by Mina al-Lami
[BBC] Recent events in Mali, where JNIM, Al-Qaeda's branch in the Sahel, joined forces with a non-Islamist separatist group to launch a large-scale territorial offensive in April and again in July, have revived questions about its links with Al-Qaeda and the possibility that it is preparing the ground for a split, even if only a formal one.
JNIM has maintained its military momentum, most recently claiming responsibility for a major attack against a military base in central Mali on September 10, which reportedly killed more than 100 soldiers.
The group, whose full name is Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), officially remains an Al-Qaeda affiliate and one of its two most powerful, alongside Al-Shabab in Somalia. However, it no longer resembles Al-Qaeda, neither in appearance nor in its rhetoric, whether in terms of media strategy, branding, or messaging.
Although Al-Qaeda branches generally focus their attacks on their local or regional theaters of operation, JNIM's discourse has moved markedly away from the network's traditional global jihadist rhetoric.
In recent years, it has focused almost exclusively on the Sahel, largely avoided major Muslim causes – notably the Palestinian question, which is central to Al-Qaeda’s propaganda and stated objectives
| Don’t be absurd, Ms al-Lami. The Palestinian question, as you put it for the BBC, is just something Al Qaeda pronouncements occasionally throw in at the end to puff up a list of grievances, not an actual concern. Had that part of the world actually mattered to them, they would have joined in the fun sometime in the last three years, or at least said something on the subject. But I don’t recall hearing anything from them… |
JNIM has also abandoned the distinctive Al-Qaeda branding that once featured prominently in its main propaganda videos.
On the ground, he allied himself with the nationalist Tuareg separatists and expressed his willingness to maintain "balanced" relations with "the Russian side," referring to the forces of Moscow's African Corps present in Mali.
These changes come amid a broader debate within jihadist circles about whether greater pragmatism offers a more viable path to political power, after international jihadist groups repeatedly failed to seize and hold territory, while the Taliban in Afghanistan and, more recently, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, succeeded in taking control.
This analysis examines the indications that JNIM may be seeking to distance itself from al-Qaeda, either through a formal split or simply by further reducing its ties with this global network. Such a shift would not necessarily signify a complete break between the two groups, but could result from a mutual agreement and constitute a tactical maneuver aimed at improving JNIM's political prospects and allaying fears of an al-Qaeda takeover in Mali.
More at the link (in French)