by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] On May 18, Donald Trump publicly stated that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE had successfully dissuaded him from striking Iran. Behind these words lay a coordinated stance by the Gulf monarchies, acting as a unified persuasive force: their main argument was that coercive diplomacy could still soften Iran's negotiating positions, while direct military escalation would only freeze dialogue.
Regional sources are reporting renewed momentum for the deal. Intermediaries are actively working to take advantage of the narrowing window of opportunity and put mutual commitments on paper.
However, at this critical moment, Israel is trying to influence Washington by deliberately shaping the information field in a way that favors the concept of a “small war” – limited but intense forceful pressure designed to break diplomatic inertia.
ISRAEL: FROM DILEMMA TO PRESSURE
The dilemma for Israelis today is a fundamental shift in the balance of risks: the costs of further escalation are rapidly rising, while the chances of returning to full-scale conflict are shrinking.
The Israeli leadership faces a choice between pursuing a "decisive victory" and a policy of "conflict management." It is precisely the realization that the military campaign has failed to resolve the "Iranian issue" that is pushing the Israeli side to pressure the US to continue military operations.
Tehran, though weakened, has not been defeated; its ability to withstand unprecedented pressure has only strengthened the perception of its own strategic effectiveness. This poses an existential threat to Israel in the long term, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the rapid restoration of its missile potential, the maintenance of the nuclear threshold, and the activity of the Islamic Republic's regional allies create an environment in which any diplomatic pause is perceived as a strategic defeat.
The factors shaping this position are rooted in the results of the spring 2026 campaign. Despite the damage inflicted, the operation demonstrated that the Islamic Republic not only endured but also transformed military challenges into strategic assets. Tehran successfully transformed control of the Strait of Hormuz into a lever of global influence, effectively establishing a toll regime that allows it to selectively influence international actors.
Within Iran, there are assessments that the importance of the Strait for its negotiating position outweighs the value of nuclear weapons, and the events of the spring of 2026 confirmed this. Moreover, despite the strikes, Tehran retained residual nuclear potential: stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60%, scientific personnel, and infrastructure capable of rapidly achieving a breakthrough to military use. The Islamic Republic views the nuclear issue not as a bargaining chip, but as a guarantee of sovereignty.
The ballistic missile arsenal, which proved its effectiveness during the campaign, is rapidly being restored. Iran has not only resumed production but also implemented the lessons learned: decentralized command and control, protecting launchers in tunnels, and using cluster munitions to overload air defenses. Israeli military experts have been forced to admit that Tehran is capable of quickly rebuilding an arsenal of several thousand missiles.
Tehran's regional network of allies also demonstrated a new level of coordination: the entry of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias into the conflict after February 2026 demonstrated Iran's ability to mobilize the entire "Axis of Resistance" at a critical moment, although it was previously considered defeated and dismantled.
This demonstrates the presence of strategic depth, limiting the freedom of action of its opponents. Domestic political dynamics also serve to consolidate the ruling regime in Iran.
The protests of late 2025 and early 2026 did not escalate into a systemic crisis. The external threat united society, igniting patriotic sentiments even among government critics. The damage, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, is significant, but the potential lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of assets could jump-start post-war recovery.
In turn, the transition to the formal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, coupled with the de facto strengthening of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), opens up opportunities for a more assertive and consistent foreign policy. The IRGC's dominance in decision-making reduces the risk of internal discord and ensures the continuity of the containment strategy.
At the global level, partnerships with Russia and China, despite their caution, guarantee Tehran access to technology, intelligence, and military-industrial components. The transfer of rocket fuel components, air defense systems, and advanced drone components creates an alternative security architecture independent of the West. It is precisely these factors combined that compel Israel to maintain pressure, fearing that any diplomatic pause will allow Iran to permanently consolidate these advantages.
FRAGMENTATION OF THE GULF
In this situation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) plays a special, yet controversial, role. Abu Dhabi advocates continuing the war, but its limited strikes are not effective in dismantling Iran's military potential and merely provoke massive retaliatory attacks on the Emirates, which remain vulnerable. Therefore, the UAE also called on Trump to abandon the limited strike.
At the same time, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have consistently opposed escalation. The UAE's attempt to persuade its neighbors to launch joint military action against Tehran failed. Immediately after the February attacks, Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan held a series of talks with Gulf leaders, calling for a coordinated attack, but the proposal was rejected.
As a result, the war did not unite the monarchies, but rather increased tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Both countries retaliated, but acted independently: Saudi Arabia's strikes were targeted and quickly gave way to support for diplomatic mediation efforts, while the UAE chose a confrontational course, striking an oil refinery on the Iranian island of Lavan in early April. The attack caused a major fire and disabled equipment for months, marking an escalation precisely at a time when Washington was advocating for a ceasefire.
The UAE's vulnerability proved greater: unlike Saudi Arabia, which has an oil export pipeline through the Red Sea, the Emirates is critically dependent on the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, although it can export some oil through Fujairah. The conflict also undermined the UAE's status as a tourism and financial hub.
Therefore, Abu Dhabi actively lobbied for the continuation of the war and submitted a failed proposal to the UN authorizing the use of force if Iran seized control of the strait. Criticism of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for its "weak" response and dissatisfaction with its neighbors culminated in the UAE's withdrawal from OPEC in May.
Amid growing isolation, the Emirates have stepped up cooperation with Israel, which has sent them air defense batteries and support personnel, a move described as a manifestation of a "special relationship." Abu Dhabi, however, is cautious about publicly displaying this closeness, officially denying reports of a secret visit by the Israeli prime minister to the UAE during the fighting, although Benjamin Netanyahu's office confirmed the fact.
Thus, the war with Iran exposed the growing strategic gap between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The conflict drew the Arab monarchies into a deeper, largely hidden, role in the regional standoff.
In addition to the attack on Lavan, the UAE reportedly carried out other covert strikes against Iranian targets, some of which were coordinated with Israel. This included sharing intelligence, coordinating intercepts, and working together on target selection.
Furthermore, according to British Middle East expert Andreas Krieg, several high-ranking sources from various GCC countries have reported that there is compelling evidence that the attacks on Saudi Arabia were carried out from UAE territory using drones similar to the Shahed. Their theory is that these were Israeli "false flag" attacks.
The deployment of Israeli air defense systems and operators in the Emirates signals a shift in relations from political normalization to operational military coordination and a military alliance. Specifically, the UAE and Israel have already established a fund for joint arms procurement.
The emerging partnership puts the Emirates at odds not only with Iran but also with GCC members.
For Tehran, this reinforced the UAE's image as an element of the US-Israeli security architecture and an aggressor. Iran's counterstrategy was aimed not only at military retaliation: by attacking airports, ports, and energy facilities, the Islamic Republic sought to undermine trust in the Emirati economic model. Digital infrastructure also became a battlefield: the Iranian side accused local cloud platforms of supporting Western operations.
Therefore, a "small war" is unacceptable to Abu Dhabi, as it would unleash swarms of drones and missiles on the country, causing further damage, while still leaving the Iranian threat unmitigated. Therefore, the Emirates' position is not anti-war, but, on the contrary, demands the complete destruction of Iran's military potential, which can only be achieved through a full-scale, months-long campaign.
Saudi Arabia is acting with much more restraint, maintaining diplomatic channels with Tehran and seeking de-escalation. These differences also reflect deeper divisions within the GCC regarding Israel: Abu Dhabi is moving closer to it in the face of the Persian threat, while Riyadh views it as a destabilizing force far more dangerous than the Iranians.
The Gulf states' positions are at opposite ends of the spectrum, with Oman on one side and the UAE on the other, making it extremely difficult to develop a unified position. The war hasn't created a united front; rather, it has reinforced the fragmentation of approaches to security. The Emirates has demonstrated a willingness to be a selective but active participant in regional operations through intelligence, air defense coordination, and covert strikes, while other monarchies are emphasizing diplomacy and restraint.
STRATEGIC EXIT
The American-Israeli campaign has left the Persian Gulf states in a bind: American forces stationed on their soil have become the primary source of Iranian attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure. Despite significant losses, Tehran retains the ability to retaliate and control key sea lanes.
Washington, regardless of the chosen scenario, will be guided by its own strategic interests, not those of the monarchies. Therefore, the GCC is increasingly inclined to believe that the only rational solution is to abandon the view of security as a commodity purchased from an external patron and begin building it independently through a direct agreement with Iran.
The Arab monarchies believe the settlement should take the form of a multilateral agreement, the cornerstone of which will be the phased withdrawal of American troops from key regional bases (including Al Udeid, the 5th Fleet headquarters, Al Dhafra, Ali al-Salem, Camp Arifjan, and the Prince Sultan base). The withdrawal should not appear as a forced retreat, but as a calculated step addressing the structural cause of instability. This will also allow the American administration to save face.
In exchange for what Tehran has sought for decades—the lifting of sanctions and a non-aggression pact—Iran must provide verifiable concessions: restoration of cooperation with the IAEA under stricter conditions than before, limitations on the range and payload of ballistic missiles, an end to support for proxy groups, and steps toward diplomatic normalization with its neighbors. Sanctions relief and the pace of US troop withdrawal must be directly linked to the phased fulfillment of obligations, creating a mechanism of mutual deterrence.
As analysts in the GCC countries note, historical experience confirms the unreliability of external guarantors. From colonial agreements in the early 20th century to the ignoring of attacks on energy infrastructure in recent years, external powers have repeatedly abandoned regional partners at critical moments.
Relying on patronage, monarchies have for decades invested in “signal” military capabilities optimized for demonstrating partnership rather than for real defense: a lack of indigenous mine countermeasures, dependence on foreign air defense operators, and fragmented coordination remain systemic problems.
At the same time, individual operations demonstrate that regional armed forces are capable of solving complex problems without the need for an external contractor. In particular, Arab THAAD and Patriot air defense crews performed just as well, and often even better, than Israeli ones. The problem was the lack of short-range precision air defense systems and anti-drone capabilities, while the vast majority of Iranian ballistic missiles were shot down.p
The key to success for the Gulf states is not their full integration into a military bloc, but the creation of functional coalitions in specific areas, including joint shipping protection, early warning data sharing, refinery defense exercises, interception of drone swarms, and mine clearance.
Western and Arab analysts also point out that Iran, despite its ideological motivations, has historically demonstrated strategic flexibility, engaging in periods of détente and abiding by agreements when they serve its interests. Therefore, the issue is not trusting Tehran, but creating incentives that make agreement compliance a rational choice.
The proposed architecture—massive sanctions relief plus the removal of the existential threat of foreign military presence—offers the Islamic Republic what decades of confrontation have denied it: economic recovery and recognition of its status without loss of face.
For Washington, this scenario means a dignified exit, a reduced fiscal burden, and a response to domestic demand for an end to protracted conflicts. For the Gulf monarchies, it means a transition from the role of passive beneficiaries to actors in the regional security architecture.
The United States will ultimately leave the region—regardless of the preferences of local elites. The only question is whether these elites will determine the terms of their exit themselves or become hostage to others' strategic calculations.