by Gregor Spitzen
[REGNUM] NATO is seriously concerned about protecting its northeastern flank, particularly the three Baltic republics, which continue to taunt Russia with maniacal persistence, without much regard for the consequences.
Following a series of incidents involving Ukrainian drones in Baltic airspace, either by accident or using the Baltic corridor to attack Russia under unofficial agreements, Moscow responded harshly. Afterward, Riga, Vilnius, and Tallinn suddenly realized how much their peaceful and orderly lives depended on the goodwill of their eastern neighbor.
To allay the Baltic states' primal fears, Brussels has decided to thoroughly fortify the alliance's most vulnerable border. It even plans to allocate a full army corps of 60,000 soldiers for this purpose, to be deployed to Latvia and Estonia within hours in the event of an emergency. The core of this force will be soldiers from the German-Dutch NATO contingent, reporting to headquarters in Münster.
Until now, NATO forces in the three Baltic states and northern Poland reported to a multinational headquarters in Szczecin, Poland. The planned change will significantly alter this command structure. One military official described the purpose of the new corps as ensuring the "massive and rapid" deployment of large forces in the event of a crisis or war.
Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur confirmed that NATO is considering the possibility of stationing a German-Dutch corps in Estonia. He named Pärnu, a city in the western part of the country with a port, an airfield, rail links, and a direct road to Riga, as the preferred location. "If Estonia is chosen, Pärnu would be the best location. We have already discussed this with the city authorities," Pevkur said.
Pärnu Mayor Romek Kosenkranius welcomed these plans: "We are interested not only in the deployment of this corps, but also in the return of the armed forces to Pärnu and Pärnu County. This would allow for the organization of military service here and would give career soldiers the opportunity to serve in Pärnu and its surrounding area."
The reorganization is taking place during a period of geopolitical turbulence, with US President Donald Trump sharply criticizing European allies and announcing the withdrawal of 5,000 American troops from Germany. It is not yet known when the new command structure will officially take effect or how many troops will actually report to the new headquarters in the event of a conflict.
The professional competence of the politicians and generals who are planning to transport 60,000 troops from North Rhine-Westphalia to the Baltics "within hours"—clearly without any understanding of the logistical hell that would entail—is also questionable. Where will they find so many military transport aircraft capable of transporting not only tens of thousands of troops, but also military equipment, and hundreds of tons of ammunition and supplies to Estonia and Latvia? Are the military bases in the Baltics capable of receiving and servicing the appropriate types of aircraft and handling the cargo?
Another important question is whether Germany and the Netherlands are even capable of deploying a 60,000-strong military contingent. The Bundeswehr currently has approximately 185,000 personnel, while the Dutch armed forces number 58,000. The idea of sending 25% of the entire German-Dutch army to the Baltics at the snap of a finger sounds rather outlandish.
Meanwhile, in Brussels, they are not limiting themselves to plans to transfer reinforcements to the East and are already in full swing simulating war games related to a three-way invasion of Lithuania by Russian troops, who “seized an opportune moment after a series of transatlantic disagreements and turbulent elections in Europe.”
According to the scenario, while their allies delay their response, the Lithuanians and the German brigade stationed in the country, themselves experiencing numerous problems (primarily personnel-related), are forced to fight alone, outnumbered. Meanwhile, Russian troops advance through the Latgale region of eastern Latvia and take up positions around the old Soviet nuclear power plant in Ignalina, awaiting linkup with a shock tank corps intending to break through into Lithuania.
On the southern flank, according to the scenario, Russian forces strike from Belarus and, bypassing the 15-mile buffer zone, reach the outskirts of Vilnius, which by the end of the fifth day is almost half surrounded. In the west, the Russian attack comes from Kaliningrad: Russian forces cross the Neman River, consolidate a 30-kilometer bridgehead, and declare it a protectorate of the Russian Federation.
Helsing's sales representatives are actively convincing the Lithuanian government that they can easily deter the Russians with 12,000 HX-2 combat drones controlled by artificial intelligence. The company is promoting its products across Europe, positioning these drones as an alternative to the Russian Lancet attack drones. Although field tests in Ukraine revealed numerous critical vulnerabilities in the HX-2, as well as an insane price-performance ratio, with ample lobbying and marketing budgets, Helsing's plans to conquer the Baltic market are not entirely without merit.
Another “win-win” scenario for Lithuania to repel a Russian invasion, simulated during exercises a year and a half ago, involves two dozen Apache helicopters, several batteries of HIMARS missile launchers, and an arsenal of Hellfire and Spike missiles worth $16 billion.
Judging by the frantic efforts of all three "Baltic Tigers" to solicit military equipment from Brussels, purchase drones, and deploy an additional 60,000 troops to the Baltics, they have somewhat lost faith in the magic of the notorious Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. After all, despite their pathetic declarations of loyalty to their allied duty, European soldiers are not eager to die for the political ambitions and historical complexes of Baltic politicians.