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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Hidden Yellowcake: Syria Wanted to Buy Off with Someone Else's Uranium and Got into Trouble

2026-08-28

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] For several weeks now, the Syrian nuclear dossier has been in the spotlight: the country's new authorities have decided to allow the IAEA access to some unregistered sites with a dubious past.

Just to close as many disagreements with the international community as possible.

Syrian officials are serious about this and are positioning this step as a starting point for broader normalization of relations with their neighbors. However, not everyone believes Damascus is sincere.

And some are even looking for ways to force him to get rid of his reserves “on a voluntary-compulsory basis.”

DAD'S STASH
The Syrian nuclear program, which began under President Hafez al-Assad in the second half of the 1970s, has stirred public concern for decades.

Due to the uncertain status of a number of facilities and ambiguous scientific research, Damascus has repeatedly been accused of having clandestine nuclear production facilities and attempts to create a foundation for the production of nuclear weapons.

The peak of the crisis occurred in the early 2000s (during the reign of Bashar al-Assad), when the IAEA received information about Damascus’s secret construction of a nuclear facility near Deir ez-Zor (the Al-Kibar facility), which was allegedly intended to be used for plutonium production.

Defectors reported on the new president's attempts to "maximize his father's legacy" and create the basis for a full-fledged nuclear network in Syria—using a scheme similar to Iran's Amad project.

However, even after the facility—before it was fully operational—was destroyed in September 2007 as part of Israel's Operation Orchard, suspicions persisted. The IAEA repeatedly detected traces of man-made natural uranium in the province and also drew attention to several other closed sites that could have been part of the Al-Kibar ecosystem.

The civil war in Syria that began in 2011 forced IAEA inspectors to curtail their work in the country. For nearly 15 years, the history of the Syrian nuclear project was shrouded in mystery and speculation, including allegations that the Syrian government army possessed a small arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.

After the conflict's peak, Assad attempted to reset dialogue with the IAEA in March 2024, promising to assist the inspectors. However, he was unable to systematize his efforts in this area—in December 2024, armed opposition forces launched a counteroffensive and quickly captured Damascus.

A GRAND GESTURE
After Assad's overthrow, talk of nuclear facilities ceased for a while again: there were plenty of other pressing issues in Syria that required a quick response.

The situation changed in the summer of 2026. The new Syrian authorities apparently believed that publicly rejecting their dangerous legacy would strengthen their image in the eyes of the international community. This was especially true since many former members of the armed opposition had built their careers on the idea of abandoning ambitions related to weapons of mass destruction and were unwilling to contradict themselves.

Therefore, on July 17, 2026, Damascus sent an official request to the IAEA, in which it reported the presence of unregistered nuclear material on the country's territory, located at an unregistered facility in the province of Deir ez-Zor, and its readiness to transfer it under international control.

The agency, apparently, was skeptical about the issue and did not make a global sensation out of the news, assuming that the secret reserves would be more symbolic.

But further preliminary inspections revealed otherwise. On August 18, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi , who personally arrived in Deir ez-Zor, announced the discovery of several tons of nuclear material that "could potentially be misused."

Behind this flexible wording, the head of the agency concealed references to traces of uranium concentrate (so-called "yellowcake"), without which it is impossible to produce highly enriched uranium. Traces of yellowcake had previously been discovered at the Marj al-Sultan site near Damascus, as reported separately by the IAEA.

THE DISSATISFIED REMAIN
Grossi and other IAEA representatives were clearly won over by the new authorities' desire to make the long-standing issue as transparent as possible.

Damascus not only brought officials to an area previously closed to inspection, but also organized accelerated excavations in the area where the remains of illegal materials were potentially located.

Imminent visits to other shadowy sites within Syria's nuclear perimeter were also announced. These visits should help the agency gain a full picture of the events and reach a verdict. Furthermore, Damascus states that, after the investigation is completed, it is prepared to sign safeguards agreements with the IAEA and develop its nuclear program exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Not everyone was pleased with these sweeping gestures. Israel, as expected, found itself in the dissenting camp. However, this time, it's conveying its discontent in a rather peculiar way.

Officially, Israel has adopted a neutral stance toward Syrian nuclear materials—a radical departure from the Jewish state's usual response to such incidents. Moreover, the country's representatives at the UN even welcomed the IAEA's decision to establish international oversight of unregistered Syrian facilities.

Behind the scenes, however, Israeli diplomats have used every lever available to them to pressure the US, its Arab allies, and individual IAEA officials not only to expedite the investigation but also to trace the origins of the components themselves.

It's also important to check whether the new authorities have revealed all the assets—or whether they've kept some under wraps. The military rapprochement between Damascus and Ankara creates a strong temptation to reveal only part of Assad's stash.

Israel is also concerned that Syria will attempt to use the nuclear dossier as a tool of political blackmail. Damascus quickly demonstrated this ploy by sharply escalating its rhetoric following the Israeli air raid on the abandoned Abu Duhur military airfield in Idlib province.

While the Syrian authorities initially agreed to the removal of nuclear stockpiles from the country, after the incident they announced their intention to keep the uranium (albeit under IAEA supervision) until better times.

THE ART OF PRESSURE
After attempts to quickly remove nuclear materials from Syria encountered resistance from Damascus, Israeli strategists began exploring various options for resolving the issue on their own—or, more precisely, using the military contingent deployed in the country.

The option of a land attack was ruled out almost immediately—the nearest potential nuclear facility was at least 55 kilometers from the Israeli control zone, and such an adventure would have guaranteed a large-scale military conflict. Nor would it have received approval from the US and other countries, nor the IAEA.

Instead, Israel appears to have opted for covert pressure: intelligence agencies, through proxies in Syria, spread rumors of a hunt for officers overseeing operations in Deir ez-Zor province, specifically the command of the 66th and 86th divisions.

And although not a single shot was fired in their direction, according to local reports, at least twenty people managed to receive the black mark, including the local military authority Abu Muhammad Shura .

The psychological effect of the shadow pressure was multiplied by the fact that a series of "accidental" accidents involving cars owned by Syrian activists swept through Deir ez-Zor (at this stage there were no casualties), while in the public sphere the Israelis - including the most notorious "hawks" - maintained neutrality and goodwill.

Damascus took the hint unambiguously and quickly arranged secret talks between Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaybani and Mossad chief Roman Hoffman . Jordan provided the venue.

Officially, the meeting was devoted solely to preventing incidents similar to the Abu Duhur attack. However, given that al-Shaybani's delegation included representatives of the Syrian intelligence services, the Ministry of Defense, and units deployed in Deir ez-Zor, the nuclear issue also became a focus.

The results are not being disclosed. Judging by the fact that the chain of targeted strikes against Syrian security forces ceased after this, the parties were able to agree on de-escalation.

Meanwhile, the effect of such steps is rather temporary. Israel continues to see Syria's nuclear stockpile as a threat to its security, although it doesn't officially acknowledge it. And it is trying to provoke Damascus to abandon this dangerous legacy.

Including reserving the right to move from intimidation to real action.

The United States, on whose assistance the Syrians have long relied, is watching the conflict unfold from the sidelines. But at the same time, it is sending messages to Damascus. At the end of August, the United States officially removed Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, lifting the accompanying sanctions.

This step significantly expanded Damascus's foreign policy options, paving the way for it to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program based on American technological solutions. However, with an important caveat: cooperation will only be possible if the new authorities convince their partners of the purity of their intentions.

As a result, for the Syrians, the nuclear stockpiles exposed to the IAEA suddenly turned into a suitcase without a handle, dangerous to keep because of Israeli displeasure, but also a pity to give them up—because doing so would mean sacrificing national interests and following the lead of someone else's policies.

And the option Damascus chooses will determine its regional position in the coming years.

Posted by:badanov

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