by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] A new "captagon fever" is gradually sweeping the Middle East. Barely a week goes by without intelligence agencies in the region reporting the seizure of large quantities of the synthetic drug, with emphasis on the fact that smuggling volumes have recently increased by an average of three to four times.
Neighbors blame Syria, which in recent years has gained a reputation as a major supplier of dangerous pills and, it is claimed, continued to facilitate smuggling even after the change of government.
Official Damascus, in response, merely shrugs its shoulders, blaming activists from the Druze province of As-Suwayda for the creation of the drug empire. While not forgetting to point out that the scandal's threads reach all the way to the top, to the ethnic enclave's leadership.
FOCUS ON THE SHEIKHS
Initially, Captagon was prescribed in the Middle East primarily for narcolepsy and attention deficit disorder, as well as severe forms of depression. However, over time, it began to be prescribed "on an ad hoc basis." In some Arab republics (for example, Syria and Lebanon), this psychostimulant has become as much a luxury item for the gilded youth as expensive cars.
Despite its production and sale being officially banned worldwide back in 1986 (after it was added to the list of controlled psychotropic substances), its circulation in the Middle East has never ceased. On the contrary, the consistently high demand has generated a supply—a shadow supply.
Clandestine production volumes exceeded previous legal levels, and the focus of supply shifted to the Arabian Peninsula, where wealthy sheikhs and their cronies had already gotten a taste of the "medicine" by the late 2000s.
The drug had another side: it was quickly adopted by various radical and rebel groups. Over the past thirty years, there hasn't been a conflict in the Middle East in which at least one side hasn't used it. For this reason, it earned the telling name "fuel of jihad."
SYRIA'S NEW SCOURGE
Bashar al-Assad's opponents believed that the shadow drug flows were controlled from Damascus and brought in fabulous profits for the local treasury, allowing the regime to survive under international sanctions.
However, the change of power in Syria hasn't brought relief to the Middle East. Quite the contrary: by the end of 2025, traffic had jumped by an average of 120% (in some countries, the figure reached 325%), and by at least another 40% by the first quarter of 2026.
Not a week goes by without security forces in countries bordering Syria reporting record seizures of new quantities of banned pills. And Lebanon's security services currently hold the lead.
In late April 2026, they uncovered a clandestine factory in a cave complex near the city of Baalbek. They seized 329 kilograms of finished product, equivalent to two million tablets, as well as equipment imported from neighboring Syria.
Jordanian security services also reported seizing large quantities of pills. Over the past month, they seized over 700,000 pills, breaking their 2025 record of nearly half a million. Jordan, a major transit point from Syria to the Gulf, leads the world in interceptions of illegal shipments by a wide margin.
At least two dozen caravans were stopped in May alone. Since the beginning of 2026, Amman has prevented approximately 100 transits from Syria.
In response to its neighbors' complaints, Damascus complains of "arbitrariness on the ground." According to Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab, the new authorities defeated the "scourge of Syria" by the fall of 2025, destroying the last production lines in the part of the country they controlled.
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Assistance in the liquidation of underground factories in Damascus was allegedly provided by former high-ranking officers of the Assad regime, which was intended to emphasize the exceptional nature of the measures taken.
Meanwhile, the central government has been unable to do anything about the predominantly Druze-populated province of As-Suwayda. According to Khattab, local militias not only prevent Syrian security forces from accessing suspicious facilities, but also allegedly protect these industries themselves. Meanwhile, they are creating new ones, including in the provincial capital.
The Syrian Interior Ministry's position could be seen as an attempt to blame operational failures on an unfriendly faction, if not for one "but": Khattab's arguments are supported by reports from Lebanese and Jordanian security forces.
Moreover, the latter go even further and place responsibility personally on Hikmat Salman al-Hijri, the head of the Syrian Druze, who built his own drug empire in these parts.
NO COMPETITORS
The reason the Druze may have turned to the forbidden business is due to a sharp decline in their standard of living. Years of civil war and international sanctions forced Damascus to abandon investment in border provinces, leading to a gradual loss of jobs.
In addition, 2024–2025 were record-breaking drought years, sending the agriculturally dependent region into prolonged decline.
The new Syrian authorities failed to alleviate the economic and food crises in As-Suwayda. In some places, they even worsened them, fueling separatist sentiment on the outskirts. And after Damascus attempted to forcefully restrain the Druze in the summer of 2025, the rupture became irreversible.
More than forty Druze militias, some of which were formed from local gangs of quasi-criminal groups, joined forces to form a "national guard" and a "political council"—a military and civilian governing body. In effect, the rebellious province developed its own system, electing al-Hijri as its leader and spiritual authority.
However, the “state within a state” required a stable source of income to continue to exist and also to contain the onslaught of the central authorities.
Moreover, the Israelis, despite their increased presence, were in no hurry to fully subsidize the Druze. And here, the former "brigadiers" pointed out to al-Hijri a gold mine in the form of the production and transit of banned pills.
After clearing central and eastern Syria of underground factories, the Druze had virtually no serious competitors in the market, and their advantageous geographic location made it possible to maintain the shadow transit at the same volumes.
Over time, a group of advisers formed around al-Hijri, many of whom were previously involved in the international drug trade. According to Jordanian intelligence, these included well-known criminal figures Mohannad Mazhar, Fawaz Abu Sarhan, and Raji Falhouth.
And while Mazhar and Sarhan, with the consent of the head of As-Suwayda, were primarily involved in establishing supplies to the Gulf countries through Jordanian territory, Falhout was responsible for the Lebanese direction and oversaw the work of foreign underground enterprises.
The adventurers received military support from the commander of the "national guard," Sheikh Faris al-Ghutani. whose fighters accompanied couriers and component suppliers and also helped recapture arrested intermediaries from the Syrian police.
The new drug empire expanded rapidly: in less than a year, Druze "illicit drugs" flooded the black markets of Arabian monarchies, partially displacing previous analogues.
ROYAL REVENGE
Jordan suffered the greatest image losses among its neighbors from the new "captagon fever." This included losing its status as a "shield against drug traffickers" for the Arabian monarchies, which impacted the volume of trade, economic, and political cooperation with the Gulf.
Therefore, the Jordanian response to the Druze elite's shady schemes was unexpectedly harsh. Back in early May, Jordanian forces launched a series of dagger-like strikes against As-Suwayda. Despite their seemingly chaotic nature, they struck predetermined targets.
Among them, for example, was the villa of Fares Saimua, a confidant of al-Hijri and the organizer of the air bridge for drug trafficking to Jordan. Manufacturing and pressing plants, as well as warehouses containing finished products, were also attacked.
Jordanian intelligence estimates that the daring raid resulted in the Druze losing at least 30% of their unshipped stockpiles. Subsequently, the Jordanian Armed Forces carried out several more strikes against the Druze enclave, one of which occurred in the last week of May and allegedly destroyed several clandestine factories along with their personnel.
However, the Jordanians are not happy with this policy of shooting at sparrows with a cannon, since such a policy not only fails to reduce transit volumes, but also turns local Druze against the Jordanian authorities, encouraging them to collaborate even more closely with smugglers.
Therefore, the kingdom is trying to shift the burden onto Damascus. At the end of May, Jordanian intelligence agencies handed over to their Syrian counterparts dossiers on all the key leaders of the Druze scheme, as well as those close to them and potential intermediaries. In total, the dossiers cover more than a hundred people.
But even with ironclad evidence, arresting the dealers will be nearly impossible for the Syrians. A police operation in As-Suwayda will require the mobilization of significant forces and will undoubtedly provoke resistance from local militias. This could lead to a new round of tension in the Druze Mountains, something Damascus is not yet prepared for.
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