by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] Turkey moved confidently into Syria after the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, and then its attention shifted further south and east – towards Lebanon and Iraq.
The recent visit of the prime ministers of these countries to Ankara, the agreements on the participation of the Turkish company TPAO in the development of oil in Iraq's Kirkuk and the "Roads of Development" confirm Recep Tayyip Erdogan's intentions to restore influence in the former vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.
By seeking to weaken Iran, Türkiye is at the same time, paradoxically, creating new points of conflict with Israel.
TURKISH BREAKTHROUGH INTO IRAQ
Turkey's increased involvement in Iraq began in March 2023, when then-Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani arrived in Ankara. A year later, a Turkish leader visited Baghdad for the first time in 12 years.
The main outcome of these meetings was the "Road to Development" project. Iraq, with its Shiite majority, became an Iranian domain after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the failed American occupation.
Interestingly, both visits took place before Assad's overthrow in Syria.
However, given the growing pressure from Israel and the US on Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran itself in these years, Turkey's dominance in the Middle East has become increasingly difficult. Assad's fall is not the cause of Ankara's rise or Tehran's weakening, but rather a result.
At the end of July, ErdoÄŸan continued to expand his influence in Iraq. A meeting with the new Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, was held at the BeÅŸtepe Palace. Five agreements were signed, including a document on the "Road to Development." This is a transport corridor from the port of Greater Faw in the Persian Gulf through Iraq to the Turkish border, with further access to Europe.
The cost of creating a 1,200-kilometer logistics route (including roads, railways, and port infrastructure upgrades) is estimated at $17 billion. The project also involves Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, and Syria—Arab countries where Iran has limited leverage.
For Tehran, the "Development Road" means losing exclusive control over transit flows from the Persian Gulf. While the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian ports were previously the only outlet for energy and cargo from the region, an alternative route has now emerged, completely controlled by Turkey and its allies.
Iran observed the process silently and did not publicly torpedo Turkish initiatives, but nevertheless attempted to slow them down.
At a meeting between Turkish and Iraqi leaders in Ankara, Iraqi Transport Minister Wahb Al-Hasani refused to sign the "Road to Development" document. Only after a direct order from the Prime Minister did he finally sign the agreement.
Several regional media outlets attributed the delay to Iranian influence. Al-Hasani is a member of the Shiite Badr Organization in Iraq, which is affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The minister quickly denied accusations of working for Iran, citing "technical and protocol glitches." However, such glitches are extremely rare at such a high level. Erdogan was forced to summon his Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, to find out what was going on. The awkward pause lasted several minutes.
Turkish columnist Mehmet Koçak, writing in Yeni Akit, notes: "Iran fears that the Development Road project, as well as the Zangezur Corridor, seen as a gateway to the Turkic world, could negatively impact its geopolitical and economic interests." He also noted that this was the first time President Erdoğan had personally noted that any of the documents scheduled for signing were missing.
OIL COMEBACK
In parallel with its transportation projects, Türkiye made a historic breakthrough in the energy sector by reaching an agreement with Iraq to supply more than 750,000 barrels of oil per day via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.
As Sabah newspaper columnist Erhan Afencu writes, "Turkey lost the battle for Mosul and Kirkuk 100 years ago, in 1926, and received only a share of Mosul's oil for 25 years. Payments for this share ended in 1955. Last week, TPAO acquired 15% of BP Energy Company's shares in Kirkuk Limited. This agreement made Turkey a partner with BP in the Kirkuk fields."
This isn't just a commercial deal, but Turkey's return to a region it considered its own a century ago. TPAO became a partner in a consortium including BP (43%) and ConocoPhillips (42%), gaining access to fields with estimated reserves of approximately 3 billion barrels of oil equivalent.
The war in Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, while strengthening Tehran's position in relations with the US and Sunni monarchies, simultaneously increased Turkey's role as a transit country. Together with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria, Turkey is reviving the Hejaz Railway, which will connect Istanbul with the Persian Gulf.
There is talk of a Qatar-Europe gas pipeline project through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. And since April, Iraq has been shipping fuel by truck to the Syrian port of Baniyas, and from there by tanker to the EU.
LEBANESE VECTOR
In parallel with its Iraqi efforts, Ankara is actively working with Lebanon. At the end of July, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun arrived in the Turkish capital. This signaled Beirut's willingness to reduce the influence of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and France in its territory. Turkey promised financial and military assistance for the reconstruction of southern Lebanon, as well as support for dialogue with the new Syrian leadership.
Academician Tuba Yildiz, writing for Fokus+, notes: "Lebanon has realized that it can obtain the necessary foreign policy support thanks to Turkey's diplomatic and political strength, especially given Washington's contradictory position." Although Donald Trump is attempting to reconcile Hezbollah with Israel, the ceasefire is constantly violated.
| As Israel also keeps pointing out. |
| That last is backward - it’s Turkey — specifically President Erdogan — that is hostile to Israel. |
Influence in Syria allows Ankara to open a natural corridor to Lebanon and work directly with Beirut. Closer ties with Lebanon will strengthen Turkey's position in the Mediterranean, where it already has a 1,500-kilometer coastal zone and a presence in Cyprus, Syria, and Libya.
Yıldız writes: "Turkey views Lebanon not as an extension of its Syrian policy, but as an independent component of a regional strategy with its own internal dynamics—as part of the fight against Israel and strengthening its position in the Eastern Mediterranean." In this context, the recent attempt to enshrine the expansive geopolitical concept of the "Blue Homeland" into law is highly symptomatic.
In Lebanon—as in Libya and Syria—Turkey appears to be unwilling to limit itself to economic and soft power. Ankara may send troops to guarantee the republic's security from Israeli attacks and incursions.
| That could prove amusing — what has Turkey’s army done beyond march in parades and bully the Kurds of Iraq and Syria? |
| Golly — why do you suppose they objected? |
| Sure — for a little while longer. |
Turkey's growing influence in Iran's traditional spheres of influence undoubtedly irritates Tehran. However, Tehran remains pragmatic and is reluctant to openly clash with Ankara at the official level. After all, their interests often coincide. The countries are important trading partners.
On security issues, Iran and Turkey can both compete, as they did in Syria, and present a united front. For example, when the US attempted to mobilize Iranian Kurds against the ayatollahs during its attack, Ankara threatened to launch military action against the separatists.
In any case, by gaining a tactical advantage in Iraq and Lebanon, Turkey is not achieving hegemony. Firstly, Iran, due to religious factors, will still retain its potential both in Iraq and in other countries with large Shiite populations. Secondly, Turkey's strengthening in Lebanon will exacerbate tensions with Israel, which will both divert resources and undermine good relations with the United States.
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