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| Science |
| Deep Dive on Russian Kometa Amti-Jamming Antennae System Used on Drones |
| 2026-11-17 |
| [Defence Ukraine] The Kometa Ladder: Russia's Anti-Jam Navigation Module, Its Foreign Silicon and the Limits of Striking One Factory ![]() Week five of 2025. That date code marks an Analog Devices AD9253 analogue-to-digital converter photographed inside a Kometa-M12 satellite-navigation module pulled from a downed Russian Izdelie-30 cruise missile, documented in teardown findings Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) released on its War & Sanctions portal on 2 March 2026. The identical circuit board mounted an Analog Devices AD9753 converter manufactured in June 2024 and a Swiss u-blox GNSS receiver produced in September 2023. Three years into Western export controls, the guidance pack that determines whether jamming can deflect a Russian missile off course was still relying on American and Swiss silicon under a year old. Kometa designates the family of controlled-reception-pattern antennas (CRPAs) and companion receivers developed by VNIIR-Progress in Cheboksary, capital of Russia's Chuvash Republic. Russian units bolt these arrays into the strike weapons launched at Ukrainian cities: Geran one-way attack drones, UMPK glide-bomb kits, cruise missiles and the 9M723 Iskander-M. Across Russia's precision-strike inventory, Kometa offers the single component family whose design iterations can be tallied straight from battlefield wreckage. The open record substantiates a narrower case than common commentary suggests, and that disparity matters for planners preparing sanctions or kinetic strikes against the production chain. |
| Posted by:Dopey Photch2701 |
| #1 |
| Posted by: Skidmark 2026-11-17 11:42 |