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Africa Horn

The Sheikhs Are Distracted: Why Did the RIF Chief of Security Escape from 'Little Muhammad'

2026-10-28

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[Regnum] In recent weeks, the Rapid Intervention Forces (RIF), a rebel movement fighting against Sudan's central government, have been in dire straits. The RIF is rapidly losing territory, along with experienced commanders who prefer to surrender to the government in Khartoum.

Among those who recently left the group's ranks is Yudo Muhammad Adamu Hamma, who previously commanded key units in the rebel capital, including the personal guard of the RSF leader. The defection of the security chief is in many ways symptomatic—especially in light of his close ties to the sponsors of the conflict—and promises significant changes on the Sudanese front.

A DEMARCHE OF EITHER A COLONEL OR A GENERAL
Hamma's biography, as befits a field commander, is full of blank spots and inconsistencies. Even his military rank is uncertain—reports list him as either a colonel or a major general. However, within the SBR, he was positioned as a senior officer, part of the inner circle of the group's leader, "Little Muhammad" ( Muhammad Hamdan Daglo ), and his brother, Abdelrahim Daglo.

According to available information, Hamma led the defense of the southern sector of Nyala, the de facto capital of the insurgency in South Darfur, for a long time. He also served as the commander of the Daglo brothers' personal guard (also known as the "Little Muhammad Guard").

Within the RSF system, the unit simultaneously handled security for senior officials, counterintelligence work, and overseeing the distribution of prisoners; indirectly, it was responsible for distributing humanitarian aid in occupied areas. This made Hamma one of the key and influential security officials in the rebel camp.

His move was all the more unexpected. On October 24, Hamma recorded a video message in which he declared that he now served the government and would fight in the name of the country's leader, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

POINT OF NO RETURN
Hamma's sudden defection to Khartoum's government is a high-profile, but far from isolated, case of high-ranking rebel officials defecting. For example, in early October, Mohamed Azraq al-Fanjari, a battalion commander in one of the special forces units, defected to the government.

Moreover, he brought with him almost the entire personnel of his assigned unit—about 300 men in 30 vehicles. Most of them expressed a desire to fight against their former comrades-in-arms.

Several months earlier, Major General An-Nur Ahmed Adam and Colonel Daifallah Adam defected to the army. Both had previously coordinated offensive operations in the RSF and were responsible for strategic planning within the group.

All the commanders, as if from a carbon copy, explain their revision of views by the same reasons: rampant corruption in the ranks of the RSF, the lack of understanding of the real situation "on the ground" by Daglo and his associates (and, as a result, the increasing frequency of "meat assaults" on government positions), and the moral decay of the personnel.

At the same time, everyone considers the same episode to be a kind of point of no return for the RSF: the capture of El Fasher, a major defensive hub for government forces in Darfur, in October 2025 after a year and a half of siege.

Many field commanders involved in the fighting in this area expected promotions. However, Daglo chose to assign lucrative positions to those who could offer the most money. Thus, he elevated shadow gold miners and other members of the local criminal underworld, most of whom had never even seen the front.

At that time, many commanders harbored a grudge against the leadership of the RSFSR and, at the first serious change in the operational situation, began to gradually defect to the other side.

MOOD SWINGS
However, there is another, more rational explanation for the sharp decline in the loyalty of field commanders. Specifically, the decline in direct support from the UAE—until recently the key shadow sponsor of the rebel forces in Sudan.

In the spring of 2026—when the first cases of mass defections among the RRF command staff began to be recorded—Abu Dhabi faced more pressing challenges. With the escalation of the Gulf conflict, the sheikhs were forced to focus their efforts on defending their own airspace from Iranian strikes, temporarily putting support for the rebels in Sudan on the back burner.

While there is likely no talk of a systemic cut in funding, Abu Dhabi remains more concerned with its own security, which is impacting the scale of supplies and funding.

Furthermore, the Gulf sheikhs are clearly seeking to streamline and "reboot" the RSF project, making it less "toxic," especially in light of the constant accusations against "Little Muhammad" supporters of violating the laws of war and humanitarian law.

Thus, over the past six months, the Emirates have already transferred a significant portion of the RRF training infrastructure to Ethiopia (where Israeli military advisers are also involved in training future personnel), thus transferring personnel training under the supervision of new intermediaries.

Logistics also changed: the firms that had handled these contracts during the initial stages of the civil war were suddenly sidelined from control over military supplies to Sudan. Many of them were linked to the Daglo family and their trusted associates.

Hamma's defection was further indirect confirmation of impending changes. Since the "guard" entrusted to him was trained and maintained almost entirely by the UAE (and the general himself, due to his close ties to the underground leaders, likely had close ties with Emirati military advisers), only a significant shift in sentiment in Abu Dhabi could have prompted him to switch camps. This included the disappearance of security guarantees from the UAE for the rebellion's leaders.

Therefore, it's possible that other field commanders, less immune to possible elimination, will soon follow the example of the former influential security official. This will undoubtedly accelerate the pace of the Sudanese army's advance in Darfur.

Let us hope this war will soon be over, letting a mutilated people space and time to recover.

Posted by:badanov

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