, it became known that 33 Lithuanian citizens would stand trial on charges of participating in a large-scale criminal organization.
The gang operated for nearly ten years in Lithuania, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The group is accused of human trafficking (including children), drug trafficking, and money laundering. The case contains 297 volumes and includes testimony from over 400 witnesses.
According to investigators, the gang members smuggled at least 100 people from Lithuania to Ireland and Northern Ireland. They were lured with rosy promises and forced to sell drugs, primarily heroin. They were subjected to various forms of torture to ensure compliance.
"They were beaten with car cables, scalded with boiling water, and forced onto drugs. There were cases where people overdosed and were simply left on the streets to die," reports Lina Garanitskaitė, chief investigator for the Klaipėda County Police.
In late 2025, British police arrested five Lithuanians who had developed a peculiar business. They raided containers intended for charitable donations, stealing tons of clothing. The Lithuanians resold the items abroad, using the proceeds to finance other crimes. More than 20,000 pounds were seized during searches.
That same year, a Lithuanian gang specializing in luxury car theft was convicted in Peterborough. Between April and September 2024, the gang stole 22 luxury cars worth over £500,000. The perpetrators stole the vehicles from driveways in several towns and villages. The cars were shipped to Eastern Europe to be scrapped for parts.
While Lithuanians in the UK mainly specialise in organised crime, Latvians specialise in beatings and murders.
Earlier this year, 22-year-old Latvian citizen Maksim Pilko received an eight-year sentence in England for attempted brutal murder. The victim had to be placed in an induced coma. Pilko had previously been convicted of threatening someone with a knife in a store.
Last year, Northampton Court sentenced a Latvian citizen, who had been on the run for over ten years, to five years and three months in prison. He and an accomplice brutally assaulted their landlord over a dispute over £30 in rent.
In August 2025, 31-year-old Latvian citizen Erika Korsak was arrested in Gravesend. Along with 25-year-old Shahim Bulika from Albania, she is accused of murdering 33-year-old Latvian citizen Vladimir Perminov, who they fatally stabbed.
Due to the appearance of a third suspect, also Albanian, in the case, the start of the trial was postponed until September of this year.
[FOX] A former U.S. Navy SEAL was convicted in a foiled plot to attack law enforcement officers with explosives during a "No Kings" protest
…the anti-Trump No Kings thing was yet another Antifa/Black Bloc anarcho-communist syndicalist action…
in California after a store clerk's tip led federal investigators to him.
Gregory Vandenberg, 49,
…who identifies as a neo-Nazi, joined in the Antifa fun because he was angry with President Trump because Mr. Vandenburg believes the US government is controlled by Israel and the Jews…
was found guilty after a five-day federal trial of transportation of explosives with intent to kill, injure or intimidate and attempted transportation of prohibited fireworks into California, according to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Mexico.
Jurors deliberated for about three hours before returning the guilty verdict.
Prosecutors said Vandenberg was driving from El Paso, Texas, to San Diego ahead of the June 14, 2025, demonstrations when he stopped at a travel center near Lordsburg, New Mexico, and purchased six mortar-style fireworks and 72 M-150 firecrackers.
While making the purchase, Vandenberg told a store clerk he intended to throw the explosives at law enforcement officers during the protests, federal authorities said.
He repeatedly asked about the amount of gunpowder in the fireworks, whether taping multiple mortars together would increase their explosive force and said he was interested only in their ability to injure officers, prosecutors said.
#1
US government is controlled by Israel and the Jews
"A Jewish man sitting in a coffee shop in Moscow, calmly reading a notoriously antisemitic newspaper. Another Jew sees him and says, “How can you read that garbage? Don’t you want to know what’s actually happening in our community?” The man replies, “When I read the Jewish papers, there is so much written about antisemitism and the threats we face. But here, I read that we run the banks, control the media and own half the world. It’s much more uplifting.”
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] Turkish politics hasn't seen such a demonstrative political rift in a long time. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and 90 other MPs left the party to form the New Party (YENİ Parti).
Formally, it all began with an appeals court ruling in May that invalidated the 2023 RPP congress, where Özel replaced Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as chairman. The court cited the "absolute nullity" of the proceedings, annulled the results, and reinstated the unpopular party veteran.
For Ösel's supporters, this verdict was the point of no return. Removed from his post as chairman but retaining his position as head of the parliamentary group, he spoke openly of a "forced and long-overdue sad farewell" and took to the podium with the phrase: "Every end is a beginning."
Compromising and accepting the leadership of the reinstated leader, who was essentially appointed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through the judges, would have meant capitulating to the authorities. Özel preferred a split in the party to its external control.
Although the opposition's grip on parliament has weakened, the newly formed party is ahead of the CHP. The New Party has 91 seats. The Republicans have lost ground from 135 seats to 44, falling behind even the pro-Kurdish DEM party, which has 56 seats. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) holds 277 of the 600 seats.
The new party's main goal, according to Özel, is to become the most important opposition force in the Grand National Assembly. His closest ally, Ankara MP Murat Emir, is even more blunt: "We are leaving behind the occupied party." For the CHP's old guard, this is a blow to its influence and prestige.
The reasons for the split go far beyond a single court decision. Özel assumed leadership of the CHP in 2023, replacing his 77-year-old predecessor, whose 13-year leadership was widely described as an ineffective challenge to Erdoğan.
Just a year later, Özel proved his effectiveness, securing the AKP's first-ever defeat in municipal elections. The politician became the face and symbol of the opposition to Erdoğan, especially in 2025, when the most popular opposition figure, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested. He is currently in prison, with combined sentences amounting to thousands of years.
The government's actions following İmamoğlu's arrest looked like an attempt to wipe out the opposition. Erdoğan's men attempted to impose external control over the CHP's Istanbul branch, though unsuccessfully. Then came the declaring of Özel's election as party leader illegal. Dozens of mayors and party officials were arrested on charges of corruption and ties to terrorism.
For part of society, Özel's departure is perceived not as a betrayal, but as an attempt to give new life to an opposition suffocated by legal battles and internal political contradictions.
This is precisely the perspective of the opposition liberal newspaper Sözcü. Rahmi Turan's column is headlined: "The People Seek Hope in the New Party." The publication sees Özel's project as a chance to reshape the opposition, moving beyond tired faces and procedures. The popular demand for change, according to the author's logic, is no longer satisfied by the historical legitimacy of the CHP alone—new energy and a new organizational model are needed.
Pro-government newspaper Akşamcriticizes Ozel for trying to build yet another centrist structure without clear ideological contours, comparing his plan with Macronism, Biden's course, and the failed "pillar of six" (an alliance of parties for the 2023 Turkish parliamentary elections).
"Ideological diversity alone does not guarantee a common political identity," the publication notes, effectively warning that the anti-Erdoğan coalition format without a clear ideological core has already proven its inadequacy in 2023.
The popular publication Hürriyet draws attention to the moral and political side of the issue: for some Kemalists, leaving the “century-old party” is almost a family taboo and a betrayal.
But author Ahmet Hakan, arguing, writes: "A party membership is not hereditary... You can have boundless respect for your father and still not follow in his footsteps." For him, Özel's departure is part of a modernization of political consciousness, a rejection of "tribal thinking," where party affiliation is determined by tradition rather than rational choice.
At the other extreme, in the same Hürriyet, the well-known columnist Abdulkadir Selvi actually accuses Özel of using the resources of the RPP to prepare a split.
He describes in detail how the opposition leader, losing lawsuits against Erdoğan for insults, spent years paying compensation not from his personal pocket, but from the party treasury. Moreover, according to him, just before leaving, he secured accelerated payments for three major court decisions totaling approximately 747,000 lira. For a conservative audience, this seems like a bill for his own legal losses.
For the New Party, gaining recognition, media attention, and parliamentary status is now far more important. Özel needs to demonstrate that his bloc is more popular and can win over the entire opposition in the future, representing them in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Özel and his team expect up to a million CHP members to join the movement. However, several influential mayors, including Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, have chosen to remain in the old party. This means that the struggle for the Kemalist camp's electoral legacy is only just beginning.
The CHP found itself in an extremely vulnerable position. It had effectively lost its leader and a significant portion of its faction. Kılıçdaroğlu returned to his seat, but was unable to regain public trust: after years of battling Erdoğan, he had failed to translate his electoral potential into victory.
Now, he's also being portrayed as someone who regained power through the courts (or even through collusion with Erdoğan), rather than through a congress. For some of the Kemalist core, preserving the historic party at any cost will be crucial, but the CHP will likely lose a broad base of voters, as it was unable to elect its leadership without the involvement of the authorities and the courts.
Clearly, the main beneficiary of the opposition's split is the ruling AKP. The CHP's shrinking mandates and support base, the New Party's lag and its squabbles with the Republicans, coupled with frustration among opposition supporters, all make it easier for Erdoğan to retain power. The Kemalists will certainly lose ground in potential snap elections.
Scheduled parliamentary elections are scheduled in two years, and no one is rushing to call snap elections yet. Meanwhile, a multipolar opposition architecture is emerging on the horizon. The Democratic People's Republic (DEM) is strengthening its position as a third force, with a stable Kurdish electorate and its own strategy for surviving the threat of possible bans.
Nationalist and Islamist parties—from the MHP to smaller conservative projects—will try to lure away supporters disillusioned with the RPP. The new party is becoming an experimental field: whether it can unite disillusioned Kemalists, part of the urban middle class, and those who see no place in either the old party or traditional conservative structures remains to be seen.
In any case, the Turkish opposition has entered a new phase of its development. The CHP has lost its monopoly as the sole Kemalist force, and Erdoğan, having achieved a split in his main adversary, simultaneously opened the field to new, less predictable players.
The Turkish political system, accustomed to the AKP versus CHP model, will now face a fragmented opposition. And whoever best navigates this new landscape will determine not only the outcome of the upcoming elections but also the future of Turkish politics and democracy itself.
Geopolitically, the split of the RPP and the emergence of the New Party are also important for external players. Despite the embrace of Erdoğan and the lure of Turkey into new European security arrangements, Europe will, deep down, sympathize with both the New Party and the RPP.
After all, the destruction of the opposition weakens democracy and centralizes power, diminishing the EU's ability to influence Turkey's domestic politics and its intransigent leader. Donald Trump, who shed no tears over İmamoğlu's arrest and considers Erdoğan an important partner, won't be concerned about a split within the Kemalists.
As for Russia, we still have to deal with the current leadership until the new elections. Relations with Ankara are strategically important in the economic and energy sectors.
At the same time, Erdoğan periodically makes it clear that Turkey is far from being an ideal neutral country and negotiating platform. From August to November, a squadron of Turkish F-16s and approximately 70 military personnel will be stationed in Estonia. At the last NATO summit in Ankara, Erdoğan promised arms supplies to Ukraine, and the Turks intend to resell the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems purchased from Russia to the UAE.
In any case, internal squabbles between the authorities and the RPP, as well as between the RPP and the New Party, are unlikely to affect Russian-Turkish relations in the next couple of years.
Posted by: badanov ||
07/28/2026 00:00 ||
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[NationalContext] Turkey’s parliamentary peace commission, established to chart a political and legal path out of the decades-long conflict with the PKK, adopted its landmark report on 18 February 2026, laying out an architecture for disarmament verification, fighter reintegration, and democratic reform. But the document is also a strategic doctrine: it treats domestic settlement as the prerequisite for fortifying Turkey’s internal front and sustaining a cross-border security posture in a region the report portrays as increasingly shaped by proxy conflict and fragmentation scenarios.
Context: The commission today adopted the draft with 47 in favour, 2 against, and 1 abstention, after a process officials described as 20 meetings that heard from 137 institutions and individuals, producing 88 hours of deliberations and 4,199 pages of minutes. The “yes” camp included the main parliamentary blocs, including the ruling AK Parti, CHP, MHP, the pro-Kurdish DEM Parti, and the Yeni Yol Group, while the smaller left parties TİP and EMEP voted “no,” with one CHP member abstaining.
DEM Parti’s yes vote is the politically critical signal, but it is not a blank endorsement of the state’s framing. The party voted in favour while filing a formal dissent note, objecting to the report’s language and arguing that the Kurdish question should not be defined through “terror” terminology. That qualification matters: DEM supported the process architecture while contesting the ideological frame it is wrapped in.
The adopted text is a framework, not enacted law. It proposes a roadmap for legislation, but concrete change still requires separate bills, committee passage, and a full vote in parliament.
[Breitbart] Thirty years after 230 people were killed in the explosion of TWA Flight 800, the federal government still has not come clean. The families deserved honesty. The country deserved transparency. Instead, we are left with shifting explanations, withheld evidence, and newly uncovered documents that raise serious questions about what officials knew—and when they knew it.
And the timing tells its own story. The crash came on July 17, 1996, in the middle of Bill Clinton’s reelection campaign, when the administration had every incentive to smother any suggestion that a terrorist missile had brought down a U.S. airliner off Long Island.
That document states plainly that “FBI headquarters is in receipt of faxes generated from Cairo claiming credit” for the destruction of the aircraft. This was not a rumor or retrospective theory. It was an internal FBI communication
Through a Freedom of Information Act investigation, Judicial Watch obtained more than 400 pages of FBI records, including a striking communication sent just days after the disaster. That document states plainly that “FBI headquarters is in receipt of faxes generated from Cairo claiming credit” for the destruction of the aircraft. This was not a rumor or retrospective theory. It was an internal FBI communication, distributed with “IMMEDIATE” priority in the earliest phase of the investigation.
For decades, Americans have been told there was no credible evidence of terrorism. Yet the FBI’s own records show that claims of responsibility from overseas were received and logged in real time. The question is not whether every such claim was legitimate, but whether these leads were fully pursued—and why the public was never meaningfully informed about them.
The same records raise another uncomfortable point. Internal FBI material referenced “a wealth of evidence pointing to a missile strike.” That assessment aligns with what hundreds of eyewitnesses reported—streaks of light rising from the surface toward the aircraft moments before the explosion. In total, 755 witness accounts were gathered, including 183 describing such a streak, with many placing its origin near the horizon. These accounts were effectively sidelined, never tested through full public scrutiny.
Instead, the government settled on a theory centered on a catastrophic fuel tank explosion supposedly caused by a short circuit that was never found and never recreated. After a four‑year investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that the plane crashed due to a flammable fuel‑air mixture in the center wing tank, likely ignited by a short circuit—even though the precise ignition source was never definitively identified. No Boeing 747 before or since has suffered a similar unexplained and catastrophic failure, and the fleet was never grounded for comprehensive inspection.
Equally troubling is the unusual role played by the CIA, which inserted itself into the public narrative by producing a televised animation intended to explain away eyewitness observations. The agency has no formal role in aviation accident investigations, yet it helped shape the public understanding of what occurred. Judicial Watch is still seeking full transparency on that involvement through ongoing litigation described in its lawsuit for related records. "Unusual role" indeed. If your 'WTF meter' didn't ping in that one, chances are it never will.
Questions also persist about physical evidence recovered from the wreckage. Traces of explosive materials were attributed to a supposed K-9 training exercise. That explanation lacks documentation, conflicts with the aircraft’s actual movements, and fails basic scrutiny. It appears less like a definitive finding and more like a convenient way to dismiss contradictory evidence.
To bring these issues into the open, Judicial Watch released a new documentary, “Judicial Watch Investigates TWA 800 — 30 Years Later,” which presents the FBI records obtained through FOIA alongside expert analysis and eyewitness accounts. A preview of the documentary, available on YouTube, further highlights these findings. The film lays out a factual record that challenges the completeness—and credibility—of the official narrative.
#2
When Politicians cover their mistakes, omissions and A$$es, we are the ones that suffer and/or die.
So over the next 5 Years, the Islamic terrorists decided they needed to go really big and so in our face that the DC Swamp could not hide it or cover up their success.
Remember the DOJ/FBI/CIA Chinese Wall B? I think some of that was true, but it became the "end all be all" alibi for inattention and negligence in other places.
Just spit ballin' here but a lot of people did not want the public to imagine that that this might be a retaliation for the Iranian airliner shoot-down, making instant, wide-spread Iran war fever erupt domestically, so the ground-to-air sightings were suppressed it seems.
#6
USS Vincennes shoot down 3 July 1988.
TWA 800 disaster 17 July 1996.
No "spit balling." Eye-for-an-eye possibility. Legitimate possibilities should never be totally discounted until validated evidence from multiple sources proves otherwise. And only then, archived for future use.
Some people call them "conspiracy theories." I call them healthy analytic thinking exercises.
#8
A USAF tanker exploded over Carpentersville, IL 19 Mar 1982, killing 28 people. The cause was determined to be an electrical short in the fuel tank.
When the cause for TWA-800 was announced, I immediately thought of the tanker crash.
#9
It's odd that the story does not contain the names of the important people on that flight. I forgotten who they were but it seems their were some important figures.
Jed Johnson, Andy Warhol's partner of twelve years, interior designer, and director
Pam Lychner, American crime victims' rights advocate and former TWA flight attendant, along with two daughters
Rico Puhlmann, German fashion photographer.[24] One of his clients, Polish fashion model Agnieszka Kotlarska (Miss Polski and Miss International), was originally supposed to be on the flight with him but backed out at the last minute. She was murdered a month later by a stalker outside her home.[25]
Courtney Elizabeth Johns, sister of future comic book writer Geoff Johns and the inspiration for the DC Comics superhero Courtney Whitmore / Stargirl[26]
Ana Maria Shorter, musician Wayne Shorter's second wife,[27] and the couple's niece, Dalila, daughter of singer Jon Lucien.
Jack O'Hara, executive producer of ABC Sports, along with his wife and daughter. He was going to France to supervise coverage of the Tour de France in what was to be his last assignment for the network after being let go the previous week.[28]
In addition, 16 students and five adult chaperones from the French Club of the Montoursville Area High School in Pennsylvania were on board.
[ZNUA] The massive depletion of strategic arsenals resulting from the fighting against Iran threatens the US military's ability to confront China and North Korea.
Critical US weapons stockpiles remain significantly depleted and will come under further pressure if strikes on Iran continue at the current pace. Military experts and analysts warn that this weapons situation could critically impact the US military's ability to fight a potential future war with China or North Korea, CNN reports. The DOD is working on increasing the manufacturing pace and shortening the time necessary to approve new suppliers. It’ll probably go better now that Brandon Newsom, the Navy’s Director of Business Operations, is no longer employed there, following his interesting date with James O’Keefe. THE REAL SCALE OF LOSSES
During the early phase of the conflict with Iran, dubbed Operation Epic Fury, the US military expended thousands of key missiles used for long-range precision strikes and to defend against enemy air and missile attacks.
The US military's weapons shortage has no quick fix, according to the NYT.
By the time full-scale hostilities between the US and Iran ceased in April, the Pentagon had expended a colossal amount of advanced weapons, according to an analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):
at least half of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile interceptors;
nearly half of the Patriot missile interceptors;
About 30% of the Tomahawk land-based cruise missiles
These figures were confirmed by three sources within the US Department of Defense familiar with the agency's internal stockpile assessments. While the subsequent months-long ceasefire and reduced intensity of mutual attacks have given US stockpiles some respite, the overall situation remains alarming, and stockpiles are significantly lower than desired.
YEARS OF RECOVERY
The main problem is the extremely slow pace of arsenal replenishment. As CSIS military analyst Mark Cancian notes, according to delivery schedules for the current fiscal year, the Pentagon is receiving only approximately 15 new Tomahawk missiles and 20 new Patriot missiles per month. As for THAAD systems, there are no projections for their delivery until 2026.
Eh? We’re already halfway through 2026. Does the writer mean some later year?
CSIS estimates that it will take three years to restore these stockpiles to pre-war levels with Iran.
Elaine McCusker, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and former deputy and acting comptroller of the Pentagon, confirmed that replenishment lead times will generally be measured in years—two to five years for most weapons.
The situation is exacerbated by the political standoff in Washington. Defense procurement expert John Ferrari, a retired US Army major general, emphasized that since the war began, Congress has not appropriated a single dollar to replace even a single missile. The entire process relies on the usual, slow-moving annual peacetime budget adjustments. Although the White House has officially requested additional funding from lawmakers to cover the costs of the conflict with Iran, this document faces a difficult path through Congress.
AN ATTEMPT TO GET OUT OF THE CRISIS
In June, US President Donald Trump enacted the Defense Production Act to eliminate regulatory red tape and expedite missile production. A Pentagon spokesperson assured that the agency is actively implementing the best American innovations to ensure mass production and supply chain resilience. However, analysts note that the effect of this law will be minimal, as expanding production capacity is time-consuming.
To ease the burden on American production lines, the United States is entering into licensing agreements allowing other countries, particularly Germany and Ukraine, to independently produce Patriot interceptor missiles amid growing global demand. Trump announced the granting of such a license to Ukraine on Thursday during a speech on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Turkey. However, such international projects are also slow to develop: for example, it took Japan three years just to build a Patriot plant, and Germany, which began work on its own line in 2022, has yet to produce a single missile.
On the other hand, stockpiles of some other weapons, such as Precision Strike Missiles and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, are recovering more quickly. They are expected to reach pre-war levels by mid- to late 2027.
Then tactics will be adjusted to fit with the supplies they have instead of the supplies they usually use. No big deal.
More at the link
Posted by: badanov ||
07/28/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[481 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
#1
What's the fuck use in having them if you don't use them? Tired 0f hearing this hysterical bullshit!
Posted by: chris ||
07/28/2026 1:11 Comments ||
Top||
#2
I am with Chris on this. More sour grapes from a Russian source.
Posted by: Whiskey Mike ||
07/28/2026 2:12 Comments ||
Top||
#3
If your stockpiles are not enough to fight Iran, better just surrender to China.
#8
Talk about half truths and misconceptions all through this article.
They make it sound like there is one large pile that everyone draws from and that is running out. Actual military draw downs from supplies works differently. Each area has its own cache that it draws from so the Middle East has its own, Europe has its own, Pacific has its own, etc. All are filled with the stream of ammunition being made from various sources.
When you see military sources talk about dwindling stocks, they are talking about their own AOE and not the general supply. So yes, the ME cache is getting a bit thin and if war with China kicks off, that cache will be the priority draw and the ME will get shafted when it comes to resupply.
Worrisome? Yes. The entire US military running out of beans and bullets? No.
#9
I love how you are always worried about the national debt NN21, goddamn you act like the collectors are coming by your front door like al sharpton. Shut your scared ass up to!
Posted by: chris ||
07/28/2026 6:27 Comments ||
Top||
#10
^#9
Thank you Chris for expressing your view on my thoughts about Gov Waste.
#17
Actually, I am more than just a little perturbed about that new plant to make 155mm rounds that has yet to produce a usable part. For half a bil$.
https://www.twz.com/land/new-500m-artillery-shell-plant-failed-to-produce-any-155mm-parts
Posted by: ed in texas ||
07/28/2026 15:44 Comments ||
Top||
#18
I think part of the problem is that the US is bringing up new weapons, both offensive and defensive and the suppliers don't have enough talent and equipment to handle both resupply of existing weapons as well as the new weapons.
Posted by: Lord Garth ||
07/28/2026 18:32 Comments ||
Top||
This is going to be a rather long and detailed post about Halabja, the PKK/PJAK’s latest fortifications in Halabja and the surrounding areas, Iran’s possible plans, and the current situation. To understand the PKK/PJAK’s recent actions, Halabja itself must first be studied in… pic.twitter.com/uYqqw2Y9xQ
Halabja, the PKK/PJAK’s latest fortifications in Halabja and the surrounding areas, Iran’s possible plans, and the current situation. To understand the PKK/PJAK’s recent actions, Halabja itself must first be studied in detail.
HALABJA AND ITS STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
1) Construction of tunnel networks is not new; it has been going on since early spring. However, the earlier tunnels were located north of Penjwen, whereas the new ones now appear to be concentrated around Halabja.
2) Halabja is a highly sensitive area, apart from its strategic importance. Although the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan received more than 50% of the vote there in 2001, the political environment later normalized, yet Islamist parties still receive roughly 20% of the vote, where it is one of the few pluralistic political area in KRG.
Halabja was not always a particularly religious or conservative city. In the 1970s, there were rock bands, female musical groups, an active intellectual environment, and a relatively liberal social life. However, the 1988 chemical attack created an enormous collective trauma that contributed to growing conservatism while simultaneously cementing a strong Kurdish identity.
At the same time, the people of Halabja do not want their city to become the victim of another confrontation between regional powers. This is one reason the area has remained relatively quiet and cautious, trying to survive without strongly aligning itself with any single political party. Its economy has relied considerably on agriculture and both legal and informal cross-border trade, while Halabja has maintained a delicate balance between Baghdad, Sulaymaniyah, and Iran.
Bearing all this in mind, the PKK has historically been unable to develop the same level of popular, ideological, or logistical support in Halabja that it enjoys in parts of Sulaymaniyah, yet it was able to establish minor camps in surrounding areas of Halabja, both inside Iraq and Iran.
[IsraelTimes] Times of Israel review of Hamas and Islamic Jihad announcements finds that at least 18 of those identified as doctors, nurses and hospital employees in Gaza were also combatants
On September 8, 2025, about a month before fighting in Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response... halted, Mohammed Akram al-Kafarna was killed in an Israeli strike.
Following his death, the Paleostinian Nurses and Midwives Syndicate mourned al-Kafarna as the Gaza head of the medical association.
The International Council of Nurses, a Geneva-based body that calls itself "the global voice of nursing," wrote in a condolence letter that it was "deeply saddened by the death of Dr. Mohammed Akram al-Kafarna, one of the leaders of the Paleostinian nursing profession in Gaza."
He was "among the hundreds of nurses and healthcare workers who have tragically bit the dust during the conflict," the ICN added, according to a copy of the letter published on Facebook.
But al-Kafarna was no Florence Nightingale. According to Hamas ..not a terrorist organization, even though it kidnaps people, holds hostages, and tries to negotiate by executing them,... , alongside his medical work, al-Kafarna was also a fighter in the Nidal Nasser Battalion in Beit Hanoun, part of its Northern Gaza Brigade.
In a picture published by Hamas, al-Kafarna is seen in full military gear, holding a loaded rifle.
His name is one of scores published by Hamas and its fellow Gazook terror group, Islamic Jihad ...created after many members of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood decided the organization was becoming too moderate. Operations were conducted out of Egypt until 1981 when the group was exiled after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. They worked out of Gaza until they were exiled to Lebanon in 1987, where they clove tightly to Hezbollah. In 1989 they moved to Damascus, where they remain a subsidiary of Hezbollah... , in recent months, belatedly identifying their many fighters killed during the two years of war sparked by the October 7, 2023, massacre in southern Israel.
Among the names are not only those previously identified as journalists and athletes, but also healthcare workers, including doctors, nurses, and hospital employees.
The revelations that these figures had dual roles that made them legitimate military targets have cast doubt on claims that the Israel Defense Forces aimed their firepower at innocent civilians, including those in key roles that are supposed to afford them special protections.
At least 18 Gazooks killed during the war who were reported to be healthcare workers — including doctors, nurses, paramedics, and other employees of Gaza hospitals or the Hamas-run Health Ministry — have since also appeared in lists published by Hamas and Paleostinian Islamic Jihad identifying them as members of the groups.
The names of the 18 were first compiled by independent researcher Salo Aizenberg, and confirmed by The Times of Israel.
Despite the admissions, groups tracking those killed in the two years of fighting continue to list the figures as healthcare workers. On the ICN’s website, the statement condemning al-Kafarna’s death remains available, as does its assertion that his killing constituted a violation of international law.
The role of healthcare amid the fighting in Gaza has been among the most sensitive touchpoints, with Israel accused of targeting hospitals and first responders throughout the war. According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, which is run by the Hamas terror group that has been the de facto ruler of the Strip since 2007, 1,141 health workers are among the approximately 70,000 people killed in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Rights groups, citing the United Nations ...an organization originally established to war on dictatorships which was promptly infiltrated by dictatorships and is now held in thrall to dictatorships... Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, claim that the number of health workers killed is over 1,500.
Gaza Health Ministry tallies of war dead, which have never differentiated between civilians and combatants, are considered suspect by Israel given Hamas’s role in administering health and rescue services in the Strip. During the war, Israel regularly accused Hamas of using hospitals and other medical facilities as bases for military operations, often in tunnels dug below hospital buildings.
The IDF has released photographs, operational footage, and interrogation material that it says demonstrate Hamas’s use of hospitals to hide weapons, control centers, barracks, and even hostages.
The army has said its activities around hospitals, which left some facilities closed or only partially operational, sought to protect civilians and patients from harm within a complex combat environment, though rights groups have challenged those claims and continue to accuse Israel of decimating the Strip’s health services as part of a genocidal campaign.
Israel has also defended arrests of hospital directors and other health workers accused of collaborating with Hamas, such as Kamal Adwan hospital head Hussam Abu Safiya, whom the IDF says served as a colonel in Hamas’s armed wing.
BAD MEDICINE
Throughout the war, Hamas and Paleostinian Islamic Jihad, the two main fighting forces in Gaza, refrained from identifying rank-and-file operatives killed in the fighting, but, in recent months, both have begun publishing names in online obituaries, with hundreds of names published so far.
A previous Times of Israel review of published names revealed that several figures identified as journalists were actually terror operatives.
Earlier this month, the Israeli military provided details on 12 soccer players killed in the Gaza Strip during the war who it said have been identified as terror operatives, slamming their international portrayal as innocent athletes. Seven of the 12, including one who was a FIFA referee, were acknowledged as members by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Hamas continues to release new names daily, while Islamic Jihad publishes additional lists every few weeks.
Among those claimed by the terror groups are several figures previously identified as nurses, such as Ahmad Adel Abu al-Hilal, who served as a team commander in the Central Information Unit of Islamic Jihad’s Rafah Brigade.
When he was killed in Gaza on May 25, 2025, Paleostinian media outlets, including the Paleostinian Authority’s official television station, reported that he worked as a nurse at the European Hospital in southern Khan Younis, publishing a photograph of him wearing nursing scrubs.
Islamic Jihad also named Ayman Suleiman Abu Tir, who was killed in Gaza on June 26, 2025, as a commander in its Central Operations Unit.
The Gaza Nurses Syndicate’s Facebook page identified Abu Tir as a nurse at Nasser Hospital.
A database run by a website called Genocide in Gaza, which documents Gaza residents killed during the war, identifies him as head of the clinical nutrition department at Nasser Hospital.
Genocide in Gaza describes itself on its website as an independent legal team that collects information and documents what it describes as "acts of genocide and massacres committed by Israel in the Gaza Strip" since October 7, 2023.
It could not be reached for comment.
Jaber Abd al-Hamid Mohammadin was presented by Gaza’s Health Ministry on Facebook as a nurse who was killed while working in the intensive care unit at Rantisi Children’s Hospital in northern Gaza.
According to reports on social media, he was killed on December 13, 2024. However,
Switzerland makes more than cheese... there are no known reports of an IDF ground operation at the hospital at that time, and the military’s main operation there took place in late 2023.
Paleostinian Islamic Jihad has since identified Mohammadin as a commander in its military manufacturing unit.
Six healthcare workers whose names later appeared on Hamas and Paleostinian Islamic Jihad lists of members killed during the war are included in a 2024 report published by Healthcare Workers Watch, a Paleostinian group documenting healthcare workers killed in Gaza and detained by Israel.
According to its website, it compiles information by monitoring social media and cross-checking it against data from Gaza’s Health Ministry, hospitals, professional associations, and local media outlets.
Healthcare Workers Watch did not respond to The Times of Israel’s request for comment on whether it intends to update its report or issue a clarification.
Among those listed by the group is Ibrahim Abd al-Raouf al-Farra, who appears in the report as a nurse.
According to another database of those killed in the war maintained by the Institute for Paleostine Studies, al-Farra worked as a clinical instructor at a nursing faculty, as a nurse at a private clinic, and at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. A picture of him posted on Facebook in 2021 shows him wearing a lab coat with the logo of a Khan Younis youth center.
Hamas, however, has listed al-Farra as one of its operatives. According to the group, he served in the Osama bin Zaid Battalion of the Khan Younis Brigade and was killed on October 20, 2023.
The Beirut-based Institute for Paleostine Studies, an independent research institute, operates a database titled, "Documenting the Targeting and Destruction of the Health Sector in the Gaza Strip." According to the project’s website, its purpose is to provide "accurate and detailed information" on what it describes as "Israel’s attacks on Gaza’s healthcare sector during the genocidal war."
The Institute for Paleostine Studies could not be reached for comment.
Healthcare Workers Watch also lists Ahmad Mohammed Hassan Balousha as a nurse killed in the war. According to Gaza’s Health Ministry’s Facebook page, he worked in the ministry’s organ transplantation unit.
Paleostinian Islamic Jihad, however, identified him as a commander in the military judiciary unit of its Northern Brigade.
Najm al-Din Nasser Abu al-Jabin was also identified as a nurse killed by Israel. According to Hamas, he served in the Fawzi Abu al-Qara Battalion of the group’s Northern Brigade and was killed on October 27, 2023.
According to reports from Gaza, Salem Jumaa Shirab was killed on March 2, 2024. About a year after his death, Gaza’s Health Ministry Nursing Administration wrote on Facebook that he had worked as a nurse at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis, and was killed while working at an Emirati field hospital in Rafah.
He has since been named by Islamic Jihad as a member of its military medical department in the Khan Younis Brigade.
Mohammed Darram Abu al-Harbid is listed in the Healthcare Workers Watch database as a physiotherapist or occupational therapist killed during the war. In Facebook posts published before October 7 by a Gaza charity operating a physiotherapy center in Beit Hanoun, he is described as a specialist in the field.
However,
Switzerland makes more than cheese... he was subsequently identified by Islamic Jihad as a member of its air defense unit in the Northern Brigade of its military wing.
Healthcare Workers Watch and the Genocide in Gaza database list Haitham Mohammed Hammad as either a nurse or a Health Ministry employee.
An obituary from Islamic Jihad gives him a third role: cell commander in the military medical department of its Northern Brigade.
DOCTORS WITH GUNS
On June 25, 2024, Médecins Sans Frontières announced the death of Fadi Jihad al-Wadiya, a 33-year-old physiotherapist and father of three who had joined the organization in 2018.
The statement expressed outrage over his death, saying he was killed while riding a bike near an MSF clinic, "on his way to provide medical care to others who had been injured."
A day later, after Israel accused al-Wadiya of being a member of Islamic Jihad, MSF responded that it "has no indication that this is true."
"There is no justification for this; it is unacceptable," the group fumed.
Then in February of this year, Islamic Jihad identified al-Wadiya as a member of the organization, describing him as an assistant in its military manufacturing unit.
MSF has since appended a note to its posts about al-Wadiya stating that it "had no information indicating that Fadi al-Wadiya was involved in any military activity before he was killed by Israeli forces."
"If the Israeli authorities had any credible information about Fadi’s involvement in military activities, they never shared it with MSF — prior to his killing or when we reached out immediately after he was killed to ask for clarifications around the circumstances of his death," the group added. "We would never knowingly employ people engaging in military activity. Any employee who engages in military activity would pose a danger to our staff and patients."
Al-Wadiya continues to be listed by MSF as one of its employees killed during the war, on an "In Memoriam" page.
Not all of the healthcare-related personnel identified by Hamas and Paleostinian Islamic Jihad worked in clinical roles. Some were employed in supporting positions within Gaza’s healthcare system.
Ahmad Faiz al-Dalu appears on a Paleostinian Islamic Jihad list as a team commander in the Training Department of the Central Operations Unit in the Gaza City Brigade.
The exact date of his death is unclear. However,
Switzerland makes more than cheese... in July 2025, Gazook media reported that his body had been recovered and identified him as a medical laboratory technician at Kamal Adwan Hospital. Paleostinian media published a photograph showing him wearing the hospital’s uniform.
Several other individuals identified by Hamas and Paleostinian Islamic Jihad as members of their organizations are listed in various databases as employees of Gaza’s Health Ministry in administrative positions.
Raed Abd al-Hamid Khdeir served as a cell commander in Paleostinian Islamic Jihad’s Khan Younis Brigade. The Institute for Paleostine Studies database identifies him as an administrative employee at Gaza’s Health Ministry.
Tamer Mohammed al-Hamidi appears on a Paleostinian Islamic Jihad list as a cell commander responsible for armaments in the organization’s Central Brigade.
According to an online database maintained by a group calling itself the Shireen Observatory, which documents Paleostinians from Gaza and the West Bank killed by Israeli forces, al-Hamidi worked in an administrative position at al-Aqsa Hospital, apparently referring to al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in central Gaza.
Shireen Observatory could not be reached for comment.
The Institute for Paleostine Studies also identifies al-Hamidi as an administrative employee at Gaza’s Health Ministry.
On June 22 of this year, amid a ceasefire that took effect in October, Maysara Salah Nassar was killed while traveling in a civilian vehicle struck by Israel, according to reports from Gaza.
According to the Genocide in Gaza database, Nassar was a paramedic. However,
Switzerland makes more than cheese... Islamic Jihad published a notice identifying him as a cell commander in the military medical department of the organization’s Rafah Brigade.
Two of the figures flagged by Aizenburg were not included in any of the databases, but were identified as health workers by their places of work.
After Munther Faiz al-Sharafa was killed in July 2025, a Gaza City clinic identified him as an employee, without specifying what his role was. al-Sharafa subsequently appeared on a Paleostinian Islamic Jihad list as a cell commander in the Financial Management Unit of the Gaza City Brigade.
Abd al-Latif Adel Abu Tabiya was killed that same month, along with his infant daughter and several family members, according to reports from Gaza.
On his Facebook profile, Abu Tabiya identified himself as an employee of the European Hospital in Khan Younis, though without specifying his role there.
The hospital compound was bombed by Israel in May 2025, after being evacuated, in strikes that killed then-Hamas leader Mohammed Sinwar, who Israel said had been hiding in terror tunnels beneath the site.
Though it is unknown whether he had any connection to the military activities taking place at the hospital, Abu Tabiya was later identified by Islamic Jihad as a team commander in the Eastern Battalion of the Khan Younis Brigade.
[IsraelTimes] Petition seeks full accounting of roadblocks, checkpoints, and other barriers put in place across territory, many in aftermath of October 7, but IDF indicates that even it does not know full scope.
[NY Post] A California children’s charity funded by billionaire George Soros stands accused of sending cash which may have ended up in the hands of a Palestinian terrorist organization, according to a new report obtained by The Post.
The Berkeley-based Middle East Children’s Alliance (MECA) features Democratic Rep. Maxine Waters and activist academic Noam Chomsky on its advisory board and claims to provide humanitarian aid to children in the Middle East.
It was founded by husband-and-wife activists Barbara Lubin and Howard Levine in 1988, but has strayed far from its original mission and has been tied to a US-designated terrorist group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine through its funding of other groups, according to a new report by the Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI).
Since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, MECA “emerged as a critical US charitable fundraising vehicle promoted across the pro-Palestinian activist ecosystem,” according to the report.
“America built the most generous philanthropic infrastructure in human history,” said Joel Finkelstein, an NCRI senior scientist.
“When American foundations bankroll groups tied to foreign terrorist organizations, when senators, members of Congress and prestigious academics endorse it … they’re turning the country’s own institutions against it,” he claimed.
MECA and Soros did not respond to The Post’s requests for comment.
But as MECA’s grants to foreign groups grew exponentially, their reporting became less transparent, the NCRI report claims.
MECA brought in more than $18 million in revenues in fiscal 2024, according to public records. That same year, the group’s payouts rose to nearly $11 million — nearly five times the previous year — while “grant descriptions were progressively replaced with generic labels such as ‘community projects’,” according to NCRI.
By 2025, all foreign grants were described with the generic labels, obscuring their true purpose, the report claims.
“The convergence of these findings raises concerns about whether donors in the United States may be unknowingly donating to a group that ultimately benefits a foreign terrorist organization,” according to NCRI, a nonprofit that studies extremism.
Between 2017 and 2025, MECA’s tax filings show $35 million in foreign grant payouts, in total. Some of that money went to groups accused of being affiliated with the PFLP, including the Union of Health Work Committees and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, both based in the West Bank, territory under control of the Palestinian Authority.
The UHWC and UAWC have both been designated as terror organizations by Israel and accused of funneling cash to PFLP, claims which they have denied.
Mona El-Farra, who once served as deputy director of UHWC, a PFLP “civil society” affiliate, has long overseen MECA’s Gaza-based humanitarian projects, according to its website.
Doing so “demonstrates an overlapping, interconnected structure across organizations,” the report says. “This is especially true given the fact that MECA has funded the UHWC, El-Farra’s former group.”
Israel’s cabinet approved legal immunity for the International Stabilization Force (ISF), paving the way for roughly 200 personnel from friendly countries, including Uganda and Morocco, to deploy beyond the Yellow Line.
Israel’s cabinet approved legal immunity for the International Stabilization Force (ISF), paving the way for roughly 200 personnel from friendly countries, including Uganda and Morocco, to deploy beyond the Yellow Line.
The IDF will retain control of the Yellow Line until Hamas is fully disarmed
…given that once again Hamas is receiving arms from Iran, that’ll be right about…never…
and Gaza demilitarized. Israel will approve participating countries, while each ISF deployment requires authorization from the PM, defense minister and foreign minister.
The cabinet also decided that Israel will determine which countries are permitted to contribute personnel to the force, the official continued, saying “only countries with which Israel has a peace agreement, and which are not acting against the State of Israel or its officials in international forums, will be eligible.”
That condition would seem to preclude Indonesia, which has no formal diplomatic ties with Israel, and had initially vowed to contribute some 8,000 troops to the force, though it backed away in recent months due to domestic backlash and doubt regarding the Gaza plan’s progress.
It would also apparently rule out troops from Turkey, which has been among the harshest critics of Israel’s war against Hamas, launched after the October 7, 2023, massacre, and which has hosted Hamas leaders.
“At this stage, the force is expected to consist of approximately 200 personnel from friendly countries such as Uganda and Morocco,” the official said.
While three other countries — Albania, Kazakhstan and Kosovo — have also agreed to contribute troops to the ISF — Morocco is slated to be the first of them to actually deploy troops in Gaza, officials familiar with the Board of Peace’s plans have told The Times of Israel.
The Board of Peace has been promoting the plan for several months. It envisions the establishment of a pilot humanitarian zone in the Rafah area of southern Gaza, from which Israeli troops would withdraw and be replaced by personnel from ISF. The arrangement would allow an initial group of vetted Gazans to relocate from Hamas-controlled territory. Hamas has so far refused to disarm as envisioned under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point framework for Gaza, and the Board has been struggling to get Israeli approval on certain key components of the plan.
“I welcome steps by Israel that enable the deployment of the International Stabilization Force in Gaza, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2803,” said Board of Peace High Representative for Gaza Nickolay Mladenov on X. “It is a critical part of the agreed framework for stabilizing Gaza, supporting demilitarization, and enabling the transition to effective Palestinian transitional administration under the NCAG.”
“The focus now is on ensuring that we move forward with the 20-point Plan for Gaza, including the implementation of the Roadmap as presented by the mediators,” he wrote.
While not mentioning the cabinet vote, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG) said on Sunday it had “completed the necessary institutional and operational preparations to assume its mandate in the Gaza Strip under the Comprehensive Peace Plan, once the Board of Peace and Security Council authorizes deployment, Israeli forces have withdrawn, and the agreed implementation arrangements are in place.”
[IsraelAlma] The true intentions of the al-Sharaa regime remain, at present, an enigma. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the regime under his leadership will act in the future once it has consolidated its power. As part of our efforts to unravel this “intentions enigma”, we seek to identify indications pointing in one direction or another that may contribute to our understanding of the regime’s future course.
Recently, we published a report assessing the updated curriculum (2024–2026) of the “Dar al-Wahi al-Sharif” (دار الوحي الشريف) school network, which is affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and has since been incorporated into the official education system of Syria’s new regime. We will mention that Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa is the founder and former leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
Not former leader so much as leader of the government that HTS is evolving into. That’s what happens when revolutions and conquests succeed.
Although Dar al-Wahi al-Sharif remains a relatively small educational network compared with Syria’s public education system, it currently serves several thousand students across approximately 70–80 educational institutions nationwide. Nevertheless, it represents the al-Sharaa regime’s flagship educational network – its principal educational project. Its expansion has been rapid, and we assess that its growth trajectory is likely to continue.
More at the link
Posted by: badanov ||
07/28/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[156 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Syria/HTS
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.