by Sofia Kapanina
| Responding to this story from yesterday. |
[Regnum] On September 30, 2026, Flydubai Flight FZ1073 was on a routine flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv. There were approximately 174 passengers on board, including 27 children. Approximately an hour and a half after takeoff, the aircraft activated Code 7700, a general emergency signal. A few minutes later, Code 7500 was activated, which in international aviation practice denotes unlawful interference or hijacking of an aircraft.
Israeli authorities were unable to establish contact with the plane. Fighter jets were scrambled, and Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Defense Minister held an emergency meeting. According to tracking data, the plane plummeted from approximately 34,000 feet to less than 17,000, losing more than 14,000 feet in one minute. The plane eventually landed safely at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia.
Initially, conflicting reports emerged, but they eventually coalesced into the following chain of events: the co-pilot, an Omani citizen, stabbed the captain, an Emirati citizen, with a folding knife and attempted to seize control of the aircraft in an attempt to crash it. One of the passengers described the incident this way: "We heard screams. When the cockpit door opened, we saw a lot of blood. Someone had stabbed the pilot with a folding knife." The captain, according to subsequent reports, died from his wounds.
| Or possibly not. One India reports Captain Smit Machchhar underwent surgery in a hospital in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia and was in stable condition. |
The cockpit door was open, and if the reinforced door, designed to protect against terrorists, had remained locked, no one from outside would have been able to intervene. And the commander resisted, despite his injury, buying critical time.
The captain unlocked the door, allowing passengers in to overcome his attacker.
This incident once again reminded us of the paradox that has plagued aviation security for over twenty years: every terrorist attack on an aircraft introduces a new rule, written in blood. Regnum News Agency investigated how this affected the Flydubai incident and how this attack could, in turn, influence further changes to the rules.
9/11: PILOTS NOW UNDER LOCK AND KEY
Before September 11, 2001, the logic of aviation security was based on a simple assumption: hijacking an aircraft is always a bargaining operation with demands, not a suicide attack. It was this logic that allowed the hijackers to bring knives, which were then considered acceptable, on board and seize control of four airliners.
Following the tragic events in New York in 2001, flight regulations were radically rewritten. It was then that cockpit doors were reinforced to armored finish and equipped with locks that could be locked from the inside.
The US created the Transportation Security Administration, transferring passenger screening from the airline to the government. Air marshals—armed, plainclothes law enforcement officers who covertly escort civilian flights to prevent terrorist attacks, hijackings, and crime on board—were now on duty on high-risk flights.
Andrey Patrakov, an aviation security expert and founder of the digital flight safety service RunAvia, points out that it was after September 11th that the cockpit access regulations themselves were established. These include codes, locking systems, and security cameras at the door.
"Before this, older aircraft might not have had a cockpit door at all, or they might not close," he says. "Then codes were introduced on the cockpit doors, according to separate regulations. Today, the codes have to be changed during flights, in part because the crew is different on each flight."
NO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLILITERS
In August 2006, terrorists planned to smuggle liquid explosives disguised as Lucozade and Oasis on seven major transatlantic flights departing from London to New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Montreal, and Toronto. The conspirators intended to assemble the bomb from harmless components on board, but British intelligence arrested the perpetrators before they boarded the flights.
This is how the rule of one hundred milliliters of liquid that can be carried on board an airplane came about.
In 2010, a terrorist hid explosives in his underwear while attempting to blow up a flight to Detroit, prompting airports to deploy body scanners en masse. Each time, the regulations closed a specific loophole, and after each incident, airlines around the world revised their procedures.
One of the main questions surrounding the incident on the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight is how the knife ended up in the cabin, as such items are prohibited on board after the 9/11 attacks. Crew members are screened like passengers, albeit in a separate line, but there should be no exceptions.
Flydubai, based in Dubai and flying to Israel, among other destinations, operates from one of the world's busiest and most technologically advanced aviation hubs. However, as experience shows, even the most sophisticated security system doesn't provide an absolute guarantee.
Patrakov speculates that the knife could have been smuggled into another airport than Dubai, or perhaps hidden on the plane in advance. "No security system can provide an absolute 100% guarantee," he emphasizes. The investigation will now follow the entire chain of events: scanner records, who was on duty, what equipment was used, and when exactly the item was smuggled in.
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY VICTIMS OF ONE WRONG DECISION
On March 24, 2015, Germanwings Flight 9525 crashed in the French Alps. An investigation revealed that the co-pilot, who suffered from a mental disorder and concealed it from his employer, intentionally flew the plane into a mountain. The tragedy claimed 150 lives, including the pilot's.
The key detail is that it was the cabin door, reinforced after 9/11, that allowed him to completely isolate himself. The very door, designed to protect against terrorists, became an instrument of destruction at that moment.
Following the incident on the Germanwings flight, airlines worldwide urgently implemented the "two-person cockpit" rule. At least two crew members must be present in the cockpit at all times. Since 2020, Europe has required airlines to establish crew support programs—confidential channels through which pilots can report mental health, alcohol, or drug issues without risking license revocation. Psychological screening has been added to regular medical examinations.
This rule was introduced specifically to control the pilot, ensuring that no crew member, including flight attendants, could remain alone in the cockpit. And in the case of the Flydubai flight, it did work, but not as intended.
According to media reports, the co-pilot took the knife precisely because he knew the captain would confront him. But during the struggle, someone from the crew managed to open the door, which saved the situation. Thus, the "two-person cockpit" rule, which arose in the wake of the 2015 tragedy in the French Alps, today saved the 174 passengers on flight FZ1073.
Today, pilots with depression and other mental health issues can be cleared to fly, but only under strict conditions and constant monitoring. Current regulations allow for conditional certification for pilots in remission and consistently taking approved antidepressants.
Before the Germanwings tragedy, the rule allowed pilots with depression to fly, relying on their honesty and timely self-disclosure. However, the pilot then hid his relapse. After the disaster, the system attempted to create conditions that make it more beneficial for pilots to disclose than to conceal their illness: through support programs, protection from immediate license revocation, and closer monitoring of those with a history of disorders.
According to medical science candidate and psychiatrist Vladimir Vozhzhov, the pilot's motivation on the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight may have been more than just suicidal.
"The condition could have changed due to a number of factors. There are acute psychoses that arise suddenly. These are extremely rare, but anything is possible; it could be the first acute attack of schizophrenia. Still, if this were the case, it's unlikely the signs of an acute attack wouldn't have been visible to doctors."
The expert expresses caution regarding the admission of pilots taking medication to flights:
"It's better to have pilots who are completely healthy, without psychological problems. The safety of others should take precedence over the rights of one person to carry out their professional activities. Some antidepressants even increase suicidal tendencies. Sometimes, activity increases, but suicidal thoughts persist."
FRIEND OR FOE?
Modern airlines are eliminating permanent crews, and pilots may meet for the first time just before departure. Patrakov explains that crew rotation and selection through the crew resource management process are mandatory. Experience shows that long-serving crews are more likely to quarrel and start physical fights.
Selection is based on a psychological compatibility procedure, and this is a mandatory requirement. This rule also arose in the wake of a series of tragedies: on March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747s collided over the island of Tenerife, killing 583 people. The cause was not technical problems, but the crew's inability to work as a team: the captain, an instructor with thirty years of experience, interrupted the young co-pilot who was trying to warn him of danger, and the co-pilot hesitated to insist to his former mentor.
This tragedy was not isolated—in 1978, the crew of United Airlines Flight 173 was so preoccupied with a burned-out landing gear light that they failed to notice the plane running out of fuel; in 1982, at Potomac, the first officer failed to alert the captain to a thrust problem; and in all these cases, the reports recorded the same thing: pilot error turned out to be a coordination error.
In 1979, NASA convened a conference to understand why experienced pilots make such mistakes, and the conclusion was surprising: it wasn't a matter of flying skills, but of human error. This is how the rule was born: there shouldn't be a superior and a subordinate in the cockpit; there should be two professionals, each of whom is obligated to question, question, and point out the error.
Crew rotation is a direct consequence of this logic—if two people fly together for years, an excessive cohesion develops between them that kills criticism: the co-pilot stops contradicting "his" captain, and the captain stops perceiving the co-pilot as an independent controller. This is precisely why airlines deliberately shuffle crews—not to prevent pilots from colluding on something bad, but to ensure that there are always two people in the cockpit who can keep each other in check.
According to Patrakov, pilots rotate through the CRM system, and they often don't know who they'll be flying with. They meet only an hour before the flight, and sometimes they even meet for the first time. At the same time, the expert notes, "pilot selection is based on psychological compatibility, including psychological compatibility. And this is a mandatory requirement." He emphasizes: "Let's say you have two of the best pilots in the world, but they're incompatible; they can't be placed on the same crew."
Patrakov also discusses the political factor that could impact compatibility. He believes that, given current realities, this risk should at least be taken into account and understood. It's theoretically possible that, in this context—both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict—controversial issues could arise that could lead to conflict. The expert calls this a genuine risk, as airline safety management systems are complex systems that also extend to crew selection.
Patrakov notes that the primary focus is on psychological compatibility, but the system universally requires a continuous review of risks and, if new ones emerge, consideration of them and appropriate action. He adds that only the investigation will reveal the extent to which these risks were taken into account in the Flydubai case. And undoubtedly, this incident will also prompt further changes to aviation security regulations in the future.
Every disaster leaves behind not only grief but also new rules. Tenerife taught pilots to listen to each other, 9/11 and the Germanwings flight forced a rethink of cockpit access, and the 9/11 attacks completely rewrote the entire security system.
The incident on the Flydubai flight is still under investigation, but it's already clear: it will once again force the industry to rethink regulations—on knives in the cockpit, crew compatibility, and how well airlines know who they're flying.
| Israel is insisting on checking crew of flights heading to Israel, rather than relying on the airline or its host country to do the work. |
Related:
Flydubai 09/30/2026 Israel says pilot tried to hijack flydubai flight to Tel Aviv that diverted, landed in Saudi Arabia
Flydubai 11/27/2019 Report cites pilot error in 2016 Flydubai plane crash in Russia
Flydubai 03/21/2016 ‘Last words’ of Flydubai pilots revealed
Flydubai 09/30/2026 Israel says pilot tried to hijack flydubai flight to Tel Aviv that diverted, landed in Saudi Arabia
Flydubai 11/27/2019 Report cites pilot error in 2016 Flydubai plane crash in Russia
Flydubai 03/21/2016 ‘Last words’ of Flydubai pilots revealed