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The Grand Turk

'You all lack charisma.' Erdogan has decided who will take his seat

2026-06-25

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov

[REGNUM.RU] For the past two years, the Republic of Turkey has been abuzz with debate over one important topic: will Recep Tayyip Erdoğan run for office? Now it's clear—he will.

Turkey held presidential elections in 2023. The current leader won, not without difficulty. Officially, he still has two years left in his current term. However, there's a catch. According to the law, he's not allowed to run in subsequent elections under the usual procedure—he can serve no more than two consecutive terms. But there are two options.

The first is to return the country to a parliamentary form of government, where the prime minister can rule indefinitely as long as his party wins. But Erdoğan himself transformed the system from parliamentary to presidential in 2017—precisely to extend his stay in power. So no one will understand or appreciate this reversal.

Pooh. They’ll understand it completely. Appreciation depends on who’d be doing the work.

Moreover, even such a change requires time and public support. And it's not a given that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will prevail.

The second option—more obvious and simple—is to call snap elections. While previously these were merely rumors, speculation, and hints, recently AKP spokesman Ömer Çelik officially announced that Erdoğan will be a candidate in the new presidential elections. And since Erdoğan is running, the elections will be early.

But even if the snap vote opens the door for the president to the political race, it still doesn't guarantee his victory. And the issue isn't even the results of individual candidates, but rather the parliament.

To call an early presidential election, a minimum of 360 votes out of 600 is needed. The AKP and its nationalist coalition partners (MHP) can expect 327. The pro-Kurdish party DEM is opposed, so the outcome depends on the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP).

WHY ERDOGAN?
The current president's decision is, on the one hand, his personal choice. Over the past 20 years, he has built a new political system in which, for example, the army is no longer independent but is completely subordinate to the head of state.

On the other hand, his fellow party members and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli are nominating him. They fear losing their seats, and after the 2017 constitutional changes, the president is the key figure in power.

In recent years, the media have actively discussed potential successors. The list included Erdoğan's sons and sons-in-law, as well as the current Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan. However, none of them have comparable charisma or approval ratings. Attempting to nominate any of them could prove a risky maneuver.

A potentially weaker leader could exacerbate competition within the AKP and the government, which would reduce the government's effectiveness. Erdoğan himself may be perceived as the best guarantee of succession.

Fidan has regularly figured in discussions as the leading potential successor, eclipsing even Erdoğan's son, Bilal. Among the president's other favorites (including, for example, his son-in-law, Selçuk Bayraktar, the head of a drone manufacturing company), the 57-year-old foreign minister is the most experienced politician.

He has been a member of government structures for 25 years. He held the posts of head of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency and head of the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey (MIT).

But despite Fidan's recognizability, nominating him while Erdoğan is alive and well would undermine the government's chances of victory. After all, the current president represents the elite consensus. Fidan, on the other hand, could be controversial.

Even if it is approved from above, a conflict of interest could arise later. For example, with Ibrahim Kalın, the former presidential spokesman and current head of the MİT. Kalın and Fidan's approaches to the Kurdish issue differ: the former advocates a moderate course, the latter advocates harsh measures.

In December 2025, some AKP MPs criticized statements Fidan made during a visit to Syria. At the time, the Foreign Minister threatened a military operation against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG).

WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION?
Ataturk's CHP would have had a good chance if Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu had not been under investigation in 2023 and then jailed in March 2025, where he was soon given a one-year, eight-month sentence.

The end of this sentence does not guarantee freedom or participation in the elections, as the investigation is being conducted into a major corruption case. The prosecutor's office is demanding up to 2,430 (!) years in prison.

The remaining candidates are clearly inferior to the mayor in popularity, and they face other challenges. Özgür Özel lost his position as CHP chairman after an Ankara court overturned the results of the party congress.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was formally reinstated as party leader. Özel is currently challenging the court's decision, calling for a party congress to be held as soon as possible and for himself to be elected as the sole and undisputed leader. Had Özel accepted Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, party unity would have been preserved.

But Kılıçdaroğlu is objectively less popular. He lost to Erdoğan in the last election. Furthermore, his reputation has been tarnished after he was reinstated as chairman of the Republican People's Party by a pro-government court ruling. He could be seen as a Trojan horse.

There's also the well-known and quite popular mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavaş. But he's a relatively quiet politician and less charismatic than Özel. His nationalist views could alienate the Kurdish opposition. Moreover, the capital's mayor himself isn't trying to push his candidacy forward.

EARLY PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS?
Meanwhile, early parliamentary elections may take place in the republic, which could affect the balance of power.

Until recently, the opposition was the one seeking them more. Economic problems, inflation, ineffective governance, and outrage over Imamoglu's arrest gave the RPP an advantage, fueling public disapproval of the government. But now, the ruling party is the one most eager for snap elections.

Her argument is this: yes, the economy has slumped, but it's recovering. Inflation has fallen from a record 75% in May 2024 to 33%. The government is preparing a large-scale social support package to regain the trust of pensioners. Politically, the AKP has the advantage over the RPP: the opposition is riven by internal contradictions.

Özel fears the authorities will suddenly call snap elections. And there's a risk the RPP won't be able to participate, as it won't have time to hold its congress and elect its leadership.

Tensions within the RPP make it impossible to quickly develop a unified strategy against Erdoğan and undermine the electorate's trust. As a result, the opposition is unable to turn fair criticism of the socio-economic situation to its advantage.

According to polls, around 30% are prepared to vote for the RPP, and the same percentage for the AKP. Neither party will win with certainty; the result will be, as before, a close race. But the government could outmaneuver the opposition using administrative resources and form a coalition with the support of nationalists and other small parties.

INTERESTS OF GLOBAL PLAYERS
It's too early to say how the elections will play out. By Turkish standards, two years is a long time. Erdoğan's adviser, Mehmet Üçum, announced that presidential elections will be held on April 16, 2028, the anniversary of the constitutional referendum that established the country as a presidential republic.

But one thing is certain: unless his health deteriorates, Erdoğan will stand for his next (and likely final) election at age 75. If he wins, he will rule until 2034.

The usually critical West is unlikely to object to the very fact of early elections. Under Donald Trump, the United States pursues a non-ideological policy. For the sake of a deal, he is willing to negotiate with Ahmed al-Sharaa and even with the hated regime in Iran.

And Erdogan is Trump's friend. Incidentally, during a meeting with him, the American once joked that the Turk is well versed in the art of falsification.

As for Europe, Brussels, Paris, and Berlin continue to feign a commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. But with the US retreating from European security, Turkey is becoming increasingly important to the Old World. This is being made clear by the leaders of the "EU-3" (Britain, Germany, and France).

Since no one has charged the Turkish president with İmamoğlu's arrest, will Europeans be concerned about his run for reelection? Deep down, the French and Germans will hope for the long-time leader's defeat, but they won't risk supporting the opposition ahead of time. After all, a victorious Erdoğan could be vengeful.

Moscow will be watching developments with interest. The Turkish opposition is not overtly anti-Russian, but some of its leaders, including Kılıçdaroğlu, have made vocal statements against the Kremlin. The AKP is critical of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project, which is being implemented by Rosatom. If this party's representative wins, Turkey will move closer to the EU and pursue a more pro-Atlantic course.

Under Erdoğan, relations between Russia and Turkey will remain more predictable. One way or another, any Turkish government will act in its own interests. And no one will sever ties with the main importer of oil and gas.

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