by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] Turkish politics hasn't seen such a demonstrative political rift in a long time. Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and 90 other MPs left the party to form the New Party (YENİ Parti).
Formally, it all began with an appeals court ruling in May that invalidated the 2023 RPP congress, where Özel replaced Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as chairman. The court cited the "absolute nullity" of the proceedings, annulled the results, and reinstated the unpopular party veteran.
For Ösel's supporters, this verdict was the point of no return. Removed from his post as chairman but retaining his position as head of the parliamentary group, he spoke openly of a "forced and long-overdue sad farewell" and took to the podium with the phrase: "Every end is a beginning."
Compromising and accepting the leadership of the reinstated leader, who was essentially appointed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through the judges, would have meant capitulating to the authorities. Özel preferred a split in the party to its external control.
Although the opposition's grip on parliament has weakened, the newly formed party is ahead of the CHP. The New Party has 91 seats. The Republicans have lost ground from 135 seats to 44, falling behind even the pro-Kurdish DEM party, which has 56 seats. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) holds 277 of the 600 seats.
The new party's main goal, according to Özel, is to become the most important opposition force in the Grand National Assembly. His closest ally, Ankara MP Murat Emir, is even more blunt: "We are leaving behind the occupied party." For the CHP's old guard, this is a blow to its influence and prestige.
The reasons for the split go far beyond a single court decision. Özel assumed leadership of the CHP in 2023, replacing his 77-year-old predecessor, whose 13-year leadership was widely described as an ineffective challenge to Erdoğan.
Just a year later, Özel proved his effectiveness, securing the AKP's first-ever defeat in municipal elections. The politician became the face and symbol of the opposition to Erdoğan, especially in 2025, when the most popular opposition figure, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested. He is currently in prison, with combined sentences amounting to thousands of years.
The government's actions following İmamoğlu's arrest looked like an attempt to wipe out the opposition. Erdoğan's men attempted to impose external control over the CHP's Istanbul branch, though unsuccessfully. Then came the declaring of Özel's election as party leader illegal. Dozens of mayors and party officials were arrested on charges of corruption and ties to terrorism.
For part of society, Özel's departure is perceived not as a betrayal, but as an attempt to give new life to an opposition suffocated by legal battles and internal political contradictions.
This is precisely the perspective of the opposition liberal newspaper Sözcü. Rahmi Turan's column is headlined: "The People Seek Hope in the New Party." The publication sees Özel's project as a chance to reshape the opposition, moving beyond tired faces and procedures. The popular demand for change, according to the author's logic, is no longer satisfied by the historical legitimacy of the CHP alone—new energy and a new organizational model are needed.
Pro-government newspaper Akşamcriticizes Ozel for trying to build yet another centrist structure without clear ideological contours, comparing his plan with Macronism, Biden's course, and the failed "pillar of six" (an alliance of parties for the 2023 Turkish parliamentary elections).
"Ideological diversity alone does not guarantee a common political identity," the publication notes, effectively warning that the anti-Erdoğan coalition format without a clear ideological core has already proven its inadequacy in 2023.
The popular publication Hürriyet draws attention to the moral and political side of the issue: for some Kemalists, leaving the “century-old party” is almost a family taboo and a betrayal.
But author Ahmet Hakan, arguing, writes: "A party membership is not hereditary... You can have boundless respect for your father and still not follow in his footsteps." For him, Özel's departure is part of a modernization of political consciousness, a rejection of "tribal thinking," where party affiliation is determined by tradition rather than rational choice.
At the other extreme, in the same Hürriyet, the well-known columnist Abdulkadir Selvi actually accuses Özel of using the resources of the RPP to prepare a split.
He describes in detail how the opposition leader, losing lawsuits against Erdoğan for insults, spent years paying compensation not from his personal pocket, but from the party treasury. Moreover, according to him, just before leaving, he secured accelerated payments for three major court decisions totaling approximately 747,000 lira. For a conservative audience, this seems like a bill for his own legal losses.
For the New Party, gaining recognition, media attention, and parliamentary status is now far more important. Özel needs to demonstrate that his bloc is more popular and can win over the entire opposition in the future, representing them in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Özel and his team expect up to a million CHP members to join the movement. However, several influential mayors, including Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, have chosen to remain in the old party. This means that the struggle for the Kemalist camp's electoral legacy is only just beginning.
The CHP found itself in an extremely vulnerable position. It had effectively lost its leader and a significant portion of its faction. Kılıçdaroğlu returned to his seat, but was unable to regain public trust: after years of battling Erdoğan, he had failed to translate his electoral potential into victory.
Now, he's also being portrayed as someone who regained power through the courts (or even through collusion with Erdoğan), rather than through a congress. For some of the Kemalist core, preserving the historic party at any cost will be crucial, but the CHP will likely lose a broad base of voters, as it was unable to elect its leadership without the involvement of the authorities and the courts.
Clearly, the main beneficiary of the opposition's split is the ruling AKP. The CHP's shrinking mandates and support base, the New Party's lag and its squabbles with the Republicans, coupled with frustration among opposition supporters, all make it easier for Erdoğan to retain power. The Kemalists will certainly lose ground in potential snap elections.
Scheduled parliamentary elections are scheduled in two years, and no one is rushing to call snap elections yet. Meanwhile, a multipolar opposition architecture is emerging on the horizon. The Democratic People's Republic (DEM) is strengthening its position as a third force, with a stable Kurdish electorate and its own strategy for surviving the threat of possible bans.
Nationalist and Islamist parties—from the MHP to smaller conservative projects—will try to lure away supporters disillusioned with the RPP. The new party is becoming an experimental field: whether it can unite disillusioned Kemalists, part of the urban middle class, and those who see no place in either the old party or traditional conservative structures remains to be seen.
In any case, the Turkish opposition has entered a new phase of its development. The CHP has lost its monopoly as the sole Kemalist force, and Erdoğan, having achieved a split in his main adversary, simultaneously opened the field to new, less predictable players.
The Turkish political system, accustomed to the AKP versus CHP model, will now face a fragmented opposition. And whoever best navigates this new landscape will determine not only the outcome of the upcoming elections but also the future of Turkish politics and democracy itself.
Geopolitically, the split of the RPP and the emergence of the New Party are also important for external players. Despite the embrace of Erdoğan and the lure of Turkey into new European security arrangements, Europe will, deep down, sympathize with both the New Party and the RPP.
After all, the destruction of the opposition weakens democracy and centralizes power, diminishing the EU's ability to influence Turkey's domestic politics and its intransigent leader. Donald Trump, who shed no tears over İmamoğlu's arrest and considers Erdoğan an important partner, won't be concerned about a split within the Kemalists.
As for Russia, we still have to deal with the current leadership until the new elections. Relations with Ankara are strategically important in the economic and energy sectors.
At the same time, Erdoğan periodically makes it clear that Turkey is far from being an ideal neutral country and negotiating platform. From August to November, a squadron of Turkish F-16s and approximately 70 military personnel will be stationed in Estonia. At the last NATO summit in Ankara, Erdoğan promised arms supplies to Ukraine, and the Turks intend to resell the S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems purchased from Russia to the UAE.
In any case, internal squabbles between the authorities and the RPP, as well as between the RPP and the New Party, are unlikely to affect Russian-Turkish relations in the next couple of years.