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| Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
| Undisclosed Small Centrifuge Facility at Fordow Support Site? |
| 2026-06-11 |
Text: Undisclosed Small Centrifuge Facility at Fordow Support Site? We recently learned from a trusted colleague about reporting about enrichment related reconstruction activities at the Fordow enrichment site, information we were unable to confirm. This led us to look more broadly at the site, which includes the well-known underground enrichment plant (bombed by the United States in June 2025) and the less-known above-ground support area north of the underground site (see first image below). As of mid-May 2026, available satellite imagery does not provide evidence of renewed access to, or reconstruction activity at, the underground Fordow enrichment plant itself. However, Iran appears to have recently increased passive defense measures at the site (see second image below). Perhaps, there is some secret human intelligence-based information showing secret activity immune from satellite surveillance, but if it is occurring, it may be small-scale activity, perhaps tied to recovering HEU still inside the plant, which is reported to be about 80 kgs, or two significant quantities. While we did not find any concerning activity at the main site, we did identify something worrisome at the support site. This site was barely damaged in attacks during either 2025 or 2026 attacks. Our results are described in a report we published on Monday on our website, titled "Recent Activity at the Fordow Enrichment Plant and its Associated Support Site." We were drawn to a lightly damaged building next to and connected to the Vacuum Technology Center, which several years ago we could determine was involved in manufacturing difficult-to-make equipment needed to operate centrifuge cascades. (See images below of the attacked but lightly damaged building) The activities at this building were not secret. Open-source information suggests that it may house a relatively small hall containing up to two-cascades of gas centrifuges, installed for stable isotope enrichment, which Iran was pursuing under the JCPOA in cooperation with Russia. However, if Iran installed the centrifuges, as planned, and did not use them for stable isotope separation, they would be usable for uranium enrichment. More at the link Related: Fordow: 2026-06-06 Reports: U.N. Nuclear Body Has No Idea Where Iran's Enriched Uranium Is, Demands Access Fordow: 2026-05-05 Iran no further from nuclear weapon than before war, US intel agencies assess Fordow: 2026-04-27 Chekhov’s Lesson for Tehran: Trump isn’t negotiating with Iran—he’s dismantling its regime |
| Posted by:badanov |