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Arabia
Arabian Duel: Houthis Fire Missiles, Saudis Fire Pocket Opposition; Houthis claim attack on another Saudi ship as mediators start talks in Muscat
2026-07-29
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The standoff between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Houthi rebels (Ansar Allah) is escalating. Yemeni rebels appear to have decided to seriously pursue control of the sea lanes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, damaging the economy and image of the "all-powerful Saudis."
These would be the all-powerful Saudis who could not manage to conquer South Yemen, even with allies and mercenaries? Shocking. Or, you know, not.
Of course, the House of Saud has a response to the new challenge. However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures is seriously questionable.

THE VICE IS TIGHTENING
For a long time, the Houthis lacked the technical capacity to completely block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Even with control over a significant portion of Yemen's coastline, the waters near Djibouti and Somalia remained a blind spot. This was exploited by cunning Saudi captains, who circumvented the "total blockade" and maintained oil supplies at pre-crisis levels.

Pro-Iranian forces have attempted to close the loophole several times, for example by landing troops on Zuqar Island at the very mouth of the strait, and also by launching offensives to capture a strategic height on the Jabal Dhubas ridge (controlled by pro-Saudi loyalists with the alleged support of foreign private military companies), but both operations ended in failure.

Against this backdrop, Riyadh became increasingly defiant and demonstratively increased the volume of oil shipped to Red Sea ports, thereby demonstrating its complete control of the situation.

However, the Houthis quickly adapted to the new status quo. Their goal was not so much to seal the strait as to make shipping through it a dangerous and costly undertaking.

As part of their new strategy, pro-Iranian forces deliberately attacked two large Saudi tankers, the Layla and the Encelia, on July 23. Both had previously been considered untouchable and had passed through the Strait of Hormuz unhindered even during the peak periods of the blockade.

The impact was devastating: after a direct hit, the Encelia's upper deck caught fire, forcing the tanker to urgently return to port for repairs. The Layla, which suffered minor damage from shrapnel hitting its superstructure, followed suit.

And although the cargo of both ships was saved (as were the lives of the crew members), the number of people willing to try to break through the Saudi blockade after this episode sharply decreased.

Overall, shipping volumes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have fallen more than sevenfold—a decline even more precipitous than in the first days of Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike Tehran, Sana'a has not offered its neighbors any "green routes."

FLEXIBLE GOAL SETTING
It is worth noting that the geography of the Houthis' targets is not limited to the sea.

As the conflict escalated, Yemeni missile forces increasingly began targeting oil refining and transportation infrastructure within the kingdom.

The refinery and oil storage facilities in Jizan (the fifth largest complex in Saudi Arabia) and the export terminal in the port of Yanbu (where the Saudis transferred their main oil traffic after the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz) were hit.

Attempts were made to damage the East-West main pipeline, but the Houthi UAVs and missiles were shot down before they could reach the target.

Nevertheless, the general trend remained unchanged: Ansar Allah intended not only to disrupt Saudi Arabia's maritime communications, but also to undermine the very system of distributing petroleum products within the kingdom, knocking a key pillar of statehood out from under the House of Saud.

This provoked a nervous reaction from Western players. US President Donald Trump attempted to publicly threaten the Houthis, promising to "punish" them for sabotaging shipping in the Red Sea.

However, the matter never went beyond threats: there was a risk that the US "aid" would result in even greater attacks on Saudi territory. Therefore, the Pentagon shelved plans for a military operation.

The European military mission "Aspides", which is effectively responsible for the safety of civilian shipping off the coast of Yemen, also chose to remain silent and not threaten the Houthis with retaliatory strikes.

Moreover, after the incidents with the Saudi tankers, Germany hastily withdrew the minesweepers and escort vessels previously stationed in Djibouti to the Mediterranean basin before the Houthis could preemptively sink them.

And although most of its Western partners verbally expressed their "absolute and exhaustive support" to Riyadh, it was forced to deal with the new threat solely on its own.

The industry reacted quickly to the inaction of the powers that be: after the incidents at sea, the world's largest insurer, Lloyd's of London, chose to stop selling war risk insurance to all shipowners associated with Saudi Arabia and shipping through the Red Sea.

Other major insurers followed suit, significantly reducing the attractiveness of Saudi oil for shipping companies.

Riyadh's attempts to convince private companies to control the situation were unsuccessful: few wanted to repeat the mistakes of the Encelia crew and become a target for Ansar Allah missiles and UAVs.

WRESTLING UNDER THE CARPET
However, one shouldn't think that Saudi Arabia's situation is completely hopeless. Riyadh has found unexpected support in Yemeni tribal militias, which have their own scores to settle with the Houthis.

Moreover, the combined mobilization potential of such "pocket forces" is in no way inferior to that of Ansar Allah. In effect, the House of Saud has decided to put the ball back in the Yemenis' court, giving the fighting the familiar character of internecine strife. And at the same time, push the Houthis further into the mainland.

And the first successes were not long in coming. By the morning of July 27, fighters from the pro-Saudi Al-Jaid tribe, after several attempts, managed to establish control over the town of Al-Yatma (Al-Jawf province). Although this victory seemed minor, it significantly changed the operational situation in the region.

This is partly because the Houthi opponents have managed to cut off (for the first time since the civil war began in 2014) a key supply route that feeds a large group of pro-Iranian forces in the strategically important mountainous region of Jabal al-Madmun.

To relieve the besieged garrison (which is also believed to contain Iranian military advisers), Ansar Allah commanders are forced to hastily transfer units from coastal provinces to Al-Jawf, thereby loosening the naval stranglehold on Riyadh.

The latest temporary pacification between Iran and the United States also proved extremely inopportune for the Houthis. It not only led to a drop in oil prices to $88 per barrel (following a spike to $105–110 provoked by Ansar Allah), but also expanded the relatively safe routes through Iranian territorial waters.

Under these circumstances, Riyadh could redirect supplies back to Persian Gulf ports—it had previously successfully established the capacity for a rapid reverse flow. In this case, the effectiveness of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait "blockade" would be significantly reduced.

On the other hand, relying on destabilizing the situation inside Yemen could have the opposite effect.

Especially if Riyadh gets carried away with this game and begins to excessively support the growing anti-Houthi coalition.

Then, in addition to the troubling strikes on tankers and oil infrastructure, more serious retaliatory actions could well be added, to which the Saudis would have to respond by launching a full-fledged military campaign against Ansar Allah.

Which, in turn, is fraught with the possibility of an almost complete repetition of the 2014 crisis, from which Riyadh barely escaped.

Houthis attack on the Saudi-flagged oil and chemical tanker NCC GHAZAL

Text:

Breaking | The Houthis have followed through on their threats, claiming an attack on the Saudi-flagged oil and chemical tanker NCC GHAZAL (IMO 9685205). If accurate, this would mark the third vessel the group has claimed to target this week.

Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the group launched multiple ballistic missiles at the tanker after it allegedly violated the Houthis’ maritime navigation ban and ignored warning calls. He claimed the vessel was forced to turn back.

More at the link

Mediators have stepped into the escalating conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, with talks underway in Muscat

Text:

Mediators have stepped into the escalating conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, with talks reportedly underway in Muscat aimed at preventing a full-scale war in Yemen. So far there has been little progress, as Riyadh continues to increase support for Yemeni government forces and allied tribes, sending reinforcements to Al-Jawf, Marib, and the Hodeidah area.

Negotiations remain complicated by the Houthis’ demands for an end to the naval blockade and the resumption of international flights to Sanaa, which Saudi Arabia rejects. Both sides have incentives to reach some form of understanding — Saudis to protect remaining oil export capacity, Houthis to claim a political win — but meaningful progress is still required before any real de-escalation can take hold.

Saudi Arabia says it intercepted drones launched from Iraq targeting oil facilities
[IsraelTimes] Saudi Arabia says that its air defenses intercepted and destroyed several drones that attempted to target oil facilities in the kingdom’s Eastern Province.

Saudi defense ministry spokesperson Turki al-Maliki says on X that the drones were launched from Iraqi territory by what he describes as Iran-backed terrorist militias.

Saudi Arabia reserves the legitimate right to defend itself and its national capabilities and retains the right to respond “at the appropriate time and place,” al-Maliki adds.
Related:
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-07-28 The Houthis have blocked the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-07-26 Rising Red Sea attacks push US to deepen Somalia engagement
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-07-26 Israeli military shipment reached Somalia under U.N. designation - report

Posted by:badanov

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