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| Train to Lie: Small-Unit Deception on a Transparent Battlefield |
| 2026-06-23 |
| by Turner Shaw [SmallWarsJournal] Abstract: Drones and multi-domain sensors make the modern battlefield transparent, rendering traditional efforts to hide from enemy detection insufficient. To increase survivability and regain the tactical initiative, the United States Army must institutionalize and train small-unit deception tactics. By adopting a formal framework and empowering young leaders to innovate, the Army can mitigate critical vulnerabilities associated with persistent enemy observation. INTRODUCTION: A WARNING FROM THE NEAR PAST Between 2014 and 2022, a collection of articles from defense thinkers offered urgent warnings: the proliferation of cheap, commercially available drones would fundamentally change warfare. However, these arguments were often confined to professional forums and did not translate into widespread institutional change; the broader U.S. Army certainly did not fully internalize this message. As a result, the Army found itself scrambling to adapt when the drone-saturated reality of the Ukraine war arrived. The Army is now paying the price for failing to act on these early warnings. The Army is at a similar inflection point today with tactical deception. If the Army ignores its rising importance, it risks playing catch up in a decade when it is forced to learn these lessons in blood. While the Army has long recognized the value of deception at operational and strategic levels, it remains an ad-hoc skill at the small unit level, largely untaught in our schools and unrecorded in our doctrine. The proliferation of multi-domain sensors has made the battlefield transparent. In this new reality, simply trying to hide better isn’t enough. Instead, we must proactively manage what the enemy sees and turn their tools to identify us into a critical vulnerability through disciplined and institutionalized small-unit deception. CHALLENGES OF A TRANSPARENT BATTLEFIELD The Army must now operate under the assumption that its ground units are always under observation. The modern battlespace is a web of layered sensors; our near-peer competitors have demonstrated a sophisticated capability to detect any electronic emission, triangulate its position, and immediately cue indirect fires. This electronic warfare (EW) threat is overlaid with widely available satellite images and mass-produced aerial drones that can loiter for hours and unmask any movement with powerful thermal and night-vision cameras. While these foundational tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) remain essential, they are fundamentally reactive and highly fallible – camouflage nets tear, perfect discipline is difficult to maintain through the stressors of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), and dispersion demands increased electromagnetic signatures to maintain cohesion. Current conflicts provide undeniable proof of this new reality. In Ukraine, the sheer density of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and electronic warfare sensors means that virtually no part of the front line remains unobserved. This threat consists of two powerful elements: a mix of cheap, one-way attack drones capable of destroying main battle tanks and sophisticated electronic warfare systems that can intercept encrypted tactical communications in nearly real time. Outside of the Ukraine War, the use of Iranian-made Shahed UAVs by both state and non-state actors in the Middle East further demonstrates the lethality and reach of such systems against conventional forces. More at the link |
| Posted by:badanov |
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| Posted by: Abu Uluque 2026-06-23 13:42 |
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| Posted by: Besoeker 2026-06-23 13:29 |
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| Posted by: badanov 2026-06-23 10:01 |
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| Posted by: Chantry 2026-06-23 09:17 |