by Evgeny Balakin
[REGNUM] August 23 marks the defeat of Nazi Germany by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in 1943. This day of military glory is tied to the anniversary of the liberation of Khar'kov by three fronts—the Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwestern Fronts. The successful conclusion of the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation is also considered the end of the Battle of Kursk.
Marshal Ivan Konev, who commanded the Steppe Front in 1943, noted that Headquarters sent almost 5,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery units to a relatively small (on the scale of the entire Soviet-German front) sector—almost half of the armored vehicles of the entire active army.
"An unprecedented tank encounter unfolded near Kursk, the largest in the history of World War II. In the Prokhorovka area, and then in the Akhtyrka and Bogodukhov areas, there was a true tank massacre," Konev wrote in his " Notes of a Front Commander."
The 49 days of "carnage" (from July 5 to August 23) cost the enemy thirty routed divisions, including seven tank divisions. The Battle of Kursk lasted four times longer than Stalingrad, but in terms of its impact on the course of World War II, the "arc" is quite comparable to the Battle of the Volga.
According to historians, the defeats at Kursk, Belgorod, and Khar'kov convinced the Wehrmacht leadership of the futility of the entire campaign on the Eastern Front—one of the consequences of this conviction was the generals' conspiracy against Hitler in 1944.
Our army, as Konev noted 25 years after the victory, gained invaluable experience that became part of post-war military science.
"The success of a tank army battle depends on its interaction with combined arms armies, on the proper organization of artillery and air support, on the rapid concentration of forces in the main direction, on the speed of the attack and the continuity of command," the commander listed in the early 1970s.
The lessons of Kursk (adjusted for the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles and the development of communications) are still relevant today.
BEFORE THE FIGHT
The Kursk salient emerged after the Red Army's winter offensive of 1942–1943 and the German counterattack in March 1943. The Wehrmacht's spring offensive was a significant setback for the Red Army, especially in light of the recent victory at Stalingrad. Soviet troops were forced to abandon Khar'kov, which they had captured after the February–March operation.
German divisions of Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein captured Belgorod.
Manstein, who was known behind his back in the Wehrmacht as a "selfish commander," as usual took credit for the achievements of his subordinate generals, thereby strengthening his reputation at Hitler's headquarters as the most gifted strategist.
Our Voronezh Front commander, Filipp Golikov, was removed from his post and recalled to Moscow. His replacement was appointed Nikolai Vatutin —one of those who, along with Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, distinguished themselves at Stalingrad, for which he was one of the first to receive the Order of Suvorov.
Vatutin organized his troops in such a way that—in fierce fighting—he managed to stop the Germans, who were once again pushing east and south from Khar'kov. The front line stopped on the banks of the Seversky Donets, forming the southern face of the Kursk Bulge.
A deep salient formed in the center of the front, more than 150 kilometers deep and extending up to 550 kilometers along the front. Troops from the Central and Voronezh Fronts overhung the flanks of the German Army Groups Center and South.
The German command saw an opportunity to regain the initiative. Operation Citadel, assigned to two army groups simultaneously—Center and South—proposed two counterattacks.
From the north, from the Orel region, the 9th Army of Colonel General Walter Model, nicknamed “ Hitler’s fireman,” was supposed to strike. Model was entrusted with the most difficult operations.
Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were to advance from the south of Belgorod. The southern group was covered by Wolfram von Richthofen's 4th Air Fleet —one of the few commanders who received a promotion rather than a reprimand for Stalingrad. From the winter of 1943, Richthofen wore the epaulettes of a Generalfeldmarshal of the Luftwaffe.
The entire German group numbered 780–900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and assault guns, reinforced by Tigers and Panthers.
The overall goal was to use a “concentric offensive” to cut off the Kursk salient at its base, creating a giant “cauldron” similar to those that arose in the first months of 1941.
Hitler's directive stated:
“This offensive is of decisive importance… The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world.”
Wehrmacht Chief of Staff Wilhelm Keitel put it more succinctly and precisely: "We must attack for political reasons." A German success would have adjusted the plans of the Anglo-Americans, who were hesitant to open a second front in Europe.
Our command had guessed the enemy's plan in advance. The northern front was defended by General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front, the southern by General of the Army Vatutin's Voronezh Front. Colonel General Konev's Steppe Front was deployed in Stavka's reserve. All three fronts were being rapidly replenished with manpower and equipment reserves.
The Soviet group exceeded 1.3 million people, had over 19 thousand guns and mortars, about 3.4 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft.
“Even before the enemy’s offensive began, we had powerful strategic reserves concentrated in advance, while the enemy did not have them and was forced to begin a hasty transfer of his troops to the Kursk direction from other parts of the front,” Konev recalled.
THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE. PROKHOROVKA
The offensive began early in the morning of July 5, 1943. Before dawn, Soviet artillery launched a powerful preemptive strike. German forces launched the attack around 5:30 AM on the northern side and around 6:00 AM on the southern side. The Battle of Kursk had begun.
On the northern front, Model's 9th Army encountered a dense defense from Rokossovsky's Central Front from the very first hours.
The main attacks fell on Ponyri and Olkhovatka. Our 13th and 70th Armies, relying on prepared positions and powerful artillery, held back the enemy onslaught. By July 10-11, Model's offensive had run out of steam. The Germans' maximum advance did not exceed 10-12 kilometers.
On the southern front, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Group Kempf advanced significantly deeper. By July 11, they had reached Oboyan and deployed toward Prokhorovka. A real threat of a breakthrough to Kursk from the south arose.
On July 12, one of the most famous tank battles of the war unfolded here. Southern Front commander Vatutin committed the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov to the battle. The Guardsmen were opposed by the II SS Panzer Corps.
The encounter took place at close range. By the end of the day, neither side had achieved a decisive tactical victory, but the German advance in the Prokhorov direction was halted.
By mid-July, Operation Citadel had stalled. On the northern front, Model went on the defensive. On the southern front, Goth and Kempf were unable to encircle the Soviet forces or reach Kursk.
The Germans failed to achieve the strategic goal of their offensive. The most difficult, defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was over.
BREAKTHROUGH TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH
“Our troops’ transition to a counteroffensive was a surprise to Hitler, since the German command had never revealed our plan for a deliberate defense,” Ivan Konev noted in his memoirs.
Even before the German offensive had completely ceased, the Soviet command ordered an active counterattack. On July 12, troops from the Western, Bryansk, and Central Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov in Oryol. The goal was to defeat the Oryol group and eliminate the Oryol salient.
The Germans suffered two painful local defeats on the northern and southern sides of the salient on the same day. On August 5, 1943, units of Colonel General Markian Popov's Bryansk Front and Rokossovsky's Central Front liberated Oryol. That same day, troops of Konev's Steppe Front and Vatutin's Voronezh Front captured Belgorod.
That evening, Moscow fired its first artillery salute since the war—twelve volleys from 120 guns. From that moment on, salutes became a tradition marking major victories.
Soviet machine gunners engage in street fighting in Khar'kov, 1943.
The collapse of the southern face of the Kursk Bulge allowed our troops to begin a breakthrough south of liberated Belgorod.
On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts began the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation "Commander Rumyantsev".
The plan was to cut through the German Belgorod-Khar'kov group and develop an offensive bypassing Khar'kov. Within the first few days, our troops broke through the defenses and created the conditions for an advance on the city.
"I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES"
After breaking through the defenses, Soviet troops quickly advanced to the southwest.
But heavy fighting erupted on the approaches to Khar'kov—the Germans had dug in heavily. "The enemy's tactical defensive zone consisted of a primary and secondary line, with a combined depth of up to 18 kilometers," recalled Marshal Konev. Along the main defensive line, the enemy had established "strongholds" connected by trenches with numerous pillboxes; "stone structures were transformed into small fortresses."
But the experience gained at the Kursk Bulge of joint work between infantry and armored vehicles, artillery and the Air Force, plus the numerical superiority – all this decided the outcome of the operation.
The Germans attempted to halt our forces with counterattacks near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, but only temporarily slowed the pace. By mid-August, units of Konev's Steppe Front had approached Khar'kov.
By August 22, it became clear that the enemy was beginning to retreat. Konev decided to prevent an orderly retreat and ordered a night assault that evening. Street fighting raged throughout the night of August 23. Blocks burned, explosions thundered, and Soviet units broke through between strongholds.
At dawn on August 23, units of the 183rd Rifle Division were already driving the enemy from their positions on the central Sumskaya Street and were the first to reach Dzerzhinsky Square. Soldiers of the 89th Guards Rifle Division raised the red banner in the very center of the city, on the Gosprom building.
By 11:00 a.m. on August 23, the Steppe Front troops had completely cleared the city.
Konev recalled:
I called [ Joseph Stalin's secretary ] Poskrebyshev. He replied:
"Comrade Stalin is resting. I won't disturb him."
I decided to call myself. There was no answer on the first few rings. I demanded of the operator:
— Call again. I'll be responsible for the consequences.
Finally I hear a familiar hoarse voice.
- I'm listening...
— I report, Comrade Stalin, the troops of the Steppe Front liberated the city of Khar'kov today.
Stalin did not hesitate to respond:
— Congratulations. We'll give you a first-class salute.
After Kursk, the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of mounting a major offensive on the Eastern Front. The strategic initiative finally passed to the Red Army. The conditions were ripe for the liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine, access to the Dnieper, and a further advance westward.