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Terror Networks

The historical evolution of the Islamic State’s anti‑China propaganda

2026-10-24

by Lucas Webber, Riccardo Valle, Colin Clarke, Daniele Garofalo

Very long. You’ll want food as well as a stimulating drink before you get to the end.

[CombatingTerrorismCenter-WestPoint] ABSTRACT:
This article traces how the Islamic State has come to view China over the years. Over the past decade, within the Islamic State’s broader propaganda and operations ecosystem, Beijing has evolved from a peripheral grievance into a routinized enemy, with serious implications. It argues that this evolution unfolded in four phases: early, episodic references to Uyghur suffering prior to 2014 and, after 2014 and the caliphate’s proclamation, a gradual consolidation under Islamic State central media, which embedded Xinjiang and “East Turkestan” into the group’s global narrative; a period of experimentation with Chinese‑language content and symbolic threats, including Mandarin-language nasheeds and Uyghur‑focused videos; the emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) as the movement’s anti‑China vanguard; and finally, normalization of China alongside the usual arch-enemies of jihadis—America, Russia, and local regimes—and expansion of the anti-China campaign to Africa.

The article concludes that China’s ascent to great‑power status and deepening involvement in fragile Muslim‑majority regions will sustain, and likely increase, its prominence in Islamic State discourse, posing a persistent, if uneven, security challenge for Beijing and its partners.

Over the past decade, the Islamic State has moved China from the periphery of its worldview to a routinized enemy whose interests are legitimate targets for both propaganda and attack.1 This shift has not been linear, and it cannot be understood simply as a reaction to Beijing’s repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Rather, it emerges from the interplay of three major developments: the evolution of Islamic State central media after the proclamation of the caliphate in 2014; experimentation with Chinese‑language and Uyghur‑focused content; and, more recently, the rise of Islamic State Khorasan Province as the movement’s anti‑China vanguard.2

This article traces that trajectory in four phases primarily through the lens of Islamic State propaganda content and output. It begins by briefly situating the Islamic State’s hostility toward China in pre‑2014 jihadi discourse, then shows how the group’s central media after 2014 converted sporadic grievances into a recurring campaign theme. It then examines the Islamic State’s experimentation with Chinese‑language material and symbolic threats during the mid‑2010s, before turning to ISKP’s post‑2019 efforts to weaponize China’s regional posture and Taliban-China relations.3 The final section argues that by the mid‑2020s, violence and propaganda against Chinese targets had become normalized components of the Islamic State repertoire, lowering the threshold for future attacks on Chinese interests. The aim of this article is to accurately describe how the Islamic State views China in its media releases, how the views expressed through media content have changed over time, and why this matters for the terrorist threat landscape facing China. This includes a look ahead to regions such as sub-Saharan Africa where Beijing is likely to face increased resistance and outright hostility toward its expanding presence. This more aggressive pushback against Chinese interests is reflected in the proliferation of Islamic State media accounts, both official and unofficial, placing Beijing in their collective crosshairs.

Phase 1: From Early Uyghur Grievances to Caliphate Rhetoric (2009-2014)
The Islamic State’s hostility toward China predates the formal caliphate but was initially episodic and derivative of broader jihadi concerns. In the late 2000s, when the Islamic State was still the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and part of al‑Qa`ida’s transnational network, references to Uyghur suffering only appeared sporadically in its messaging. Shortly after the 2009 Urumqi riots and ensuing crackdown, ISI released a lengthy martyrdom video4 that advocated for the protection of the Uyghurs, threatened Beijing, and folded Xinjiang into a global narrative of Muslim oppression at the hands of “crusaders,” “Jews,” and local “apostates.” This material foreshadowed later themes but did not yet place China at the center of Islamic State strategy. Geopolitical developments have impacted this shift to a more China-focused Islamic State propaganda campaign, with operational implications expected to follow.

More at the link

Posted by:badanov

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