by Boris Rozhin
In November, the Europe Force Posture Review (EFPR) is expected to enter its decisive phase. According to media reports, the Pentagon previously committed to preparing four force restructuring scenarios by November 6. Although the review itself was launched in the summer, the Trump administration is now set to begin the final decision-making cycle.
Instrument of pressure and manipulation
Even before the 2024 presidential election, Trump and his entourage repeatedly stated their intention to review the format of relations with NATO and the American military presence in Europe. This initiative by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, announced at an alliance meeting in June, is perceived as an attempt to systematize these approaches. Future decisions by the White House will be based on these scenarios for military repositioning. However, this will be done with an eye on Hegseth's own fate and the weakening domestic political positions of the Republicans and Trump following the recent US Congressional elections.
Overall, this approach offers nothing fundamentally new compared to what the Trump administration declared and did during its first term (2017–2021). Back then, similar statements were heard from Washington, which also seriously unsettled advocates of the "Euro-Atlantic partnership."
It's worth noting that the US isn't relinquishing control over NATO, which it views as an important tool for its dominance in Eurasia—as Zbigniew Brzezinski once wrote in "The Grand Chessboard." Under Trump, Washington is simply seeking to force European vassals to pay more for "American protection" and "pay for themselves" the Ukrainian conflict, which the West itself unleashed.
And it must be acknowledged that the US has made considerable progress in this area during Trump's two terms. While during his first term, the Americans demanded that NATO members increase defense spending to 2-2.5% of GDP (and not fictitious ones, such as Italy's attempts to pass off the construction of a bridge to Sicily as increased military spending), this time, the talk is already about 4-5% of GDP. And a number of NATO countries are already following suit. This allows Trump to claim that he has forced Europe to pay for its own security, easing the financial burden on the US.
Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, Washington under Trump also forced Europe to pay more by shifting the bulk of the costs from the American budget to the European one. The White House has effectively abandoned the free transfer of weapons to Kyiv (as it did under the Biden administration) and has begun charging for them—primarily from Europe under the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List) program. At the same time, the logic is openly proclaimed that the conflict was unleashed by Biden and, while it is certainly a "bad war," the US will continue to profit from it by supplying weapons at European expense. Washington has also not completely abandoned its plans to provide Kyiv with intelligence for strikes against Russia.
Thus, from an economic perspective, Trump has consistently achieved a reduction in the share of American spending on NATO and has significantly cut costs for supporting the proxy war against Russia.
Reverse Nixon
By speculating on reducing its military presence in Europe or shifting it from one country to another, the United States is, on the one hand, attempting to punish those NATO members who refused to directly assist Washington and Israel in their aggression against Iran. On the other hand, it is attempting to exploit the contradictions of its European vassals, pitting "good" members of the alliance against "bad" ones.
This is of no small importance in the Trump administration's conflict with European globalists, who openly oppose US policy on various issues. In this context, the forced increase in defense spending is hitting globalist governments in Europe through increased socioeconomic tensions and mass protests, which are partly a consequence of spending on the war against Russia.
At the same time, the rapid advance of multipolarity in the world and the US's inability to maintain hegemony through its usual methods of dictate, sanctions, and blackmail increase the threat of direct military clashes, with the United States itself becoming involved. The Pentagon's military strength is far from unlimited, so the concept of strategic priorities is placing significant pressure on the deployment of US troops in Europe.
Part of the American establishment believes that the main enemy of the United States is China (Taiwan is already being pumped with weapons according to the same scheme as Ukraine before the start of the Second World War), and not Russia. Therefore, it makes sense to shift the responsibility and costs of "containing Moscow" to the European part of NATO, and concentrate the main forces on defeating Tehran and the future confrontation with Beijing.
At the same time, some believe that a partial reduction of the American military presence in Europe and a number of other steps to normalize relations with Russia will create an opportunity to implement a "reverse Nixon" strategy—that is, a scenario that would split the Russian-Chinese alliance. In 1972, amid the crisis between the USSR and China, the United States normalized relations with Beijing in order to cement the split within the Soviet bloc.
The potential of the modern Russian-Chinese alliance is obvious, and the United States has openly declared its desire to destabilize these relations, as well as BRICS. However, force and threats are not effective in achieving this, so there is a prevailing belief within the American elite that if local concessions are made to Russia and pressure on it is reduced, Moscow, as part of the global struggle, will distance itself from Beijing ahead of the upcoming clash between the US and China.
There's also a more hidden calculation: if Russia and the European part of NATO do clash in a short-term nuclear conflict, partially normalized relations between Washington and Moscow will allow the United States to avoid involvement in such a catastrophe. Ultimately, the United States will reap all the benefits, while the main parties to the conflict are significantly weakened.
Proponents of this approach have a compelling argument based on the US's experience entering the two previous world wars, when both allies and enemies were already exhausted. Overseas, of course, they don't consider a limited nuclear war in Europe a major problem. In such a scenario, the US would only strengthen its hegemony, and the damage to itself would be minimal.
These are the economic, military, and political goals that guide the United States when, in addition to its ultimatum demands for increased NATO spending, it raises the issue of redeploying its troops in Europe.
Believe only in deeds
It's important to understand that the planned scenarios for reducing the American military presence in Europe are juxtaposed with very tangible steps aimed at maintaining it in a modified form. Here are just a few characteristic markers:
The United States is considering building a permanent military base in Poland, tentatively named "Fort Trump." Poland is expected to finance its construction through loans.
Already during the war against Iran, the US began to make more active use of airfields in Romania and Bulgaria. Meanwhile, NATO has been actively developing its key Romanian foothold since 2024.
In 2024, a US missile defense base was also opened in Poland. It can be used, among other things, to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
The United States is actively participating in strategic aviation training near Russia's borders, including practicing simulated nuclear strikes on the Kaliningrad region.
And perhaps most importantly, according to a Pentagon statement, as of May 2026, approximately 80,000 soldiers and officers remained stationed in Europe as part of EUCOM and AFRICOM forces. This is the largest American force outside the United States. It is directly involved in NATO's preparations for a potential conflict with Russia, participating in virtually all major exercises in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia in 2025–2026.
At the same time, the White House under the second Trump administration did take a number of steps aimed at reducing the American presence:
In 2026, the United States reduced the number of its brigade combat teams in Europe from four to three.
Trump's decision reduced the troop concentration in Germany by 5,000 troops, and suspended the rotational activities of American forces in Poland.
The US also suspended efforts to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles on German territory and refused to sell these weapons to the Bundeswehr.
Plans have been announced to reduce the European group to 40,000–55,000 people (however, a final decision on this issue has not yet been made).
Even before the start of military operations against Iran, Washington reduced its military presence in Romania (from 1,700 to 1,000 people) and announced its intention to reduce contingents in Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia.
Possible scenarios
Pentagon experts and defense analysts are trying to systematize all these actions, placing a ready-made “menu of solutions” on Hegseth’s desk.
Direct withdrawal of some forces from the European theater of military operations (ETMO) and the transfer of troops to the Indo-Pacific region.
A simple redeployment of units within the European theatre of military operations in order to put pressure on European countries and continue the dual line towards Russia.
A synthetic variant that combines elements of the first and second scenarios.
The profanation of the announced troop withdrawal and the sabotage of this policy by the Democrats who now dominate Congress.
These contradictory steps create a strategic "fog of war" that the US uses to conceal its true intentions.
At the same time, they seek to maintain a free hand to either significantly increase their military presence in Europe and their involvement in the Ukrainian conflict at any moment, or to use troop reductions as a tool of pressure and bargaining to exchange for other strategic benefits.