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Terror Networks

Three Things the US Can Do to Save the Sahel

2026-07-02

By Robert Dussey

[NATIONALINTEREST.ORG] Washington has taken important steps toward re-engagement, but the jihadist threat is outpacing policy.

The jihadist threat expanding across West Africa is not a distant regional problem. It is a direct danger to American security interests—and the window to address it is narrowing. Washington has begun to recognize this, taking meaningful steps toward re-engagement with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after years of counterproductive isolation. But those steps, while welcome, are not sufficient. More needs to be done.

The situation in the Sahel has not stood still. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, has reached its highest operational capacity since its founding. Entire communities have been emptied across northern Mali, western Niger, and broad swaths of Burkina Faso. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2026, all three Sahel countries rank among the top five globally in terms of terrorism’s measurable impact.

In late April, coordinated jihadist attacks struck three Malian cities simultaneously, killing the country’s defense minister and underscoring once again the cost of American absence from the region. The threat is actively seeking access to the West African coastline. This development puts not just African nations at risk but also increases the chance of threats reaching American shores. Terrorist attacks in northern Togo, once unthinkable, are now tragically real. The window to prevent this crisis from becoming irreversible is narrowing.

The response to this emergency, for too long, was isolation. When the governments that came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023 took office, Washington followed a familiar logic: pressure must be applied, aid conditioned, military cooperation suspended. Isolation did not restore civilian governance. It pushed three governments, facing existential threats they could not meet alone, toward whatever partners were willing to engage without conditions. Global competitors moved quickly to fill the vacuum. And as those arrangements failed to deliver lasting security gains, the violence only worsened. Foreign policy must be judged by its consequences, and the consequences of isolation were disastrous.

Washington appears to have recognized this, and its current approach emphasizes shared interests: counterterrorism, economic partnership, and engagement on terms these governments can accept. Intelligence sharing with Mali may soon resume. Sanctions on senior Malian defense officials have been lifted. A five-year, $147 million health cooperation agreement with Burkina Faso has been signed. State Department officials have visited Burkina Faso and Niger. These are meaningful steps, and they deserve acknowledgment.

But they are not sufficient. Three concrete things still need to happen.

More at the link

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