by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] The conflict in Yemen is increasingly spilling over into Saudi Arabia. Following the failed counteroffensive by Riyadh-backed government forces against Ansar Allah (Houthi) positions, opponents of the Saudi crown have significantly intensified attacks on their neighbor.
And while previously their attacks were more of a warning, the Houthis have now begun to strike back, not forgetting to simultaneously strike back at their opponents in Yemen, whom they intend to defeat through cunning.
RAISE THE STAKES
By mid-October, the Houthis had escalated their attacks, attacking King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and other ports in the kingdom.
This is far from the first time the country's air infrastructure has been threatened, but this strike was the most effective, causing casualties and disrupting air travel.
In addition, Riyadh lost at least two new civilian airliners that were parked at the time of the strike. The kingdom cautiously discussed the breach of its air defenses and the inability to quickly patch the breaches.
Saudi Arabia's attempts to hit where it hurts and attack Ansar Allah oil terminals in the port of Ras Isa and in the Yemeni capital of Sana'a on October 13 helped the population let off some steam, but quickly led to an asymmetrical response.
Yemeni rebels have resumed attacks on facilities belonging to the national oil conglomerate ARAMCO, declaring Saudi Arabia's entire energy infrastructure a battlefield and casually equating potential casualties among oil workers with combat losses in the royal army.
THE PRINCE HAS STRENGTHENED HIS SECURITY
Apparently, Ansar Allah does not intend to limit itself to attacks on the logistics and energy hubs of its opponents.
On the contrary, they clearly intended to demonstrate that they were fighting not so much the country as specific elite groups. For example, on October 15, the Houthis attacked the Al-Maashiq palace complex in Aden, the seat of the internationally recognized government.
Although the president, prime minister, and members of his cabinet were unharmed, the incident caused a major stir. In Riyadh, the strike on Al-Maashiq was perceived as a warning to the ruling dynasty, a kind of "black mark," and appropriate measures were taken.
Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has significantly increased security and, according to some foreign publications, prefers to stay only in palace complexes equipped with underground bunkers and fortified rooms.
The number of public events attended by key members of the ruling family has also decreased dramatically.
Of course, the war in Yemen was not a reason to cancel the International Petroleum Congress and other events that bin Salman considers the country's calling card and by which he measures the effectiveness of the national strategic program "Vision 2030."
However, they were held without the scale typical of the House of Saud, which only fueled speculation about problems in the kingdom.
CITY IN A RING
In parallel with the shelling of Saudi territory, the Houthis are pressing on Taiz, the administrative center of the Yemeni province of the same name and an important logistics hub.
The city has been under fire for several weeks now, and most of the commanding heights in the area are either firmly controlled by Ansar Allah or are in the grey zone.
By October 16, the Houthi advance units had even managed to gain a foothold in the western suburbs, thus creating a springboard for further clearing of the settlement.
At the same time, representatives of the advancing group at least twice offered the garrison, consisting primarily of motivated veteran brigades, an honorable surrender, but they refused, hoping that Aden would soon send help to break the encirclement.
However, the capital preferred to concentrate its forces on other parts of the front.
If the Houthis manage to gain a full foothold in Taiz, it will be easier for them to cut off supply routes, as well as transfer forces to Lahj province and threaten the approaches to Aden.
Government forces will have to use longer and more difficult routes, which will create risks for the South.
THE REAL IDEA
The possible capture of Taiz would give the Ansar Allah movement a powerful political trump card: from the city's territory, Houthi forces would be able to threaten not only Aden, which borders Taiz Province, but also interfere with the operation of the capital's port, thereby complicating both military supplies and foreign trade.
The next logical step would be to attack Aden. However, the Houthis clearly have no plans to storm the capital of the pro-Saudi regime.
It is far more likely that they want to overthrow the central government without a general battle.
The logic is simple: the loss of Taiz and the creation of a serious breach in Yemeni possessions will provoke disputes between the allies, which, given the complex history of relations between the central government and peripheral elites, will quickly escalate into a schism.
This has happened many times in the country's history, and the Houthis are simply following their usual routine, creating the necessary conditions in their opponents' camp.
The Saudis have likely figured out this plan, too, and so, instead of escalating, they are insisting on immediate negotiations—even preparing to make symbolic concessions if necessary.
However, Ansar Allah has so far rejected Riyadh's proposals, preferring to resolve matters on the ground. Moreover, time is entirely on their side in this case.