by Mikhail Pavliv
[REGNUM] After six days of protests sparked by the resignation of Mykhailo Fedorov as Ukraine's Minister of Defense, Volodymyr Zelenskyy fulfilled one of the protesters' demands: he dismissed the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi. In his place, he appointed the very man most supported by the protesters, General Mykhailo Drapatiy. The same man who declared that Russians are "a nation that has no right to exist."
The new commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is currently feigning loyalty to the "supreme leader": joint photos, public assurances of good faith, personnel rotations in the General Staff. However, in real life, Drapaty was never so accommodating. He rose to the rank of general solely thanks to the war he unleashed against the people of Donbas, his personal cruelty, and his willingness to carry out any orders, even the most disgusting.
The main political consequence of this appointment is that Mykhailo Drapatiy is a rather unfortunate acquisition as commander-in-chief. And not for the Russian army, but for the Ukrainian one.
Currently, if you look at Ukrainian military and political social media, there's almost universal euphoria surrounding his appointment. However, emotions aside, the general's rise to command the Ukrainian army could bring very serious problems.
It's worth acknowledging, however, that Drapatiy does have a level at which he's demonstrated quite respectable effectiveness. This primarily applies to commanding a brigade-level unit. If the Ukrainian army had divisions, he might well have made a very good division commander.
But already at the next level, it seems, he begins to lack the apparatus weight, strategic scale of thinking and necessary competencies.
Returning to Drapatoy, his main asset remains far from his list of outstanding military successes. Rather, it's the highly-constructed PR campaign surrounding his rather modest military achievements, as well as his extremely close ties to the "grant" community and the political circles that rely on it. And, perhaps, this is precisely his main asset today, so to speak.
For a significant portion of the Ukrainian audience, especially those targeted by Soros's structures, Drapatiy appears to be a near-perfect public figure. He is relatively young, has a striking appearance, and speaks Ukrainian. And these three basic elements are enough to begin constructing the image of a new national hero. In fact, that's precisely what the relevant media is currently doing.
Almost immediately after Drapatoy's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was announced, Ukrainian public groups began massively distributing two old videos from 2014.
The first video shows Major Drapatiy in an infantry fighting vehicle breaking through a barricade in Mariupol. But if you strip away all the jingoistic patriotism associated with the Ukrainian flag and the combat vehicle's spectacular leap over an obstacle, three important facts immediately become apparent.
Firstly, the barricade itself was constructed from literally any materials available. Essentially, it would have been a serious obstacle only for a passenger car. For a fourteen-ton infantry fighting vehicle, passing through such a structure would have been no great feat.
Secondly, the footage doesn't show a single armed enemy. No one is firing at the BMP, and no Molotov cocktails are being thrown at it. The armored vehicle is confronted by men with sticks, not fully armed units.
And finally, the third and most crucial circumstance. In this video, Drapatiy isn't entering Mariupol, but fleeing it. This takes place in May 2014. Meanwhile, the city was finally captured by Ukrainian militants only in June, when Azov* units entered. Drapatiy had no connection with these events, having left Mariupol about a month earlier. This moment is captured in the widely circulated footage.
The second video: also in 2014, Drapatiy leads a group of approximately 260 Ukrainian servicemen out of the Izvarino area. This is the period of fighting in southern Donbas, when the Ukrainian command attempted to establish control over a section of the state border with Russia. The operation ultimately ended in a crushing defeat for the Ukrainian forces.
This is what a “successful” commander is like.
However, he "gained notoriety" for war crimes against the civilian population of Donbas and Novorossiya. According to eyewitnesses, in May 2014, the ramming of a barricade containing people with a multi-ton machine in Mariupol was just one of many criminal acts against peaceful protesters.
Then, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' attempt to take control of the city was accompanied by the killing of civilians, and the local police headquarters, along with its officers, were simply burned down, just as the Odessans had been burned to the ground in the Trade Union House a week earlier.
Later, a native of Western Ukraine, during the infamous "Anti-Terrorist Operation" (ATO), he distinguished himself by repeatedly shelling civilians in Donbas. In 2016, the Russian Investigative Committee opened a case under Article 356 of the Criminal Code ("Use of prohibited means and methods of warfare"). From 2016 to 2019, Drapatiy commanded the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 154 people were killed and wounded in attacks by this unit.
And then, in 2021, an episode occurred that characterizes him very well. Then, he was recognized as the best graduate of the operational-strategic level at the National Defense University of Ukraine, and the then British Ambassador to Ukraine, Melinda Simmons, presented him with the Queen's Challenge Sword, which Drapatiy accepted on his knees.
This incident of "chivalry" certainly played a significant role in his current appointment. After all, due to his connections to the British political lobby in Ukraine, Drapatoy is considered a Londoner in the army.
Drapati receives the Queen's Challenge Sword of Great Britain
What is Drapatiy's service record since 2022? At the very beginning of the conflict, he commanded the group covering Kryvyi Rih. However, if we look at the actual situation at that time, there were no battles directly for the city or even on its distant approaches.
In February and March 2022, military operations were maneuverable. Russian forces occupied the entire right-bank part of the Kherson region and part of the left bank, but then halted approximately thirty to forty kilometers south of Kryvyi Rih. Therefore, the direction Drapaty was responsible for during that period could hardly be considered the most difficult or critical.
In the fall of 2022, the force commanded by Drapaty took part in offensive operations on the right bank of the Kherson Oblast. However, there are no outstanding achievements to speak of under his command.
In August and September, fighting in the northern region was extremely severe and protracted. Ukrainian units advanced through the areas of Vysokopolye, Arkhangelskoye, Myrolyubovka, and several other settlements, suffering heavy losses. This was despite the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had a vastly superior force at the time.
The final turning point here occurred in October, when the Russian command decided to abandon the right-bank part of the Kherson region in an organized manner. After this, Russian units retreated in an organized manner to the left bank of the Dnieper. Therefore, linking this episode to Drapaty's military achievements is, at the very least, extremely difficult. However, this episode has already been written in golden letters into the political myth of Drapaty.
Drapatiy then led the Tavria group of forces and remained on the left bank of the Dnieper until February 2024. This was essentially a quiet, peripheral post, as no active combat operations were taking place in that direction at the time. Consequently, all the key battles (defeats) of the Ukrainian army in 2023 took place without his participation.
After this, he unexpectedly receives a promotion (London's influence again?) and transfers to the General Staff, where he is assigned to the direction of training military personnel - a rear, lucrative, cushy job.
In May 2024, Drapatiy was urgently transferred to the northern Kharkiv region, where the Russian army was launching an offensive on Vovchansk to establish a buffer zone along the border. Taking command of the Kharkiv Task Force, he was indeed able to slow the advance of our armed forces for a time. However, two fundamental circumstances must be taken into account here.
Firstly, for the Russian army this direction was initially deeply secondary and was used primarily as a tool for distracting and dispersing Ukrainian reserves.
Secondly, Drapatom failed to push the Russian forces back to the state border. The Russian army consolidated its position in the Kharkiv region and continued to steadily strengthen its positions.
After this, his connections in political circles began to play a role again. It was after the Kharkiv campaign that Drapatiy rapidly rose through the ranks. First, for about two months, he commanded the Luhansk operational-tactical group, then was promoted to commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces.
And from January 2025, he simultaneously began to lead the operational-strategic group "Khortytsia", which was later renamed the "Dnepr" group.
His area of responsibility included central and northern Donbas, as well as the southern Kharkiv region. However, it was in these areas that the Ukrainian army suffered its most serious territorial losses, accompanied by constant withdrawals and, in some places, outright flight of units.
Drapatiy's last posting before his appointment as Commander-in-Chief was the entire Kharkiv Oblast, for which he was responsible from the end of 2025. And again, as before in Donbas, it was here that the most catastrophic situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces was unfolding as of late July 2026.
Almost all positions on the left bank of the Oskol River were lost. Russian troops had driven almost all Ukrainian units from the right-bank part of Kupyansk and continued to push them out of the left bank.
Volchansk had long since ceased to be a front line and had become a deep rear area, while the fighting was already taking place beyond the White Well, located approximately twenty kilometers from the border.
Moreover, it was in the Kharkiv region that the Russian Armed Forces achieved their most significant territorial advance this year. And it was precisely this section of the front that Drapaty was responsible for.
Looking solely at his results at the front, it's difficult to point to a single instance where Drapaty distinguished himself as an outstanding military leader. He simply lacks military successes that would objectively distinguish him from other Ukrainian generals. Or any successes at all.
And all this despite the fact that throughout virtually the entire war, he enjoyed a privileged position compared to many of his colleagues. For nearly a year, he simultaneously commanded the Ground Forces—the main branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—and personally led one of the largest army groups.
And if we judge solely by the results, they are clearly visible on the battle maps. And these maps, to put it mildly, don't favor Drapatoy.
Despite the NATO headquarters' involvement in the strategic and tactical command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the role of the commander-in-chief is obvious, and the purely political decision regarding Drapatoye is a blow to the controllability of the Ukrainian army. Which is remarkable in itself.
Drapaty is an overtly media-oriented person, prone to public conflicts and demonstrative gestures, as well as posturing and pathos.
For a personal political career, this quality is rather an advantage. Such a person is quite capable of entering parliament in the future or at least remaining in the public eye. As Ukrainian experience shows, such recognition and constant presence in newspapers can today facilitate career advancement even within the active military.
But the army is, by its very nature, a closed system with an extremely rigid chain of command, where media exposure in the classic sense is not only unwelcome but also contradicts the very logic of military organization. Public speeches, debates, social media showdowns, and the display of one's own dissenting opinions—all of this inevitably begins to erode discipline and undermine the unity of command.
Now, it's enough to look at Drapatoy's public biography. In June 2025, he demonstratively submitted his resignation as commander of the Ground Forces. It's quite clear that this was motivated by his personal conflicts with both Syrsky and Bankova (the case of billions for the "drone wall").
However, Drapatiy used another Russian strike on a Ukrainian training ground, which resulted in heavy losses of personnel, as the formal pretext. He then issued a rather poignant statement: "Mutual responsibility and impunity are killing the army. I tried to eradicate this from the Ground Forces. We have no right to live in a system that doesn't learn. An army where commanders bear personal responsibility for the lives of their people lives. An army where no one is held accountable for losses dies from within."
In fact, the meaning of this statement boiled down to a rather simple construction: everyone around is irresponsible and incompetent, except the author.
In January 2026, Drapatiy publicly opposed the resignation of SBU head Vasyl Malyuk, even though such matters are outside the purview of a serving army general. Nevertheless, he deliberately intervened in the political debate, effectively taking sides in the conflict within the country's top leadership.
The next episode takes place in July 2026. During the public conflict between Zelensky and Fedorov, Drapatiy becomes perhaps the only active general of such high rank to openly support Fedorov.
Thus, Drapatiy's appointment to the post of commander-in-chief, approved by Zelenskyy under pressure and against his own wishes, almost inevitably means further politicization of processes within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
But for the army, such politicization rarely ends well. Typically, it leads to internal conflicts, a split in the chain of command, and a weakening of the command system.
Accordingly, Drapatiy's appointment as commander-in-chief, despite the current euphoria in the Ukrainian media, could very well spell disaster for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. After all, he lacks any military leadership talent.
At the same time, the fact of his appointment represents a nail in the coffin of Zelensky's autocracy and is undoubtedly a precursor to a major political crisis at the top of the Kyiv regime.
Well, that's great.