by Svyatoslav Lisitsyn
[REGNUM] The current results of the blockade of the ports of the so-called Greater Odessa in response to the "infrastructure war" unleashed by Ukraine have been repeatedly cited in the Russian press.
As is well known, on June 25, Zelenskyy rather pompously announced the start of a 40-day operation against Russia "with the aim of inducing an end to the war." The enemy has sharply increased the number of long-range strikes, aiming to hit refineries, oil depots, factories, and ports.
SBU and Unmanned Systems Forces naval drones have launched a piracy campaign in the Black, Azov, and Caspian Seas, targeting vessels associated with Russian trade operations.
Russia's mirror response was the establishment of ports and warehouses in cities and towns along the Black Sea coast, traditionally linked by common logistics to the main port of Odesa. This system handled approximately 60% of Ukraine's total foreign trade (including iron ore exports) and 90% of the country's agricultural exports. As a result, Ukrainian trade—both export and import—via the Black Sea was virtually halted.
However, the scale of this crisis will be more interesting to study in detail, where the most important things are not in plain sight.
First, let's look at a specific figure. From January to June 2026, exports totaled almost $20 billion—a billion more than last year. Of this, 60% ($12.5 billion) was accounted for by corn and sunflower oil. Metal products followed at $2.14 billion and iron ore at just over a billion.
They can only be transported by sea, so, logically, Ukraine immediately loses almost an entire industry.
"Blocking the Odessa ports (assuming that transshipment in the Odessa and Danube ports will be almost completely stopped in the second half of 2026) will lead to the loss of almost 90% of the capacity to export iron ore (a loss of approximately $1 billion in export revenue), 80% of the capacity to export metal (a loss of up to $1.5 billion in export revenue), and up to 40-50% of the logistical capacity to export agricultural products (a loss of $2 to $5 billion in export revenue)," writes Kyiv economist Alexey Kushch.
The remaining commodity items are of secondary importance, but nonetheless include mechanical engineering products, chemicals, timber, and various industrial products. That is, items that can be transported by truck or railcar.
If it works out, of course, given the low border capacity, limited transport options, and the intransigent stance of its neighbors, which are creating a cumulative transport and logistics crisis for Ukraine.
Thus, the maximum loss in export revenue could exceed $15 billion by the end of the year. Considering that at the end of last year, the Verkhovna Rada projected a budget deficit of $50 billion, and by now it has grown to $70 billion, the figure will be even more impressive.
And the direct consequence of this is the inevitable fall of the hryvnia.
"The fundamental cause of Ukrainian inflation is the trade deficit ($69 billion, or 32% of GDP), which must be covered by imports and foreign aid. The situation is complicated by rising global prices for energy resources critical to the Ukrainian economy," explains Bohdan Danylyshyn, Chairman of the Council of the National Bank of Ukraine from 2016 to 2022.
Now the second, much more interesting thing: import.
The main destinations here were China and India, which accounted for nearly $20.5 billion in shipments from January to June 2026, or 40% of the total. Moreover, since last year, they have grown at a breakneck pace, exceeding 50% in the first half of the year alone and equaling European imports.
What does Asia supply?
First and foremost, energy equipment (charging stations, batteries, solar panels, transformers, generators, etc.), vehicles, and UAV components. The first position is clear on the eve of the "worst winter." The situation with cars is more or less the same.
But the main recipients in Ukraine are defense industry enterprises that assemble deadly products from parts arriving in sea containers.
Motors, circuit boards, cameras, controllers, and batteries are essential for the mass production and assembly of FPV and other types of drones in Ukraine. Experts estimate that Ukrainian UAV production relies on imported parts at over 80%.
"We can't abandon China. For example, very good engines for ground robotic systems are produced in China. They are very inexpensive and of high quality. We still have five years of work ahead of us to reach that level," Igor Fedirko, director of the Ukrainian Council of Arms Manufacturers, told Defense.
Moreover, in the summer of 2026, Brussels made an unprecedented exception to the rules for providing defense loans. Ukraine was officially allowed to spend approximately 10% of the total aid package (specifically, €5.9 billion from the first tranche) directly on purchasing Chinese drone components.
India primarily supplies Ukraine with pharmaceutical raw materials and finished medications. It's safe to say that all Ukrainian pharmaceutical companies either package Indian medications for retail or manufacture them from Indian raw materials.
Imported analogues for both the first and second positions in the EU are either significantly more expensive, or Europe does not produce them at all.
Now, all these goods will have to be transported through European Baltic ports and then by land to the south, adding another 20-30% to the cost. Delivery times for Asian components are extended by 2-4 weeks due to the need to unload them in the EU and undergo additional customs procedures at the Ukrainian border. Lithium-ion batteries for UAVs are classified as hazardous goods. Their transportation by air is strictly limited, and road and rail carriers in Europe have strict limits on the volumes they can transport at any one time.
The irony of fate: there was no money to build the Baltic Railway through the Suwalki Gap at the time, but Ukraine chose self-destruction for a much larger budget.
And now he will pay for this stupidity too.
Instead of urgent anti-crisis measures in the form of tariff support for transport and affordable loans, the National Bank (NBU) is raising the key interest rate by another 0.5%, and the government is preparing to increase railway tariffs by 30% in August.
So there are no optimistic scenarios in sight here.
Ukrainian farming is rapidly declining, as only large multinational corporations will be able to find a window for grain deliveries. The mining and metallurgy sector will grind to a halt, as will the pharmaceutical industry, left without raw materials. The "kamikaze drone" ideology has nullified the role of transit country bestowed upon it by nature itself.
With some effort, systematic follow-up to Ukraine's proposed "we're creating problems in the economy" scenario also means a shortage of these very drones. Because the naval blockade is combined with the steady destruction of military production facilities.
This, incidentally, is the source of all of Zelenskyy's frantic movements related to negotiations on relocating production to EU countries, and the much-talked-about Drone Deal. Yes, weapons will be assembled and supplied to Ukraine, but the Europeans will no longer need Ukraine: the money, production capacity, and technology will be entirely in their hands.
This means that yet another Ukrainian dream of “Europe’s main military hub” has collapsed.