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Africa Subsaharan

We didn't even have tea. The US Army only just arrived in Nigeria, but is already leaving

2026-07-07

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM.RU] On the eve of US Independence Day, the head of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), Dagvin Anderson, gave the American audience a reason to be proud. Speaking at a conference of African defense chiefs in Angola, the commander stated that the Pentagon had "maximum reduced" its direct military presence in Nigeria—where a counterterrorism mission was deployed in February 2026—due to the accomplishment of its assigned tasks.

However, the actual effectiveness of this mission is questionable. In some cases, the Pentagon and AFRICOM have deliberately misrepresented wishful thinking.

COMPROMISE AID
Debate over the counterterrorism operation in Nigeria flared up back in November 2025, when jihadist attacks on Christian communities in the country intensified. US President Donald Trump was enraged by the oppression of fellow believers (with American missionaries indirectly under attack) and demanded that the local government immediately address the problem. Otherwise, "America will take matters into its own hands."

The very next day, the Pentagon developed three scenarios: "soft" (delivery of weapons and intelligence with a minimal military presence), "medium" (sending a limited contingent to reinforce the government army), and "hard" (deployment of an aircraft carrier group and a full-scale military operation). All of them were submitted to Trump for approval.

However, the first option was dismissed almost immediately: the White House didn't believe Abuja (Nigeria's capital) could manage the aid wisely. Furthermore, there had been previous instances of weapons and ammunition supplied to Nigeria disappearing before reaching combat units. Sometimes, they even fell into the hands of terrorists. There was a risk that the same would happen this time.

However, the "hard" option was also quickly abandoned—by early 2026, the situation around Iran had escalated, and the Pentagon decided to deploy additional carrier groups to the Middle East rather than Africa. Multirole fighters and bombers, originally intended to support Abuja, were also partially redeployed to Jordan and Bahrain.

Ultimately, the only option available to Washington by February 2026 was the average scenario. A detachment of Green Berets, Navy SEALs, and Rangers, totaling up to 200 personnel, was deployed to Nigeria, and a UAV refueling station was established in the northeast of the country. An airbase near Maiduguri became the contingent's headquarters.

THE COACH IS NOT PLAYING
Despite the fact that American troops arrived in Nigeria under Trump's public promise to "personally destroy terrorists," they have hardly participated in combat operations.

The Nigerian army led the ground offensive, while the US presence in the region was more of a flag-raising and morale-boosting ally. Commandos were advised not to intervene in the fighting unless absolutely necessary.

The Pentagon used the resources deployed to Nigeria to conduct reconnaissance missions (primarily aerial) and coordinate ground operations, training local security forces in counterinsurgency warfare techniques. Furthermore, the unpublicized task was to oversee the distribution of American weapons arriving in Nigeria.

This caution wasn't without reason. Trump wanted a quick and elegant operation—preferably without American casualties. After all, the Green Berets had already had a disastrous experience encountering local insurgents.

In October 2017, a joint US-Nigerian commando patrol encountered a terrorist ambush and was forced to retreat under heavy fire. The encounter resulted in the deaths of four US special forces personnel (the largest single American loss of life in Africa since 1993). Consequently, the Pentagon and AFRICOM chose to minimize the direct use of the contingent, shifting the focus to their mentoring role.

However, during the Nigerian campaign, the newly-appointed "mentors" still managed to distinguish themselves in an unfavorable light.

In particular, a market in Borno State was mistaken for a terrorist "fortified camp." As a result of the intelligence distortion, civilians were targeted in a bombing raid in April 2026, killing over 200 people. Dozens more died from their wounds.

At the same time, the United States, which has been consistently supplying the Nigerian army with data from reconnaissance drones and satellites, stubbornly denies its own involvement in the high-profile incident, hinting that the terrorists had changed into civilian clothes, and that members of their families could have been present at the "camp" at the time of the attack.

KILL THE FINANCIER
In May 2026, the White House reported its first major victories in Nigeria. Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, one of the leaders of the African branch of ISIS*, was killed in the Lake Chad region.

According to Trump, he was "the second man of ISIS* in West Africa" and held a high position in the group's global leadership, distributing financial flows between radical cells on the continent.

This was one of the few times the Pentagon risked using strike force directly. The final stage of the hunt for al-Minuki involved approximately 20 commandos (mostly Navy SEALs), supported by air power and armored vehicles. As a result, the radical and his associates were trapped in a building, which was targeted by a precision airstrike.

The raid on al-Minuki's hideout bore fruit: the Americans seized a large amount of loot, including commanders' phones and laptops. This allowed the coalition to track down other major figures in the African underground.

Over the next week, West Africa's chief propagandist, Abd al-Wahhab, and senior field commanders Abu Musa al-Mangawy and Abu al-Muthanna al-Muhajir, the "night governors" of northeastern Nigeria, were assassinated.

The Americans were convinced that after this, the African "terrorist empire" began to collapse like a house of cards. Having lost their key leaders, the militants threw down their arms and went into hiding, ceding significant territory to government forces. Therefore, after just six weeks, according to Anderson's reports, keeping several hundred fighters in Nigeria simply became impractical.

The Pentagon decided to reduce its contingent by a factor of ten. Mainly UAV operators and technicians coordinating aerial reconnaissance, as well as several Navy SEALs—guerilla warfare and combat engineer instructors—remained in Maiduguri.

ARE YOU SURE YOU WON?
The Pentagon, contrary to pessimists' expectations, didn't get bogged down in the Nigerian conflict. In fact, it emerged triumphant and unscathed, having killed several thousand jihadists

…that’s a lot…

and "completely disrupted" their system of governance in West Africa. At least, that was the thrust of much of Anderson's speech in Angola.

But the AFRICOM chief was being downright disingenuous in some places. When it comes to casualties, the Americans don't take into account the statistics of their coalition partners. They reported that during the operation, they lost at least 150 service members killed. Another 300 or so were wounded.

At the same time, Abuja is extremely evasive in answering questions about the US contribution to the overall victory, hinting that all the dirty work was done without the participation of the Americans.

The data on the “several thousand” terrorists killed during the campaign are calculated very roughly, since massive strikes against them were carried out primarily from the air.

The underground fighters themselves admit to losing no more than 500 people,

…still a lot…

some of whom died from wounds and illnesses. Nigerian security forces report eight hundred radicals killed and approximately 1,500 detained. Regardless, the parties to the conflict have no overall figure.

There are also questions about the effectiveness of the operation on the ground. Despite the increased pressure from the government army, the jihadists continue to stage rather daring raids against security forces. And in some cases, they are even successful.

For example, in early June 2026, militants attacked a military base near Mandaragirau, and less than a week later, a fortified area in Bani Bangu. In the latter case, the attackers managed to damage a hangar housing military armored vehicles and steal several aircraft.

In addition to the above, the assassination of al-Minuki and his key associates opened a Pandora's Box for West Africa. Today, the most likely successors to the assassinated man are considered to be Abu Salem and Ban Chingori —brutal field commanders who embarked on a radical path as children.

This marks a significant turning point in the African underground—the rapid consolidation of professional thugs who grew up in war at the helm. This, in turn, promises a fairly rapid revival of militant structures and their even greater brutality.

However, even if ISIS fails to recover from the damage it has suffered in Africa, al-Qaeda* emissaries, whom the Americans have somehow forgotten, still remain (and feel quite confident) in the country. After al-Minuki's death, his rivals hastened to strengthen their positions in the northwest of the country.

They transferred advance troops there from Burkina Faso and other "transfer" countries. As a result, the terrorist threat in Nigeria remained, but the dominant force in the underground changed—making the US triumph purely paper.

Posted by:badanov

#2 comments); ?>werwer

Posted by: Mercutio 2026-07-07 09:17

#1 comments); ?>werwer

Posted by: ed in texas 2026-07-07 08:44

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