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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

'Conditions for Triumph': Khamenei Challenges the 'Iranian Seven Boyars'

2026-08-14

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] Iran's new Supreme Leader (Rahbar), Mojtaba Khamenei,

…who may or may not have died last spring, or may still be in a coma, but certainly is not actively running the government…

who in the West was generally considered a purely ceremonial figure, has made his presence felt. And quite forcefully.

He carried out personnel changes in the army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the National Security Council. Behind these seemingly chaotic transfers lies a clear signal: Iran has no intention of giving up the leverage it has gained in the Middle East over the past year and, if necessary, will continue to counter external pressure asymmetrically.

And Khamenei Jr.

…or whoever is acting in his name…

took this step not so much to deter the US and Israel from taking rash steps (although he also pursued that goal), but rather to clearly rein in the “peace party” gathered in high offices, which was not averse to compromising certain demands of Tehran in exchange for an end to the confrontation.

RECONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL
One of the key steps taken by Mojtaba Khamenei was the appointment of former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Rezaei is a hawk and enjoys enormous authority both among the Corps and in political circles. At the same time, the new Security Council secretary's views on the situation in the Gulf are almost identical to Mojtaba's own: Iran must firmly defend the new status quo and be prepared to defend it with arms in hand.

Rezai is also categorical about the Strait of Hormuz—in his view, the strait will not fully open even after a technical deal with Oman, at least not until all of the Islamic Republic's conditions are met.

His predecessor, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, who took office in March 2026, was characterized by greater flexibility. Despite belonging to the hawkish camp, he developed a close relationship with President Masoud Pezeshkian and became his stronghold among the security forces during the first weeks of the March war. He also served as an unwitting relay of the reformist wing's position to the security forces and the outside world.

Over time, a sort of "Seven Boyars"

…a Russian aristocratic title below prince, I think like a duke, so pretty high up in the hierarchy…

emerged behind Zolghadr—a group of politicians, primarily representing the interests of the reformist bloc, who considered a peace agreement with the US and certain concessions to Washington, including the hypothetical clearing of the Strait of Hormuz and the transfer of highly enriched uranium reserves. This was on the condition that the West, in return, eased pressure on the Iranian economy and loosened sanctions.

One of the apologists for this position was Pezeschkian himself, whose political triumph in 2024 was built precisely on promises of a quick reset of economic and political contacts with the West.

And although Zolgadr himself never directly stated the need to surrender what had been conquered, over time his speeches increasingly began to hint at the need to record the results of the war and shift efforts to the diplomatic track.

It took Khamenei Jr. several months to find a way to address the growing dissent without turning it into repression and a witch hunt. Along the way, he predictably encountered resistance from Pezeshkian, who perceived the pending reform of the Security Council as an attack on the balance of power between the institutions of the Supreme Leader and the President.

This was especially true after Zolghadr, on the advice of friends in the IRGC, announced his intention to voluntarily resign. However, after a seven-hour audience with the Rahbar, Pezeshkian finally agreed to the proposed symbolic exchange. As a result, Zolghadr was promoted to the position of political adviser—and although he formally retained his position in the hierarchy, he lost a significant portion of his leverage over political processes.

Zolghadr's soft ousting had a negative impact on his patron's power base. Even though the president remained the formal head of the Security Council, the shift in power toward the conservative security forces intensified with Rezai's arrival.

And thanks to the new secretary also receiving the status of Khamenei's official voice within the structure, Pezeshkian's autonomy has diminished. Decisions the Rahbar desires can now be imposed on him not only from above, but also from within the structure.

As a result, the president is forced to act carefully and balance in the new environment, so as not to further anger Khamenei Jr. while maintaining a cautious dialogue with the West. Especially since the cost of a mistake in this case would be high: rumors of the possible removal of the "defeatist president," as some conservative Iranians call Pezeshkian, have been circulating for several weeks.

IN THE LOGIC OF WARTIME
Khamenei Jr. didn't limit himself to redistributing power within the Security Council. The very next day, his office issued a series of orders to replace the leadership of the security bloc in a wartime manner.

Major General Ali Abdollahi, who previously led the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters—the main command body of Iranian security forces during the US-Israeli "hybrid aggression"—has assumed the post of Chief of the Army General Staff. His first deputy is Amir Kiumars Heidari, who was previously responsible for commanding the ground forces and is considered one of the developers of the Islamic Republic's counterinsurgency doctrine.

Changes also occurred at the top of the IRGC. Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who had effectively led the Corps' operations as acting commander since March 1, 2026, was appointed as its commander-in-chief. He was appointed deputy to General Mostafa Izadi. The latter, although he earned the offensive nickname "the rear general" among his opponents for serving primarily in administrative positions, came to the new structure with experience in leading digital espionage and complex cyber operations.

The IRGC Naval Forces also received a new commander, Ali Azmai, considered in the West to be one of the developers of the "Noose of Hormuz" tactic. Finally, Hossein Taeb, a master of public agitation, intrigue, and espionage, returned to the head of the government's Basij militia after nearly fifteen years as commander of the IRGC Intelligence Corps.

The reshuffle signals a shift in the direction of the confrontation. Khamenei Jr. apparently expects his opponents to make new attempts to destabilize Iran from within (including through the non-systemic opposition and armed ethnic groups) or to paralyze its critical infrastructure with sophisticated cyberattacks. Therefore, he is placing officers familiar with counterinsurgency and counterintelligence operations, as well as proxy warfare, at the helm.

Moreover, the new Rahbar is clearly focused on patriotic unification among the population. His decree appointing commanders explicitly states that the Basij militia will be charged with the dangerous mission of protecting the republic's borders, and that the organization itself is intended to become a new model of thinking for Iranian citizens.

CONTACT WINDOW
The restructuring of Iran's domestic political system bypassed the diplomatic track. Khamenei Jr. not only left key negotiators with the West—Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf —unmolested, but even sent them words of support and gratitude for their "tireless struggle for the country's interests."

Moreover, judging by Ghalibaf's public rhetoric in recent days, the negotiators have received instructions from the Supreme Leader to more aggressively push Tehran's conditions, alternating between carrots and sticks.

Indeed, amid growing nervousness, the US has become increasingly restless and made obvious mistakes in the negotiations. This includes, for example, Donald Trump's public statements about his willingness to "temporarily set aside" nuclear issues for the sake of finalizing the Strait of Hormuz deal. This, according to Mojtaba, "creates the ideal conditions for a decisive triumph for the Iranian people."

Khamenei Jr., apparently, doesn't think in terms of "war for the sake of war" and is also prepared to negotiate a peace agreement and even détente with the West and its allies in the long term. Therefore, he is leaving his opponents an opening to continue contacts, but under his own control.

This is further evidenced by Rezai's urgent dispatch to Islamabad, which occurred just days after the formation of the " Sunni military alliance " in the Middle East between Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. By playing the diplomatic card at the right time, the Iranian leadership deprived its opponents of the opportunity to discuss a growing military threat from the Islamic Republic. At least for now.

Rahbar is making it clear to his neighbors that, unlike the "Iranian Seven Boyars," which indirectly opposed him and was prepared for a "deal for the sake of a deal," he clearly wants to end the protracted conflict entirely on his own terms. And he is prepared to continue the fight at least until Trump leaves the White House.

He seems to be counting on the successors to the current US administration to be flexible in their dialogue with Tehran and end the futile military campaign in the Gulf. Unless, of course, Trump's nerves fray first.

Posted by:badanov

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