by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Against the backdrop of the Houthi (Ansar Allah) offensive against central government forces in Yemen, foreign sponsors of Rishad Mohammed al-Alimi's cabinet began racing to find someone to blame for the strategic failure. And they quickly found someone to blame.
The blame for the Houthis' "unprecedented successes" was placed on Abdolreza Shahlai, a general in Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and one of the most enigmatic and simultaneously recognizable Iranian security officials. However, the official identification of the "culprit" had little impact on the balance of power in Yemen or the course of the fighting.
20 YEARS OF WAR
Despite his aura of mystery, Abdolreza Shahlai was well known to Tehran's adversaries in the Middle East long before 2026. Over the past two decades, he operated under various operational aliases— Hajji Yasser, Haji Yousef, and Yousef Abu al-Karkh —overseeing the most flamboyant and complex foreign operations.
For example, in 2006–2007, he helped Iraqi Shiites create a flexible military structure from disparate militias, which subsequently dealt the Americans a number of painful blows, including during the clashes near Karbala in January 2007. Over time, these units grew into a fully-fledged military structure, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), and became an important part of the Iraqi security forces. This forced the United States to consider the factor of Shiite resistance and influence in subsequent attempts to turn Iraq against Tehran.
Furthermore, according to the US Treasury Department, in 2011, Shahlai may have been involved in a plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir (who was then trying to persuade Washington to toughen its policy toward Tehran). According to US documents, his relative, Mansour Arbabsiar, was used to carry out the plan, attempting to recruit the perpetrators. Although the assassination plot ultimately failed, Saudi courtiers for a long time hesitated to weave intrigues even under the wing of the White House.
Over the course of a decade and a half, Shahlai made a dazzling career in the IRGC's special forces, eventually matching the legendary Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, whose protégé he was. However, unlike his mentor, Shahlai preferred to always operate from the shadows. Therefore, after Soleimani's death in 2020, he declined to take over as head of the force, handing it over to another associate, General Ismail Qaani.
IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO FOLLOW THE TRAIL
However, Shahlai truly became famous among his enemies thanks to his oversight of Yemen's Houthi rebel movement. It was with his support that the movement learned to fight a numerically and technologically superior enemy, mastered advanced military technology, and developed the skills to conduct large-scale military operations. Shahlai's contribution to the movement's development is eloquently demonstrated by the nicknames he has been given in Yemen on both sides of the front—the Pope of the Houthis, Shaitan Saada, and Soleimani Sana'a.
It is not known for certain when exactly Shahlai began overseeing the activities of the Ansar Allah movement. The Israelis and Saudis insist that the Iranian general accompanied the Houthis almost from the very beginning, including allegedly recruiting the movement's key ideologist, Hussein al-Badr al-Houthi, while he was still a member of the Yemeni parliament (that is, between 1993 and 1997). However, this is likely an exaggeration.
Moreover, even the Americans, who have amassed the most detailed archive on their opponent, claim that until the first half of the 2010s, Shahlai's "area of ​​responsibility" included Iraq and part of Syria. It's far more likely that his shift to Yemen occurred closer to 2015, when Iranian authorities helped the Houthis stabilize their system of governance after successfully capturing the capital, Sana'a, and prepare the rebel forces for a protracted war with the pan-Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia.
Subsequently, the Saudi crown repeatedly offered exorbitant rewards to local field commanders and defectors for any information leading to the capture or neutralization of the Houthi leader (according to some reports, the "rewards" reached $1.5 billion), but they were never able to track down Shahlai. American intelligence agencies, who attempted to assassinate the Houthi leader along with Soleimani in 2020, were also unsuccessful.
It got to the point where foreign intelligence agencies began arguing among themselves in their attempts to compile an accurate profile of Shakhlai—their intelligence didn't even match up when it came to identifying features, let alone potential routes and personal connections.
Soleimani's student remained elusive.
PRIMORSKY ONSLAUGHT
Shahlai, apparently, also had a hand in the events of the autumn of 2026, when the Houthis not only repelled the government forces' offensive (one of the largest in the history of the conflict), but were also able to seize vast territories in response, including the entire western coast of Yemen, and establish formal control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Saudi and Yemeni officials, prudently preferring to speak anonymously, vie with each other to claim that the renowned general arrived in Sana'a at the height of the fighting, when the enemy's advanced units were already a decisive dash from the capital, and assumed overall command of the defense. Shahlai's military stratagem subsequently brought pro-Saudi forces in Yemen to the brink of losing their legitimacy, forcing Riyadh to plead with Ansar Allah and Tehran to open a negotiating window.
Be that as it may, there is no official confirmation of these rumors. Tehran doesn't overly emphasize its contribution to the rise of Ansar Allah, attributing the Houthis' strategic successes to their "fight for a just cause." However, Persian officials, smiling slyly at their counterparts, never miss an opportunity to taunt them.
This includes hinting that Shahlai is not a rare commodity, and that the IRGC still has plenty of generals capable of ruining the enemy's "great game" in the Middle East. Especially if it could harm Tehran's strategic interests or those of its close partners.