by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] With the military conflict in the Middle East blocking the planet's main oil artery, the world is once again waiting in anticipation of a price shock for gasoline and crude oil, which promises enormous windfall profits for some and multi-billion dollar losses for others.
However, behind this obvious plot, an even more complex drama unfolds, in which the fates of continental trade routes, air corridors, investment strategies, and real estate markets are intertwined.
The aggression against Iran and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz provoked tectonic shifts in the non-energy economy of the entire Greater Middle East, the aftershocks of which spread around the world like ripples in water, with losses and gains distributed extremely unevenly and sometimes even unclearly.
Before turning to specific sectors, it's important to acknowledge a key fact. The conflict is not so much maritime in nature, but primarily air and land-based, temporarily paralyzing several key land transport corridors that served not hydrocarbons but industrial goods, food, equipment, and consumer imports.
LAND CORRIDORS: CLOSURE, CONGESTION, AND A FRAGILE "POST-TRUCE"
The main land arteries that came under attack were the eastern and western branches of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), as well as links serving Central Asia and Afghanistan.
The eastern branch of the INSTC traditionally serves for the transshipment of goods from India to the Iranian port of Chabahar
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In parallel, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) operates, connecting China with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Georgia, and Turkey, essentially bypassing Iran. Finally, the Chabahar-Zaranj-Delaram corridor, as well as routes through Pakistan, are vital for Afghanistan.
During the acute phase of the conflict, the eastern branch of the INSTC was effectively severed. Maritime access to Chabahar became impossible due to mine threats, attacks by US and Israeli air forces, and the resulting revocation of insurance coverage. Meanwhile, Iranian rail and road routes leading to the Turkmen border were subject to missile strikes and suffered catastrophic disruptions.
The western branch also came to a standstill, as the Iranian section of the route was located in the zone of the most active combat operations of the Israeli Air Force over Western Iran.
Thus, cargo traffic that previously flowed through Iran to Indian Ocean ports flooded into the Middle Corridor, instantly overloading its infrastructure. Container freight rates on this route jumped to fifteen to sixteen thousand dollars, and delivery times increased by two to three weeks.
Moreover, the TRIPP project, which was supposed to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and then with Turkey, bypassing Iran, was frozen by investors for an indefinite period due to a general increase in country risks.
Following the ceasefire, the situation remained tense. Shipping companies are returning to the Gulf of Oman with extreme caution, as insurance companies are reluctant to reinstate coverage for voyages to Iranian ports amid the US blockade.
The INSTC's eastern branch is formally open, but cargo traffic is only a fraction of its pre-war level: damaged infrastructure requires restoration, and logistics operators fear a resumption of hostilities.
The western line through Azerbaijan is showing relative stability, but it also operates with limitations.
The Middle Corridor continues to experience increased traffic, leading to increased transit costs for all shippers from China and Central Asia.
Thus, the armistice did not restore the pre-war logistical picture; it merely consolidated its new, more expensive and less predictable configuration.
LANDLOCKED: THE AFGHAN DEADLOCK AND CENTRAL ASIAN TRANSIT
The countries most vulnerable to the blockade of Iranian ports are those without their own access to the open ocean. In the Middle East and its immediate vicinity, these states include Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan (although the latter has a Caspian coastline).
However, critical dependence on Iranian port infrastructure is characteristic primarily of Afghanistan and, to some extent, Uzbekistan.
For Afghanistan, the port of Chabahar has been the main sea gateway in recent years, especially after relations with Pakistan soured and transit through Karachi became politically unreliable. Grain, flour, sugar, medicine, and humanitarian aid entered Afghanistan through Chabahar.
At the time of the blockade, this channel was almost completely blocked, which led to a sharp rise in food prices in an already very needy country and threatened to disrupt the international food aid program.
The alternative route through Pakistan was blocked due to the conflict between Kabul and Islamabad. But even after the gradual reopening of Pakistani transit, the inability of Pakistani logistics to immediately replace the Iranian flow is evident.
Uzbekistan also has complex logistical links with Iran, despite not bordering it and not directly using its ports. However, in reality, Uzbekistan's foreign trade dependence on Iranian transit is colossal.
Uzbekistan actively used the eastern branch of the INSTC to export textiles, fruits and vegetables, and automobiles, and to import industrial equipment, components, and consumer goods.
The route was structured as follows: cargo from Uzbekistan traveled through Turkmenistan to Iran and then to the port of Bandar Abbas, from where it was shipped by sea to markets in South Asia and the Middle East. Containers carrying Indian and South Korean goods traveled in the opposite direction.
According to available estimates, Uzbekistan's share of the total volume of transit cargo passing through Iranian ports before the war reached approximately 19%, making the republic the largest non-Iranian beneficiary of this route after India.
This is why the blockade of Bandar Abbas and the damage to Iranian highways dealt a blow to Uzbek logistics comparable to the direct closure of its own borders.
Exporters were forced to seek alternative routes—through Kazakhstan and then along the Middle Corridor—which greatly increased transportation distances and production costs. Industrial imports became more expensive, and some contracts were suspended entirely.
Thus, Uzbekistan's economy found itself squeezed between the overloaded Middle Corridor and paralyzed Iranian transit, while its own remoteness from the open sea reduced its room for maneuver.
COLLAPSE OF AIR TRAVEL AND A PROTRACTED RECOVERY IN TOURISM
The disruption of land logistics was accompanied by an equally large-scale crisis in the air.
The closure of airspace over the conflict zone, which covers nearly three million square kilometers, forced air carriers to route through narrow bypass corridors, dramatically increasing flight times and fuel consumption.
At the same time, the main problem was the acute shortage of aviation kerosene. Up to a third of the finished jet fuel consumed in Europe was imported from Middle Eastern countries, whose refining capacity was cut off from the market.
In response, the world's largest airlines announced mass flight cancellations. Lufthansa canceled thousands of flights, Air France introduced a fifty-euro surcharge on each ticket, and the total number of canceled flights worldwide exceeded twelve thousand.
In addition, Dubai and Doha international airports, which served as global hubs, were forced to temporarily suspend operations.
The region's tourism sector also suffered colossal losses. Sharply rising airfares and the general instability led to a precipitous decline in tourist traffic not only to the Gulf countries but also to remote countries like Sri Lanka, which received a significant portion of its visitors via Middle Eastern hubs.
Tens of millions of people's holiday plans are at risk, with hotel businesses from Dubai to Male facing a wave of cancellations.
Following the ceasefire, the aviation industry began a slow and uneven recovery. The formal reopening of air corridors alone has not restored confidence: insurers maintain elevated premiums for flights over the region, and airlines, battered by losses, are resuming routes with extreme caution.
The jet fuel shortage is gradually fading as supplies are rerouted, but fuel prices remain significantly higher than pre-crisis levels.
Tourist flow to the Gulf countries, primarily Oman, and surrounding areas is recovering, but extremely slowly: travelers and tour operators remember the shock they experienced and are factoring additional risks into their plans.
Moreover, during the crisis, many air carriers reoriented their fleets to other destinations, and now a rapid restoration of the previous flight schedule to the region is limited by both logistical and financial considerations.
Airfare prices remain elevated, continuing to hinder the tourism revival in the Middle East and related regions.
INVESTOR EXODUS AND REAL ESTATE MARKET COLLAPSE
The war and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz instantly dashed the Gulf states' years-long efforts to create an image of a stable and safe investment haven.
Shipping companies faced a massive revocation of insurance coverage for voyages in the danger zone, making any maritime transport in the region economically unprofitable. Investors began urgently reviewing their portfolios.
The most visible and dramatic consequence was the collapse of the Dubai real estate market.
Beginning with a 30% drop in leading developers' shares, the crisis quickly spread to the real estate sector. If the conflict were to continue, experts predicted a 50-70% price decline by the summer of 2026.
Around a third of Russian investors, traditionally active in the Dubai market, have frozen planned deals in anticipation of significant discounts.
It could be said that capital, previously settling in Emirati mansions and commercial real estate, has begun to move towards more conservative jurisdictions geographically removed from the conflict.
In particular, some funds have already flowed to European markets, and some to countries in Southeast Asia, which has become an additional factor of pressure on the economy of the Middle East region.
HIDDEN BENEFICIARIES: PAKISTAN, OMAN, AND A CHANCE FOR SYRIA
While most countries in the region suffered colossal losses, some states managed to extract strategic and material benefits from the crisis.
Thus, Pakistan, acting as the main mediator between Iran and the United States, converted diplomatic efforts into economic dividends.
The acute energy shortage that Pakistani industry was facing due to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz was alleviated during the negotiation process: Islamabad secured guarantees from Tehran to resume tanker passage for the country's needs and to restore cross-border barter trade in rice, cement, and textiles in exchange for Iranian goods.
However, the role of Pakistani ports proved far more significant. Karachi and Gwadar, not directly affected by the blockade, became transit points for cargo bound for Iran and onward to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Transit fees and container handling contracts brought Pakistan's economy significant foreign exchange earnings during the height of the crisis, and Islamabad itself cemented its status as an indispensable logistical and political player at the crossroads of South and West Asia.
Oman, whose coastline lies outside the Strait of Hormuz, benefited most directly. The ports of Salalah and Duqm, capable of handling large-capacity vessels, became natural transhipment points for goods that previously traveled directly through the Persian Gulf.
Fearing the risks of transiting the strait, shipowners rerouted their cargo en masse to Omani hubs, from where it was transported by land to Gulf countries or transshipped in small batches onto smaller vessels for careful delivery to its destinations.
Omani ports' revenues have increased, and the sultanate itself, not being involved in the conflict on either side, has cemented its reputation as a reliable and predictable logistics hub for the entire Arabian Peninsula. This transit boom is likely to continue even after a full settlement, as businesses prefer stability.
Furthermore, Syria could potentially become another unobvious beneficiary. Relative stabilization in the country and the restoration of control over key transport routes open the possibility of creating a transit corridor linking Turkey and the Mediterranean with Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf countries, giving them access to Mediterranean ports.
Damascus and Ankara are already discussing plans to revive the Hejaz Railway, the legendary route that once connected Damascus with Medina. In the current context, restoring this line (primarily the Damascus-Amman-northern Saudi Arabia section) would create an additional land route bypassing the unstable straits and vulnerable maritime shipping routes.
Such a corridor would strengthen Syria's logistical role, giving a boost to its devastated economy, while offering Gulf countries an alternative route for the export and import of non-energy goods both to Mediterranean ports and directly to Europe via Turkey.
While these plans are still far from being realized, the very fact that they have been intensified during and after the crisis indicates a tectonic shift in perceptions of future trade routes in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Syria is already taking advantage of its position by increasing the transit of goods by road from the Persian Gulf countries through its territory.
CHINA: THE WORLD'S FACTORY IS VULNERABLE AND EXPORTS ARE HIT HARD.
While the war opened a window of opportunity for Pakistan and Oman, it became a major stress test for China, exposing the vulnerability of its export-led model.
The first blow was dealt to energy imports: in March 2026, China recorded a decline in crude oil imports of almost 3%, and natural gas imports of 11%.
While Beijing's strategic reserves could cushion the shortage for several months, the very fact of the outages has raised alarm bells.
The second, less noticeable but no less painful blow hit industrial exports. The Middle East was China's second-largest market for metal products, accounting for approximately 16% of all Chinese steel exports. The blockade and military action paralyzed supplies, leading to the accumulation of excess steel stocks in China and putting pressure on domestic prices.
Other low-margin goods, for which sea shipping via Hormuz was the only viable option, were also stuck in warehouses. This posed a threat to the entire industrial production chain, which relies on external demand.
RUSSIA: BENEFITS BEYOND THE OIL MARKET
Russia has emerged as one of the main beneficiaries of the conflict, but the nature of this benefit goes far beyond rising oil prices.
The disruption of supplies from the Persian Gulf affected not only hydrocarbons, but also significant volumes of aluminum from Qatar and Bahrain, as well as a wide range of chemical products.
Russia, one of the world's largest aluminum producers, immediately began replacing the lost Middle Eastern supply on global markets. A similar situation developed in the fertilizer and other chemicals market, where the global shortage drove up prices, allowing Russian exporters to increase revenue.
The helium market, a critical element in microchip production, deserves special mention. The Persian Gulf blockade disrupted its supply chains, and Russia, which had already imposed restrictions on helium exports outside the EAEU, gained additional leverage in high-tech sectors.
Moreover, the crisis has given a powerful impetus to the development of overland routes bypassing the unstable region. Some cargo flows that previously went through Iran have been redirected to Kazakhstan and Russia, while Iranian exports and imports themselves, amid the blockade, are increasingly relying on Russian routes, strengthening the transit potential of the Eurasian region.
Combined with the substitution effect of the dwindling Middle Eastern goods, this provided Russia not only with short-term profits, but also with long-term strengthening of its position in several strategic markets simultaneously.