Trump’s Immigration Enforcement Really Is Slashing Violent Crime
Is crime falling? Some conservatives, notably Steve Bannon, argue that Americans should ignore the FBI’s crime statistics showing record drops in violent crime. The murder rate last year fell to the lowest rate ever recorded, and the violent crime rate is clearly at the lowest in many decades. But Bannon recently declared that “nobody believes” FBI crime data or its director, Kash Patel, adding: “I don’t want to hear any more statistics about how crime’s coming down.”
That skepticism overlooks an important distinction.
The FBI has made mistakes in the past, particularly in its active shooter reports and hate crime data. Some police departments have also failed to report complete crime data to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. But those problems do not explain the concerns with the measure of overall crime.
The real issue is understanding what different crime measures actually tell us. Past problems with the FBI’s measure of crimes reported to police do not mean anyone manipulated the data. Nor do they mean that last year’s reported decline in crime — or the declines so far this year — are inaccurate.
The United States has two primary measures of violent crime. The FBI tracks crimes reported to police. The Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) estimates both reported and unreported crime. Researchers have known for decades that most crimes never reach the police. Victims report only about 40 percent of violent crimes and roughly 30 percent of property crimes.
The media focuses almost exclusively on FBI crime data. Before 2020, FBI data and the NCVS generally moved in the same direction. During the Biden administration, however, they sharply diverged. While reported violent crime fell by about 8 percent, total felony violent crime measured by the NCVS surged 59 percent — the largest four-year percentage increase since the survey began more than five decades ago.
Several factors explain that gap. Whether victims report crimes depends heavily on whether they believe police will catch and punish offenders. As cities reduced police staffing through budget cuts, retirements, and, in some places, “defund the police” policies, arrest rates declined. Lower arrest rates gave victims less reason to report crimes.
Some police departments also made reporting more difficult. In some jurisdictions, 911 operators asked whether the offender was still at the scene. If the answer was no — as it almost always was — they instructed victims to visit a police station later to file a report. Simply calling 911 does not place a crime in the FBI’s statistics; an officer must complete an official report. When governments make reporting more burdensome, some victims understandably decide it isn’t worth the effort.
Fortunately, many of those policies have been reversed.
Although reported crime has declined, we will not know whether total crime also fell in 2025 until the Bureau of Justice Statistics releases the next NCVS this September.
Even so, there is good reason for optimism.
Reducing crime is not complicated. Governments must make crime riskier by increasing arrests and convictions, imposing longer prison sentences, and allowing law-abiding citizens to defend themselves. The news on each of those fronts has been encouraging.
FBI arrests surged in 2025, rising 184 percent over 2024 levels. Total FBI arrests — a broader category that includes many joint operations with state and local agencies — increased by 197 percent.
Voters also replaced several George Soros-backed prosecutors in jurisdictions such as Los Angeles and San Francisco with district attorneys who prosecute criminals more aggressively and seek tougher sentences. Across the country, President Trump’s U.S. attorneys have also pursued criminals far more aggressively than their predecessors. In Washington, D.C., for example, the Biden administration’s U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute 67 percent of those arrested. Under U.S. Attorney Jeanine Pirro, that figure has fallen to just 4 percent.
Nor is it a coincidence that the record influx of illegal immigrants during the Biden administration coincided with a sharp increase in violent crime. It is equally unsurprising that crime has fallen as deportations have increased. Deportation records show that 70 percent of illegal immigrants deported during the Trump administration had either criminal convictions or pending criminal charges in the United States. Even those who avoid arrest understand that any contact with law enforcement could lead to deportation, giving them a strong incentive to stay off the police’s radar and avoid committing additional crimes.
Finally, the number of adults carrying concealed handguns has risen sharply, with the latest survey data showing a 5-percentage-point increase in concealed carry over the past year and a half.
Americans shouldn’t blindly accept crime statistics, but they need to understand what the different numbers actually measure. The FBI’s numbers show that reported crime has fallen dramatically, while the NCVS will tell us this September whether total violent crime has also declined. Stronger law enforcement, more aggressive prosecution, and greater accountability provide good reasons to expect that the encouraging trend in reported crime reflects a real improvement in public safety.
[THENATIONALCONTEXT.COM] The Kurdistan Region has one flag and is constitutionally one polity, but for nearly two years it has not been able to form a new government, with the current caretaker cabinet having been voted in by parliament in July 2019. In practice it has two governments. The Kurdistan Democratic Party runs Erbil and Duhok. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan runs Sulaimani and smaller portions of Erbil and Kirkuk. Foreign powers have stopped pretending otherwise: Washington, Ankara and Baghdad now deal with each party separately, as a power centre in its own right. Two things decide what each centre is worth to them. The first is energy. The second is the PKK.
Start with energy, because the split is almost perfectly clean. The region’s oil sits in the KDP zone: the producing fields of Duhok and Erbil, the pipeline connection to Ceyhan, and the crossing at Ibrahim Khalil, which for a generation was Iraq’s most important land gate to Turkey. The region’s gas sits almost entirely in the PUK zone. Khor Mor, near Chamchamal, reached 750 million cubic feet a day of processing capacity after its KM250 expansion was completed in October 2025, with output already around 700 million, and the pipeline connecting the field to the Sulaymaniyah power plant was completed in late June, Kurdish-language outlets have reported. Chamchamal itself is next, with contracts signed to supply industrial buyers with up to 142 million cubic feet a day from the second half of 2027. Behind those sit two of the largest energy deals in Iraq’s recent history, both in the PUK sphere: a $40 billion agreement for the Miran field and a $70 billion arrangement for the Topkhana-Kurdamir blocks, signed with American companies in 2025.
Oil and gas are not equally useful right now. Oil earns revenue. Gas changes politics. Iranian gas still fuels roughly a third of Iraq’s power generation, which gives Tehran a standing grip on Baghdad that PUK-zone gas can loosen. Turkey’s own gas contract with Iran, 9.6 billion cubic metres a year, expires this month, and analysts already describe Kurdistan gas exports through Turkey as the mechanism that could anchor a durable PUK-Ankara relationship. The KDP’s oil serves budgets. The PUK’s gas serves the region’s central strategic project, which is reducing Iranian leverage in Baghdad and Ankara at the same time. The KDP’s border advantage is eroding in parallel. Assad’s fall opened a Syrian route between Turkey and Iraq that is shorter and cheaper than the Kurdish one: a first cargo convoy crossed it in May, a rail line through Nusaybin, Qamishli, Rabiya and Mosul is the next stage, and Baghdad has approved feasibility studies for pipelines from Basra through Haditha toward both the Turkish and Syrian coasts. Every one of those routes gives Ankara and Baghdad an option that does not pass through KDP territory, which means Ibrahim Khalil no longer sets the terms it once did.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM.RU] The events of early July 2026 in the Gaza Strip marked a significant transformation of the Palestinian system of governance in the enclave.
Hamas announced the dissolution of its de facto government, which has functioned for two decades, and the beginning of the transfer of administrative powers to the National Governance Committee for Gaza (NGGC), a technocratic cabinet formed as part of the American-led ceasefire initiative. Taqqiya. "Give us money"
This move should be assessed through the prism of Hamas's strategy. It is a complex maneuver aimed at adapting to the ongoing Israeli military operation, despite the ceasefire, and the international diplomatic landscape.
TRANSIT MECHANICS
It should be clarified that the Committee for Oversight of Government Work is subject to dissolution – a structure that, from 2006–2007, effectively performed the functions of the executive authority in the Gaza Strip under the auspices of Hamas.
As a Palestinian source close to Hamas's leadership explained to Regnum, the committee was formed of deputy ministers and technical specialists after the Hamas government came to power to manage the daily affairs of citizens. It was designated as a committee, rather than a government, to avoid political clashes with the Palestinian National Authority. Tellingly, the government in Ramallah refused to accept the committee's documents in 2017.
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar insisted on calling the staff deputy ministers rather than ministers, and the committee a supervisory body rather than a government, to avoid political embarrassment and ensure the continued provision of services to citizens regardless of factional squabbles.
The committee was successively led by prominent figures.
In 2021, it was headed by Issam al-Daalis, who remained in his post throughout the active phase of the war with Israel and became the most prominent civilian figure in the governance of Gaza during its most difficult period.
But on March 18, 2025, he became the target of an assassination attempt by Israelis and was killed. Daalis was one of the most knowledgeable figures in the social and humanitarian sphere.
Then, as a Hamas spokesman recounted, Muhammad al-Farra took over as chairman of the committee in complete secrecy, without an official announcement, for fear of surveillance and assassination.
He continued to govern from behind the scenes until the acting chairman officially announced the committee's dissolution.
“This decision was not a cold political maneuver, but rather a responsible step aimed at preparing the ground for reaching agreements with the Palestinian factions and implementing the necessary measures to preserve the rights of the people and end the bloodshed.
Hamas understood that continuing to call this committee a 'government' or keeping its members on the front lines of events gave the occupation authorities a constant pretext for harassment, murder, and starvation of the besieged population," the source explained.
"Hamas readily offered unprecedented administrative concessions, allowing the technocratic committee (i.e., the NCUG – editor's note) to take over the management of civil affairs," the source added.
The decision to liquidate the committee was accompanied by the resignation of its head and the appointment of the Deputy Minister for Religious Endowments and Awqaf as temporary coordinator.
In official comments to the media, Ismail al-Sawabta, director of the government media office in Gaza, detailed the transfer of powers, emphasizing its gradual nature and the elimination of the possibility of an administrative vacuum.
Gaza's Hamas-affiliated Ministry of the Interior will continue to provide basic security functions not only until the physical arrival and operation of the technocratic committee, but also until the creation of new security forces subordinate to the Palestinian Authority, rather than to external control.
In turn, the 15 members of the previous government committee will retain control of current affairs, but will suspend political decision-making until they agree with the officials of the NKUG.
This transit structure demonstrates the desire of Palestinian institutions to maintain the continuity of the state apparatus in a context where external actors are attempting to impose alternative models of governance.
Coordination between committee leaders and local ministries—the police, the health ministry, and border crossing services—has been ongoing for several months, indicating that infrastructure preparations for the transfer of authority have been underway. Hamas has never opposed the transfer of authority to the technical administration. The main obstacle was Israel, which blocked access to Gaza for members of the NCUG.
THE 50,000 EMPLOYEE PROBLEM
The central issue of the transition period remains the status of the approximately 50,000 permanent and temporary employees of the Hamas government.
Temporary Hamas government employees, but permanent Hamas members, surely. Terror organizations are not known for hiring temps.
This figure goes beyond a purely administrative issue and becomes a matter of social stability.
The demands of Israel and parts of the Palestinian political elite, including Fatah, call for the mass dismissal of these employees or their selective integration after a “thorough vetting” into new structures with the dismissal of the majority.
However, the layoff of tens of thousands of people in the context of a destroyed economy and the absence of a functioning private sector will lead to the impoverishment of between 250,000 and 500,000 people dependent on these salaries – family members, including children and elderly relatives.
Bummer. War is hell — next time don’t start one.
Hamas insists on a comprehensive approach: integrating civil servants, including police officers, into the new authorities while simultaneously compensating those forced to leave government positions.
The movement's position is based on the understanding that mass layoffs under a blockade are tantamount to collective punishment of the population. Maintaining the skeleton of the previous government until guarantees for employees are agreed upon reflects an attempt to protect the social fabric of Gaza from further disintegration.
As the Hamas representative emphasized, the agreement on the formation of the NCUG was based on the issue of internal security personnel, that is, essentially, the armed wing of Hamas, which was seen as a fundamental basis for avoiding an administrative or security vacuum.
According to the Palestinian, the official agreements stipulated that all technical and support personnel in the health, education and municipal services sectors, as well as internal security and police forces, would continue to work as usual, as if nothing had changed.
However, their labor and financial status will be radically altered, as their affiliation will be fully transferred to the National Governance Committee for Gaza, recognizing them as civil servants and not employees of any particular faction. Their number was estimated at 45,000–48,000, all appointed after 2007.
So we’e to just ignore the fact that they are hardcore Hamas members — a requirement to be hired, just like people had to join the Nazi party to get a job after Hitler was elected.
As a Hamas spokesman noted, the Israeli authorities met this approach with systematic rejection, quickly dismissing it as a "gimmick."
"Israel's true goal is not simply a change of administrative personnel, but a demand for complete disarmament, the dismantling of military capabilities, and the subordination of any agreements in Gaza to the plans for population transfer and occupation. This rejection is clearly demonstrated by the continued ban on the new National Committee entering Gaza, demonstrating that the obstacle is not on the Palestinian side, but exclusively on the Israeli side," Hamas emphasized.
MLADENOV AND ADMISSION CONDITIONS
In parallel with the administrative reorganization, negotiations are ongoing in Cairo with the participation of Hamas, other Palestinian groups, and the Peace Council's high representative for Gaza, Bulgarian Nikolay Mladenov. The subject of discussion is the implementation of the roadmap presented by Mladenov in April 2025.
The key point of disagreement is the condition put forward by Mladenov: the entry of the technocratic committee into the Gaza Strip is made contingent on reaching an agreement on “arms limitation” and the disarmament of Hamas.
The Palestinian side qualifies the demand as violating the basic principles of international law, since it requires the disarmament of the movement's armed wing before the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory.
Huh?
This sequence of actions contradicts conflict resolution precedents, where the withdrawal of foreign forces precedes or is accompanied by disarmament processes.
Stacking arms is part of the historic surrender process. When, and for what stupid reason, did that change?
Hamas insists on a gradual approach to the arms issue, with the mandatory withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
As a Palestinian source for Regnum noted, Mladenov's plan left Gazans suffering from hunger, siege, lack of education and housing.
"By requiring weapons collection and linking it to humanitarian aid, the plan turns aid into a weapon of collective punishment, giving Israel free rein to starve the population and hinder reconstruction efforts," he stressed.
The Israeli television channel Kan, citing an internal Hamas document, reported on the movement's decision to delay disarmament negotiations. However, analysis shows that the decision was based on an assessment of the behavior of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
According to the document, Hamas assumes that Netanyahu views any concessions on Gaza as political suicide in the context of the upcoming Knesset (parliament) elections and is deliberately delaying the implementation of the ceasefire conditions.
The Palestinian movement decided to mirror this tactic, hoping for a change in Israeli leadership after the elections.
Thus, both sides are using delaying tactics, but the motivations are different: while Hamas is expecting a change in Israeli leadership, Netanyahu is seeking to maintain the status quo of permanent conflict, blockade, and limited continuation of military operations as a political resource.
BUFFER ZONES AND EVICTIONS
At a meeting of the Israeli government, Netanyahu commented on reports of a possible change in American policy towards Gaza.
The Prime Minister tried in his own manner to refute the information that the US is demanding that Israel “continue reconstruction work even if Hamas is not disarmed,” and stated: “There will be no restoration of Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization of the Strip.”
The statement merely confirms that Israel is deliberately blocking reconstruction efforts by tying them to conditions that are impossible to fulfill under current circumstances and that Hamas initially rejected when negotiating the deal with the Americans. This position, according to human rights organizations, amounts to using the humanitarian situation as leverage against the civilian population.
Netanyahu's words attracted particular attention: "The people of Gaza must have freedom of choice: those who want to leave can do so, and those who stay must not pose a threat to us."
Given the destroyed infrastructure, the lack of basic living conditions, and the ongoing military operation, the Israeli prime minister's statements, according to international lawyers, could be qualified as a violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the forced displacement of protected persons from occupied territory.
Netanyahu also confirmed the retention of buffer zones: "There is now a new border belt around Gaza—within Gaza itself." According to satellite analysis by the B'Tselem research group, these zones encompass a significant portion of the Strip's agricultural land and coastal areas. The de facto annexation of territory limits Palestinian access to resources.
As a Hamas spokesman emphasized, this also demonstrates that the Netanyahu government has no acceptable solution other than population transfer or occupation of the remaining parts of Gaza. This explains their military expansion, which has increased their control from 50% of Gaza's territory to almost 60%.
He said the committee's dissolution was a "political earthquake" that forced a rethinking of the issue and placed it before America and Donald Trump personally, especially before his meeting with Netanyahu.
"With this move, Hamas put Israel in an awkward position, since Tel Aviv could no longer blame the Palestinians for the lack of partnership, and Washington was forced to admit that the problem had not yet been resolved and that Mladenov's plan, which it considered a ready-made deal, had collapsed in the face of the fact that Gaza needed a political solution, not related to the management of municipalities, but rather to an end to the occupation and aggression," the source noted.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT
Israel's actions in Gaza, including the creation of buffer zones, blocking reconstruction and tying humanitarian aid to political conditions, have been criticized by various international institutions.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has highlighted systematic violations of international humanitarian law in its latest reports.
The technocratic transition in Gaza is taking place in a context where the international community is failing to ensure Israel complies with its obligations as an occupying power. The creation of the Peace Council and the appointment of Mladenov as the High Representative for Gaza, according to international law experts, sets a precedent for external governance of the territory without ensuring the basic rights of its population.
The dissolution of the Hamas government and the transfer of powers to a technocratic committee represent an attempt to adapt to the new political reality. However, the success of this transition depends on several factors.
First, it depends on Israel's willingness to allow entry of members of the NCUG into the Gaza Strip. Currently, such permission has not been granted, making the entire process purely declaratory.
Secondly, it requires funding to pay the salaries of 50,000 former Hamas government employees, including security forces. Without a solution to this problem, the technocratic committee will face a social upheaval.
Thirdly, it depends on the position of the Arab states, which must determine the extent of their participation in financing the reconstruction processes and guarantees for the Palestinian population.
Thus, the events of July 6–7, 2026, in Gaza reflect a complex process of institutional transformation under conditions of ongoing occupation and blockade.
The dissolution of the Hamas government is not a capitulation, as some Western media have interpreted it, but represents a pragmatic step to protect the governing institutions in changing circumstances while preserving Palestinian security structures.
[RONINSGRIPS] Drone swarms represent an evolutionary departure from conventional flight formations. While a traditional flight formation relies on human pilots rigidly following a centralized leader or an automated system navigating along pre-programmed, static waypoints, a true swarm functions as a collaborative, autonomous entity.
These systems leverage localized interactions, shared sensor data telemetry, and dynamic task allocation to achieve complex mission objectives in highly contested environments. The deployment of these autonomous swarms presents a multitude of operational, economic, and tactical benefits that fundamentally alter the balance of power on the battlefield.
#2
War is barbaric, but it is a part of us. If anything can be learned from the war in Ukraine, it’s that war isn’t going anywhere, despite what globalisation and capitalism would like us to believe.
[PCMag] A Hacker's Arrest Reveals Microsoft Can Track Users Via a Windows Device ID: The FBI used a Microsoft device identifier, dubbed GDID, to link a teenager to a hack attributed to Scattered Spider, raising privacy red flags about Windows' surveillance capabilities.
Add to this a Garrett Langley is the founder and CEO of Flock Safety is on record (video) freely admitting his company tracks people and the Flock System has also been disclosed to contain microphones and other capabilities, to track audio, bluetooth, etc.
So face it people, we are already tracked and monitored now. The recent SCOTUS ruling on GEOFENCE hopefully may have a serious impact on Flock Cameras also. We'll have to wait and see.
BTW: These are not Trump's Flock Cameras, the owners are out of Atlanta Ga.
The Flock Systems Founders (on record) are:
Garrett Langley
Matt Feury
Paige Todd
[ISRAEL-ALMA.ORG] Just two days after President Ahmad al-Sharaa appointed two representatives from Suwayda Governorate to the Syrian Parliament (for further reading, see: “Suwayda’s Representation in Parliament: The Politics of Appointments Amid a Crisis of Trust“), violent clashes erupted between the regime’s security forces and the (Druze) National Guard in the Tal al-Hadid area, west of the city of Suwayda (July 3, 2026).
The focal point of the fighting was the Tal al-Hadid outpost, one of the regime’s Internal Security positions established as part of the ceasefire arrangements following the Suwayda crisis in the summer of 2025. The outpost controls the western entrance to the city, the road leading to al-Tha’la Airbase, and several key transportation routes. As such, it constitutes one of the regime’s most important control points in the governorate.
According to the Syrian Ministry of Interior, National Guard forces opened fire on Internal Security positions at the outpost and attempted a ground advance but were repelled. In contrast, local sources in Suwayda refrained from determining which side initiated the fighting and described the incident as part of the continuing cycle of clashes between the two sides. At this stage, it is not possible to determine conclusively who initiated the confrontation.
The clashes continued for several hours and involved the use of heavy machine guns, medium weapons, and mortars. In addition, there were reports that the regime’s forces employed explosive drones. According to the reports, one of the drones struck a military position of Rawad Abdul Khalek, commander of the National Guard’s Rapid Intervention Battalion, wounding him.
The clashes did not end after the fighting at Tal al-Hadid. On July 6, the Syrian Parliament convened for its first session following the swearing-in of its members, including the two representatives from Suwayda appointed by al-Sharaa. The following day, July 7, reports indicated continued reinforcement of regime forces in the Tal al-Hadid area, along with sporadic exchanges of fire.
The close timing between the political developments and the continued friction on the ground illustrates that the struggle over Suwayda is being fought not only on the military front, but also over the question of the governorate’s legitimacy and representation.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
