#6
"In 1985, Jacques-Yves Cousteau introduced Alcyone, a revolutionary vessel designed to test and demonstrate the potential of turbosail technology. This pioneering propulsion system combined traditional sailing techniques with advanced aerodynamics, enhancing fuel efficiency and reducing environmental impact. As a result, Alcyone became a beacon of Cousteau’s vision for sustainable maritime exploration."
[ZeroHedge] The Valdai Club, which is Russia’s premier think tank and elite networking platform at whose annual meetings Putin participates, shared some startling insight into “the changing purpose of wars”. It was included in the eponymous section of their report titled “Dr. Chaos or: How to Stop Worrying and Love the Disorder”, which was written by Oleg Barabanov, Anton Bespalov, Timofei Bordachev, Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrey Sushentsov, and Ivan Timofeev. They’re all regarded as Russia’s top policy influencers.
They wrote on page 25 that “Russia would not risk its own socioeconomic stability for a decisive victory in a military conflict. One exception is direct full-scale aggression, but the probability of such an action against a nuclear superpower is close to zero…Perhaps the purpose of wars has changed. The contemporary objective may no longer lie in victories – wherein one party achieves all its goals – but rather in maintaining a balance necessary for a period of relative peaceful development.”
This startling insight prompts a re-evaluation of the special operation, which has been going on for over 3,5 years, in no small part due to Putin’s restraint in not waging a US-inspired “shock-and-awe” campaign at the cost of Iraqi-like civilian casualties among what he believes to be the fraternal Ukrainian people.
In light of what Russia’s top policy influencers just revealed, however, a complementary reason might be his trusted policy advisors’ reluctance to risk their country’s “socioeconomic stability for a decisive victory”.
It can only be speculated what form this could take if Putin abandoned his restraint by ordering the bombing of bridges across the Dnieper, the total destruction of all major Ukrainian power plants, and/or targeting political sites like the Rada. Nevertheless, the salience rests in the Valdai Club’s implied assessment that pursuing “a decisive victory in a military conflict” presumably like the present one could lead to such risks, thus further contextualizing why this hasn’t yet happened and might never will.
With Takaichi set to become Prime Minister of Japan: •The government will shift to the right (she sees herself as the successor to Abe's conservativism). •The LDP's coalition partner, Komeito, which said it wanted a "moderate" PM, will be unhappy. •The recent improvement in… pic.twitter.com/SbMYJELA9N
As a result, rantburg.com will keep a link to the San Remo manual on the right sidebar.
While reading Craig Murray's most recent post on international law related to naval blockades, I am reminded of the familiar adage suggesting it is better to stay quiet and be thought a fool than to speak and remove all doubt. Murray would have been better off staying quiet. Here's why, again in point-by-point format:
1. We'll get to the authority of ICJ to establish international law in the next point, but first let's address this rather...eccentric observation by Murray: "[Dr.] Cox treats as Gospel in international law the San Remo Manual, which is not a treaty and not a court, but a compendium of practice compiled by experts."
I suggest this observation is rather eccentric because...wait for it...in my post I was responding to Murray's commentary citing the San Remo Manual (SRM) as authority!! If I were to paraphrase this exchange, it would go something like this:
- Murray (1st): San Remo manual says this about naval blockades.
- Me (2nd): That's not what the Manual says. Actually, it says this.
- Murray (3rd): Ah, but "San Remo is useful as a guide to customary international law as it stood 30 years ago, but is no more than that."
See? Rather eccentric. I know what SRM is and what its utility is as a reference regarding international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. Yes, it merely collects observations of experts on the subject as understood in 1994 when it was published. There is also a movement afoot to reconvene another group to update the Manual.
For now, its authority is related to how states - including Israel - refer to the various rules reflected therein as expressions of customary law. Still, the reason I focused on specific provisions of SRM is because CRAIG MURRAY DID SO in his initial post and he incorrectly cited relevant provisions. So his suggestion now that I treat "as Gospel in international law the San Remo Manual" seems rather...eccentric.
2. Now to ICJ authority to "establish" international law. It's not actually "[Dr.] Cox [who] denies the authority of the International Court of Justice" (returning to Murray's point 1.). It's the Statute of the International Court of Justice that does so.
Before we refer directly to the Statute to explain, let's address this claim from Murray in his point 2. as well: "[Dr.] Cox states that the 2004 ICJ opinion on the legality of The Wall (it is not legal) does not affect the later maritime blockade, but I plainly was citing the 2024 ICJ advisory opinion on the status of the occupation, which Cox completely ignores. Perhaps he is not very up to date."
Tbh I did a double take when I read this delusional observation since that doesn't seem like something I would say at all. Turns out, Murray just fabricated this claim completely from thin air.
Don't believe me? Do what I did - go back and read my post he's quoting here. Not once do I refer or cite to the 2004 ICJ [Wall] advisory opinion. Rather, this is what I say (in relevant part): "Additionally, CIJ_ICJ does not have unilateral authority to establish international law - whether through advisory opinions or otherwise. Therefore it doesn't matter what ICJ 'found illegal' in advisory opinions" (emphasis in original). Later, I said: "Like ICJ advisory opinions, no UN CoI [Commission of Inquiry] has unilateral authority to establish international law" (emphasis added).
Notice any references to a specific ICJ advisory opinion, whether Wall (2004) or otherwise? No, me neither. Which is why I did a double take - my observations regarding "authority" of ICJ to establish international law apply to all advisory opinions - not just Wall. So Murray's claim that I state "that the 2004 ICJ opinion on the legality of The Wall (it is not legal) does not affect the later maritime blockade" is either disingenuous or delusional (or both).
Either way, the point remains that NO advisory opinions (Wall, Occupation, or any other) have unilateral authority to establish international law. Here's why, according to the ICJ's own Statute.
Specifically, we'll refer to 3 separate provisions. Let's start with art. 66 on...that's right...advisory opinions.
According to art. 66, ICJ "may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request" (pic 1). The rest of Ch IV (on advisory opinions) establishes procedures for requesting AOs and such.
Notice that nothing about art. 66 establishes AOs constitute a binding source of international law. In fact, the ICJ Charter explicitly indicates states party to a dispute must affirmatively accept compulsory jurisdiction during a contested proceeding in order for its judgments to be binding even then (art. 36(2), pic 2). By definition, there are no contestants in an advisory opinion proceeding - so these opinions do not constitute a binding source of international law.
So, ICJ advisory opinions are not binding as a matter of international law. And it's not just me saying so. Arts. 66 and 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice say so.
Next, let's address art. 38 of the ICJ Statute - which describes sources the Court should apply when deciding disputes between states (pic 3).
Notice art. 38(1)a-c represent state practice - these are the primary sources ICJ is to consider. Then, art. 38(1)d describes judicial decisions (as well as "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations" as a subsidiary means to be considered when deciding disputes between states.
Even though art. 38 is intended to provide guidance regarding the hierarchy of sources ICJ is to apply in contested cases, states negotiating the Statute (along with the UN Charter) established this procedure because it represents how international law is actually established in general. General state practice in the form of conventional (that is, treaty) and customary (that is, extensive and virtually uniform state practice that is engaged out of a sense of legal obligation) law is the primary source, while judicial opinions and teachings of HQPs are subsidiary means for determining composition of international law.
This means an ICJ advisory opinion could represent binding international law - but only if it captures or represents extensive and virtual uniform state practice with an accompanying opinio juris (legal obligation). This is relevant to Murray's next observation in point 3.
Here's what he says next:
"The ICJ advisory opinion was subsequently adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-10/15. So it is not just an opinion.
It was adopted by 150 votes in favour to 6 votes against. Those against included Israel and the USA.
There can be no dispute that an ICJ advisory opinion supported by 150 nations with only 6 against has force in international law."
In reality, neither an ICJ advisory opinion nor a UN General Assembly resolution are capable of unilaterally establishing international law - unless, of course, either or both constitute extensive and virtually uniform state practice with an accompanying opinio juris.
The aspect of that observation related to ICJ AOs has already been addressed above. But how do we know UNGA resolutions also don't constitute binding international law? Not just because it's "the opinion of Dr Brian L Cox," as Murray suggests. That is my "opinion" because I am capable of reading...wait for it...the UN Charter!
If Craig Murray, or anyone else, cared to actually refer to the Charter, they would find Ch IV that generally establishes UNGA functions and, within Ch IV, art. 10 (pic 4).
And upon referring to art. 10, they would see the "General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter" and "may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council..." (emphasis added). Now, the Security Council has authority to pass binding resolutions - but that's because the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS says so (art. 25, not pictured).
In the end, it isn't just "the opinion of Dr Brian L Cox" that ICJ advisory opinions and UNGA resolutions do not constitute a binding source of international law. This should be everyone's "opinion" since it reflects relevant aspects of the ICJ Statute and UN Charter.
If Murray tried to make the case that the Occupation advisory opinion (2024) or Res. A/RES/ES-10/15 represents extensive and virtually uniform state practice with an accompanying opinio juris, his opinion may actually be convincing. But he doesn't...so, it's not.
3. Again with mischaracterizing what I actually said. Notice the trend? Ok, let's break this misrepresentation down.
- What Murray claims I said: "[Dr.] Cox is - to use a charitable word - mistaken in claiming that the current blockade is legal because it was put in place after 7 October 2023."
- What I actually said: "Maritime security measures conducted during peacetime are beyond the scope of SRM since the manual addresses international law applicable to armed conflicts at sea. So, it doesn't matter how long Israel has enforced a naval blockade. The current armed conflict was initiated by Hamas on October 7, 2023 - and rules reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea have applied since then" (emphasis in original).
Notice the difference - again? That's right! Not once did I say or suggest that the blockade is legal JUST because it was put in place "after 7 October 2023." What I said is that maritime security measures predating Oct 7 are beyond the scope of SRM since the Manual addresses rules that apply during armed conflict (not before, or not after).
Now, this isn't to say that rules reflected in SRM cannot or should not guide conduct of maritime security measures conducted during peacetime - and indeed many provisions do guide 🇮🇱 conduct when not engaged in armed conflict (as has been the case at present since Oct 7).
Even so, my point regarding temporal scope of the applicability of SRM was presented in response to Murray's observations that the blockade "has been in place for 17 years and is an intrinsic part of the long term occupation found illegal in the ICJ advisory opinion" (2)) rather than "a short term measure in time of armed conflict as specified in the San Remo manual" (3)). The "17 years" component and reference to SRM are incompatible since SRM applies only during armed conflict - which at present began on October 7, 2023 (not 17 years ago).
So it's not the case at all that "[Dr.] Cox seems confused in his argument that there was no blockade pre 7 October 2023 because there cannot be a blockade in peacetime." Actually, Murray IS confused when he suggests my "argument" is that "there cannot be a blockade in peacetime." In my post, I merely correctly point out that SRM applies during armed conflict - and it is therefore not directly relevant to "17 years" of supposedly (but not actually) "illegal" "long term occupation."
4 (the first). To reiterate (from my initial post): "The claim that the 'blockade is plainly a part of the machinery of such genocide' [quoting Murray's initial post] is just as anecdotal and authoritative as the UN CoI report Craig Murray cites here for support." Repeating (in his most recent post) that "the blockade CANNOT be legal as it is integral to maintaining an illegal occupation and part of the mechanism of a genocide" is once again just as anecdotal and authoritative as it was the first time - no matter how many times Murray would like to reiterate it.
4 (the second). Murray's claim that the context of the SRM is to "aid of facilitating humanitarian relief and prectice in warfare" is simply, yet again, pure delusion. To understand why, all we need to do is refer - again - directly to the source.
Here, let's consider ¶ 6 of SRM (not pictured): "The rules set out in this document and any other rules of international humanitarian law shall apply equally to all parties to the conflict" (emphasis added). So the overall intent is to "set out" the rules that are applicable to armed conflict at sea (as the full title of SRM suggests).
Yes, there are provisions about facilitating humanitarian relief - but that is only to the extent that customary LOAC involves rules addressing the facilitation of humanitarian relief. There are other rules such as when a vessel may be attacked or captured, and innocent passage through neutral waters, and so on.
The intent of SRM is to capture international law that applies to armed conflict at sea - just as the title indicates. The overall goal is not to "facilitating humanitarian relief and prectice in warfare" as Murray suggests. Once again, he is either misinformed or delusional (or both). What he is not, though, once again, is correct.
5. It was bad enough that Murray thoroughly misquoted SRM in his initial post. Now he's doubling down and misquoting it even further in the subsequent post. Here's why.
First, there is no reference to "safe goods" as he claims. SRM does refer to "free goods" - which seems to be what Murray actually means. Now, it's not that "Dr Cox forgot to tell you" about "safe [actually, "free"] goods." Rather, I didn't address these directly because MURRAY DOESN'T IN HIS INITIAL POST.
Although he apparently forgot to tell you about free goods then - yet he seems to have remembered now - let's consider how he misquotes SRM even now that he has remembered free goods.
According to Murray this time around, "under the San Remo rules it is ILLEGAL to intercept food, medical supplies, clothing and bedding for the civilian population" since these are considered "'safe goods'". Of course, it is true that any goods "not on the belligerent's contraband list are 'free goods', that is, not subject to capture" (SRM ¶ 150, not pictured).
HOWEVER, a vessel suspected of carrying contraband (as opposed to free goods) is but one category of vessels that are subject to capture outside neutral waters (SRM ¶ 146(a)). Any guesses what another justification for capturing a vessel outside of neutral waters? That's right...breaching or attempting to breach a blockade (SRM ¶ 146(f))!!
Maybe Murray just "forgot" to tell you about that in his latest post - but I didn't in my initial response. For reference, you may go back to that post and refer to point 7 just to confirm.
6. Next up is Murray's claim that, "A blockade must be proportionate. Something cannot be both infinite and proportionate. The Israeli blockade of Gaza is infinite - it covers all goods, even "safe goods" under San Remo, and has no end."
He's correct to suggest that a blockade must be proportionate - that's reflected in SRM ¶ 102(b): "the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade" (not pictured).
But in circumstances wherein land crossings are utilized to facilitate the entry of "safe [actually, "free"] goods," it's unlikely that damage to the civ pop of even a total maritime blockade is "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" from neutralizing a domain (sea) by which Hamas would otherwise be able to receive munitions and supplies and such.
Of course, Murray could attempt to make that argument - but he doesn't. So his observation that the blockade "covers all goods" doesn't actually address proportionality since he fails to explain how the damage to the civ pop from these measures is excessive IRL to the C&D mil advantage anticipated.
And it is true that SRM ¶ 94 requires the blockading party to declare the duration. But there is no provision to support his claim that "'Until further notice' is not a duration: it is the antithesis of a duration." Nothing in SRM prohibits the party from declaring it will enforce the blockade until the cessation of hostilities - so Murray's musings about the "antithesis of a duration" are, once again, purely anecdotal.
7. According to Murray, "Dr Cox forgot to tell you about" ¶ 136 (e), which indicates "vessels charged with philanthropic missions" are "exempt from capture." Once again, it's not that I "forgot" to "tell you about" this. I was addressing the points Murray made in his initial post. And guess what, HE FORGOT TO TELL YOU ABOUT THIS PROVISION IN HIS INITIAL POST.
And it's for good reason that he forgot/neglected to do so initially. Any guesses why that is? That's right!!
This provision is in Section IV of SRM, which addresses "CAPTURE OF ENEMY VESSELS AND GOODS." So unless Murray is explicitly acknowledging GSM Flotilla is a HAMAS VESSEL, it's not clear why he's bringing up anything in Sec IV of SRM (including ¶ 136 (e)). So, it's probably best for him that he "forgot" about that provision to begin with...but it does seem rather foolish to bring it up now.
8. Then, perhaps most foolish of all, is this concluding substantive point: "Here is yet another key passage Dr Cox preferred not to bring to your attention. '102 The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if:' [...]
If you're still not sure why I suggest this observation is perhaps the most foolish of all, I invite you to go back to my initial post he's quoting here. When you do, pay close attention to my point 4 (which corresponds to his initial point 4) and my attached pic 3.
Notice anything amusing yet? That's right!! Both my point 4 and attached pic 3 EXPLICITLY ADDRESS SRM ¶ 102!!
Specifically, I say: "SRM rules DO NOT 'explicitly state that humanitarian supplies may not be blockaded' [quoting Murray's initial post]. There are rules addressing that conduct, but these rules are subject to other conditions and restrictions. As such, there is no outright ban on blockading 'humanitarian supplies.' Source: SRM ¶¶ 102-04 (pic 3)" (emphasis in original).
So, whether Murray is misinformed or delusional when he claims now that "Dr Cox preferred not to bring to your attention" this "key passage" of SRM, there is no doubt that this observation is something - and that something is foolish.
___________
In the end, Murray indicates he felt "obliged to respond" to my "garbage" response to his initial post. To each her/his own, I suppose.
But my response here to his response should serve as a lesson to Craig Murray and anyone else inclined to believe anything he says involving international law: it is better to stay quiet and be thought a fool than to speak and remove all doubt.
Hezbollah will not integrate into the LAF. It will swallow the Lebanese Armed Forces! @ZehaviAlma spoke to @BritainIsrael about the concerns regarding Hezbollah in Lebanon. https://t.co/BJCXjQq5UL
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
