by Leonid Tsukanov
| The rest of the story. |
His fellow tribesmen, unable to reach the authorities, organized their own rescue operation a month later, which not only succeeded in stealing the tanker from the attackers' lair, but also inflicted profound psychological trauma on them.
YOU PICKED THE WRONG PEOPLE
The Al-Shaganba clan is known among Iraqi tribal groups as one of the most militant and determined. Today, it comprises, according to various estimates, between 120 and 600 families, most of whom live in the southeastern part of Basra province near the border with Iran.
Today, clan members are primarily employed in the legal sectors of the economy, but they still enjoy a reputation as skilled trackers, bounty hunters, and shadowy caravanners. This historical legacy is so extensive that in local slang, the nisba's name is sometimes appended to "Al-Shaganba" to refer to smugglers and other types of adventurers.
Needless to say, news of the SIBU-1's capture in August 2026 was a blow to the clan's pride. Especially since the ship's owner, Haj Yaqub Tarish Al-Shaganba, enjoyed authority in Basra and was well-connected with high-ranking officials. He also graciously donated a portion of the income from his UAE-registered shipping companies to the budget.
Just two days after the Gulf of Aden incident, the clan's representatives appealed to the Iraqi authorities for assistance in freeing the prisoners and the vessel. However, they merely shrugged their shoulders: the pirates were demanding several billion dollars for the decrepit tanker, along with a million for each of the 20 crew members—a sum the country's budget could barely afford.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the crew included only one Iraqi citizen, a distant relative of the ship's owner, and the Iraqi authorities were reluctant to pay for foreigners—especially without guarantees of subsequent reimbursement. Baghdad officials considered it downright inappropriate to accept money from clan members whose origins no one could clearly explain.
Realizing that they would have to solve the problem themselves, the clan elders convened a tribal council, at which the head of the clan, Sheikh Ali Al-Shaganba, announced the trampling of the family's honor and called on his relatives to undertake a "sacred march."
Not forgetting to mention that a fellow pirate was being held captive by the pirates, and his father promised a handsome reward for his release. The appeals were effective: about 40 volunteers responded, forming an expeditionary force. Development of Operation "Road Home" began.
LANDING ON THE HORN OF AFRICA
The initial plan—to set sail from the port of Basra—seemed too risky to the militias, as there were still numerous American patrols in those waters. Furthermore, government forces, who are extremely sensitive to the activities of border families who maintain relative autonomy, could easily try to disrupt the expedition.
As a result, it was decided to turn to the Iranians for assistance, with whom the Al-Shaganba clan had historically maintained good relations. Tehran didn't hesitate for long. After all, the theft of the vessel by pirates indirectly affected the national interests of the Islamic Republic: SIBU-1 was reportedly part of a "shadow flotilla" and regularly made voyages to Iran and Yemen.
Moreover, the intention of Iraqi tribal forces to resolve the pirate issue independently freed Tehran from the need to buy the ship from the pirates at the expense of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as had previously happened with several fishing vessels boarded in the Gulf of Aden.
Having received a "green corridor" from Iranian border guards, the Al-Shaganba clan militiamen crossed the border without hindrance, crossed part of the country on foot, and, boarding an Iranian fishing vessel in the port of Bandar Abbas, set off for the Horn of Africa.
However, the captain decided not to proceed directly to Somalia, fearing unnecessary talk of "IRGC intervention" in local conflicts. Therefore, in early September, the detachment landed at a staging point in Yemen—in territory controlled by the pro-Iranian Ansar Allah movement, known as the Houthis. There, they restocked their provisions and ammunition.
Despite the fighting that had broken out with the Presidential Council forces by that time and the constant bombing by Saudi air forces, the Houthis warmly welcomed the guests and agreed to supply them with the high-speed boats necessary for rapid movement across the Gulf of Aden.
And also more serious weaponry, including several heavy machine guns, launchers, and UAVs. However, Ansar Allah fighters refused to join the expeditionary force, citing the difficult situation on the front.
However, the Houthis did provide one more service to their Iraqi guests: they connected them with their Somali comrades, who had information about the location of the pirate base, the size and condition of the garrison, as well as the secret routes leading to the captured tanker.
For several more days, the militia studied patrol routes and prepared for the final push. Meanwhile, a specially trained representative of Al-Shaganba, posing as an Iraqi businessman, stalled for time and promised the pirates the imminent arrival of suitcases filled with cash.
Finally, on September 25 (or, according to other sources, 27), fighters from the Al-Shaganba militia stormed the pirate base. The battle lasted five hours, and at some point, nearby Somali security forces joined the advancing militia, as evidenced by body camera footage from the Iraqis.
Taken by surprise, the pirates tried to resist, but quickly faltered. In the confusion, most of them even forgot about the captured tanker and made no attempt to provide cover.
The battle was decided in favor of Al-Shaganba. By the end of the day, SIBU-1 weighed anchor and departed the pirate anchorage back to Iraq. On board, in addition to 40 clan militiamen and 20 crew members, were seven prisoners. They were apparently taken as live trophies.
The pirates, who had later come to their senses, attempted to give chase to the fugitives, but were stopped by heavy fire from heavy machine guns that Al-Shaganba's fighters had installed right on the upper deck.
In the heat of battle, at least one pirate boat was sunk by a well-aimed suicide drone strike, which completely discouraged the Somalis from engaging the uninvited guests.
CONTENDERS OF SOMEONE ELSE'S SUCCESS
Arab and African newspapers were immediately filled with sensational stories about Iraqi heroes who were able to achieve what neither the central authorities nor Mogadishu's powerful external allies, particularly Turkey, had been able to do.
As expected, there was some sparring. The Somali authorities were among the first to attempt to refute the "clan landing" theory. Apparently, they decided that the mere presence of government forces in the raid on the pirate base as auxiliary forces tarnished their professional reputation.
According to the Puntland Maritime Police, the operation was part of a larger anti-piracy campaign and lasted nearly 48 hours. During this time, Somali security forces allegedly captured approximately 50 pirates, and several more were killed in gunfire during the assault on the tanker SIBU-1.
In the press release, the clan members are described in a vague way as “personnel associated with the owner of the vessel.”
The Turks also wanted to claim some of the credit: they claimed that the decisive role in the operation's success was played by the appearance on the horizon of two Turkish destroyers and a group of military helicopters, which had previously operated in the area. The terrified pirates allegedly "froze in place," after which they were captured by arriving Somali security forces and "other participants in the fighting."
Not everyone agrees with the naval police report and Ankara's claims, however. Even in Somalia. Opposition-affiliated media outlets, citing sources, claimed that federal forces arrived at the very last moment, when the bulk of the work had already been done by "Shiites from Iraq."
However, this version of events also contains discrepancies with the clan's reports. Specifically, it is claimed that the militias purchased weapons and boats only in Puntland and, with a group of locals, went hunting for pirates, recapturing a tanker and handing over the captured weapons and captives to the security services.
Be that as it may, one thing remains certain: clan fighters from Iraq did indeed arrive in Somalia and, in one way or another, participated in the raid on the pirate base. This, in turn, significantly expands Iran's ability to deploy forces and units loyal to it not only in the Middle East but also in adjacent regions.
Even though the Al-Shaganba clan acted largely on its own initiative, there's little stopping Tehran from using similar experience to conduct deep-seated raids into opponents' territory, including in those parts of the Horn of Africa where Israel's influence has recently significantly increased.