An interesting perspective.
[PJMedia] Who wins, and who loses, if the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) and the BEM (Bab el-Mandeb) become free(er) to transit? What if they can't be reopened? Can any deal to restore free passage succeed?A successful deal means the Europeans are reprieved from the economic effects of oil scarcity arising from the immobilization of tankers. G7 leaders (notably at the recent summit in La Belle France) have welcomed the preliminary U.S.-Iran
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for
spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet
militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word
Iranis a cognate form of
Aryan.The abbreviation
IRGCis the same idea as
Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term
Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either
Duceor
Führeror maybe both. They hate
deal. G7 economies are major importers of Gulf energy (especially Europa
...the land mass occupying the space between the English Channel and the Urals, also known as Moslem Lebensraum...
and Japan). Disruptions raised inflation, slowed growth, and strained supply chains with dire political effects. Reopening restores normal flows, reduces rerouting costs (transits round Africa’s Cape of Good Hope add time/fuel), and supports industries. The U.S. was probably under immense diplomatic pressure from Europe to do a deal — for the sake of money.
Russia loses money if supplies are freed up. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (and stabilization of Bab el-Mandeb) will exert downward pressure on Russian oil export earnings, primarily through lower global oil prices. Markets are already pricing in restored flows. Brent has fallen toward $75—$80/barrel (or lower in forecasts), with Urals dropping below $65 in some readings. This reverses the crisis premium Russia was formerly able to charge.
The proposed deal does not reverse the reported fuel shortages in Russia. Russia is experiencing fuel shortages (especially gasoline) in mid-2026 mainly due to sustained Ukrainian dronezaps on its oil refineries and related infrastructure, which have significantly reduced domestic refining capacity. Because the shortages are caused by damage to production, storage, and logistics, they are largely unrelated to a campaign in the Gulf.
But the G7 countries are only reprieved not pardoned. Russia's income will likely fall, but it may rise again. It is unlikely that the last act in the oil drama has been played. For one thing, otherwise unimportant economic actors have gotten a taste of navigational blackmail. Iran's desire to control SOH and BEM has already sparked discussions in Indonesia about charging fees for the Straits of Malacca.
Because the Strait conflict is a war-within-wars, any number of actors can sabotage the ceasefire if their demands are unmet. Thus, not only Iran but Israel can close the Strait. "Iran said Saturday that the Strait of Hormuz is closed, citing ceasefire violations after Israel continued deadly strikes in southern Leb
...home of the original Hezbollah, which periodically starts a war with the Zionist Entity, gets Beirut pounded to rubble, and then declares victory and has a parade....overnight." It turns out that the money spigot (counting the value of the ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz) can be turned off at many points. The narrows can be shut not only by Iran and not only by the USN, but also by Israel simply by retaliating against Iran's proxy attacks.
This lack of monopoly was the flaw in Tehran’s calculation. Iran saw the Strait as insurance against retaliation, but it did not stop Israel or the U.S. from bombing it. The geography of the Strait only guarantees Iran can hurt others, but it provides no protection from actors that don’t rely on Hormuz.
The situation means it takes three keys turned together to open the Strait and stop the war, but it only takes one key to close it when none of the interests of the keyholders are fully aligned. That is why it is meaningless at this point to say who ultimately "won" the Strait War. Too many people have the veto card over the truce for anyone to"'control" it. Not just state actors but even faction leaders and militia leaders inside Iran itself can jump in and spoil the broth. For any given deal, there is the likelihood that some bearded leader will object and say, "Hey I wasn't paid!" The situation will continue until the situation resolves on the ground. For now, nothing can be won or even surrendered on the basis of a sheet of paper.
Iran's whole business model was built around blackmail. What they didn't count on was others dealing themselves in. To answer the question of who started the game of navigational blackmail in the first place, we must go back to Khomeini and Jimmy
MalaiseCarter
...only the second worst president ever. Now the third worst, after Obama and Biden...
, or perhaps (if you're bipartisan) the former Shah of Iran. Long did the blackmail card lie there like a snake, coiled but unused until the first tanker war during the Iran-Iraq conflict saw its open employment. It took on the money aspect during the B.O. regime when the Nobel Prize winner paid the ayatollahs pallets of cash to keep out of mischief. But the Islamic Theocratic
Republicused the funds instead to blow up coalition soldiers in Iraq and store up munitions against what would later become Oct. 7, the consequences of which they assumed would be avoided by holding the Strait hostage.
But their ace betrayed them because the very existence of a chokepoint is impossible for the world economy to endure. Hormuz turned out to be a ticking time bomb they can’t get rid of. Iran no longer "controls" Hormuz; rather, it controls them. The Persian Gulf is a classic case of broken symmetry. Hormuz seemed to be in equilibrium as an international waterway, but it was unstable, like a pencil balanced on a desk. As the first tanker war in the 1980s showed, it had a lower, "natural" ground state (also visible in the Bab el-Mandeb and Somali coast) of Moslems exacting tribute from the world. Once Western power had fallen below a certain point, the symmetry broke; the pencil fell over and what we observe in the Gulf and the Red Sea is a lower state of order where it must lie flat until another arrangement. There’s probably no going back to the past, but there is a possible future. With pipelines, nuclear energy, and adaptation, the irreplaceable waterway can someday be replaced. History goes on. It never goes back.