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Recent successes in hostage diplomacy in the Sahel, such as the release of Kevin Rideout, stand in stark contrast to the grim reality of Mali’s current security landscape.
Mali’s junta is deeply embattled, even as gold exports and Russian mercenaries continue to prop it up.
JNIM has established itself as one of Africa’s most successful insurgencies, raking in significant revenue streams, maintaining and governing territory, and launching terrorist attacks with impunity.
ISSP continues to expand its operational footprint and launch attacks at both security forces and civilian targets.
Last week, the Tuareg-led rebel group Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) released 82 Malian Armed Forces soldiers whom it had held captive. Many of the soldiers had been taken on April 25, 2026, when the group and its ally Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel, launched their spectacular joint offensive across Mali, leading to the recapture of the city of Kidal and further ratcheting up the pressure on Bamako. An additional 60 civilians taken hostage by JNIM were also liberated in Mali last week, an apparent sign of goodwill towards the villages from which they were taken. That same day, the Malian junta, following mediation efforts by Morocco, released the French intelligence agent it had held since August 2025. Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which has been at war with JNIM since 2019 and is nestled in the tri-border area and the eastern Ménaka and Gao regions of Mali, released a U.S. citizen, Kevin Rideout, one of a handful of Western hostages it was holding.
Analysts have emphasized that these outcomes stem from distinct negotiation paths with different parties involved, including Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar, who reportedly played a central role behind the scenes, allegedly paying $12 million in ransom. These recent instances of successful hostage diplomacy in the Sahel stand in stark contrast to the grim reality of Mali’s current security landscape, which remains marked by major upheaval and violence.
The fuel blockade, launched in September 2025 by JNIM, is approaching its one-year anniversary. JNIM continues to demonstrate its strength by capturing and holding territory, while launching new attacks targeting the regime. Human rights abuses by all parties, including Mali’s junta and Russia’s Africa Corps, show the devastating extent of the civilian toll. And ISSP profits from diminished state capacity, counting roughly 2,000 fighters and growing operational capabilities.
Economically, Mali’s junta remains heavily reliant on gold, the country’s main export, which is primarily sourced from the South and West, where Africa’s third-largest gold deposit is located. But even this important, lucrative economic pillar is increasingly destabilized by JNIM, which also relies on extortion around the gold industry as an economic motor.
Rather than directly controlling gold mines, the group uses the routes gold takes to extort and tax, earning illicit proceeds from nearly every stage of the value chain. JNIM also engages in economic warfare and, during the April offensive, regained control over Intahaka, with the largest artisanal gold mine in northern Mali. While the junta remains in control of the industrial mines and continues to collect revenue from them, it must also pay major expenses to survive, including costly blockade workarounds such as army-escorted supply convoys and heavy monthly bills for the dubious help of Russian mercenaries. JNIM also benefits from ransom paid for hostages. Most notably, the UAE paid the group $50 million for the release of its citizens in 2025, which significantly helped fund its offensive.
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