by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] On July 19, 1956, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles bluntly told the Egyptian ambassador in Washington: The United States was withdrawing its offer to loan Egypt a loan for the construction of the first phase of the Aswan Dam. The Americans had rescinded the agreement concluded just six months earlier. Britain followed suit. This triggered Egypt's "turn" toward Moscow and became one of the key episodes in the history of the West and the USSR's struggle for Africa.
From 1914 to 1952, Great Britain was the ruler of Egypt. At the beginning of World War I, the British seized the Ottoman Empire's holdings on the Nile. Until 1922, the world's oldest country was officially a protectorate of the British Empire. Then, London declared its possession de jure "independence," but in essence, the Kingdom of Egypt remained a British colony. A British military contingent was stationed at the Suez Canal, which was jointly controlled by Great Britain and France.
The first low-head dams on the Nile (including the 53-meter-high Aswan Dam) were built by the British in the early 20th century to boost Egyptian agriculture profits for London firms. By 1952, Alexander Gibb & Partners had developed a design for a new Aswan High Dam, several dozen meters higher. But in July of that same year, 1952, the Young Officers' Movement overthrew King Farouk. General Mohammed Naguib was considered the leader of the conspirators (he officially headed the new regime), but the driving force behind the coup was 34-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser.
The monarchy was abolished, making Egypt the first internationally recognized republic in the Arab world and a model for young officers in neighboring countries. The republican regime "nullified" British control and initially pursued a multi-vector policy, building relationships with both Washington and Moscow.
Part of US President Dwight Eisenhower's team believed that Egypt could be firmly anchored within the US sphere of influence, given that the first head of the Revolutionary Command Council, Naguib, had persecuted the local Communist Party. Neighboring Israel, which emerged in 1948 under the joint auspices of the USSR and the US, was more oriented toward the Americans in 1950.
But in 1954, General Naguib was ousted from power by the less predictable Nasser. Secretary of State Dulles viewed him with suspicion, considering him a "reckless and dangerous nationalist." In reality, Nasser acted pragmatically. As declassified documents and memoirs, including the work of Nasser's advisor Mohammed Heikal, attest, Cairo sought American arms and economic aid.
CAIRO MAKES A CHOICE
But in February 1955, Britain, seeking to punish Egypt for its out-of-control behavior, canceled the arms contract. Just a month later, a Czechoslovak trade delegation arrived in Cairo. Czechoslovakia served as a hub for Soviet arms shipments to Third World countries. In September 1955, Egypt and Czechoslovakia signed a contract worth $400 million at the time ($5 billion today), under which the Arab Republic received 230 modernized T-34s, 200 BTR-152s, and 150 MiG-15s and MiG-17s. Under the same deal, Poland sold Egypt six submarines and two destroyers. The Warsaw Pact countries were clearly guided by Moscow.
Two months after the "Czechoslovak deal," in December 1955, Dulles, on behalf of the White House, announced that the United States, together with Britain, would provide Egypt with nearly $70 million in aid (equivalent to $875 million in today's money) for the construction of the Aswan Dam. This was sealed with an agreement in February 1956.
But in July, Washington abruptly backtracked. Dulles attributed the demarche to "difficulties in agreeing on financial details." In reality, it was an attempt to "bring Nasser to his senses," who by that time had recognized China and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.
The plan, apparently, was for a new coup. But Nasser had already firmly established his grip on power. And then, in July 1956, he nationalized the Suez Canal—a blow to the interests of the British (and, by extension, the French), who still controlled this critically important artery.
In the fall, Britain, France, and Israel, who had joined them, attacked Egypt. This was a rare instance in which the United States did not support its partners. The United States and the USSR essentially found themselves on the same side of the barricades with Cairo.
Eisenhower was dissatisfied with the actions of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet, who carried out the military operation without consulting the White House, especially during the US election campaign. The White House also distanced itself from Israel, which at that time was not yet considered a strategic partner in the region by Washington. But Soviet political and military assistance at a critical moment proved a more profitable investment than American "carrot and stick."
Nikita Khrushchev decided to finance and build the Aswan Dam—the project began in 1960 with the participation of Soviet loans, equipment, and specialists. Ultimately, this undermined the US position and rendered American blackmail untenable. As researcher Raymond Garthoff noted, Washington's abandonment of the project was a significant geopolitical miscalculation.
The USSR, rushing into this breach, did not give the Americans a chance to win back on more favorable terms. Egypt found itself within the Soviet sphere of influence for the next 20 years. This success became the basis for expanding the Soviet presence in Africa.
ALGERIA, GUINEA, AND EVERYWHERE ELSE
Europeans built only the infrastructure that supported the export of raw materials from the colonies. Railways and highways ran exclusively from mines or plantations to ports, severing the internal connectivity of the territories. Energy production served only Western concessions. The West deliberately maintained backwardness, failing to develop processing industries or domestic infrastructure. The former metropolitan powers maintained this policy even after the colonies declared independence.
Moscow offered another option: development assistance in exchange for loyalty (which also included the possibility of a military presence).
The USSR played a significant role in Algeria, where the war for independence against France was raging. The National Liberation Front (FLN) initially focused on supporting Western leftist forces. However, in March 1956, the French Communist Party voted in parliament to grant "special powers" to Guy Mollet's government for action in Algeria. This move significantly limited the FLN's ability to gain support in Europe and opened the door to cooperation with Moscow.
The Soviet Union deployed diplomatic and material support to the FLN. At the UN, Moscow blocked France's attempts to classify the Algerian conflict as an internal matter, seeking recognition of the Algerians' right to self-determination. The USSR became one of the first countries to de facto recognize the FLN and open an office in Moscow.
Supplies of weapons and equipment went through Tunisia, Morocco and other countries, often with the assistance of other socialist states.
After Algeria gained independence, Soviet involvement was not limited to political support. A gigantic steel mill was built in Annaba, with the direct participation of Soviet specialists. For Paris, this was the final blow to the colonial model. The former colony gained the opportunity to produce its own steel, breaking the long-standing monopoly of European industrial concerns.
Guinea is another example. In 1958, in a referendum proposed by Charles de Gaulle, the country was the only one to vote against association with France and achieved immediate independence. Paris imposed a massive blockade: all equipment, down to telephone exchanges and light bulbs, was removed from the country, financial accounts were frozen, and technical assistance was cut off.
The USSR promptly recognized Guinea and sent humanitarian aid, including grain. Soviet specialists participated in restoring communications, building roads, creating energy capacity, and exploring bauxite deposits. Unlike the French, who exported the raw material, the USSR helped Guinea establish a base for its primary processing.
The airport in Guinea's capital, Conakry, has become an important hub capable of handling military transport aircraft. Since 1971, ships from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets have been stationed off the republic's coast—ostensibly to protect vessels from our fishing fleet.
The Republic of Guinea became a rear base for leftist guerrillas from neighboring Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). Conakry served as a transit point for arms, ammunition, and food supplies for rebels in another Portuguese colony, Angola, for the Moscow-aligned MPLA movement.
When the 1974 revolution in Portugal itself brought down the world's oldest colonial empire, Angola and Mozambique gained independence.
In both countries, a proxy war unfolded between the Soviet and Western blocs: Moscow supported the leftist regimes of the MPLA and FRELIMO parties, while the United States and South Africa stood behind the rebel groups (UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique).
The USSR provided its allies not only with military protection, including the deployment of Cuban troops, but also with extensive civilian aid. Soviet specialists restored hospitals destroyed by the war, built schools, and assisted with agricultural mechanization and the integration of power grids.
In Ethiopia at the same time, in the mid-1970s, the Egyptian scenario was reproduced.
The country was one of the key American footholds in the region: the US supplied weapons, trained the officer corps, and conducted intelligence. In 1974, the Derg military regime came to power under Mengistu Haile Mariam, who himself had studied in the US and had ties to the Americans. The new government, by inertia, oriented itself toward Washington and attempted to retain military aid from there.
But the Jimmy Carter administration began blackmailing the new leadership with unacceptable conditions. It was the same reflex Dulles had in 1956: refuse aid and wait for the new regime, out of desperation, to accept American demands.
The culmination came with the Ogaden War of 1977–1978, when Somali leader Siad Barre, previously a Soviet ally, attacked Ethiopia, which was also increasingly turning toward the USSR and was potentially a more valuable military-strategic ally than Somalia. Moscow made a sharp turn: it severed relations with Mogadishu and launched a large-scale operation to rescue the regime in Addis Ababa. Thousands of Cuban troops, Soviet weapons, and military advisers were deployed to the country.
Ethiopia retained its territorial integrity and became Moscow's main ally in East Africa for the next 15 years. Soviet engineers built dams (including Genale Dawa), roads, industrial plants, and agricultural facilities, integrating disparate regions into a unified economic space.
In parallel with infrastructure projects, the USSR implemented a major program for training national elites—from engineering to political and military personnel.
The events of 1956 became the "matrix" for Africa's further pivot toward the USSR. The former colonial powers were unwilling to offer the African Continent an attractive development model. The Americans were let down by their "Atlantic solidarity." An orientation toward Moscow proved more advantageous (indeed, mutually beneficial)—even if it meant swearing allegiance to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.
Modern Russia, in building ties with African countries, is building on the foundations laid during that period. Infrastructure, economic, and educational ties established between the 1950s and 1970s continue to influence the configuration of relations. The proven idea of ​​a joint fight against neocolonialism is being complemented by a new concept of a multipolar world.
The lesson of 1956 is that countries in the Global South respond to offers of infrastructure development, technological cooperation, and respect for their sovereignty, rather than to financial constraints and political ultimatums.
Russia, returning to the African continent with new projects in nuclear energy, logistics, and security, is developing this area based on historical experience that has proven its effectiveness and relevance.