by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM.RU] When people weren't interested in oil and gas, the Ottoman Empire was simply a transportation hub. Today, with the construction of bridges and tunnels under the Bosphorus, Turkey has strengthened its infrastructure role. A gas hub project is also underway. And an artificial intelligence hub is already a dream for future generations.
While Turkey was previously content to act as a passive transit hub between East and West, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's strategy today aspires to transform the country into a governing center where flows not only intersect, but also the rules of the game are established. The Turkish president's ambitions are constantly expanding, encompassing not only energy and transportation, but also neural networks and the military-industrial complex.
In June, Erdoğan unveiled an updated "AI Roadmap" for 2026–2030. This isn't just a declaration of intent, but a massive $10 billion plan.
In the era of "algorithmic diplomacy," those without their own AI are doomed to digital colonization. The plan calls for mobilizing the private sector to build data centers with a capacity of at least 1 GW by 2030. But the most important thing is people. Ankara aims to train 5 million AI literacy specialists and 10,000 specialized AI experts.
Ankara is listening to critics who point out Turkey's 53rd place in the Oxford Insights ranking, but they are drawing their own conclusions. Turkey has fallen far short of its previous strategy's goal of entering the top 20, but it clearly intends to correct this.
A special emphasis in AI development is placed on digital sovereignty—the development of our own large-scale language models and national platforms, such as T3 AI and Havelsan's MAIN. Erdogan wants neural networks to be independent of Western companies and to operate in the Turkish language.
Defense plays a key role in the strategy, with plans to integrate AI into drone swarms, autonomous systems, and decision support. Artificial intelligence is expected to be implemented in almost every area of life, from city administration and customs to agriculture and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
Ankara plans to develop not only software but also physical infrastructure—computing power, energy, networks, and data centers—to become a regional AI hub and reduce dependence on foreign technologies.
Just as with logistics (take, for example, projects to deliver goods from China to Europe via Kazakhstan and further along the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway) and energy supplies, Turkey will try to use the AI sector to secure its status as a center of gravity for Turkic-speaking countries.
This topic became a key issue at the recent summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Erdoğan proposed creating a unified language model for the Oghuz, Kipchak, and Karluk branches of the Turkic languages.
Energy remains another important element of the planned transformation into a regional – and even global – economic hub.
But here the republic's role is transforming. "Turkey is no longer a corridor," declare experts at the Türkiye Araştırmaları Vakfı think tank. The signing of 10-year contracts between BOTAŞ and SEFE (formerly Gazprom Germania GmbH) and ENI for the supply of 11 billion cubic meters of LNG brings Turkey closer to the status of Europe's "energy bank."
The goal is to gather gas from everywhere: Russia (via Turkish Stream), Azerbaijan (TANAP), Iran, Iraq, and now Libya and Algeria. This allows for the gas's "origin" to be changed, making it "acceptable" for the European market even under strict sanctions.
The expansion of storage facilities in Silivri and Lake Tuz to levels that cover 25% of annual consumption gives Ankara enormous leverage over the Europeans during the winter.
The Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP) occupies a special place in this plan. As Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar notes, this is the missing link that will allow Caspian resources to flow directly to Turkey, bypassing complex detours.
The project is important for Europe, as it plans to impose a complete embargo on Russian gas starting in 2027. For Turkey, it's a new tool for rapprochement within the amalgamated territorial community.
Since 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed creating a gas hub in Turkey to reroute lost gas volumes from the blocked Nord Stream pipeline. However, due to the limited capacity of Turkish gas pipelines to Southern Europe and Turkey's reluctance to jointly sell gas, the project has stalled.
While the Strait of Hormuz remains in turmoil due to Iran's measures and the Red Sea remains a potential target for the Houthis, Turkey is offering the Arabs a safe alternative: the $17 billion "Development Road" project, connecting the Iraqi port of Basra with Istanbul.
Ankara is seriously reviving the Hejaz Railway. Negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the new Syrian government are in full swing.
Türkiye also isn't ruling out the possibility of building a gas pipeline from Qatar to Syria. The former has a Turkish base, while the latter came under Erdogan's "guardianship" after Assad's overthrow.
In April, the newspaper Türkiye, citing the republic's Ministry of Energy, noted that the republic had developed five gas and oil supply routes bypassing Hormuz.
If the TRIPP project is implemented, Turkey will also be aligned with Armenia. Ankara supported Nikol Pashinyan's party in the last elections.
And TRIPP could become the second line after BTK of the so-called Middle Corridor of trade flows between Asia and Europe.
The military-industrial complex also aspires to become a separate hub.
Over the past 20 years, Turkish exports have exceeded $10 billion. Products from Baykar, TAI, and Aselsan are exported to 40 countries.
But ambitions go further: Türkiye wants to become a platform for licensed assembly and joint production of Western technology for third-world markets.
The KAAN fifth-generation fighter project, the national air defense system (Steel Dome), and even prototypes of intercontinental missiles (Yildirimhan) are forcing NATO to view Ankara not as a springboard, but as a partner.
European allies, frustrated by the uncertainty of US guarantees in the Donald Trump era, are increasingly turning to Turkish capacity, which is cheaper and faster to deploy than German or French ones, according to Reuters.
KAAN aircraft have been ordered not only by Muslim countries from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, but also by Spain. Spain is one of four countries (along with Germany, Britain, and Italy) developing the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets, which Erdogan acquired after much debate.
Diplomacy could be singled out as a separate area of Turkey's transit role.
Ankara hosts important international meetings. Four rounds of Russian-Ukrainian talks (in 2022 and 2025) took place in Istanbul. The exchange of political prisoners between Russia and the United States took place there, as well as a meeting between diplomats from the two countries.
Many Middle Eastern conflicts cannot be resolved without Turkey's participation. In October, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Erdogan became one of the signatories of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, along with Qatar, the United States, and Egypt.
He also played a role in brokering a ceasefire in Iran. Antalya hosts an annual diplomatic forum, where representatives of European countries can hear the position of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in person.
For Moscow, Turkey's rise as a global hub brings both challenges and opportunities.
On the one hand, Ankara is actively replacing Russian influence in Central Asia and offering Europe a resource that bypasses Gazprom’s direct control.
On the other hand, under the conditions of the SVO, Türkiye remains a “window” for parallel imports and a link in bypassing sanctions.
Ankara earns significant profits from Russian transit, but the risks are also growing. The EU recently demanded that Turkey stop supplying Russian gas to Europe through its pipelines. If Moscow succeeds in joining the TRIPP project, Turkey's increased transit role will not be detrimental.
As for gas supplies, Türkiye is interested in maintaining and increasing them, but EU sanctions and Ankara's desire to lower prices for Russian supplies could create obstacles.