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| Britain |
| 'Absurd Carousel': Britons Ask Trump to Save Them from Migrants |
| 2026-09-23 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Mikhail Kolovangin [Regnum] The English village of Piddington has decided to become the 51st US state. It sounds like the plot of a political satire, but behind this oddity lies a very real conflict between the British government and the local residents. Following the recent symbolic referendum on secession from the United Kingdom, the local council announced plans to send a letter to US President Donald Trump and handed over a dossier of arguments in favor of joining the American embassy. Direct negotiations with the White House, of course, are not taking place, and the plebiscite itself has no legal force. But it was precisely this nonsense that made the protest noticeable far beyond Oxfordshire. Only 312 people turned out to vote—almost 92% of voters. 285 residents voted for separation, 26 against, and one ballot was deemed spoiled. The reason for this was the Ministry of Internal Affairs' plans to house up to 1,256 asylum seekers on the territory of a former Ministry of Defense base near a village with a population of approximately 350–400. As a result, the site's population will be more than three times that of the village itself. There's no mechanism in British law that would allow a village to secede from the country on its own. "Independence," and then the idea of ​​a 51st state, is a way to force the central government to listen to people who feel the decision has been made for them and without them. And in this sense, the referendum has already worked: the small village received coverage in the British and international media, whereas a simple appeal from a local council would hardly have made it beyond departmental correspondence. The village of Barnham in Suffolk has also attracted similar attention, with the Independent reporting that it is in a similar situation and plans to hold a similar show vote. The Piddington project involves not only the conversion of an existing building on a former Ministry of Defence site, but also the demolition of some structures, the installation of residential modules, the creation of medical and social facilities, roads, fencing, parking and its own wastewater treatment system. All of this is intended to temporarily accommodate up to 1,256 people. In other words, we're essentially building a new settlement near the old village. Local authorities also claim they were presented with a fait accompli. Municipal representatives reported that they learned of the project only a few hours before the Ministry of Internal Affairs' public announcement. The decision is being made through the urgent state development procedure, which allows for the consideration of a nationally significant project, bypassing the usual local approval process. The government explains the choice of former military bases by the need to avoid expensive hotels for immigrants. Piddington is one of three announced sites with a total capacity of approximately 3,700 people. A similar project is being discussed in Linton-on-Ouse, North Yorkshire. The former airbase is to house up to 1,200 people for at least three years, although a final decision has not yet been made. The local council has opposed the plan, arguing that it lacks the necessary transport, medical, and social resources. For London, the scheme appears to be a convenient response to criticism of the hotel idea: larger properties are easier to secure, maintain, and present to voters as evidence of savings. In August, the government reported the closure of 13 more hotels and expected savings of £51 million. But for the villages this is a big problem, since the state is reducing one item of political costs and simultaneously creating another. While the British hinterland protests against the new centers, London is trying to demonstrate its control over the cross-Channel route itself. The main diplomatic tool was the "one in, one out" scheme created by then-British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron. Britain will be granted the right to return people arriving on small boats to the Fifth Republic, but in exchange will accept the same number of asylum seekers through legal channels – after screening and subject to selection criteria. Political advertising portrayed this as a turning point: the illegal route would supposedly become pointless. In practice, everything was initially designed for limited volumes—around 50 returns per week, while tens of thousands of people pass through the strait annually. By June 30, 2026, 1,087 people had been returned to France, and 1,117 had arrived in Britain via the counter-channel. By September, the number of returns had risen to approximately 1,400, although Interior Minister Shabana Mahmoud acknowledged that the scale remained relatively small. The cost of the issue is particularly telling. According to the minister, a single refund costs an average of £56,000. The total cost for 1,400 cases is approximately £78 million. Mahmood defended this figure by arguing that a year's stay in a hotel costs a comparable amount. The result is an absurd carousel: the taxpayer pays for the detention, lawyers, security, and transportation of one person to France, after which the country accepts another participant in the program legally. Separately, Britain has pledged to provide France with up to £662 million over three years to strengthen patrols, surveillance, and prevent boat launches from its shores. Thus, international cooperation creates costly infrastructure for managing the flow, but does not address the reasons driving people to the British border or address the issue of their accommodation. In 2026, the number of arrivals on small vessels nevertheless declined: by mid-September, the Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded 17,425 people, 44% less than for the same period in 2025. The official report from the Border Command also noted a 41% decrease for the first half of the year. However, even the reduced flow is not comparable to the number of returns, and a direct causal link between the decline and the one-for-one scheme has not been proven: crossings are affected by weather, police actions, smuggler tactics, and route changes. To enhance the demonstrative effect of the fight against migration, Germany, which has long been a logistical hub for the smuggling business, was also brought into the fight. In the spring, German, French, and British investigators conducted a joint operation in North Rhine-Westphalia. The secret warehouse contained more than 9,000 life jackets, dozens of nine-meter inflatable boats and motors, and 360 pumps. According to the British National Crime Agency, the confiscated equipment would have been enough to transport over 2,000 people. The paradox is that Germany remained a convenient transit point for years, in part because of the legal loophole that emerged after Brexit. Key German regulations against facilitating illegal migration applied to the transfer of people to countries in the EU's free movement zone, which Britain no longer belongs to. Raids have been carried out before, but usually on the basis of French or Belgian warrants. Now, facilitating illegal crossings into the United Kingdom is a separate criminal offense, and this spring's operation marks the first time German authorities have used these new powers. Warehouses in western Germany are integrated into an international supply chain: boats and life jackets are manufactured primarily in China, transported through Turkey and Bulgaria, stored in Germany, and then delivered to the French coast. British investigators believe Kurdish criminal networks play a significant role in this business. London is already using the German operation as proof of the effectiveness of international cooperation, so the confiscated warehouse gives the authorities a compelling report card, but it doesn't yet prove a turning point. After all, as long as demand, profits, and extensive international logistics remain, the liquidation of a single shipment of equipment is more likely to force smugglers to adapt than to abandon transportation. That's why the agreement looks much more impressive in a government press release than in the eyes of the public. It establishes procedures and allows for reporting on returned people, but it doesn't solve the underlying problem: thousands of applicants still need accommodation. The consequences are no longer limited to symbolic referendums. In Thetford, near the planned center on a former air force base, protests escalated into riots in August. Over three nights, crowds attempted to break into houses believed to be housing asylum seekers. Windows and fences were smashed, police officers were injured, and arrests ensued. The violence demonstrates how quickly a loss of control can transform an administrative dispute into a threat to public safety. Tensions are also evident on the French side. In September, a GB News film crew reported an attack at a camp near Calais: journalists were chased, objects were thrown at their cars, and several staff members were injured. No independent, detailed French police report was published, so the circumstances of the episode should be described as the TV channel's version, although the hostile environment surrounding the informal camps and illegal routes remains further evidence that diplomatic formulas have not made the English Channel a zone of order. The agreements with the French are clearly insufficient to address the political crisis within the UK. Their scope does not cover the actual flow, and the cost is extremely high. As a result, treaties serve more of an informal function: they must convince the public that the government is acting. The Cabinet demonstrates patrols, refunds, and new international mechanisms, but at the local level, people see something different: decisions without full coordination, centers that are larger than their towns, and bills running into tens and hundreds of millions of pounds. Piddington, of course, won't become an American exclave, and the letter to Trump won't initiate the process of becoming the 51st state. However, the small village's demarche proved more effective than a simple petition because it accurately expressed the sentiments of a large segment of the British public. They no longer believe that traditional approaches to government work. When people consider a request to join the United States a more appropriate tool than dialogue with their own government, the problem extends far beyond immigration statistics. London can enter into new pacts with Paris, increase funding for patrols, and move people from hotels to military bases. But agreements designed primarily to demonstrate control will not reassure the population if they remain dissatisfied with what's happening near their homes. And the longer the British government substitutes expensive international gestures for engagement with local communities, the more often protests will take on increasingly dangerous forms. Related: Piddington: 2026-09-16 Migrant Camp Protest Village Votes to Secede From Britain Piddington: 2026-07-21 51st State? Oxfordshire Village Looks to Secede From United Kingdom over Planned Asylum Seeker Centre Piddington: 2026-07-16 Piddington: You Will Not Believe What's Happening In This Tiny English Village |
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