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| Africa Horn |
| Why the RSF’s rapid takeover strategy in Sudan failed |
| 2026-06-17 |
| By Husam Eldin Suliman [AfricanArguments] From the beginning of Sudan’s war, the strategy pursued by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its supporting network relied on one central assumption: that the Sudanese military leadership could be rapidly neutralized, forcing the collapse of the military institution and allowing for a swift takeover of the state. Public statements made during the opening days of the conflict reinforced this impression. The expectation seemed to be that senior military commanders would either surrender quickly or be eliminated altogether, creating political paralysis and institutional breakdown within days. At the time, such calculations may have appeared reasonable to some observers. Sudan was already facing severe political instability, economic decline, post-revolution fragmentation, and tensions inside the military establishment following the collapse of the former regime. In fact, the strategy may have had a realistic chance of success during the first days of the conflict. Had senior military leaders been captured or killed, the political and institutional consequences could have been completely different. The problem was not necessarily the initial assumption itself, but the absence of a credible alternative once that assumption failed to materialize. But political instability is not the same as institutional collapse. The two are often confused, particularly during moments of revolutionary upheaval. More at the link |
| Posted by:badanov |