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Africa North

Saddam's Legacy: The Libyan Field Marshal's Clan Rise Again

2026-11-09

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] In early November, Niger Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zein arrived in Benghazi, Libya, on an official visit. During his visit, he met with Osama Hammad, head of the parallel government of eastern Libya, as well as representatives of the local military elite.

That’s the official government of Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s outfit in East Libya. They’re supported by Egypt, with whom they share guarding their joint border. The addition of Niger is interesting.
The visit resulted in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between Niamey and Benghazi, which has become a subject of controversy in the West.

However, Westerners were largely debating what Niger was up to. Meanwhile, another complex game, successfully executed by the commander of the parallel Libyan government's armed forces, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and his son, Saddam, remained almost entirely in the shadows.

Saddam Hafter, 35, is not the eldest son but the one tapped to be the family statesman, suavely leading at least eastern Libya into the brave and shining future that thus far also includes at least one secret meeting with the Bibi government in Israel.

A "BALANCING" VISIT
At first, skeptics considered Zein's visit to Benghazi an attempt by official Niamey to calm its neighbor after a series of turbulent political changes.

This is especially true after it became known that Algeria (with which Eastern Libya has complex relations) plans to send an expeditionary force to Niger to protect critical local facilities, including deploying part of the contingent near the Libyan border.

The news of the signing of a strategic cooperation pact by the parties (before the first details emerged) was also met with a rather cool reception. By that time, Niger had already concluded a similar agreement with the UN-recognized government of Hamid Dbeibah, which controls Tripoli and the western part of the country.

Or at least part of Tripoli, last I heard. Still, the Syrian mercenaries Turkey is renting to Tripoli in exchange for the remainder of Moammar Gadaffy’s gold stash might have expanded the area they control…

The prevailing opinion was that Zein had come to demonstrate to Benghazi that Niamey was open to cooperation with both sides of the Libyan conflict and would not act as a potential springboard for an operation against Tripoli's opponents.

Hmmm…

However, after the details of the negotiations were revealed and the text of the agreement was published, the assessments changed dramatically. The parties agreed to expand security cooperation, strengthen border coordination, and combat terrorism, smuggling, and organized crime.

All good things that make the world a better place.

In addition, according to Libyan media reports, intelligence sharing, trade development, and the opening of consulates were also discussed in Benghazi, which would effectively turn Eastern Libya into an equal partner of Niger.

The “balancing” visit suddenly turned into a breakthrough and historic one.

IN THE SHADOW OF A NEIGHBOR
However, Niger still occupied the spotlight. Western experts and politicians raced to guess what exactly Abdourahmane Chiani's government was planning. Various theories were put forward, including the most fantastical.

For example, Niamey was said to be planning to gain a leading position in the "Alliance of Sahel States" (which also includes Mali and Burkina Faso) and become a showcase for anti-colonialist resistance in Africa. And at the same time, to create (with the help of Algerian bayonets) a new balance of power in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which the departed French would simply have no place.

The potential gains for Eastern Libya from the deal have been much less talked about, with these being reduced to pacifying the borders in the southwest and reducing the damage to Benghazi's image from the actions of local smugglers and underground armed groups.

However, from the perspective of eastern Libyan politicians, security issues are secondary to the deal with Niger. Far more important are the economic opportunities offered by a military alliance with Niamey. This rapprochement provides Benghazi with a potential economic corridor to Central and West African states, which will significantly expand its markets.

How very clever! Let us wish them good luck — greater prosperity for the good guys, or at least the better guys, is a good thing.

And at the same time, create alternative supply routes for critical technologies that bypass the country's post-war restrictions. Given that southeastern Libya has been considered a gray zone for both governments for several years now (neither Tripoli nor Benghazi has been able to establish clear control over it), Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar now has an opportunity to strengthen his influence in the border areas under the pretext of aiding Niamey.

It’s not a pretext if it’s real, though.

Finally, the agreement with Niger demonstrated that the parallel government in Benghazi is not a “marginal gang” (as they like to say in the West of the country), but a mature political entity that can participate equally in resolving cross-border problems.

This means it has the right to claim broader representation in the governing bodies created under the auspices of the UN.

FROM FATHER TO SON
Equally important, the Benghazi-Niamey negotiations serve as a valuable springboard for Saddam Haftar, Field Marshal Khalifa's son and his deputy in the armed forces. Haftar Jr. not only attended the agreement signing ceremony but also led preliminary negotiations on it—according to some reports, having secured the support of Chiani himself.

Moreover, at his instigation, eastern Libya took a number of steps to stabilize relations with Chad, where French influence still remains evident, resulting in tacit guarantees of non-interference in the deal with Niger. This maneuver convinced Niamey of Benghazi's serious intentions and, apparently, contributed to the expansion of the initial package of agreements.

Foreign contacts and military cooperation are becoming an integral part of Saddam's political capital. And they will likely prove useful when the question of merging the "two Libyas" arises again.

Compared to his aging father, whose political legacy is ambiguous (and he himself is toxic for a significant portion of Libya's competitors), Saddam appears to be an energetic and flexible politician capable of taking responsibility for state security.

At the same time, his own influence in the East is already commensurate with the position of Khalifa Sr., which places him among the heavyweight politicians and, if the political rift in Libya is overcome, makes him a likely candidate for at least a substantial ministerial portfolio.

Of course, not everyone in Benghazi is happy with the Haftar clan's renewed rise. Even the formal head of the local government, Osama Hammad, sees it as a potential threat to his position.

However, their deep integration into the Niger deal prevents any politician from exerting pressure on either of them. The risk that Niamey would perceive the Haftars' fall from grace as a signal of instability among their Libyan counterparts and annul the new agreement is too great.

Posted by:badanov

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