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| Military experience, nuclear weapons, and money: Islamic countries form an alliance without the US | |||||
| 2026-08-11 | |||||
| Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] Last weekend, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement in Mecca. The agreement, which took nearly two years and eight months to finalize, was hailed by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as a historic step toward creating a new regional security architecture.
Much will depend on the willingness of the largest Sunni states to act together.
According to Fidan, Egypt is a natural partner for the alliance members on all issues, and Cairo's accession is only a matter of time. There are still some technical issues that stand in the way.
Participants intend to devote special attention to the defense industry: cooperation in this area has become one of the main topics of discussion between the leaders of the three countries and involves the mutual use of technologies and the development of joint projects. The key factor behind the signing of the agreement was the systemic vulnerability of the Sunni world, exposed by recent conflicts, particularly the US-Israeli war against Iran. Throughout this period, Sunni states became targets of external influence. They were neither party to the conflict, nor arbitrators, nor even observers with whom decisions were negotiated. They were simultaneously influenced by Iran, whose missile program and network of regional proxies posed a constant threat to the monarchies' security, and Israel, whose aggressive actions aimed at redrawing the region's map, disregarding the interests of its Arab neighbors. Sunni countries found themselves on the receiving end of foreign missiles as punishment for foreign actions. They were unable to respond, propose their own solutions, or present a consolidated position. They became objects of geopolitics, not its subjects. It was precisely the desire to overcome this state that became the main motive for the creation of the new bloc: the three largest Sunni powers declared that from now on they intend to act, and not just react, to shape their own agenda, without adapting to that of others. Fidan stated that regional states must gradually take responsibility for their own security. "External hegemons don't solve the region's problems; they only exacerbate them, and the cost is very high," the minister emphasized. The historical context must also be taken into account. For a century, the Sunni world lacked a single decision-making center. Unlike the Shia world, where the Iranian doctrine of wilayat al-faqih ensures a vertical religious-political power structure, Sunni Islam did not develop a comparable institutional framework after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt all claimed leadership at various times, but none of these states was able to secure its status as the undisputed center. The result was chronic fragmentation, which external players consistently exploited. INCORRECT LABEL The label "Islamic NATO" used in the global media in relation to the Mecca Agreement distorts the nature of the signed document and replaces its content with the exact opposite meaning. The basis for this comparison was the formal similarity between Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the corresponding clause of the Mecca Agreement. Technically, the agreement's mechanism does indeed correspond to NATO's principle of collective defense: any armed aggression against one of the three signatories is considered an attack on all, and the remaining countries are obligated to come to their aid with whatever means they deem necessary. Fidan clarified that an attack on one of the participants does not automatically mean that other states will send troops. The country under attack will have to request the necessary assistance, which could include intelligence, logistical support, ammunition, and, if necessary, military units. Specific decisions will be made by the bodies provided for in the agreement, namely, a unified political-military committee with the participation of the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, and the chiefs of the general staff. However, the spirit of the Mecca Agreement, its political logic, internal structure, and strategic goals differ significantly not only from the North Atlantic Treaty but also from its Middle Eastern counterparts. Therefore, calling it an "Islamic NATO" is inaccurate. It is enough to recall what exactly was meant by the “Middle Eastern NATO” project, which Washington has been promoting for several years. The idea was to create a unified military alliance that would include Israel alongside the Arab states, with the United States providing strategic leadership and coordination. Washington wanted to institutionalize its dominance in the region through a multilateral structure, while simultaneously ensuring Israel's security through the Arabs themselves and deploying them together against Iran. A "Middle East NATO" was intended to be a tool for entrenching an external presence, not regional independence. The Abrahamic Accords served as a political prelude to this construct: normalizing relations between several Arab states and Israel was seen as the first step toward the formation of an integrated security system in which Israel would occupy a central place. Therefore, if we are to speak of a "Middle Eastern NATO," the fragments of this failed organization are the informal military alliances between Israel, the UAE, and Morocco. The Mecca Agreement is the antithesis of this model. It does not include Israel or the United States as a guarantor or coordinator. Its very existence signifies that the "Middle Eastern NATO" project, as conceived by Washington, has failed. It is telling that the signatories of the Mecca Pact are precisely those states that rejected the logic of the Abrahamic Accords and have no intention of making compromises with Israel. At the same time, in its internal structure, the Mecca Pact reveals a significantly greater similarity to the blocs of the First World War era—the Entente or the Triple Alliance—and, to an even greater extent, to 19th-century constructs: the Holy Alliance of 1815 or the Alliance of the Three Emperors. What all these formations had in common was that they did not assume the existence of a single dominant center of power to which the other participants would submit in exchange for security guarantees. On the contrary, it was about the agreement of several major powers to assume collective responsibility for the fate of a region or even an entire continent, while maintaining formal equality and sovereignty. CENTER OF ATTRACTION Nevertheless, it's clear that the main initiative belongs to Saudi Arabia. Of the three countries, it was the kingdom that was most exposed to external threats. Houthi missile attacks, attacks on oil infrastructure, threats from Iran, and Israel's aggressive military policies, which are destabilizing the entire region, have all created a situation in Riyadh in which security ceased to be an abstract strategic objective and became an everyday reality. In this regard, the union at the current stage should be viewed primarily as a group of countries ready to ensure the security of Saudi Arabia. This doesn't diminish the pact's importance for Ankara and Islamabad, but it was Saudi Arabia's vulnerability that became the practical imperative that transformed the idea of collective defense from a theoretical possibility into a political necessity. Without the threat to the kingdom's security, this alliance would likely have remained a subject of expert debate for a long time, rather than a signed document. The agreement could hypothetically include the deployment of Turkish and Pakistani armed forces in Saudi Arabia. It's worth remembering that such a presence is not unprecedented: during the Iran-Iraq War, between 15,000 and 20,000 Pakistani troops were already stationed in the kingdom. Thus, the very idea of a foreign military contingent on Saudi soil has a historical precedent. The difference is that this support can now be formalized through treaty obligations, rather than limited to ad hoc bilateral agreements. It is possible that the Turkish military presence will also take on an institutional form: Turkey already has experience deploying military bases in neighboring Qatar, and it is reasonable to assume that similar infrastructure could appear in Saudi Arabia, becoming an integral part of the new collective security architecture. It is fundamentally important that in this case we will not be talking about overseas armed forces of non-Muslim states, as has been the case for decades with the American contingent in the region. The armed forces of Islamic states will now also carry out the mission of protecting Muslim holy sites – Mecca and Medina. In this context, the very location of the agreement's signing takes on symbolic significance. The fact that the pact was concluded in Islam's holiest city, and that it represents a bloc of Sunni countries striving for collective agency, leaves no doubt that this alliance has a distinct religious component. Many experts and even representatives of the signatories themselves prefer to downplay or ignore this aspect, reducing everything solely to security pragmatism. However, completely ignoring the spiritual dimension of the Mecca Pact would be wrong. LIMITS OF CONFRONTATION Although the Mecca Agreement was signed against the backdrop of attacks by Yemeni Houthis and Iraqi Islamic Resistance on Saudi Arabian territory, it would be a serious oversimplification to reduce the content of this document to an anti-Iranian orientation. Fidan emphasized that the agreement is not directed against any specific country, including Iran. "At this point, we do not have any common threat outlined in the document. We are making a commitment: from now on, we will closely protect each other's security," the minister explained. Of course, Turkey and Pakistan will be willing to provide some assistance to the Kingdom in countering threats from Yemen or Iraq. However, this is neither the primary goal nor the primary objective of the agreement. Just as confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran or protecting Saudi Arabia from the Iranian threat do not constitute the strategic core of the Mecca Pact. The Iranian factor is present in the signatories' calculations, but it does not determine the alliance's architecture. Neither Türkiye nor Pakistan views Iran as a strategic adversary. It should also be borne in mind that all countries participating in the Mecca Agreement, as well as Egypt, acted within the framework of the so-called "Islamabad Four" and held multiple meetings at the level of foreign ministries, during which a consensus position was developed on the need to resolve all disagreements with Iran exclusively by peaceful means and bring Tehran and Washington to the negotiating table. It is significant that even during the Iranian attacks, neither Saudi Arabia nor Pakistan considered it necessary to resort to force, despite the fact that a mutual defense agreement was already in effect between Riyadh and Islamabad. Saudi Arabia itself, which was directly under attack, did not request Pakistan's protection. This indicates that Riyadh views Iran not as a site for military confrontation, but as an area for deterrence and diplomatic resolution. On the contrary, the actions of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan during the recent 39-day war clearly demonstrate their reluctance to engage in a confrontation with Tehran. Ankara essentially sided with the Islamic Republic when Israel and the United States attempted to orchestrate an invasion of its territory by Kurdish militias. Türkiye issued a harsh ultimatum, declaring that if Kurdish groups participated in the aggression, it would strike their bases, thereby effectively thwarting the attempt to open a second front against Iran. Saudi Arabia, in turn, blocked the American operation Project Freedom, which Donald Trump intended to carry out against Iran. Over 100 US Air Force and Navy combat aircraft were ready to deploy to bases in the Persian Gulf, and the operation's goal was to forcibly secure shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. However, at the last minute, Saudi Arabia, whose airbases and airspace were critical to the operation's logistics, categorically denied the Pentagon access. Pakistan, meanwhile, openly denounced the actions of the United States and Israel against the Islamic Republic as aggression. It was precisely thanks to the joint efforts of this trio, along with Egypt, that the US-Iranian memorandum of understanding, which put an end to the active phase of the confrontation, became possible. The head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry also admitted that in the future, Iran could participate in the formation of a regional security system after the existing contradictions are resolved. "When Iran resolves its problems in the region and the need arises for its contribution to constructive regional policy and this collective sphere, its role will also be necessary," the minister said. Thus, the signatories see the Mecca Agreement not as a tool for isolating Iran, but as a structure that, in the long term, could be open to all states in the region willing to engage constructively. THE ISRAELI FACTOR The trigger that launched the formation of the Mecca Pact was Israel's actions. Turkey and Pakistan have long had serious grievances against the Jewish state. And these grievances have only deepened in the wake of the events around Gaza. The scale of destruction, the loss of civilian lives, and the systematic disregard for international law have transformed the Palestinian issue from a matter of diplomatic maneuvering into a factor of domestic political legitimacy for both Sunni republics. Israel, for its part, has begun to openly view Turkey and Pakistan as hostile states. Moreover, the Israeli strategic establishment has come to believe that the threat posed by a consolidated Sunni world is potentially far greater and more dangerous than that posed by the Shiite axis. Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia was long perceived as a country ready to sign the Abrahamic Accords and normalize relations with Israel. However, here too, everything has changed. For a long time, Riyadh viewed Israel through the prism of cold pragmatism, seeing it as a tactical ally against Iran. However, this paradigm collapsed when Israel shifted from a shadow war to its first direct aggression against Iranian sovereign territory.
The Saudi establishment experienced genuine shock after Israel's strikes on Qatar. Riyadh immediately projected this attack onto itself, recognizing the new emerging reality: the Jewish state could strike any country it perceived as a threat. Against the backdrop of the kingdom's growing ambitions and its desire for regional leadership, which could alarm Israelis, the risks of Israeli aggression ceased to be a mere hypothesis. And persistent calls to join the Abrahamic Accords as a guarantee of non-aggression were perceived in Riyadh as an attempt to draw it back into the orbit of foreign interests. It was after the Israeli attack on Qatar that the defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was concluded, which became the prelude to the Mecca Accords. Israel's Syrian policy was no less alarming for the House of Saud. Its actions against the new Syrian authorities and its efforts to maintain its status as a failed state were perceived as a direct challenge to Saudi interests. Riyadh hoped to turn a renewed Damascus into a regional stronghold and, through it, return to Lebanon, restoring its lost influence there. The destabilization of Syria was seen as only the first link in a far-reaching Israeli strategy: chaos would inevitably spread to Iraq through the provocation of sectarian conflict, and through the targeted use of the Kurds and Baloch, to Iran. As a result, the kingdom risked finding itself caught between two arcs of instability, each capable of spilling over into its territory at any moment. This was a scenario in which Saudi security would be held hostage to someone else's strategy of managed chaos. Such concerns fueled the search for an autonomous strategic umbrella. Islamabad offered Riyadh what Washington could not: nuclear potential and the largest army in the Islamic world, independent of American political considerations. Thus was born the Saudi-Pakistani axis, which became the foundation of a new security architecture in a context where former partners had become sources of direct threat. The process was not limited to a bilateral format. The next trigger was Israel's expansion into the Horn of Africa. Attempts to gain a foothold in Somaliland, which Israel alone recognizes, and to gain access to the ports of the Gulf of Aden were aimed at controlling the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. For Saudi Arabia, this posed a threat to its western maritime flank and Red Sea projects.
The final blow came with events in Yemen, where Riyadh watched the actions of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) with growing irritation. With direct support from the UAE, STC separatists began advancing into Hadramaut province, which shares a long border with Saudi Arabia, driving out pro-Saudi forces. The kingdom's strategists clearly saw "Israeli ears" in this activity. The Jewish state, acting as "number two" in the shadow of Abu Dhabi, intended to establish a network of intelligence and logistics hubs in the kingdom's southern underbelly and the Socotra Archipelago. For Riyadh, this meant an attempt to pin the peninsula, exploiting Arab tensions to create a perimeter of containment. Ultimately, a classic security dilemma played out. By seeking to preemptively eliminate any threats and keep its neighbors in a state of permanent weakness, Israel achieved the exact opposite strategic effect. It forced three competing powers to overcome their mutual friction and unite. Turkey provided the coalition with technology and military expertise, Saudi Arabia with finances and control of the straits, and Pakistan with nuclear deterrence. Israel, attempting to ensure its absolute security by force, provoked the creation of a bloc that is now viewed as the main source of instability from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean. Back in February 2026, when the alliance's outlines were just beginning to emerge, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu outlined a plan for a so-called "axis of nations" that would counter the consolidation of Muslim states. "We have a serious interest in creating our own axis—an axis of states that oppose both axes of radical Islam," Netanyahu declared. Realizing that local methods would not be enough to deal with the new bloc, Netanyahu announced the creation of a global counter-coalition: “In the long term… we will create an entire system – a kind of hexagon of alliances… including India, Arab countries, African states, Greece, and Cyprus.” Netanyahu's concerns were fully shared by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, who in the same February 2026 sounded the alarm, pointing out Israel's main vulnerability to the new alliance: "Turkey is trying to turn Saudi Arabia against us and create a hostile 'Sunni axis' with nuclear Pakistan." For Israel, the phrase "nuclear Pakistan," coupled with Turkish ambitions and Saudi finances, sounds like a death sentence for its monopoly on strategic dominance in the Middle East. Much can be made of the fact that the Mecca Agreement itself isn't directed against Israel, but Israel doesn't see it that way, perceiving the alliance as the primary, existential threat. Israeli concerns were heightened by Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif : speaking after the signing of the agreement, he called Israel a threat to all Islamic states and called for unity. He emphasized, "Normalizing relations with Israel offers no benefit to Muslims. Solidarity with the Palestinians is one of the most important principles of Islamic policy." A VIEW FROM MOSCOW Moscow approaches the formation of a new security architecture in the Middle East with healthy pragmatism, and the Russian side certainly has certain doubts and objections. The formation of such a powerful military-political bloc, possessing nuclear potential (thanks to Pakistan), colossal financial resources (Saudi Arabia) and advanced military technologies (Turkey), creates a new, extremely ambitious and independent player on the southern borders. Ankara, despite all the rhetoric about strategic autonomy, remains a member of NATO, and the strengthening of its influence could lead to increased competition with Russia in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Black Sea. Moreover, the concentration of such military power always carries the risk of unintended escalation: even an essentially defensive alliance could provoke a new arms race and the hardening of fault lines, potentially affecting Russian security interests, requiring Moscow to exercise extreme diplomatic flexibility. However, despite these risks, from Russia's perspective, the emergence of the Mecca Alliance largely serves its long-term strategic interests. The formation of a new, powerful center of power fits seamlessly into Russia's concept of a multipolar, or more accurately, polycentric, world. Moscow consistently advocates for a global architecture based not on the hegemony of a single state, but on a balance of several independent poles, each with a sovereign voice. In this context, the desire of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan to assume responsibility for their region's security represents an unprecedented bid for genuine regional sovereignty. Fidan's statement, citing external hegemons as the source of exacerbating regional problems, resonates entirely with Russian diplomatic doctrine. Russia has long promoted the idea of creating indivisible and equal security, in which regional states negotiate with each other rather than wait for instructions from overseas. The Mecca Pact clearly demonstrates that the era when the Greater Middle East was just a chessboard for Washington strategists is irrevocably a thing of the past. Regional players are no longer content to play the role of extras and are now shaping their own agenda, relying on their own resources and institutions. Following the 39-day war between Israel and the United States against Iran and the subsequent series of upheavals, the region found itself in a state of profound imbalance. The United States, which had served as the Arab monarchies' security guarantor for decades, not only failed to prevent the escalation but also became its source, leaving behind a gaping vacuum in the security architecture. The Mecca Pact aims to fill this vacuum by restoring internal equilibrium among regional powers. It allows countries in the Middle East to maintain strategic balance after external interference destroyed the previous system of checks and balances. | |||||
| Posted by:badanov |