Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics
[ColonelCassad] My article for TASS about the attempted regime change in Mali.
Units of the Russian Ministry of Defense's African Corps prevented a regime change in Mali, preventing mass civilian casualties. Our troops were forced to provide assistance following the April 25 attack on key cities in the African country by militants from the Azawad Liberation Front and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen
…JNIM…
(which identifies itself as part of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, but is banned in Russia). Despite existing conflicts, the groups have once again united to overthrow the current government in order to ensure the establishment of an Islamic state based on Sharia law in Mali. The authorities are preventing the Tuareg from gaining Azawad (a territory in the northeast of the country), and al-Qaeda militants from establishing a branch of the Caliphate. This situation is also compounded by the geopolitical struggle for spheres of influence in Africa. This makes the traditional war between the government and terrorists merely one dimension of a conflict driven by interests that extend far beyond regional associations and countries. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE:
Mali was for decades part of the French colonial, and then neocolonial, empire. After 1960, as classical colonialism crumbled (with the USSR playing a hand in it),
…(indeed, and not a benign one)…
Paris shifted to indirect forms of control over its former possessions. Under this concept, most of the newly liberated countries of French West Africa enjoyed formal sovereignty, but in reality remained completely dependent on Paris for their financial, economic, sociocultural, and military influence. Local elites, primarily educated in the French capital, were also subordinate to the French, and those who attempted to rebel against this order were simply eliminated—as happened with Burkina Faso's President Thomas Sankara. Overall, until the second half of the 2010s, France maintained a stable grip on West Africa, including through the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and UEMOA (Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine) alliances. But even then, the situation began to change. Coups took place in these countries under the banner of national liberation from colonial oppression. The new leaders proclaimed ideas of independent national development and demanded the withdrawal of French and NATO troops from their territories. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger also announced the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) in 2023 and their withdrawal from ECOWAS (which had threatened military intervention in these countries after the coup) in 2024.
While rebuilding ties in Africa after the collapse of the USSR, Moscow began actively influencing France's sphere of influence in the region. Specifically, it established cooperation with the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russia supported the decolonization processes and sovereign policies of the ACS member countries. Units of the African Corps were deployed on their territory, which, at the request of local authorities, assumed the role of training local military and security forces and also provided military support (similar to the CAR). Former French and American military infrastructure is being used to deploy Russian troops.
Furthermore, China and Turkey are actively supporting these countries militarily (supplying armored vehicles and UAVs).
As a result of these processes, Paris's neocolonial empire in Africa has virtually collapsed. Following the Sahel countries, the French were asked to withdraw from Senegal. Anti-French sentiment also grew in a number of other countries. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, a military coup was prevented only with the active intervention of Paris. It is important to note that France is using Côte d'Ivoire as a springboard for subversive activities against Burkina Faso.
Overall, the situation for Paris was systematically deteriorating, with President Emmanuel Macron effectively presiding over the collapse of late French colonialism. But Paris was not about to give in without a fight.
A TERRORIST TOOL FOR REVENGE:
Having failed to maintain control over its former colonies, France switched to a covert campaign against uncontrolled governments. In Mali, it relied on supporting Azawad separatists in conjunction with Islamist militants.
If true, that’s incredibly stupid, especially given the Moslem colonization of the home country.
Since 2024, these militants have increasingly launched attacks on civilians and military installations in countries liberated from France. Malian authorities have repeatedly openly accused Paris of supporting Islamic terrorists in the Sahel.
France previously financed the Islamist opposition in Libya and groups in Syria. A Lafarge plant even paid direct taxes to the Islamic State (IS, a terrorist group banned in Russia). The fact that Paris was formally "fighting terrorism" in Mali as part of Operation Serval shouldn't be misleading: the groups the French supposedly opposed have now become a convenient tool for France to exert pressure on the local government. Meanwhile, France until recently dominated the African arms market.
Among other things, militants from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR) were brought in to fight against the Sahel states (and Russian influence), training terrorists in the use of FPV drones and quadcopters to increase their striking power. The alarm bell rang back in 2024: militants intensified attacks in northern and central Mali, disrupting supplies to the civilian population, hoping to provoke mass protests against the government and garner support for a power grab.
Western sponsors of terrorists make no secret of their indifference to the consequences for the country and its population should jihadists come to power and Sharia law be imposed. They also see no problem with Azawad's secession from Mali. The primary objective is to halt the erosion of French influence in Africa and undermine Russia's position. The terrorists here are nothing more than a tool, which the French press is already trying to purify, arguing that those whom the French and NATO forces fought during Operations Barkhane and Serval are not actually that radical. This is being done in case they manage to seize power, which is what they attempted on April 25, 2026, during the offensive on Bomako, Kidal, Gao, and other cities in Mali.
THE AFRIKA KORPS THWARTS THE MILITANTS' PLANS.
Apparently, the plan was for the militants to paralyze the Malian Armed Forces and the Russian Ministry of Defense's Afrika Korps by attacking the country's main centers. This was supposed to replicate the "Syrian scenario" with the collapse of the Syrian Arab Army and Bashar al-Assad's Baathist government at the end of 2024.
But this plan faltered on the very first day, in part due to the resistance of the Russian Armed Forces' Afrika Korps, which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. In total, over 2,500 militants were killed or wounded during the three days of fighting, accounting for approximately 20% of all radicals participating in the offensive. Most major urban centers remained under the control of the Malian government. Even in Kidal, where the radicals had concentrated their main forces, Russian troops managed to hold the base and strongholds. Only after the Malian government reached an agreement with the militants did our fighters withdraw from their positions in an organized manner.
Despite the militants' training and propaganda in European media, a victory march did not materialize. It also became clear that the local population (especially in southern Mali) was unwilling to submit to Sharia law—dozens of militants who failed to retreat were lynched by angry residents. The militants' strategic plan was thwarted.
However, they show no signs of stopping, declaring their intention to continue attacks toward Gao and even Bomako. They are, of course, being pushed to do this by their sponsors, who hope to defeat Russian forces first and foremost by discrediting Moscow's military aid to governments in Africa.
They don’t seem to have been the decisive factor here as was hoped…
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITANT OFFENSIVE
It can be expected that both Azawad separatists and al-Qaeda-linked militants will continue to receive weapons from abroad, particularly through French channels, as well as support from the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate for new operations. We can also predict an increase in the use of various types of drones, particularly for terrorist attacks, and a rise in raids in rural areas aimed at attacking vulnerable strongholds of the Malian army. Moreover, radicals will focus on terrorist attacks in large cities, including those targeting the country's leadership. For example, on April 25, Mali's Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, was killed in a suicide car bombing. Furthermore, a resumption of the fuel blockade of major population centers is likely. Militants will undoubtedly attempt to exploit the resources of the captured territories to replenish their ranks from the local population. A consistent pattern is evident; it is no coincidence that the radicals are being trained by "specialists" arriving from Ukraine.
After the situation stabilizes, the Malian government will undoubtedly need to strengthen the army's resilience to recapture the lost territories. After all, the long-term presence of Kidal in terrorist hands could threaten, among other things, the dismemberment of the country and the actual secession of Azawad, which is aligned with France. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to seek help from Niger and Burkina Faso: terrorism is a threat to the entire region, and especially to countries under the control of governments disloyal to the West. From a broader perspective, the African front is part of the collective West's struggle against Russia. They can't accept that Moscow is restoring and establishing new ties in the region.
Overall, things aren't over yet, of course. We'll likely see renewed attempts to overthrow the government in Bomako once the militants lick their wounds after their losses and, relying on the captured Kidal, try to launch a new offensive. It's best to prepare for this in advance. And the guys from the Afrika Korps did a good job. If it weren't for them, it's far from certain the government would have survived.
P.S. For those who asked why the Afrika Korps press releases end with the slogan "He who dares wins."
The Russian inscription on the helmet on the Afrika Korps shoulder patch reads/translates exactly like the British motto, "He who dares, wins"
[PJ] Oh, the emotions in the United States of America here in the Year of Our Lord 2026! There's despair. There's anger. There's...well, there's mostly anger. Heck, I tend to be dead inside and the partisan political acrimony has even been getting to me. In a recent VIP column, I wrote that I was taking a brief break from my workday habit of perusing the Opinion sections of The New York Times and The Washington Post because I'm starting to worry about that kind of crazy being contagious.
That followed a week or two of me venting in various ways about the state of things in American politics. Then I remembered something very important: I'm rather enjoying President Trump's second term. Seeing the Democrats rend their garments over everything that he does isn't something I should let get me frustrated. It's kind of a schadenfreude-filled bonus.
As I began to return to my typical Zen-like state, I decided it would be fun to trigger the lefties by writing a column that not only likened President Trump to President Abraham Lincoln, but likened today's Democrats to the seditious secessionists (say that three times fast) of the Civil War era. I know I'm not the first conservative pundit to do this. Honestly, I'm surprised at how long it took me to get around to it. I have a lot of lefty trolls and a kajillion prog followers on X; I really should be thinking of triggering them more often.
Even though the circumstances are obviously different, finding parallels between what's happening now and the America of the 1860s isn't difficult for conservatives, mostly because we've all read history books. I am in no way saying that things are as severe right now — families aren't killing each other from opposite sides of a war. I just can't help but think that there are some similarities between the political climate then and now.
[Townhall] At the White House Correspondents' Dinner, President Donald Trump was the target of yet a third assassination attempt — this time in full view of the Washington press corp.
The event was presented as a spirited night with Trump. After 11 years of avoiding the predominantly left-wing media event, he decided to revisit the dinner. He anticipated that he would be the object of ridicule inside the hall — and that he might see possible violence outside it.
Indeed, protesters ringed the hotel. In grimly prescient fashion, the usual sort of crowd that night was channeling John Wilkes Booth — sic semper tyrannis — with placards reading "Death to Tyrants."
#1
Trump is now the only U.S. president in history to be the target of three assassination attempts involving gunfire — with more than two years to go in his tenure as a target.
So the left strategy of demonizing Trump is obviously working. Fortunately it's not yet working well enough to satisfy the left. But we can be sure they'll keep trying. Beefing up the Secret Service might be a good idea. Cole Allen did not succeed but he got way too close for comfort. And I still think Kathy Griffin should be in jail.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
05/01/2026 13:08 Comments ||
Top||
[Ynet] The International Criminal Court (ICC) was presented to the world as a court of law. Increasingly, however, it has delivered politics—dirty politics carried out by officials now facing allegations serious enough to cast doubt over decisions they made.
If the ICC’s Gaza-and-Israel narrative was not already in question, along with the troubling issue of its claimed jurisdiction over non-member Israel, the latest reporting makes it even harder to believe the case against Netanyahu and Gallant is rooted in impartial evidence rather than political pressure and Qatar’s campaign to delegitimize the Jewish state.
A recent Wall Street Journal editorial reported that while former Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan was seeking arrest warrants against Israeli leaders in 2024, a witness statement alleged that Qatar promised to "look after" him if he proceeded. The same report said investigators discussed Qatar as the "client country," while private intelligence contractors allegedly referred to "wrapping" their "arms" around Khan in connection with the warrants. Whether every allegation is ultimately proven is not the only issue. The immediate question is whether an international institution can be trusted to prosecute Israeli officials when the process itself is clouded by claims of compromise and improper influence.
This is not merely about personalities or misconduct allegations. It is about the integrity of the process. Prosecutorial independence is the foundation of legitimacy. If there is credible reason to believe a prosecutor was offered protection or support by a foreign state while handling a politically explosive case, then justice risks becoming leverage.
The report also described efforts to scrutinize Khan’s accuser through speculative claims tied to Jewish heritage and Israeli connections, while examining personal details and travel. According to the Journal, those efforts "led nowhere," and no evidence was found that the accuser was part of any Israeli plot. Khan denies wrongdoing. But the larger lesson remains: when suspicion is weaponized, confidence in the institution suffers.
Then there is the core question for Israel: what do these allegations mean for the case against Netanyahu and Gallant, already built on contested evidence and disputed jurisdiction? Even before these revelations, the ICC’s actions raised serious legal and political concerns. An institution accused of selective enforcement does not gain credibility when scandals surrounding its own leadership emerge.
The Journal further reported that Khan took leave in May 2025 and that the court’s governors advanced disciplinary proceedings after allegations of sexual assault. Khan denies misconduct. Yet the fact that such internal proceedings are moving forward is not a footnote—it is a legitimacy crisis.
...Israel does not need perfection to demand fairness. It needs only the standard expected in any courtroom: independent decision-makers applying evidence without fear, favor, or political orchestration. The recent reporting suggests the opposite.
The ICC has failed that legitimacy test. The tainted case against Israel’s leaders should be dismissed in the interest of justice.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Shamil Kerashev
A solid analysis with unnecessary kibbitzing based on the view from afar. Worth exactly what you paid for it, dear Reader, and completely not guaranteed to be correct.
[REGNUM] Israel's political system, which has been in a state of turbulence for years,
…Israel has a very vigorous and enthusiastic democracy. Her politicians must be tough to survive…
has produced a new, high-profile news story. The local press is calling it a "marriage of convenience against Benjamin Netanyahu."
We're talking about the alliance between former prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid. They recently decided to merge their movements, Bennett 2026 and Yesh Atid, into the Be'Yahad (Together) bloc in order to secure victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Or, at the very least, to provide stiff competition to the "eternal prime minister's" team.
Naftali Bennett has proved to be a severe disappointment. He has all the right ingredients, but lacks the wily shrewdness necessary to make things happen. Poor Mr. Lapid has truly lovely hair, and looks beautifully resolute for the camera. Perhaps he would have done better in Canada.
To be fair, such an alliance wouldn't surprise local voters. In 2021, it was Bennett and Lapid's alliance that interrupted Bibi's (Netanyahu's nickname) rule. Although only briefly. The fragile coalition was held together by a situational alliance of the right, socialists, and the Arab opposition—and, overall, was more of a showcase of incompatible forces.
They all wanted desperately to topple Bibi, which very briefly sufficed.
Moreover, the two leaders appeared completely incompatible from the very beginning. The refined liberal Lapid always relied on the secular urban population and demanded the consistent integration of the Jewish state into the Western world. He also advocated an agreement with the Palestinians based on the principle of "two states for two peoples."
That won’t fly anymore. Except for the weekly protesting idiots, all Israel knows that’s just a way to get to the next 10/7 faster.
Bennett, however, is a politician of a completely different breed. A retired special forces commander,
…as was Bibi, a generation earlier…
a staunch Zionist, and a supporter of expanded settlement activity in the West Bank, he is traditionally considered a "fresher version" of Netanyahu himself, with whom he once worked closely but later fell out completely.
Like Bibi, Naftali spent part of his childhood in America and made his fortune there, but in other ways their experiences were very different. Bibi’s mother was a Sabra and a lawyer, his father moved from Europe as a child and was an academic. Naftali’s parents were American Progressive activists who made aliyah and went into real estate. Bibi is on his third wife, Naftali has stuck with the first woman he married. Bibi went to university in America, studying business, architecture, and politics for a future of public service, then worked in America as a business consultant before returning to Israel for good, while Naftali got his degrees in Israel, in business and law, then went to America to become a software entrepreneur before returning to Israel to grow more businesses, both his own and as a venture capitalist, while turning his attention to helping his country in the political arena — both men have noble intentions, but their approaches no doubt clash.
The previous merger of these two opposites ended in a predictable collapse. The MKs loyal to Naftali Bennett, with a national-religious orientation, simply couldn't coexist with those who supported Lapid's Yesh Atid, and vice versa. Passing laws under such conditions became virtually impossible, so by the end of 2022, the "government of change" collapsed under the weight of endless disputes, paving the way for Bibi's triumphant return.
And so it will again, should the joint venture manage to put together a government.
But what can we expect from a second attempt at power? Both opposition leaders say the mistakes of the past have been carefully analyzed and addressed. "We must put an end to internal strife and focus all our efforts on moving our state forward," declared Yair Lapid. "Our unification is a message to all the people of Israel: the era of polarization is over. The time has come to part with Netanyahu and open a new chapter in Israel's history," adds Bennett.
In short, Be’Yahad certainly has plenty of ambition. And most importantly, the very concept of cooperation this time around seems a little more realistic. Instead of gathering representatives of openly opposing camps under a single banner, the coalition intends to win a slice of the moderate right-wing electorate from the ruling Likud party and help it find common ground with the center-left.
Former Chief of the General Staff, pragmatic conservative Gadi Eisenkot, is keen to contribute to this task
… no doubt…
and has been officially offered the third position. He hasn't yet given a definitive answer, but appears willing to accept. "We share a common goal, which requires responsible and wise action to achieve the changes needed by the country and its citizens," The Times of Israel quotes Eisenkot as saying.
However, according to Israeli political analysts, the latter is far from a guarantee of success. According to opinion polls, even with the support of a respected military leader, the bloc could claim 25-28 seats in the Knesset. Netanyahu's faction is given the same number.
Consequently, the final outcome will critically depend on the opponents' ability to form coalitions. It's already clear that Bibi will once again be backed by his "natural allies" of recent years—the ultra-Orthodox (Shas, United Torah Judaism), the far-right (Otzma Yehudit), and Bezalel Smotrich's radical Religious Zionists.
Thus, the Lapid-Bennett team will clearly have to select everyone who remains. This includes Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu, the renewed Democrats bloc,
…actually the labour socialists renamed in honour of their American Democratic Party sponsors…
and several other forces from the left-liberal second tier.
Again, what they have in common is they loathe Bibi. And ego.
Hypothetically, it's conceivable that this time, having learned from bitter experience, they won't squabble even during the seating stage and will reach genuine unanimity. And on some issues, this will be achieved with 100% certainty: for example, all of Bibi's opponents, without exception, dream of finally burying the scandalous judicial reform.
Another excuse to harass him, it seems to me. And a fight by the Israeli deep state to retain control of one of the levers of power.
However, the question arises: will this be enough for a minimum absolute majority of 61 seats? If the answer is no, the most dangerous factor will come to the forefront: the Arab parties Ra'am,
…the political party of the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel…
Hadash,
…the Arab Communist party in Israel…
and Ta'al.
…anti-Zionist Arab nationalists, they are not big enough to get Knesset seats on their own, but they’re willing to team up.
On the one hand, their representation in the legislature should be sufficient for Be'Yahad to decisively tip the scales in its favor. But on the other hand, in today's Israeli reality, such an alliance is fraught with serious risks, at a minimum, and political suicide, at worst.
For Bennett, who is striving to maintain his image as an alternative leader of the right (even if now moderate), this ice is too thin. And Lapid, while formally remaining a staunch globalist democrat, has recently moved noticeably to the right—he warmly welcomed the military operation against Iran, harshly criticized the ceasefire with Lebanon, and distanced himself from his own statements supporting the recognition of Palestine.
Glory hallelujah, the man can learn.
Therefore, the election result—whatever it turns out to be—definitely rules out stability. If the coalition does decide to rely on Muslim mandates to secure a majority of votes, another flare-up on the borders will threaten it with an internal crisis and the potential for collapse. Not to mention that Benjamin Netanyahu, finding himself in the opposition gallery, will inevitably accuse Be'Yahad of betraying national interests.
The second scenario—a conditional victory without the Arabs—will likely simply lead the Middle East conflict to a somewhat different style of governance and external positioning. Currently, there are no influential forces in the Israeli political mainstream willing to make concessions and renounce the annexation of territories: war, from the Jewish state's perspective, has effectively become synonymous with defense.
That is Israel’s current reality - a good thing they recognize it.
Therefore, Israeli analysts believe that, at best, Be'Yahad will abandon its aggressive messianic rhetoric and try to make its actions appear more polished in the eyes of the international community. However, certain disagreements are also inevitable in relations with the army.
Yair Lapid is an ideal partner for European liberals and the US Democratic Party.
…except for being Jewish and Israeli, and committed to Israel’s continued existence, all of which is anathema to the current generation of Democrats…
Naftali Bennett, however, is much closer to the American Republicans and has even included a couple of former Donald Trump advisers in his campaign team.
Bibi was friends with The Donald’s father, which led to his friendship with the son, so that’ll be interesting.
On paper, this duality creates the impression of universality. However, in reality—given the acute contradictions engulfing the collective West itself—it's not difficult to find weaknesses.
Especially when their search is taken over by the grandmaster of political intrigue, Netanyahu, who seems determined to break all records of political survival.
#2
There's something off with Naftali. The press give him glowing reviews while calling him conservative. Media does not do that to true conservatives, the media destroys conservatives.
This guy might be a snake with the media pushing a certain narrative about him.
#3
My sense, worth less than $0.02, is that the left have given up on any possibility of winning, given the zero real impact the protest sector (wonderfully apposite term taken from a poster in your Reddit link, mossomo) has had, and they’ve turned to Mr. Bennett as someone they can help elect and then hope to control — they have no hope of controlling Bibi, only continuing to annoy him.
[Jpost] Despite leaked reports about top US military officials briefing President Donald Trump on new escalatory and potentially imminent military options against Iran, the current game of chicken will continue for the near future, Israeli and American sources have indicated to The Jerusalem Post.
While the leaks present Trump as being briefed on potential "new" options for attacking Iran so that it will make further concessions, nuclear or otherwise, all of these plans have been on the table since early March and are not new, according to people familiar with the matter.
Despite repeated opportunities to opt for any of the multiple options, Trump has preferred avoiding the additional risks they entail, the sources indicated.
Trump opted for a unilateral ceasefire on April 7, even though he received no assurances of concessions by Iran.
The calculus was relatively simple: Trump was hemorrhaging political support once the war went past its early days of euphoria.
As the days of war became weeks, large majorities of the American public — and even an increasing number of Republicans — opposed the war due to the spike in gas prices.
They also opposed the US fighting for any extended period in the Middle East, which can be framed as a "war of choice" for Washington, although it is more pressing for Israel.
Gas prices are still far above where they were before the war. If they do not decline in the coming months, the Republican Party likely will be hammered during the US midterm elections.
If there is neither war nor chaos in the Middle East in the coming months, however, then the opposition would be less intense in the short term. The prospect of bringing gas prices down in time to impact the November elections remains intact.
Nothing has really changed since Trump decided to end the war with no concessions, and then decided to extend both his deadlines and the ceasefire on two separate occasions without any stable concessions, according to the sources.
In fact, the latest leaks could signal his desperation to secure Iranian concessions before they do anything else.
Even though the negotiations are stalled, Trump thinks the Iranians will make concessions, because the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is pushing their economy to collapse.
IRAN IS ATTEMPTING TO OUTWAIT TRUMP
And President Trump is besieging Iran, which apparently must shortly such down pumping oil altogether, for lack of storage and refinery space, which will damage the equipment. So waiting may cost the Mullahs more.
The Iranians think they can wait out Trump. Their rationale is that even if the economic harm to Iranians is worse than it is to Americans, they believe their threshold for economic pain, after decades of sanctions, is far higher than Americans’ patience with gas prices.
Trump does not want to go back to a full-scale war, and the game of chicken over Hormuz has not yet moved the Iranians, so he wants to scare them more into blinking, the sources indicated.
The problem is that Trump’s blinking before the Iranians do has spoken louder than these repeated leaks.
Rest at the link
For perspective:
In July 2022, the @RCPolitics average had Joe Biden's job approval at net -19.9. Donald Trump's current RCP average is net -15.6 -- i.e, despite everything, Trump is STILL more popular than Mr. Eighty-One Million Votes. pic.twitter.com/TxjdDg9Ovj
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
[PJ] Oh, the emotions in the United States of America here in the Year of Our Lord 2026! There's despair. There's anger. There's...well, there's mostly anger. Heck, I tend to be dead inside and the partisan political acrimony has even been getting to me. In a recent VIP column, I wrote that I was taking a brief break from my workday habit of perusing the Opinion sections of The New York Times and The Washington Post because I'm starting to worry about that kind of crazy being contagious. 
