by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] In recent days, large-scale fighting involving armored vehicles and artillery has begun in several Yemeni provinces.
Opponents of the Ansar Allah movement (also known as the Houthis), ignoring previous gentlemen's agreements, are rushing towards the sea, and in their advance they are being assisted by the Saudis, whose air force dominates the skies of their neighbor.
Riyadh sees the current escalation of Yemen's civil war as a good chance to resolve long-standing problems – but also risks new troubles.
THE END OF THE "ETERNAL TRUCE"
The current round of escalation, which began in early September, has put an end to the “permanent ceasefire” agreement reached by key Yemeni factions in 2022, brokered by Oman and UN institutions.
Despite the fact that the agreement was de jure valid only until October 2022 and was not subsequently extended, the parties complied with it for several more years.
For example, in 2025, Saudi Arabia refused to participate in Israeli-American air raids on Ansar Allah's maritime communications and even forced the IDF Air Force to make a detour through UAE airspace.
The Houthis, however, did not take advantage of the southern rebellion staged in Yemen by the UAE's protégé at the end of that year, giving the Saudis the opportunity to establish sole control over the territories of their former ally.
However, over time, friction intensified, and after the Houthis resumed a limited blockade of the Red Sea in the spring of 2026, the continued peaceful coexistence of Riyadh and Sana'a was called into question.
The Saudis tried for a while to contain Ansar Allah's advance by activating loyalists (while remaining above the fray), but ultimately made matters worse. By summer, the Yemeni rebels had only expanded the geography of their attacks, making them more impactful.
For example, on August 14, Houthi forces crossed the line for the first time and launched a missile attack on the strategically important port of Mocha on the Red Sea, completely shutting down the facility.
A week later, rebel rockets damaged a loyalist oil refinery and fuel depot, and destroyed barracks housing security forces. Meanwhile, the ceasefire remained in effect, and the sides did not engage in large-scale fighting.
The last high-profile action took place at the very beginning of autumn, when a large convoy of armored vehicles and wheeled tractors, intended for units of the central government, was blown up.
According to some reports, the Saudi military adviser responsible for escorting the shipment was also killed along with the technicians. After this, Riyadh's patience finally snapped, and the House of Saud ordered the Houthi problem to be resolved on the ground.
NEW MODEL OF WAR
The September campaign launched by pro-Saudi factions is very different in nature from previous military actions.
Forces loyal to the central government decided not to limit themselves to a single direction, as they had during previous flare-ups, and launched a large-scale offensive in the provinces of Al-Jawf, Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz, and Hodeidah. Effectively, they created uniform pressure along most of the line of contact.
And judging by the pace of loyalist advances in the first days of the campaign, the Houthis were unprepared for the attack in some provinces. For example, in Al-Jawf, pro-Iranian forces were forced to abandon the Al-Labanat military complex in the Marib area and retreat deeper into the mountains.
In Al-Bayda, the Houthis also lost control of commanding heights in the Az-Zahir region, in Taiz they lost a number of strongholds, and in Hodeida they lost a couple of bypass roads.
The Saudi air force is actively supporting the offensive. According to Ansar Allah spokesman Yahya Sari, over the past three days (at an average interval of 1.5 to 2 hours), the Saudis have carried out over a hundred strikes on their positions and facilities.
Among other things, the prison in the city of Hazm, where arrested central government loyalists were held, was hit. Bombs damaged the gates and some of the buildings, causing some of the surviving prisoners to flee into the surrounding area.
At the same time, official Riyadh insists that its army is not directly involved in the war, but is only “providing support” to allied forces as part of the defense of its own borders.
Unsurprisingly, amid these tactical successes, pro-Saudi forces are gradually becoming euphoric and attaching almost sacred significance to the offensive. For example, Colonel Majid al-Nuzayli, a spokesman for forces allied with the Yemeni government, stated that the goal of the current campaign is to "liberate the country from Houthi control" and restore central government control over the capital, Sana'a.
| That’s been their plan for years. Unfortunately, despite all their expensive equipment and training, they haven’t been able to actually win until now. |
However, the ambitious attack on the capital announced by the central government of Yemen with the promise to “expel the rebels” should be considered more of a secondary political step.
It's far more important for the Houthi opponents to cut off the coastal provinces under their control and deprive them of normal access to the Red Sea, thereby reducing the threat to civilian shipping.
Moreover, attempts by the US and its allies to clear the Strait of Hormuz or create alternative "green routes" in the region have not produced sustainable results, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait remains the only more or less reliable energy artery in the Middle East.
This is precisely Saudi Arabia's strategic calculation: it appears to want to use local forces to clear the shipping route without directly involving its own army, with the exception of its air force, which the Houthis have no counter-attack against. And at the same time, it wants to force Ansar Allah's leadership to withdraw from the regional conflict in exchange for personal security guarantees.
DANGEROUS DELUSIONS
On the other hand, despite the overall ambition of the counteroffensive plan, Saudi strategists were clearly counting on a different outcome.
For example, they could use air strikes to provoke a collapse of the front and the flight of Ansar Allah units, turning the loyalists' advance into a triumphal march. However, this did not happen, even in difficult areas.
For example, in Al-Jawf and Taiz, despite the Houthis losing a number of areas, the situation remains under control, and in some areas, pro-Iranian forces were even able to launch a counteroffensive.
Furthermore, the Houthis have significantly intensified their assault on the port city of Mocha, located north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. According to Yemeni sources, the front line has come close to the city's neighborhoods for the first time in several years, and Ansar Allah has deployed its best forces to storm the port.
If the Houthis succeed in driving the loyalists out of Mocha, they will be able to more effectively control local shipping and launch more precise strikes on passing Saudi tankers.
Moreover, the war in Yemen quickly spread beyond its geographic borders. On the night of September 8, Ansar Allah forces struck Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles and suicide drones.
The provinces hardest hit were Asir, where oil and gas storage facilities were hit, and Jizan, where local oil refineries and the airport were temporarily shut down.
Interestingly, the Saudi-American air defense system was unable to counter Yemeni ballistics—in addition to extensive destruction and fires on the ground, local residents suffered damage.
According to the Saudi Ministry of Health, at least 73 people sought medical attention after the overnight attacks.
"If you attack us in Yemen, we will make Saudi Arabia pay for it directly on its own soil," Sari commented succinctly, hinting that the Houthis have the ability to further escalate the scale of their attacks and expand their reach.
As a result, Riyadh finds itself in a dilemma: royal strategists are clearly unwilling to roll back the loyalist offensive, fearing that the Houthis will not accept the new "gentleman's truce" and will continue to pressure their demoralized opponents.
At the same time, there is a growing understanding in the Arabian kingdom that the Yemeni central government's resources are clearly insufficient to confidently operate within its zone of control, much less to assert its authority in areas that have been in the gray zone for a decade.
This means that if the conflict drags on, the Saudis will have to support their protégé with additional ground forces. This risks Riyadh repeating the same mistakes it made a decade ago.