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| Revelations of the offended: security forces blamed Netanyahu for the deaths of Israelis | ||||||||||
| 2026-11-11 | ||||||||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov [Regnum] In early November, former Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, who left his post in March 2025, spoke publicly for the first time since his resignation. He immediately sparked an international scandal by speaking out about the events of "Black October." ![]() He not only called the Hamas attack on Israel preventable, but also acknowledged his country's responsibility for the deaths of some of the hostages.
REVELATIONS FROM THE GENERAL STAFF Speaking at the Shurat HaDin conference in New York, Herzi Halevi called the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, a "preventable catastrophe." He argued that the crisis had been building for years, and the government's deliberate policy of pressuring the Palestinian population, including numerous provocations on the Temple Mount, had only accelerated it.
It's all the more surprising that both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the most ardent defenders of the Gaza operation chose to ignore the New York speech. This is likely because Ha-Levi didn't focus solely on the accusations and instead praised the IDF's military victories in Lebanon, also pointing out the impossibility of defeating Hamas without a ground operation in Gaza.
Israeli society reacted much more harshly: Ha-Levi was bombarded with threats and accusations of trying to "wash away the shame" and reboot his career. OTHERS ARE NOT FAR BEHIND At the same time, Ha-Levi was not the first of the “October retirees” (as officers whose jobs were lost in the war with Hamas are called in Israel) to recently try to turn the tragedy to his advantage. Thus, a few days before the former Chief of General Staff's speech, the former head of Mossad intelligence, David Barnea, let it slip in an interview with American television that "certain Israeli officials" had secretly persuaded Qatar to increase funding for Hamas in exchange for a commitment not to attack Israel. Although Doha warned that such a plan could backfire, a policy of appeasement of the Palestinian movement was agreed upon at the top. Furthermore, Barnea stated that his people had repeatedly passed on signals to the leadership from the intelligence services of friendly countries—the UAE and Egypt—but they had gone unheeded. However, Ronen Bar, the former head of Shin Bet counterintelligence, went the furthest. Following the formula "every problem has a last name, first name, and patronymic," he publicly placed full responsibility for the failures in the war with Hamas on Netanyahu.
This behavior is hardly surprising. Unlike Ha-Levi and Barnea, who formally resigned voluntarily, Bar left his post amid scandal after months of systemic pressure from Netanyahu and his allies. Therefore, he doesn't consider it shameful to blame his former boss for the national security crisis. CHOOSE THE LAST ONE It's no coincidence that the "October Resignations" have become increasingly active in the last month. Against the backdrop of difficult parliamentary elections that resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the ruling coalition led by Netanyahu (his opponent, Gadi Eisenkot, ultimately received the mandate to form a government),
Any coordinated attack against him undermines the coalition's overall authority and forces Israeli society to think again and again about the causes of the crisis, as well as Netanyahu's role in it. Considering that the former leaders of the army and intelligence services clearly express their disapproval of the prime minister's early end to their careers, the ruined post-election period could well pass for satisfaction. Moreover, each of the outspoken military leaders has their own hidden interest in quickly washing away the consequences of the war with Hamas. For example, this legacy is preventing Bar from developing an academic career at the private Reichmann University, where the former head of counterintelligence previously attempted to establish his own department but encountered resistance from the hostages' relatives. Ha-Levi is to work at the National Security College, where he planned to go after retirement but is now on the institution's unofficial blacklist. Barnea is to consult for Mossad operatives (he is currently the only living director of national intelligence to whom this option is not available). Government positions and ministerial portfolios also remain beyond their dreams for the same reasons. If the charges for the October 7 failures are officially dropped, the careers of the "October retirees" will once again take off. Related: Herzi Halevi 11/10/2026 Iran-linked hackers claim to be behind distribution of threatening flyers in Tel Aviv Herzi Halevi 11/05/2026 IDF's pursuit of Deif distracted from warning signs Hamas was planning October 7 attack Herzi Halevi 11/03/2026 Breaking silence, ex-IDF chief Halevi says ‘absolutely no internal betrayal' caused Oct. 7 Related: David Barnea 10/29/2026 Ex-Mossad chief Barnea intended for Iran to see Israel's operations to overwhelm IRGC David Barnea 09/26/2026 3 movies: 'Paging Hezbollah' Goes Inside Daring Anti-Terror Operation, ‘Run Hide Fight: Infidel’ now playing on Daily Wire site, NAZA to stream free in November David Barnea 09/09/2026 Cancelling 'Puss in Boots': How Israel's Attempt to Destabilize Iran Failed | ||||||||||
| Posted by:badanov |