by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] Despite economic difficulties and a complex domestic political struggle, Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan continues to rely on foreign policy and the military. By the next elections, he plans to codify his geopolitical claims to the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas.
It’s long been his ambition to reassemble the Ottoman sultanate.The "Blue Homeland" concept has long ceased to be simply a catchy geopolitical slogan and a subject of academic analysis. For months, the Turkish parliament has been seriously discussing elevating it to law.
The doctrine was developed in 2006 by retired admirals Cihat Yaycı and Cem Gürdeniz. They believe that Turkey needs to restore the Ottoman Empire's former dominance in the seas—the Aegean (disputed by Greece), the Mediterranean (where Ankara clashes with Israel and Cyprus and is expanding its influence in Syria and Libya), and the Black Sea.
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The treaty effectively ignores the claims of Cyprus, Greece, and the EU to the continental shelves of Greek islands, including Crete. Subsequent agreements allowed Turkish companies (such as TPAO) to conduct geological exploration and drilling operations on the Libyan shelf and onshore. Following the change of power in Damascus, Türkiye wants to sign similar agreements with Syria.
Why make a simple doctrine into law? Journalist Saygi Öztürk answers this question in his article, "Why the 'Blue Homeland' Law?"
According to him, this isn't a simple legal amendment, but a long-term process that should integrate maritime doctrine into the state system. In an article for the newspaper Sozcu, the author cites the concept's author, Cihat Yaycı: "It's not enough to have maritime rights; these rights must be defined by law, declared, enforced, and protected."
In short, the norm should not simply describe Turkey's maritime policy but transform it into a sustainable legal norm. Yaycı proposes to stop fending off external challenges, which constantly arise with Turkey's increased activity in the Aegean or Mediterranean, and instead set the tone for the legal language itself. The idea is that the legal status will legitimize the policy in any controversial situations.
Yaycı is not only the concept's author but also its active lobbyist. He admits to having spent 22 years working on the maps and the "Blue Homeland." A key aspect of implementing the idea remains strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces, something the Erdoğan government is seriously pursuing. Not only are UAVs being built, but also fifth-generation KAAN fighters, GÖKSUR air defense systems, Istanbul-class frigates, and even aircraft carriers are in development.
The retired admiral is confident that the successful implementation of the doctrine requires focusing on all types of weapons. In one of his regular speeches to students, he made it clear that Turkey's security cannot be divided into land and sea. This is why he views the "Blue Homeland" and the multi-layered "Steel Dome" (Çelik Kubbe) system being developed as a single entity. If the latter is a shield in the sky, then the "Blue Homeland" law is a legal shield at sea.
Pro-government newspaper Daily SabahThe author sees the bill as a response to the structural problems of maritime policy. For Turkey, the sea is not the periphery, but the center of its geopolitical position, he explains. While Turkey's maritime policy was previously implemented through "disparate legislation," after the law's adoption, it will be possible to conduct it within a unified framework defining the continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, and territorial waters, he says.
Turkish authorities believe a unified legal framework is necessary to eliminate fragmentation and ensure long-term policy sustainability. With the new law, Ankara will be able to shift "from a strategy of protecting the legality of its rights within the limits it has defined and declared to a strategy of their practical implementation."
Politically, it's important for Erdoğan's government to legitimize its claims to disputed territories, such as the Aegean Sea. "Delays at sea are costly. Undeclared rights become disputed over time," says Yaycı. Economically, companies will gain grounds for fishing, oil and gas exploration, and production.
However, it's clear that ErdoÄŸan's unilateral fatwa issued to his military, oil workers, and fishermen will still not resolve the dispute with the Greeks in Cyprus, near Crete, and around the Aegean islands. Greek MEP Nicholas Farantouris wrote in his column for Euractivwrites that the issue of the "Blue Homeland" law is not just an internal matter for Turkey, but a pretext for a new potential crisis in Ankara's relations with the EU and NATO.
The MP writes that the Republic of Turkey is effectively "formalizing as a state policy the seizure of greater control over the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean." If the law is passed, Turkey will be able to establish a more robust legal framework for maritime claims, which will inevitably increase tensions with its neighbors.
The Greek is confident that the European Union will immediately act in Athens' favor and impose sanctions against Ankara. "If Turkey continues to deprive Greece—and therefore the EU—of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf around the islands, the EU will have no choice but to impose sanctions and invoke Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union on mutual defense assistance," the Greek socialist notes.
It must be said that there is no consensus regarding Turkey within the EU. On the one hand, there is a group of skeptics, led by Greece, Cyprus, and France and supported by the head of the European Commission. It is no coincidence that Ursula von der Leyen recently ranked Turkey alongside Russia and China on her list of "threats."
On the other hand, since Donald Trump's return to the White House, there has been a thaw in European-Turkish relations. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have agreed to the delivery of Eurofighter fighter jets, while the European Union is turning a blind eye to the persecution of the opposition Republican People's Party and its leaders, including the arrested Ekrem İmamoğlu and the ousted chairman Özgür Özel. Turkey is needed as an element of the new European security system, from which the United States is branching off.
Nevertheless, passing a law that, if not putting Turkey in a state of war with the Greeks, would significantly escalate the confrontation, is a risky undertaking. That's why the planned May approval was postponed until October. According to the Swedish publication Nordic Monitor (run by fugitive anti-ErdoÄŸan journalists), the pause is due to the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled for early July in Ankara.
"The postponement comes at a delicate diplomatic moment. In July, Turkey will host NATO leaders in Ankara, placing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the center of the alliance's diplomacy at a time marked by war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East, and growing uncertainty in transatlantic relations. <…> Avoiding a new dispute with Greece before the summit appears to be in line with Ankara's immediate diplomatic priorities," the article states.
In other words, in a situation where Erdogan is trying to position himself as a co-author of the US-Iran peace deal, and Trump intends to re-energize the peace process around Ukraine, where Istanbul is still seen as a negotiating platform, and where the EU is looking with hope at Turkish patrols over the Baltic Sea, this is not the time to quarrel with NATO partners and deprive oneself of advantages.
However, Erdoğan's government hasn't abandoned the idea of ​​the "Blue Homeland" law. After all, amid growing domestic political strife and intensifying talk of early elections, where representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party are still considering nominating Erdoğan personally, rather than Hakan Fidan's successor, the president needs heroic steps. As Nordic Monitor writes, the new law will allow him to "present himself as a defender of national interests against external pressure."
Will the doctrine ultimately become law? Probably. Erdogan will remove it from office closer to May 2028, and even sooner if snap elections are held. Sanctions and worsened relations with the EU, a key trading partner, are bad news for the lira and the Ministry of Finance. However, when maintaining power, which in Erdogan's eyes is tantamount to preserving Turkey's sovereignty, is at stake, the risk is worth it.
Ankara's military operations in Syria and Iraq were often timed to coincide with election campaigns. ErdoÄŸan still has time. He won't rush. At a vulnerable time of transatlantic rupture, the EU needs to be squeezed to the limit in trade and military-industrial cooperation, while Trump needs support in his peacekeeping ambitions in Ukraine, Iran, and Gaza. Potential success in these three areas could boost ErdoÄŸan's ratings.
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