by Ilya Maximov
[REGNUM] Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Taras Vysotskyi officially acknowledged a complete halt to shipping in Ukraine's Black Sea ports. Just the day before, four or five ships were calling—not many, but traffic continued. However, due to the increased intensity of Russian strikes, the situation has changed.
"As of today, vessel visits have been suspended. This is the shipowners' decision—the state, for its part, has not imposed any restrictions," Vysotsky stated, effectively acknowledging the Kyiv regime's impotence in this matter.
It was previously reported that Maersk, the world's largest container shipping operator, announced a temporary suspension of operations in Ukraine. The company's statement tactfully stated that due to the current situation affecting its operations, it is unable to continue providing services through the Black Sea port and is temporarily suspending services until further notice.
Simply put, entering Ukrainian ports has become too dangerous. And no one knows when this will end.
The Medkon Mira, a vessel carrying imported cargo scheduled to unload in Chornomorsk (Illichivsk), was diverted to Constanta, Romania, along with all other shipments destined for that port. This is the second major operator to cease operations in Chornomorsk in a month; the first was Ukraine's Kernel Holding.
Ukraine, which before the war accounted for about 10% of the world's wheat exports, 15% of its corn, and 10–15% of all world grain exports—with about 90% of these volumes passing through three Odessa ports: Odessa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny—has now lost about a third of its export capacity.
Even before the shipping halt, monthly grain shipments through Black Sea ports had fallen from approximately 6 million tons to 4 million. Meanwhile, grain remains Ukraine's largest source of foreign exchange earnings.
Just recently, Minister Vysotsky boasted of growing foreign exchange earnings from agricultural exports. But now, previously published data is working against him—it 's estimated that, on average, Ukraine's monthly income from agricultural exports over the past year amounted to approximately $2 billion.
Accordingly, each month of port downtime will cost the country this amount. It's important to keep in mind that these are only rough estimates. Firstly, it's difficult to trust Ukrainian data. It's possible, and given the level of corruption in Ukraine, it's even quite likely, that both revenues and losses are actually even higher. Furthermore, the above figures are averages, and export volumes increase during the harvest season.
Just a week ago, four of the thirteen major grain terminals at the ports suspended grain purchases. The number of grain railcars heading to Odesa ports fell by 11% in the week from July 2 to 8 alone.
“Essentially, our deep-sea exports have stopped today,” said Bohdan Kostetsky, former commercial director of the State Food and Grain Corporation of Ukraine.
Suppliers who chose Danube ports as an alternative route also faced serious problems. Freight rates on the Danube doubled due to increased shelling of Ukrainian ports and historically low river levels amid abnormal heat and drought in Europe. The cost of barging cargo from the Ukrainian Danube ports of Reni and Izmail to Constanta, Romania, has doubled since the beginning of July.
Critically low water levels have limited the normal loading of barges, which are losing between 30% and 60% of their carrying capacity. Meanwhile, due to the increased risk of attacks, the number of available vessels is limited.
In previous years, Ukrainian officials and their European allies have repeatedly mockingly claimed that Russia has no maritime capabilities and would be unable to stop Ukrainian shipping. The Ukrainians boasted, claiming they had secured their own freedom of navigation by pressuring the Russian fleet.
However, current events have shown that Russia's behavior was dictated not by weakness, but by deliberate restraint.
For a long time, Russia allowed Ukraine and its partners to continue trading, so as not to disrupt global supply chains, which had already been damaged in recent years, and to avoid provoking a food crisis. This was a responsible stance, based on an understanding of the needs of third countries not involved in the conflict but dependent on its food supplies.
Unfortunately, the enemy has become accustomed to perceiving any restraint as weakness, something it has paid for many times before. However, not everyone learns from their mistakes. Therefore, sea routes continued to be actively used not only for trade, but also for the supply of weapons and ammunition, for the launching of unmanned boats, and for other sabotage operations.
Russia didn't even have to declare a blockade—regular strikes on ships, warehouses, berths, power supply facilities, and other port infrastructure quickly did the trick. Moreover, the Russian side has repeatedly emphasized that the attacks are aimed at facilities storing cargo and fuel for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as the vessels transporting them.
In parallel with the seizure of ports, systematic strikes are being carried out against Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprises responsible for the production of long-range precision weapons and their components—Neptune and Flamingo missiles, as well as various attack unmanned aerial vehicles.
At the same time, Ukraine's fuel infrastructure is being systematically destroyed. The main oil depots were destroyed long ago, and now hundreds of gas stations across the country have come under attack. As of July 10, 200 gas stations had already been hit, and the attacks have continued since then. Moreover, attacks are being launched not only on the gas stations themselves, but also on fuel tankers, whose drivers are already refusing to work, demanding extra compensation for the risk.
Russian forces are also targeting railway rolling stock. More than 200 diesel locomotives transporting weapons for the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Poland and Romania have been hit. Major transport hubs used for the transshipment of military cargo have also come under attack.
What we're witnessing today resembles a new phase of the conflict, one the adversary has long been warned about, urging them to come to their senses and negotiate before it's too late. But they have failed to gain any semblance of understanding. Russia has repeatedly proposed negotiating options—and each time has been rebuffed, with hysteria and threats in response.
Now Ukraine is gradually losing everything: its economy, weapons, fuel, logistics.
If this campaign continues with the same intensity, the Ukrainian Armed Forces risk becoming disorganized groups incapable of rapid maneuvers and redeployment.
All the threats Ukraine voiced against Moscow have become relevant for itself. And each subsequent offer will always be worse for the adversary than the last. Ukraine has rejected several generous offers over the years. Now it's time to admit that it has no real countermeasures to the Russian military strikes, while Russia, judging by recent events, still has aces up its sleeve.
However, so far, all that's been heard in response is the usual cries. Acting Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha has reacted to the events with the hypocrisy characteristic of the Kyiv regime.
Its main thesis is couched in the dramatic vein typical of Ukrainian politicians: if Russian strikes do not cease, then “millions of families in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America could face rising prices and hunger.”
It is noteworthy that in its campaign to draw attention to “starving Africa,” Kyiv forgets to mention that Ukraine, despite its loud statements about protecting global food security, has in fact repeatedly undermined the stability of global grain markets.
In 2022, at the very outset of the conflict, Kyiv unilaterally imposed a ban on the export of wheat and other key crops, which immediately collapsed supply forecasts and triggered a sharp rise in food prices in many countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. Even though their grain exports were not being impacted at the time.
Then, after the conclusion of the Black Sea grain deal that same year, which gave hope for a recovery in exports, it was Kyiv’s actions that led to the breakdown of the agreements.
Thus, when Sybiga speaks today about famine in Africa, he somehow forgets that it was Kyiv's decisions that jeopardized the very supplies that Ukraine is now so concerned about. The regime continued to use sea routes to escalate tensions, and in doing so, by attempting to harm Russia, it shot itself in the foot.
For a long time, Ukrainians treated the threat of a de facto naval blockade with outright disdain, sometimes even posing nude on the beach with burning ships in the background. Whenever talk of strikes on Russian ports and ships arose, Kyiv propaganda rejoiced and reveled in dreams of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denying Russia access to the Black Sea.
And when analysts warned that Ukraine itself risked losing access to the Black Sea due to Russian strikes, these voices were drowned out by a belief in their own impunity.
However, now that massive strikes on Black Sea ports have become a reality and shipping has come to a complete halt, self-confidence is being replaced by panic, accompanied by the bewilderment that is so common in modern Ukraine: "What are we doing here for?"
Peace remains the only sensible way out of the situation. And in this matter, the ball has long been in Ukraine's court. But the longer the conflict continues, the more difficult the conditions become, and the less room for maneuver Kyiv has.
Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to negotiate. Ukraine now faces a difficult choice: continue to lose everything, or finally acknowledge reality and sit down at the negotiating table while there's still a chance to salvage anything.