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| Russia reassesses power bet in the Sahel.. From Tin Zaouatine to Anfiv, losses push Moscow toward peace |
| 2026-07-15 |
Text: Russia Reassesses Power Bet in the Sahel.. From Tin Zaouatine to Anfiv, Losses Push Moscow Toward Peace #Russia #Azawad #Algeria #Sahel The accumulated losses suffered by Russian forces in Mali, from the Battle of Tin Zaouatine in July 2024 to the recent battles of Anfiv, have pushed Moscow to reassess its wager on military resolution in the Sahel, amid regional moves to open a new political path led by Algeria with support from Niger, according to informed sources. Tin Zaouatine early revealed the difficulties of Russian forces operating in the desert environment against groups that possess knowledge of the terrain, freedom of movement, and the ability to target convoys and supply lines. Then came Anfiv to confirm that increased equipment and air cover do not guarantee control, nor prevent the attrition of isolated bases and forces. Activist Akli Shuka, citing sources he described as reliable, reported that around 47 members of the "Africa Corps" were killed in Anfiv—a toll not confirmed by independent sources. According to the sources, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov conveyed to officials of Sahel Alliance countries a message stating that the military option has faltered, and that dialogue and reconciliation with Azawad have become the most realistic path. The sources say Russia has become convinced that continuing the war under current conditions will turn its presence in Mali into an open-ended attrition operation. The trajectory from Tin Zaouatine to Anfiv has proven that Malian forces and their Russian allies can reach certain positions, but they lack the capacity to establish permanent control or secure vast desert expanses. Moscow, per the sources, no longer views settlement as a retreat, but as a means to protect its interests, reduce losses, and shift from direct involvement in a costly war to a role as a security and political partner. In this context, Russia is betting on Algeria as a reliable ally capable of managing the balances between Bamako, Sahel Alliance countries, Azawad movements, and tribal and political components in the north. Algeria has long borders with Mali, experience in mediation, communication channels with local parties, and strategic relations with Moscow. The sources indicate that Niger played a pivotal role in the recent rapprochement between Mali and Algeria, and is leading within the Sahel Alliance a push to restore relations with neighboring countries, shifting from a policy of rupture and confrontation to de-escalation and seeking settlements. Niamey seeks to build a path that allows Alliance countries to return to their regional orbit without appearing to retreat, while restoring Algeria to its security and political role. It also recognizes that continued war in Azawad threatens not only Mali, but expands the operational spaces of armed groups along the borders of Niger and Burkina Faso. The sources do not expect peace between Bamako and Azawad to face substantive opposition if it provides for a ceasefire, addresses political and security demands, and stops the bloodshed. The new path may not revive the 2015 Algiers Accord in its previous form, but rather an framework starting with a ceasefire and transitional security arrangements, followed by negotiations on local governance, power and resource sharing, and the return of displaced persons. The sources see Russia's acceptance of this path as decisive in changing Bamako's stance, after Russian support over the past years formed one of the pillars of betting on recapturing the north by force. Any agreement with Azawad will leave the file of jihadist groups as the next challenge, particularly the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims" linked to al-Qaeda, and the "Islamic State in the Greater Sahara." The sources do not rule out that the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims" might incline toward de-escalation or local understandings, based on its discourse about a Malian national project of which it would be a part. However, its entry into any genuine political path will remain conditional on halting attacks, respecting civilians, providing guarantees regarding its ties to al-Qaeda, and accepting national settlement rules. Neutralizing the group or incorporating some of its components into a de-escalation process could unify efforts against the Islamic State, which remains the party most likely to reject any settlement and attempt to sabotage it. Thus, the ongoing moves reflect not just a rapprochement between Mali and Algeria, but a broader shift in the Russian approach to the Sahel. From Tin Zaouatine to Anfiv, the losses have confirmed to Moscow that force may prevent collapse, but it does not create stability, and that Algeria may be the shortest path out of a war with no apparent military end. |
| Posted by:badanov |