For Palestinians, there's still a SNARC effect, but it's reversed from the Canadian SNARC effect: They're faster with the right hand for smaller numbers, and faster with the left hand for larger numbers.
But Shaki's team wasn't finished. Here are the results for 16 Israeli students on the same test: Now there's no SNARC effect at all.
Arguably, the Talibans current strategy in the Swat region of Pakistans North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is to exploit all resources available to them while the truce agreement with the Pakistan government is in force.
Emerald Mining
Late in March, reports from the Swat valley emerged that the Taliban militants had taken control of government controlled emerald mines located in the mountains of Mingora. The occupation of the Mingora mine apparently took place sometime in February 2009, following the peace deal between the provincial administration and Sufi Muhammad, leader of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM - Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law). Taliban forces then seized the nearby Shamozai and Gujjar Killi mines and initiated mining and trading processes on their own, employing a large number of local laborers. Locals are eager to work for the Taliban, who take one-third of the profits and distribute the rest to the workers.
The Gujjar Killi emerald mine in Shangla district (NWFP) was formerly leased to Luxury International, a US-based firm that abandoned operations when fighting began in the area. Nearly 70 Taliban militants occupied the mine after ousting government-appointed officials and employed local laborers on a profit sharing basis (Daily Times, April 2). Locals said the Taliban had decided to occupy Gujjar Killi when the government failed to take any action after the seizure of the Mingora mine (The News, April 2). Muslim Khan, spokesman for the Swat Taliban, justified the mining by saying that all these minerals have been created by Allah for the benefit of his creatures (Sunday Telegraph, April 4).
Mullah Fazlullah, the leader of the Swat-based Tehrik Taliban Swat (TTS), has been largely responsible for this economic activity in the NWFP. Fazlullah, the son-in-law of TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad, now controls these mining activities in Swat and adjoining places. According to one report, the gemstones are sold quickly at below market prices and smuggled to the Indian city of Jaipur (capital of Rajasthan) and thereafter transported to Bangkok, Switzerland and Israel (Sunday Telegraph, April 4). A BBC report indicated that emerald prices range from $1,000 to more than $100,000 for a cut stone, depending on the size and quality (BBC News, March 24).
Emerald mining and the international sale of gemstones through various channels provides much needed capital for the Taliban to capture other natural resources in the region. Most alarming is the possibility that the Taliban, which is largely immune to any offensive for now, could target other precious stone mines in the NWFP. Pink Topaz, Peridot, Aquamarine and Tourmaline are all available in abundance in different parts of the province. There are also reports that archaeological sites in the area are being looted, with the Taliban likely taking a cut of the proceeds, either as protection money or to encourage the continued instability that makes such looting possible (Dawn [Karachi], March 22). It is feared that the Taliban will use the money made from the excavation and sale of gemstones to finance more suicide attacks on NATO forces in neighboring Afghanistan and support Taliban expansion in Pakistan.
Timber Trade
Another lucrative source of income for the Taliban is Swats forests. The symbiotic tie between Taliban militants and the Timber mafia in Swat and nearby Dir is no secret. Large-scale illegal cutting of the regions pine forests began simultaneously with the 2007 Taliban offensive in the area and the flight of most of the people living in the forests (Dawn, March 22). Taliban militants have been involved in the widespread cutting of the thick pine forests and apple orchards of Malam Jaba, Fatehpur, Miandam and Lalko, often in collusion with the mafia elements that cause enormous environmental damage to the region while making immense profits (The News, April 13).
The Taliban has long been in control of the timber trade in the NWFP and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In mid-2008, Environment Minister Hamidullah Jan Afridi pointed towards the militant-criminal nexus in FATA and stated that the timber mafia has been responsible for funding militancy in the NWFP and in FATA (Daily Times, July 28, 2008). The enormity of the illegal exploitation of this state-owned natural resource can be determined by the statement of one government official: The losses suffered by forests in the last year were more than the losses of the last two decades (The National [Abu Dhabi], April 3).
The Jiziya Tax
Taliban financing efforts have reached the Orakzai Agency of FATA, situated close to Swat and Bajaur Agency, the site of heavy fighting between the Taliban and government forces in recent months. Taliban militants have demolished houses belonging to the minority Sikh community and confiscated their property in the Ferozkhel area of Orakzai Agency after they failed to pay the negotiated amount of 15 million rupees to the Taliban as jiziyathe poll tax levied on non-Muslim minorities living under Islamic rule as sanctioned by Sharia. The houses were destroyed at the behest of Taliban commander Hakimullah Mahsud, the Taliban head in the Orakzai Agency and a close aide of TTP chief Baitullah Mahsud (The Nation [Islamabad], April 30). Earlier in April, Taliban militants demanded 50 million rupees a year as jiziya. To enforce their demands they held local Sikh leader Sardar Saiwang Singh captive and occupied a number of Sikh-owned houses (ANI, April 15; Daily Times, April 16).
Many Sikhs have decided to flee Swat, followed by members of the Hindu and Christian minorities (SamayLive, April 25). The situation for the Christian minority in Swat following the imposition of a Sharia-based administration is not good. . . . Pro-Taliban elements have attacked the Christian community in the Karachi neighborhood of Surjani Town. The violence began when pro-Taliban militants tried to prevent local Christians from removing graffiti on their church that demanded Christians convert to Islam or give jiziya, like the Sikhs in Orakzai (Daily Times, April 23; The News, April 23).
Conclusion
Surprisingly, the Islamabad administration has so far remained silent over the Taliban takeover of mines and the exploitation of forest resources. Pakistan is suffering the loss of 65 billion rupees annually from the illegal timber trade and indiscriminate deforestation alone. The plight of minority communities has been ignored by the government.
Posted by: Frozen Al ||
05/04/2009 15:06 ||
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#1
Perhaps "60 Minutes" could do an expose on the deforestation of the Swat Valley.
I read this yesterday, looked for it today, and finally found it referenced at HotAir — you do want to read it!
Sample
Waterboarding or No Brains?
2) Ive raised this example twice now. But, really, how is waterboarding a known detained terrorist like Khalid Sheik Mohammed (who confessed to cutting off Daniel Pearls head [with two knives after the first went dull], and to planning the 9/11 mass murder) at Guantanamo considered a war crime, while blowing up with a Predator drone suspected terrorists (and all those, including women and children, in their general vicinity) not?
The latter victims were not given habeas corpus, and Miranda rights, and there is a greater doubt about their guilt from 10,000 feet than is the case with the much studied psychopath KSM in Guantanamo. Most suspects would prefer to be water-boarded than vaporized? Ditto the Somali pirates, whose heads were blown off during their apparent attempts at negotiating extortion, again a bit more drastic than waterboarding. Would a future President Sanford or Giuliani be right to bring charges against those in the Obama administration who green lighted assassinations of suspected terroristssomething akin to the Phoenix program in Vietnam?
On Monday, April 4, veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid addressed a select crowd at Karachis Mohatta Palace Museum. Not surprisingly, the subject of his talk was Afghanistan and Pakistan: Quest for Peace or Recipe for War? He argued that Pakistan was facing a major existential crisis: I no longer say that theres a creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan, its a galloping Talibanisation. Here, Dawn.coms Huma Yusuf presents the salient points from Mr. Rashids presentation.
Where did the Taliban come from?
The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat, they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance. From 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban grew in numbers and influence and became radicalized because of their proximity to the Afghan Taliban. They planned and mobilized to establish a Taliban emirate or state in Fata and the expansion of that idea of statehood is what we see happening today.
Pakistani Taliban expanding
The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated with the Pakistan the several years of progressive diplomacy with India exacerbated the rise of different Taliban-affiliated factions. For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement.
Issues in Pakistani governance
Pakistan is also weaker because of a raging economic crisis, the ongoing insurgency in Balochistan, and a political crisis. The PPP government has wasted one year vying with the PML-N for power rather than tackling the Taliban threat. Meanwhile, ANP, which was supposed to serve as secular face of Frontier province, has collapsed (ANP officials are being targeted by Taliban in northern areas).
Before 2008, the Musharraf government allowed the Taliban to resettle in Pakistan from Afghanistan. Musharraf wanted to maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians. Also, the emphasis then was on getting rid of Al Qaeda, the Taliban were not seen as a major threat.
After 2004/2005, when military operations did begin in Fata, the government pursued a stop-and-start policy, which involved several peace deals that did not hold. In the meantime, the Pakistan government and army failed to protect the people of the Fata and the traditional tribal hierarchies that were pro-Pakistan. About 300 maliks of tribes were killed and by 2007, there were half a million refugees from Fata in Pakistan. Having lost the goodwill of the population in Fata, the government will find it hard to reenter the area and rebuild traditional tribal structures.
American failures
How did we get from 2001 to where we are today? The Bush government got distracted by Iraq, which provided a diversion of attention and resources from the situation in Afghanistan. Instead of having an on-the-ground plan for capacity building in Afghanistan, the US supported warlords instead of empowering the centre, regional powers were bolstered. Plus, little was done about the drug trade, which is now the main source of funding for the Taliban (it is estimated at 300 million dollars, but Rashid believes the real figures are triple that amount). Instead of defeating Taliban in Afghanistan, Americans routed them to Pakistan.
Obama policy
US President Barack Obama is now doing what Bush should have done in Afghanistan (troop surge, capacity building, securing the ground to ensure that presidential elections can take place this August). In Pakistan, however, American options are limited. There was a hope that after February 2008 elections, there would be a strong coalition government that could serve as a civilian partner for Obama to partner with. After all, army has proved unreliable ally (especially since it still thinks that India is the main enemy; army officials dislike Indian presence in Afghanistan; and army officials dont like Karzai and other Afghan leaders). However, there is no one for America to partner with. PM? President? Opposition leader? They have all proved too weak.
As a result, US is asking for aid to help Paksitan, but there is very little trust and faith in Pakistan amongst the Congress. The aid that will be given will be packed with conditionalities that Pakistan wont be able to accept. Congress is asking, who will we give this aid to?
India question
There is a tit-for-tat game between India and Pakistan whereby they support nationalist insurgencies in each others countries (so while India may be giving funds in Balochistan, Pakistan is helping out rebels in Assam). But India is not funding the Taliban. India realizes that the Taliban will be at their border next and they have nothing to gain from supporting the militants.
Regional strategy
New focus of Obama administration is regional policy get Afghanistans six neighbors involved and make them sort out regional stability and set a common agenda. But first, bilateral issues will have to be sorted: Indo-Pak will have to clear the air, Pakistan and Central Asian states will have to reach understandings, and Iran and the US will have to start negotiating. This way, Afghanistan is not only a problem, it becomes a trigger for regional problem solving. This is one of the most doable and productive aspects of the Obama policy for Af-Pak.
Fallacies of Swat deal (Nizam-i-Adl Regulation)
The ANP thought that the deal would be contained within Swat, but that was very misguided thinking. The Taliban have an expansionist agenda. They make deals in one areas so that they can secure it and then move into other areas. There has also been no cessation of their killing of ANP and other government officials and they have not agreed to lay down their arms. Instead of achieving anything, the Swat deal formalises a different form of law and governance for one part of Pakistan, thus weakening the government.
The law in Swat is Taliban law, and its nonsense to say that the Swatis have been practicing Sharia for decades. The Taliban law has nothing to do with the mild form of Sufi-influenced Sharia that Swatis have had from 1960s.
Government was definitely taken by surprise by the speed with which Taliban moved on from Swat to Buner, Dir, etc. They will not stop and government should realise their ultimate goal of toppling Islamabad. To that end, the operation in Swat is welcome. But the question is: will it be a sustained offensive?
Also, there are already one million IDPs who have escaped from Fata and northern areas. If the army is seriously going to tackle Taliban menace, it must learn counter-insurgency tactics and get the right equipment to target Taliban without damaging entire villages.
At his press conference Wednesday evening, President Barack Obama endorsed Pakistan's official position that it has secure control over its nuclear-weapons arsenal. Mr. Obama said he was "gravely concerned" about the situation there, but "confident that the nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands."
His words are not reassuring in light of the Taliban's military and political gains throughout Pakistan. Our security, and that of friends and allies world-wide, depends critically on preventing more adversaries, especially ones with otherworldly ideologies, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Unless there is swift, decisive action against the Islamic radicals there, Pakistan faces two very worrisome scenarios.
One scenario is that instability continues to grow, and that the radicals disrupt both Pakistan's weak democratic institutions and the military.
Often known as Pakistan's "steel skeleton" for holding the country together after successive corrupt or incompetent civilian governments, the military itself is now gravely threatened from within by rising pro-Taliban sentiment. In these circumstances -- especially if, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified recently, the nuclear arsenal has been dispersed around the country -- there is a tangible risk that several weapons could slip out of military control. Such weapons could then find their way to al Qaeda or other terrorists, with obvious global implications.
The second scenario is even more dangerous. Instability could cause the constitutional government to collapse entirely and the military to fragment. This could allow a well-organized, tightly disciplined group to seize control of the entire Pakistani government. While Taliban-like radicals might not have even a remote chance to prevail in free and fair elections, they could well take advantage of chaos to seize power. If that happened, a radical Islamicist regime in Pakistan would control a substantial nuclear weapons capacity.
Anyone reassured by President Ten-Percent's assertion that the nukes are secure? Even Bambi can't believe that one if he's any kind of serious politician.
Not only could this second scenario give international terrorists even greater access to Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, the risk of nuclear confrontation with India would also increase dramatically. Moreover, Iran would certainly further accelerate its own weapons program, followed inexorably by others in the region (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey) obtaining nuclear weapons, perhaps through direct purchase from Islamabad's new regime.
To prevent either scenario, Pakistan must move to the top of our strategic agenda, albeit closely related to Afghanistan. (Pashtuns on both sides of the border are the major source of Taliban manpower, although certainly not the only locus of radical support.) Contrary to Western "international nannies," the primary conflict motivators in both countries are ethnic and tribal loyalties, religious fanaticism and simple opportunism. It is not a case of the "have nots" rising against the "haves," but of True Believers on a divine mission. Accordingly, neither greater economic assistance, nor more civilian advisers upcountry, nor stronger democratic institutions will eliminate the strategic threat nearly soon enough.
We didn't get here overnight. We are reaping the consequences of failed nonproliferation policies that in the past penalized Pakistan for its nuclear program by cutting off military assistance and scaling back the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that brought hundreds of Pakistani officers to the U.S. Globally, this extraordinarily successful program has bound generations of foreign military leaders to their U.S. counterparts. Past cut-offs with Pakistan have harmed our bilateral relationship. Perhaps inevitably, the Pakistani officers who haven't participated in IMET are increasingly subject to radical influences.
Moreover, the Bush administration, by pushing former President Pervez Musharraf into unwise elections and effectively removing him from power, simply exacerbated the instability within Pakistan's already frail system. Mr. Musharraf's performance against the terrorists left much to be desired, and he was no democrat. But removing him was unpleasantly reminiscent of the 1963 coup against South Vietnam's Diem regime, which ushered in a succession of ever-weaker, revolving-door governments, thus significantly facilitating the ultimate Communist takeover. Benazir Bhutto's assassination, while obviously unforeseen, was a direct consequence of our excessive electoral zeal.
To prevent catastrophe will require considerable American effort and unquestionably provoke resistance from many Pakistanis, often for widely differing reasons. We must strengthen pro-American elements in Pakistan's military ...
... assuming there are any, particularly if the dollars are turned off ...
... so they can purge dangerous Islamicists from their ranks; roll back Taliban advances; and, together with our increased efforts in Afghanistan, decisively defeat the militants on either side of the border. This may mean stifling some of our democratic squeamishness and acquiescing in a Pakistani military takeover, if the civilian government melts before radical pressures. So be it.
It also means stepping up the cross-border UAV raids, which tend to make the news especially when lots o' baby ducks and kittens die. That's a big impediment to Bambi wanting to go to war as he used to talk about on the campaign trail.
Moreover, we must strive to keep Indo-Pakistani relations stable, if not friendly, and pressure Islamabad to put nuclear-weapons proliferator and father of Pakistan's nuclear program A.Q. Khan back under house arrest. At the same time, we should contemplate whether and how to extract as many nuclear weapons as possible from Pakistan, thus somewhat mitigating the consequences of regime collapse.
President Obama's talks next week in Washington with the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan provide a clear opportunity to take the hard steps necessary to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and defeat the Taliban. Failure to act decisively could well lead to strategic defeat in Pakistan.
Posted by: Steve White ||
05/04/2009 00:00 ||
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#1
BHARAT RAKSHAK > PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROJECTS [ espec NEW PLUTONIUM NUCFACS] HEIGHTEN US FEARS.
#4
Mullen has been there a number of times for consultations and I for one believe that is negotiation to allow SF's in-situ for weapons security and possible repositioning. Obama only has to know that the pros have a plan and are ready to implement. He doesn't need to formulate policy or even make hard decisions. All he has to do is tell Gates and all to make sure they are secure. At least this is what I was dreaming for last night:)
Posted by: Jack is Back! ||
05/04/2009 8:11 Comments ||
Top||
#5
...or we let the Indians know where the crap is and how to take it out.
#8
Diplomacy 101 Quiz:
Identify the politician, and identify the military professional in this educational video clip about negotiations with terrorists who have a hostage.
PESHAWAR: Ten years ago on May 3, 1999, the battle for Kargil erupted and continued for the next 71 days. It claimed hundreds of lives on both sides and brought a profound change in the way the world looked at India and Pakistan.
Post-Kargil, India gained sympathy as a country that had faced aggression from Pakistan. It used the occasion to whip up patriotic sentiments and assert its right to defend its borders. Scenes from the Kargil battle were frequently shown on the Indian TV channels, thereby, enabling New Delhi to rally the people behind its cause.
On the Pakistan side, there was ambiguity because the official line was that the Kashmiri freedom fighters had infiltrated the Indian Kashmir and occupied strategic positions in the Kargil sector. No proper media campaign could be launched to mobilise the public opinion, promote patriotism and seek popular support for the Kargil battle. A belated and half-hearted effort was made to this end but it was too late and too little.
On this very day a decade ago, the Pakistani troops and the Mujahideen were first detected atop the Kargil ridges. The conflict that was triggered lasted until July 14. According to the Indian defence minister George Fernandes, the fighting left 524 of his soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded. The Pakistani death toll was put at 696. About 40 civilians were reportedly killed on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LoC), dividing the state of Jammu & Kashmir.
India mobilised a large number of heavily-equipped troops to retake the Kargil mountain heights that Pakistani forces had occupied during the spring and early summer. It moved five infantry divisions, five independent brigades and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to the area and made heavy use of its air force. By May 26, India was ready to launch its offensive named Operation Vijay.
Pakistans military objectives in Kargil were clear but not much thought was given to the consequences of the adventure, or misadventure as it was subsequently derided. The main aim was to exploit the large gaps that existed in Indias defences on and near the LoC. The border positions vacated by Indian troops during winter were to be occupied and used to cut off their supply routes.
Kargil was General Pervez Musharrafs brainchild. Three other generals were apparently involved in the planning and fine-tuning of the Kargil plan. This is the reason that critics describe them as the Gang of Four.
General Musharraf has stubbornly defended his decision to execute the Kargil plan. He still believes that it helped revive the Kashmir issue on the world stage. But the fact remains that the Kashmir issue was internationalised in a way that harmed Pakistans cause as well as that of the Kashmiri people.
Unlike India where the militarys lapses in Kargil were probed by a commission and publicly analysed, no such initiative could take place in Pakistan for the simple reason that General Musharraf was in power. Even otherwise, Pakistan does not have any tradition of making our rulers accountable for their bad deeds. In the absence of a much-needed and high-powered probe into the Kargil misadventure, there is every possibility that such mishaps would occur again. There have also been speculations and conjectures concerning the happenings at the icy heights of Kargil, Drass, Batalik, Tololing and other sectors.
General Musharraf has all along insisted that everyone was on board with regard to the battle for Kargil. It obviously included the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, who was briefed about Kargil at the headquarters of the Pakistan Armys 10th Corps in Rawalpindi. Nawaz Sharif, on his part, complained of not being fully in picture and still willing to bail out Pakistan from the Kargil fiasco by rushing to Washington to meet the US President Bill Clinton on the Fourth of July, an American public holiday.
The truth must be told because the nation would like to know whether the Army chief General Musharraf tried to hide something from Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif or the latter failed to grasp the importance of the military briefing on account of the widely held perception at the time that his attention span was always brief and unfocused.
The late Benazir Bhutto also claimed that Musharraf had given the same briefing to her about Kargil when she was the prime minister and that she had shot down the proposal in view of its consequences. A probe would also settle this point once for all.
Posted by: john frum ||
05/04/2009 00:00 ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
By JOHN R. BOLTON
