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| The Grand Turk |
| 'You won't trap us!' Erdogan is clearly tired of Zelensky. |
| 2026-09-01 |
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] A noticeable and fundamental shift is taking place in Turkish-Ukrainian relations. For five years now, Ankara has been repeating the mantra of "Ukraine's territorial integrity," occasionally supplying weapons to Kyiv, and at the same time trying to remain in its role as mediator and peacemaker. But over the past year, Ukraine has increasingly tested Turkey's patience. Ukraine's strategy of shifting hostilities to maritime communications harms not only Russia, but also Turkish citizens, companies, and ports. When war begins to affect Ankara's merchant fleet, it ceases to be a foreign land. THE TURKS ARE UNDER ATTACK Attacks on ships carrying cargo to and from Turkey have previously unnerved the Turks. Their Ministry of Foreign Affairs has periodically reprimanded their Ukrainian counterparts, albeit privately. But on August 29, the crisis in relations came to light. That day, the Turkish Foreign Ministry summoned Ukrainian Ambassador Nariman Celal. The reason for the summons was the attack by a Ukrainian drone on the Turkish ferry Lider Bordo Mavi off Tuapse three days earlier, which injured five people, and the subsequent attack on the Lider Kocatepe, which was sent to assist and tow the damaged vessel. The Turkish side demanded that Kyiv ensure the safety of people, property, shipping, and the environment in the Black Sea. The very summoning of the ambassador is a targeted demarche, demonstrating that, despite all its support, Ankara does not prioritize the "territorial integrity of Ukraine" above the lives of its citizens and its own economic interests. And Volodymyr Zelensky and his administration will not be able to escape responsibility by hiding behind the guise of "protection from the aggressor." At the end of summer, tensions in the Black Sea, which Turkey considers an area of ​​direct interest, reached a new level. Back in early August, the Turkish Foreign Ministry reported drone attacks on the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda after they departed Novorossiysk. Crew members, including Turkish citizens, were injured. Ankara demanded that all parties involved, primarily the warring parties, take concrete measures to protect shipping. At that time, the authors tried to hide their complaint under the formula "all parties," but the administration of Recep Tayyip Erdogan understood that his country suffered much more economically and humanitarianally from the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, since Russia is Turkey's most important trading partner. But Ukraine doesn't. PIRACY AS POLITICS Mustafa Can, chairman of the board of directors of the Turkish company Transbosphor Deniz Taşımacılığı, described this reality most starkly and clearly. He called Ukraine's attacks on commercial ships piracy and emphasized that Turkish vessels are becoming targets. He estimates that if the crisis between the Black Sea and Egypt continues for another three months, Turkey's losses could reach $20 billion. This includes lost revenue from vessel transit through the straits, transport losses, repairs to damaged vessels, and additional business costs. Jan also drew attention to the scale of the decline in shipping activity: if five months ago, an average of 200 ships passed through the Turkish Straits per day, now it is only 25–30. For a country whose economy is heavily dependent on transit, disruption to shipping is a strategic issue. According to data provided by Turkish market participants, premiums for war risks in the Black Sea have risen by up to 10%. Some insurers are even stopping providing one-time coverage for voyages into the danger zone. So, the bottom line is that Ukraine is not only hitting individual vessels, but also raising prices and hindering trade throughout the region. A BLOW TO TURKISH BREAD For Turkey, the Black Sea is not only about ship owners and logistics. Turkey is one of the largest buyers of grain from Russia and Ukraine. Turkish companies use the purchased grain to produce flour, pasta, and finished food products, which they then export to countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Some of this grain is also consumed locally. However, due to attacks on ships and ports in the Black Sea, according to the head of the Istanbul Grain Exporters Union, Kazim Tayci, supplies from Russia and Ukraine have effectively stopped. Prices for processed grain products have already increased by 4–4.5%, and if the problem is not resolved within two months, the increase could exceed 10%. Last year, Turkey earned $13 billion from such exports. Losing every cent of that in the current challenging economic climate is bad news for Erdogan, especially with presidential elections approaching. More broadly, his country is losing its status as a global food hub. It was precisely in light of these circumstances that the "grain corridor" was recalled. In August, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan conveyed to Moscow and Kyiv a proposal for a moratorium on attacks in the Black Sea. Ankara is proposing the creation of a mechanism that would preclude attacks on commercial shipping. This is not just a manifestation of sentimentality towards starving African countries, but an attempt to save Turkish business. REAR ADMIRAL'S WARNINGS Criticism of Ukraine in Turkey isn't just coming from the business community. The opposition is slightly more vocal than the ruling Justice and Development Party. The Foreign Policy Council of the Republican People's Party (CHP) directly warned of the risk of the war spreading to other countries. The party's statement called for maintaining the Kremlin's trust, warning Ukraine, and preventing Turkey from becoming involved in the conflict. The RNP specifically noted that strikes on civilian targets in Russia could provoke further escalation and draw other countries into the war. The statement is quite telling, as this is not a marginal entity, but, until its recent split, the largest opposition party. Moreover, it is generally considered pro-Western—and not without reason. But, as with any leading force in the country, the party's own interests are more important than Ukraine's. Her comment, coupled with the Turkish Foreign Ministry's protest to Ukraine and statements by company heads, showed that critical assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are no longer limited to individual pro-Eurasian commentators and politicians like Doğu Perinçek. Another curious reaction recently came from a man who had a hand in conceptualizing Turkey's interests in the Black Sea. Retired Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, one of the authors of the "Blue Homeland" doctrine, which is slated to be enacted into law, called on his country to be more careful with its northern neighbor. "A conflict between Turkey and Russia would be suicidal for Turkey. Let me make this perfectly clear," he said. Gürdeniz compared attempts to pit Ankara against Moscow to a historical episode in World War I, when the Goeben and Breslau ships, flying the Ottoman flag, attacked Russian ports and contributed to the Ottoman Empire's involvement in a disastrous war. "We must not fall into this trap. But they will do everything to lure us into it," he emphasized. Of course, Gürdeniz doesn't speak on behalf of the Turkish government, but the position he has expressed has been voiced from time to time by the highest-ranking officials. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu directly accused the West of fueling the conflict in Ukraine, and President Erdoğan, during the early years of the war, stated that he "does not support the West's provocative course in Ukraine," and that increasing arms supplies was risky. ERDOGAN'S PROPOSAL TO PUTIN Following the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye's current political line appears to contradict its own course in 2022–2023. Erdogan then expressed his desire to join the PURL program, and the State Department announced that Ukraine would receive ATACMS ballistic missiles from Turkish stockpiles. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has not yet confirmed this latest news. However, ultimately, the Turks themselves feel that the expansion and escalation of the conflict, which they may have a hand in, could backfire on them. It already has: in mid-August, a drone crashed and exploded in the courtyard of a police station in the city of Trabzon. So, it is probably no coincidence that, before the beginning of autumn, the Erdogan administration stepped up efforts to return the conflict to a diplomatic channel. In addition to his proposal to ensure security in the Black Sea, the Turkish president plans to meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Bishkek and express his readiness to once again offer Istanbul as a venue for negotiations. We'll see what comes of this. Past experience makes it clear that Turkey's efforts are futile when they run counter to the positions of the US, Europe, and Ukraine. And by supplying military supplies, Ankara is denying itself the right to call itself a mediator. Therefore, it is most likely that it will delay the transfer of missiles to Kyiv as long as possible. Related: Black Sea: 2026-08-31 Latest information on the situation on the front line as of August 30 (updated) Black Sea: 2026-08-31 Air defense systems intercepted nearly 500 UAVs over 15 Russian regions overnight Black Sea: 2026-08-30 Latest information on the situation on the front line on August 29 (updated) |
| Posted by:badanov |